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 INTRODUCTION
My criginal intention in initiating the work which
led to the production of the present Digest was to provide
an "annotated bibliography" which would identify and locate
all existing documentary material on the origins and develop—
ment of the IJC. As our investigations progressed, however,
it became increasingly evident that the end product could be
something more useful and of wider interest.
In the present volume Professor Jordan has provided a
reliable, unified source of information which will be valuable
to the Commissioners and to the two Governments. Not only
should it assist us to better understanding of the origins
of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 but, equally important,
it should enable us to appreciate better the subsequent
development in practice, of the principles upon which the
IJC was established.
I know that I speak for the whole Commission when I
express my warm appreciation of the lively industry and
solid scholarship which Professor Jordan has given to
this work.
A.D.P. Heeney, _
Chairman, Canadian Section,
International Joint Commission,
July 1, 1967.
 
    
 AN ANNOTATED DIGEST OF MATERIALS RELATING TO THE
ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
JOINT COMMISSION (CANADA-UNITED STATES)
 
AUTHOR'S PREFACE
The purpose of this digest is to provide a useful reference
volume of all available materials, published and unpublished, of
primary and secondary nature which relate to the Boundary Waters
Treaty, signed on January 11, 1909 by the United States and Great
Britain, and to the International Joint Commission, established
in 1912 by Canada and the United States under the terms of the
Boundary Waters Treaty.
While essentially a reference volume intended as a guide
for researchers wishing to locate specific documents or materials,
the work is designed in such a manner that it may be read with
interest and ease by the person who does not wish to pursue the
digested materials beyond the contents of this volume. With
this second purpose in mind, fairly extensive annotation of the
materials has been made and the arrangement of the materials is
basically chronological.
The volume contains all available Canadian-United States
and British materials for the period from 1894 to 1966 which have
relevance to the background to negotiation of the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909, to the complicated and protracted negotiations
between 1907 and 1912, to the establishment of the International
Joint Commission in 1912 and to the development of and changes
in the character, role and functions of the International Joint
Commission since that date. The sources include Canadian and
United States governmental records (papers of the Governors Seneral,
Department of External Affairs files, Department of State files,
and Parliamentary and Congressional papers and reports), Canadian
and United States public archive holdings of the papers and

 iii
correspondence of persons connected with the negotiations of
the Treaty and with the Commission, relevant records and files
of the Canadian and United States sections of the International
Joint Commission and the sizeable number of treatises, periodical
articles and theses which relate to the subject.
Because the work deals with the establishment and
development of the Commission and not with the substantive work
of this organization, reference is made to the cases which have
come before the Commission only insofar as these matters have a
direct bearing on the nature of the Commission. Likewise, the
legal issues which have arisen over the years in interpreting
the provisions of the Treaty are considered only to the extent
of their relevance. For a full treatment of these subjects
the reader is referred to Whiteman, M.M. Digest of International
gay Washington, U.S.G.P.O., 1964, vol. 3, pp. 752—871; 978—1002,
Vade—Mecum and Jordan, F.J.E. The Changing Role of the Inter-
national Joint Commission (Canada—United States) (unpublished
thesis) University of Michigan, 1964.
The preparation of this volume has been carried out
by the Canadian section of the International Joint Commission
with the cooperation of the United States section, the Department
of State and the Department of External Affairs. Certain of th:
materials contained in the digest are of a classified nature
and consequently are open only to authorized persons. This
restriction applies to all documentation of the Department of
State subsequent to 1933, that of the Department of External
Affairs from 1916, the Mackenzie King Papers subsequent to 1930
and to certain of the papers from the files of the Canadian
section.
F.J.E. Jordan,
Department of Public Law
Carleton University
Ottawa Canada
August 1966
  
 I BACKGROUND TO THE NEGOTIATION OF THE
BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY
 
A. Establishment of the International
Waterways Commission
The genesis of the Boundary Waters Treaty and the Inter-
national Joint Commission established thereunder is generally
attributed to resolutions introduced by the Canadian delegate
to the International Irrigation Congresses held at Denver,
Colorado and Albuquerque, New Mexico in 1894 and 1895. The
resolutions, adopted unanimously by the United States, Mexican
and Canadian delegations on both occasions, recommended to the
United States "the appointment of an international commission
to act in conjunction with the authorities of Mexico and Canada
in adjudicating the conflicting rights which have arisen, or
may hereafter arise, on streams of an international character."l
Formal response by Canada was prompt. The Cabinet in
1896 requested the British Ambassador in Washington to inform
the United States Government that it was prepared to cooperate
"by appointment of an international commission or otherwise"
in the regulation of international streams for irrigation
purposes.2 The United States did not respond until 1902 when
it advanced a proposal which went far beyond the cooperation
envisaged by the Canadian Government in 1896. By terms of the
River and Harbour Act of June 13, 1902
[€]he President of the United States is hereby
requested to invite the government of Great Britain
to join in the formation of an international commission
to be composed of three members from the United states
1. Chacko, C.J. The International Joint Commission Between tne
United States and the Dominion of Canada New York, Columbia
University Press, 1932, pp. 71—72; L.J. Burpee, "A Success-
ful Experiment in International Relations", Papers Relating
to the Work of the International Joint Commission OttawST—I
Graphic Printers, 1929, pp. 27-42.
2. Privy Council Order 3465, Jan. 8, 1896.
 and three who shall represent the interests of
the Dominion of Canada, whose duty it shall be
to investigate and report upon the conditions and
uses of the waters adjacent to the boundary lines
between the United States and Canada, including all
of the waters of the lakes and rivers whose natural
outlet is by the River Saint Lawrence to the Atlantic
Ocean, also upon the maintenance and regulation of
suitable levels, and also upon the effect upon the
shores of these waters and the structures thereon,
and upon the interests of navigation by reason of
the diversion of these waters from or change in
their natural flow; and, further, to report upon
the necessary measures to regulate such diversion,
and to make such recommendations for improvements
and regulations as shall best subserve the interests
of navigation in the said waters . . . The President,
in selecting the three members of said commission
who shall represent the United States, is authorized
to appoint one officer of the Corps of Engineers of
the United States Army, one civil engineer well versed
in the hydraulics of the Great Lakes, and one lawyer
of experience in questions of international and
riparian law, and said commission shall be authorized
to employ such persons as it may deem needful in the
performance of the duties hereby imposed; and for the
purpose of paying the expenses and salaries of said
commission, the Secretary of War is authorized to ex—
pend from the amounts heretofore appropriated for
the Saint Marys river at the falls the sum of twenty
thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be
necessary to pay that portion of the expenses of said
commission chargeable to the United States.
In July, the Presidential request was transmitted to London4
and in turn to the Canadian Prine Minister for his Views on the
proposal.5 Acceptance by the Canadian Government was prompt
 
3. 27 Stat. 826; 32 Stat. 372; Canada, Sessional Paper No. 19a,
Compiled Reports of the International Waterways Commission 1905
1913, pp. 3—4; Laurier Papers, 1902, vol. 242. no. 67661.
Laurier Papers, 1902-04, vcl. 753, no. 215545, Despatch from
United States Embassy, London to Marquess of Lansdowne,
July 15, 1902.
Laurier Papers, 1902-04, vol. 753, no. 215544, Despatch from
Downing Street to Laurier, July 30, 1902.
 and in the following terms:
That His Majesty's government accept the invitation
to cooperate in the formation of the commission;
and that, as the subjects to be dealt with pertain
to the regulations of waters adjacent to the inter-
national boundary, thereby affecting harbours and
navigation, all surveys and investigations necessary
to carry out the intent of the commission be made,
as far as Canada is concerned, under the Department
of the Interior and the Department of Public Works;
and also, that the appointment of the three members
of the commission representing the interests of
Canada be_made on the recommendation of the Minister
of the Interior and the Minister of Public Works.
Following approval of the Canadian proposal by the
British Foreign Office in June and subsequent communication
of the acceptance to the United States Government, the three
United States members of the International Waterways Commission
were appointed on October 2, 1903. They were Colonel O.H.
Ernst of the Army Corps of Engineers who became United States
chairman, George Clinton, a Buffalo lawyer and Professor
Gardner williams of Ithaca,7 In December the Canadian Cabinet
recommended the appointment of its first commissioner, Dr. W.F.
King, chief astronomer of the Department of the Interior.8
Only after numerous urgings by the Colonial Office during 19049
did the Government complete the Canadian section with the
6. Privy Council Minutes, Apr. 27, 1903; Canada, Sessional Paper
No. 19a, Compiled Reports of the International Waterways
Commission 1905-1913, p. 21.
7. Confidential Prints, St. John River and International Water-
ways Commission, vol. 1, p. 4, Note from the Acting Secretary
of State to the British Embassy, Washington, Oct. 2, 1903.
8. Privy Council Minute, Dec. 3, 1903.
9. Confidential Prints, St. John River and International Water-
ways Commission, vol. 1, pp. 8-10, Despatches from the Secretary
of State for the Colonies to the Governor General, July 27,
Sept. 15 and Oct. 2, 1904.
   
    
appointments of J.P. Mabee, a lawyer, and Louis A. Costé, an
 
engineer, in January, 1905. Mabee was named chairman of the
Canadian section.lo
Before the Commission met as a joint international
body, a disagreement arose between the Canadian and United
States Governments as to the investigative scope of the Com—
mission. The Canadian Government, wishing to have the St. John
River dealt with, argued that the Commission's jurisdiction ex—
tended to all boundary waters between the two countries.11 The
United States Secretary of State rejected this interpretation of the
Act of Congress, insisting that the investigative power of the
Commission was limited to waters of the Great Lakes system.12
Perceiving the deadlock which would occur, the Prime Minister
advised the Canadian section that in View of the United States'
objections, "it would be of no use to persist in our contention,
and the Government, therefore, are of the opinion that the
Commissioners had better proceed even in that limited way." He
urged the Canadian members, however, to continue to seek agree-
ment on a wider jurisdiction.l3
 
10. Confidential Prints, St. John River and International Water-
ways Commission, vol. 1, pp. 8—10, Telegram from the Governor
General to H.M. Ambassador, Washington, Jan. 9, 1905.
ll. Confidential Prints, St. John River and International Water-
ways Commission, vol. 1, 11—12, Despatch from the Governor
General to H.M. Ambassador, Washington, Apr. 4, 1905,
enclosing Privy Council Minute of Mar. 25, 1905.
12. Canada, Sessional Paper No. 19a, Compiled Reports of the
International Waterways Commission 1905-1913, p. 25, Letter
from the Acting Secretary of State to George P. Clinton,
Apr. 15, 1905.
13. Laurier Papers, 1905, vol. 368, No. 98211, Letter from
Laurier to Thomas Coté, Secretary, Canadian Section,
June 5, 1905.
 In November 1905, the chairman of the Canadian section
was elevated to the Ontario bench and to replace him, the
Cabinet recommended the appointment of George C. Gibbons, a
lawyer from London, Ontario.14
B. Studies and Recommendations of the
International Waterways Commission
 
The International Waterways Commission functioned
officially from 1905 to 1913, although some of its work con-
tinued until 1919. During this period it dealt with power
and navigation interests in the Sault Ste. Marie area, utili-
zation and preservation of Niagara Falls resources, adoption
of uniform shipping regulations on the Great Lakes, controlling
works on the Lake Erie outlet, diversion of boundary waters in
Minnesota, the prOposed Chicago Drainage Canal, delimitation
of the international boundary on the Great Lakes waterway,
suppression of illegal fishing on the Great Lakes, regulation
of canal shipping and transmission to the United States of
power generated in Canada. Although it gathered a great deal
of information on these matters, it did not have much success
in having its recommendations implemented.15
The major accomplishment of this Commission was its
early recognition.of the need for the adoption of principles
of law to govern the uses of all international waters between
Canada and the United States and for the need of an international
body endowed with the authority and jurisdiction necessary to
study and to regulate the uses of these waters. This conclusion
culminated in a series of recommendations to the Canadian and
l4. Confidential Prints, St. John River and International
Waterways Commission, vol. 1, p. 15, Privy Council Minute
Nov. 21, 1905.
15. Canada, Sessional Paper No. 19a, Compiled Reports of the
International Waterways Commission 1905-1913, see various
reports submitted to the governments.
 United States Governments by the two sections of
the Commission
during 1906 and 1907, that negotiations be underta
ken with a
view to accomplishing these objectives.
In its report to the governments on conditions exi
sting
at Niagara Falls, May 3, 1906, the Canadian se
ction agreed to
the proposed régime for preservation of the Falls
only on the
condition that any treaty must "establish the prin
ciples appli-
cable to all diversions or uses of waters adjacent
to the
international boundary, and of all streams which f
low across
the boundary." It recommended the following princ
iples:
1. In all navigable waters the use for navigation
purposes is of primary and paramount right. Th
e Great
Lakes system on the boundary between the United States
and Canada and finding its outlet by the St. Lawrence
to the sea should be maintained in its integrity.
2. Permanent or complete diversions of navigable wate
rs
or their tributary streams, should only be permitted
for
domestic purposes and for the use of locks in navigati
on
canals.
3. Diversions can be permitted of a temporary charact
er,
where the water is taken and returned back, w
hen such
diversions do not interfere in any way with the in
terests
of navigation. In such cases each country is to have
a
right to diversion in equal quantities.
4. No obstruction or diversion shall be permitted
in or
upon any navigable water crossing the boundary or
in or
from streams tributary thereto, which would injuri
ously
affect navigation in either counry.
5. Each country shall have the right of diversion
for
irrigation or extraordinary purposes in equal quan
tities
of the waters of non-navigable streams crossing the inter—
national boundary.
6. A permanent joint commission can deal much more
satisfactorily with the settlement of all disputes ari
sing
as to the application of these principles, and sho
uld be
appointed.
I
The United States Commissioners declined to join in these
proposals on the ground that the enunciation of principles
to govern the making of a general treaty was not within the
scope of their functions.16
In recommending the denial later that year of the
application of the Minnesota Canal and Power Company to
divert boundary waters from Rainy River, the United States
section joined with the Canadian section in the following
observations and recommendations:
2. As questions involving the same principles and
difficulties, liable to create friction, hostile feeling
and reprisals, are liable to arise between the two
countries, affecting waters on or crossing the boundary
line, the commission would recommend that a treaty be
entered into which shall settle the rules and principles
upon which all such questions may be peacefully and
satisfactorily determined as they arise.
3. The commission would recommend that any treaty which
may be entered into should define the uses to which
international waters may be put by either country with
the necessity of adjustment in each instance, and would
respectfully suggest that such uses should be declared to be:
(a) Use for necessary domestic and sanitary purposes.
(b) Service of locks used for navigation purposes.
(0) The right to navigate.
4. The Commission would also respectfully suggest that
the treaty should prohibit the permanent diversion of
navigable streams which cross the international boundary
or which form a part thereof, except upon adjustment of
the rights of all parties concerned by a permanent
commission, and with its consent.
In its third report of December 31, 1906, the Canadian
section reiterated its recommendations, and the United States
 
l6.
17.
Canada, Sessional Paper No. 19a, Compiled Reports of the
International Waterways Commission 1905—1913, p. 340.
Canada, Sessional Paper No. 19a, Compiled Reports of the
International Waterways Commission 1905—1913, p. 368.
 Commissioners urged their governme
nt to expand the juris—
diction of the United States sect
ion in compliance with the
wishes of the Canadian Govern
ment.18
In their 1907 reports, both sections
made their final
recommendations to the government
s on the subject of a general
treaty before the whole matter
was transferred to the realm
of diplomatic negotiations. The
United States section report
made a general recommendation for
a treaty which enunciated
principles. The report of the Ca
nadian section was specific
and detailed.
. . . Your commission thought it e
xpedient to first
establish principles governing the u
se and diversion
of boundary waters. Once proper pri
nciples have been
agreed upon, their application by
a permanent board
must necessarily lead to uniform c
ourse of action,
whereas if special matters are
dealt with by special
commission, all manner of inco
nsistent conclusions
might and likely would be arriv
ed at. Once principles
are agreed upon, and consistently
applied, neither
country will obtain any advantage
. The commission
by their various reports made s
uggestions and re-
commendations, from which the foll
owing conclusions
were drawn:-
1. The Great Lakes system, inclu
ding Lake Michigan
and Georgian Bay, should be made
a common highway for
the purposes of navigation to the
people of both
countries.
2. The right of either country w
ith respect to such
waters is the right of user only.
3. The primary right of user is
for domestic uses
(including necessary sanitary pur
poses) and the ser-
vice of locks and navigation c
anals.
4. Subject to these uses, the us
e for navigation shall
be paramount to all others.
5. No diversion of these waters
shall be permitted to
the injury of navigation interest
s, save such diversions
as are necessary for the pres
ervation of the public health
(sanitary purposes and domestic u
se) and service of locks
of navigation canals.
 
18. Canada, Sessional Paper, No.
19a, Compiled Reports of the
International Waterways Commissi
on 1905-1913, pp. 400-401;
429—430.
 6. Where temporary diversions of such waters without
injury to the interests of navigation are possible,
they would be permitted so that each country, so far
as is practicable, shall receive an equal benefit.
This principle is applicable to diversions for power
purposes in the St. Marys and St. Lawrence Rivers.
7. As to streams which cross the international boundary,
no diversion of such streams or their tributaries should
be permitted in either country so as to interfere with
the natural flow thereof to the injury of private or
public rights in the other country; nor should any
obstruction be permitted in such streams in one country
to the injury of public or private rights in the other.
8. In Niagara River, diversions would not interfere
with navigation, but there is a special consideration,
the preservation of the scenic beauty of the falls,
was brought to play. (sic) It was found, however,
possible to divert about double the quantity of water
on the Canadian side to that possible on the other
side, without material injury to the scenic effect.
9. The Commission have not, for lack of jurisdiction,
suggested any principle governing the use, for irri—
gation purposes, of waters which cross the international
boundary, but some principle should be adopted which
would have general application. We respectfully submit
that all the principles so far adopted by the commission
commend themselves as worthy of adoption.
The boundary line between these two countries
extends across the continent. For a great distance an
imaginary line is drawn through boundary waters; else-
where numerous streams cross and sometimes recross the
international boundary. The increased value of water
for power and irrigation purposes has given rise to
new questions which must be met and settled in some
way.
 
That can be done effectively by a treaty arrange-
ment between the two countries, as only in that way
can joint federal jurisdiction be with certainty
asserted. Special commissions, which are the outcome of
local disputes, are necessarily partial. The commissioners
are advocates. A permanent board removed from local pre-
judices would apply the principles impartially and should
be provided for in any treaty arrangement.
19. Canada, Sessional Paper No. 19a, Compiled Reports of the
International Waterways Commission 1905-1913, pp. 528-529;
628—629.
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II NEGOTIATION OF THE BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY
OF 1909
A. Canada-United States Relations
 
At the same time as the International Waterways
Commission was making its first recommendations to the gov-
ernments for adoption of general principles of water uses
and establishment of a permanent commission, a move was
underway in Washington to provide the basis for a compre-
hensive settlement of all outstanding differences between
Great Britain and the United States in relation to Canada.
Most of these problems had remained unresolved when the Joint
High Commission adjourned its deliberations in 1898 and,
following the Alaska Boundary award in 1903 the prospects for
any general negotiations involving Canadian interests seemed
dim.
In the spring of 1906, however, the British Ambassador
to Washington, Sir Mortimer Durand, and the United States Secretary
of State, Elihu Root, held private, exploratory talks on the
prospects for negotiations. In April, Lord Grey, the Governor
General, urged the Foreign Office to permit Prime Minister
Laurier to send to Washington in an official capacity, a
Canadian expert to help Durand in his negotiations with Root.
"The closer you bring Ottawa and Washington together, the
greater the chances of cleaning the slate."1
Following the talks between Root and Durand, to which
no Canadian official was sent, the Secretary of State submitted
to Durand a lengthy memorandum setting forth his views on
fifteen matters which he felt might well be negotiated. Many
of these were items left over from the Joint High Commission
1. Callahan, J.M. American Foreign Policy in Canadian Relation
s
New York, Macmillan & Co., 1937, p, 495, Letter from Lord
Grey to Lord Elgin (private), Apr. 3, 1906.
ll
talks of 1898, but added were several new ones including
one of particular note: "Use and disposition of inter—
national waters.” Pointing out that several water matters
were presently under study by the International Waterways
Commission, he felt that the two countries should con-
sider a treaty relating to the use and preservation of
Niagara Falls immediately.2
Laurier did not reply to Root's proposals until
the autumn of 1906, when he said with regard to the item 1
of "Use and Diversion of International Waters":
This subject is engaging the attention of the
International Commission appointed by the two
governments. I understand it has made sub-
stantial progress in many directions. Its work,
however, is not yet completed and it does not
seem to me there is anything to go at present
but to await their final report.
B. Boundary Waters: Preliminary Communications
 
Discussions narrowed very quickly to a consideration
of boundary waters problems when George Gibbons, chairman of
the Canadian section of the Commission, informed the Prime
Minister that the time was right for considering a treaty
 
embodying the principles enunciated by the Commission.
2. Governor General's Papers, No. 192A, vol 1, Memorandum
from Root to Durand (private), May 3, 1906; Confidential
Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp.l-2;
Anderson Papers, box 68, Letter from Roosevelt to Root,
May 1, 1906.
3. Governor General's Papers, No. 192A, vol. 1, Letter from
Laurier to Lord Grey, Sept. 25, 1906; Confidential Prints,
International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, p. 3-
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I think it is very desirable that the Treaty
should be entered into while President Roosev
elt
is in power, and while he has as his advi
sers
such men as Secretary Taft, Root, Bonapa
rte and
Chairman like Burton who is eminently fair
and
a man of very marked ability.
Laurier agreed to act at once.5
Gibbons suggested negotiations on Niagara
Falls and
in addition, "generally with the use and d
iversion of Inter-
"6
national or Boundary waters. Minist
er of Justice Aylesworth
was quickly in touch with Gibbons to p
ut the subject "in train
for practical action."7
Root sought the advice of his special
legal adviser,
Chandler P. Anderson, who agreed that nego
tiations should
take place with a view to enunciating cert
ain principles to
be applied by a commission but he felt that
some of the
principles recommended by the Waterways Co
mmission were
undesirable and he opposed any suggestion
that a commission
be given any power to enunciate principles
.8
C. Appointment of Gibbons and Clinton to Confe
r
 
Early in 1907, Gibbons was authorized by t
he Cabinet
to go to Washington to confer on the subje
ct of international
waters but the terms of his reference
were far more restrictive
than he would have wished.
4. Laurier Papers, 1906, vol. 435, No.
116139—116140, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier, Nov. 28, 1906.
5. Laurier Papers, 1906, vol. 435, No
. 116141 , Letter from
Laurier to Gibbons, Nov. 30, 1906.
6, Laurier Papers, 1906, vol. 435, No.
116212, Letter from
Gibbons to Laurier, Dec. 1, 1906.
7. Gibbons Papers, vol. 5, fol. 2 & 3, Te
legram from Aylesworth
to Gibbons, Dec. 1, 1906; Letter from
Aylesworth to Gibbons,
Dec. 26, 1906.
8. Anderson Papers, box 68, Letter fr
om Root to Anderson, Dec.
24, 1906; Letter from Anderson to Root,
Dec. 28, 1906.
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In a memorandum dated 5th January, 1907, from the
Minister of Justice, stating that the International
Waterways Commission has made certain reports to the
Minister of Public Works of Canada, and the Secretary
of War of the United States, with joint recommendations
as to the protection and preservation of Niagara Falls,
and as to the desirability of regulating and limiting
the uses and diversions of waters adjacent to the
boundary line between the United States and Canada and
of the waters of streams which cross the said boundary
line, and as to the desirability of creating a per-
manent international board for joint executive action
in the enforcement of rules and regulations to govern
the uses and diversions aforesaid.
The Minister recommends that Mr. George C. Gibbons, K.C.,
Chairman of the Canadian section of the Commission, be
authorized to go to Washington and confer with the
United States Government as to whether arrangements
can be made for legislation on the part of the United
States reciprocal with similar legislation of Canada,
providing so far as each country is concerned for giving
legislative effect to these recommendations, and that
Mr. Gibbons shall report to Your Excellency's Government
the result of such Conference and what arrangements can
be made with the Government of the United States for
carrying out the said recommendations.
Secretary Root visited Ottawa between January 19 and 23
during which time he and Laurier held discussions on boundary
water problems and other matters. 10 In this same period
Gibbons protested to the Prime Minister the narrow limits
imposed on him by the Privy Council order, urging a treaty
as a better basis for negotiations in Washington.
was non-committal.
Laurier
"Your suggestion takes a much wider scope
than what we had discussed at our last interview, but I will
10.
Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol.
1, pp.‘3—4, Privy Council Minute, Jan. 14, 1907.
Callahan, J.M. American Foreign Policy in Canadian Relations
New York, Macmillan & Co., 1937, p. 495.
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keep it in mind for action later on, if need be."ll Taking
this statement as approval of his proposal, Gibbons promptly
informed the British Embassy of his appointment as "special
commissioner to confer with Washington about implementing by
Treaty or legislation the recommendations of the Commission"
and requested an early interview with the Ambassador or
chargé d'affaires.12
Gibbons proceeded to Washington in February to hold
"informal" discussions with the Secretaries of State and War.
Reporting to the Prime Minister on his return, he observed
that Secretary Taft agreed to the need for a permanent
commission and for established principles to obtain fair play
for Canadians "which he quite conceded we would never get from
special commissions constituted by local politicians and full
of local prejudices." Secretary Root, on the other hand, would
deal with each problem "to his own advantage" being a "shrewd
American who wants all he can get without being particular about
the manner of getting." Never doubting that he would continue
to negotiate for the Canadian Government, he informed Laurier
that he (Gibbons) would arrange for another joint conference
through the new British Ambassador.
It is evident that we are going to have trouble coming
to any effective conclusion with these people; it may
be accomplished by a persistent effort.
My own idea, growing stronger every day, is that there
is only one way in which we will get fair play, and avoid
a conflict with them, and that is by a permanent joint
commission which will play the game fairly, and whose
conclusions will be so justified by public opinion, even
in the United States, as to compel their acceptance.
ll. Gibbons Papers, 1907-13, vol. 3, fol. 5, Letter from
Laurier to Gibbons, Jan. 24, 1907.
12. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. l, p. 51, Letter
from Gibbons to charge d'affaires Esme Howard (private)
Feb. 2, 1907. ' ‘
l3. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 60—63,
Letter from Gibbons to Laurier, Feb. 15, 1907; Laurier
Papers, 1907, vol. 448, No. 120079-120082. "  
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In early March, at the Prime Minister’s request,
Gibbons arranged an appointment in Washington with the new
14 He found Bryce "very much alive
Ambassador James Bryce.
and keen and with an astonishing knowledge, I think, of
Canadian affairs." On his return, he sent to Bryce a
position paper, outlining the recommendations of the Inter-
national Waterways Commission and indicating what he felt
the Canadians should strive for in the negotiations. De-
scribing the desirable scope of a new commission, he
concluded:
In fact, it could readily have jurisdiction over all
matters referred to it for obtaining information and
suggestions. This Board would be advisory as to all
new matters, but might act in a judicial capacity in
giving effect to agreements entered into by the two
countries.
Laurier approved fully the position set out by Gibbons
and requested Gibbons to stay in touch with the Minister of
Justice during the Prime Minister's absence in London. 16
Gibbons, however, was anxious to speed matters along, and
suggested another trip to Washington to confer further with
the Ambassador and the State Department.17
Ambassador Bryce meantime was meeting with the Secretary
of State to discuss further all aspects of Canada-United States
relations. Both had in mind a general treaty covering a variety
of vexing problems, but questioned the feasibility of such an
accomplishment. So did the President. In a personal letter to
a British member of Parliament, he expressed his doubts.
l4. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. l, p. 76, Letter
from Gibbons to the Secretary, British Embassy, Washington,
Mar. 2, 1907.
15. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp.85-89, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier, Mar. 19, 1907, enclosing COpy of
Letter from Gibbons to Bryce, Mar. 19, 1907; Laurier Papers,
1907, vol. 456, No. 122629—122633.
l6. Laurier Papers, 1907, vol. 456, No. l22634, Letter from
Laurier to Gibbons, Mar. 26, 1907.
17. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. l, p. 95, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier (confidential), Mar. 28, 1907.
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Bryce has started out well. Whether we can get a
general treaty settling the questions between
Canada and the United States, I do not know. I
should tremble about laying such a treaty before
the Senate.
On the matter of international waters, Bryce reported
to Laurier the outcome of his talks with Root.
I mentioned to him your suggestion regarding the
question of international waters -- viz, that the
existing Commission should be asked to consider
and prepare a scheme for the creation of a
permanent international Commission with an enlarged
sphere and larger powers. He agreed, and begged
that you would endeavour to make this request to
the present Commissioners as soon as possible. The
matter was becoming urgent, he had already thought
it well to stop a plan for diverting the waters of
the Milk River so as not to prejudice pending
arrangements. He suggested that the Commissioners
should be asked by you and by his Government to
address themselves forthwith to the matter and that
the instructions might be "to consider and report
what powers ought to be vested in a Commission for
dealing with international waters". He thought it
might be desirable to have a new Commission, even
if it consisted of the existing Commissioners (who
were good men and got on well together), because
the present U.S. branch of the Commission was under
the War Department, whereas the larger Commission
contemplated ought so far as the U.S. was concerned
to report to the State Department.
Gibbons meanwhile, impatiently awaiting word from Bryce
on the outcome of his talks with the Secretary of State, was
vigorously defending the integrity of the International Water-
ways Commission and holding it out as an example of the new
approach to Canada-Unit 31 Stats re lat ions . Replying to a
caution from the Acting Minister of Public Works concerning
a matter presently before the Commission, he said:
18.
19.
(
Theodore Roosevelt Papers, I-L, vol. 7, Letter from
Roosevelt to Arthur Lee (personal), Apr. 8, 1907.
Laurier Papers, 1907, vol. 459, No. 123685—123692, Letter
from Bryce to Laurier (in London), Apr. 11, 1907.
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Really we have passed the stage when it is necessary
to warn us constantly against the avarice of our
neighbours; our joint Commission has already solved
that difficulty.
It is the first time that you have ever had a body
dealing directly with the Americans; you have always
got the worst of it because you have always had people
conducting the negotiations who were not Canadian, and
who did not understand the situation. Our Commission
has proved the necessity for a permanent joint commission
which would adjust not only Waterways matters but other
differences between the two countries. It is the only
solution; special commissions are partisan and unsatis—
factory. A permanent commission must establish principles
which out both ways but which acted on are fair to each
and must learn to play fairly, as ours is doing.
Laurier approved the suggestion of Bryce and Root and re—
quested the Acting Prime Minister to put the matter before Council
and to inform Gibbons officially of his appointment as the re-
presentative of the Canadian section of the Waterways Commission.21
Gibbons met with the Cabinet on May 1 and presented his
ideas for a draft treaty with the United States. He rejected
the suggestion of the Acting Minister of Public Works that he
discuss the draft treaty with engineers, preferring to leave the
whole matter to be settled between himself and George Clinton
who would presumably represent the United States section.22 He
also protested promptly the joint reference formulated by Bryce
"to consider and report what powers might be vested in a
Commission for dealing with International waters", favoring the
Order in Council which directed him to negotiate with Washington
officials "with a view to confirming the principles agreed upon
by our joint Commission by a treaty or legislation and to create
 
20. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 108-111, Letter
from Gibbons to Hon. S. Fisher (personal), Apr. 19, 1907.
21. Laurier Papers, 1907, vol. 459, No. 123694, Letter from
Laurier (in London) to Sir Richard Cartwright, Apr.23, 1907;
Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 5, Letter from Laurier (in
London) to Gibbons, Apr. 23, 1907.
22. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 114—117, Letter
from Gibbons to Hon. S. Fisher (private), May 2, 1907.
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a permanent Commission to give effect to these recommendations."
Noting that a treaty would be preferable as it would require
only Senate confirmation, he requested Sir Richard to ask Root
to endow Clinton with the same powers and the two would then
proceed to draft a treaty.
In my opinion your Government could not do greater
service to the country than to bring about formation
of this Board and nothing would meet with more
unanimous commendation of the country irrespective
of politics and it might be well to consider in the
meantime whether the jurisdiction of a permanent Board
if created might not well be extended to matters other
than boundary waters.
Root concurred in the proposal of Sir Wilfrid but thought
that inasmuch as the present Commission was not empowered under
its existing constitution to prepare any such scheme, it would
be preferable to name Clinton and Gibbons as negotiators quite
independently of their functions as Commissioners and let them
submit the result of their deliberations to the two governments.24
He so instructed Clinton, outlining for him the matters which
should be discussed.
In an interview between the British Ambassador and myself
yesterday, we agreed to ask you and Mr. Gibbons to meet
and discuss and suggest a plan for a Commission to deal
generally with the subjects of international waterways
as between the United States and Canada following the
suggestions contained in the reports already made by
the International Waterways Commission.
I judged from my conversation with you some time ago, and
also from my conversation with Mr. Gibbons, that you both
have pretty well matured ideas on the subject. The scope
of the duties of the Commission, the degree of finality
which its conclusions are to receive, the extent to which
we shall endeavor to lay down the principles upon which
it is to act, all require careful consideration. We shall
23. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 123—125, Letter
from Gibbons to Sir Richard Cartwright, May 3, 1907.
24. Gibbons Papers, vol. 14, fol. l, Despatch from Bryce to
the Governor General (confidential), May 17, 1907; Confidential
Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 6-7.
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also have to determine whether any arrangement re-
solved upon can better be accomplished by means of
a treaty or by concurrent legislation of Canada and
the United States; also it is necessary to consider
whether additional authority should be conferred upon
the existing Waterways Commission either by treaty or
legislation, or whether a new and distinct Commission
should be created. In that case I should think that,
as the members of the present Commission have got on
so well with each other and their work has been so
satisfactory, it would be desirable to make the
personnel of the new Commission the same. The same
persons, in that case would continue to act as members
of two different Commissions. . . 25
Accepting the appointment, Clinton thought that a treaty
would be superior to reciprocal legislation and suggested that
the nature of the proposed commission would be vastly different
to that of the Waterways Commission. He also doubted the ad—
visability of having two commissions whose jurisdictions might
well overlap. His main concern at the moment however was over
the status of himself and Gibbons. He wanted to know if they
were negotiators or simply advisers to the governments. In
addition, he was "wholly in the dark regarding the general
purposes of the treaty and the extent of the jurisdiction you
have in View for the proposed commission."26 Root assured him
that the work of Gibbons and Clinton was to be "most informal"
and they were not acting in their official capacities.27
25. Numerical File 1906—10, Department of State, National
Archives, vol. 484, 5934/la, Letter from Root to Clinton,
May 17, 1907;
26. Numerial File 1906-10, Department of State, National
Archives, vol. 484, 5934/2, Letter from Clinton to Root,
May 19, 1907; 5934/3, Letter from Clinton to Root, May 24,
1907.
27. Numerical File 1906-10, Department of State, National
Archives, vol. 484, 5934/2, Letter from Root to Clinton,
May 25, 1907.
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D. Gibbons—Clinton Negotiations and the Treaty Draft
Maintaining his rapid pace, Gibbons was immediately in
touch with Clinton, outlining the major points for discussion
(incorporation of principles, creation of a permanent body and
endowment of that body with advisory powers on all matters in—
cluding international waters) and suggesting that Clinton might
draft up some treaty clauses for discussion when they met. 28
He followed this up two days later with a "roughly sketched Memo"
outlining the treaty as he proposed it.29 The next day he pro-
posed that the two of them proceed to Washington within a week
to hold discussionswith the State Department and Bryce.30
Clinton was more reserved. He proposed that they first meet
to discuss the questions and ascertain the views of their re—
spective governments and then proceed to draft a tentative plan
in accordance with the conclusions.31 He felt that their role
was confined to providing for a general commission and did not
include the authority to draft a treaty of water principles.
I fear that the ideas contained in your memorandum will,
if incorporated into a treaty in the form stated by you,
narrow the territorial and subject matter jurisdiction
of the Commission too much and will leave very little
for the Commission to do.
To Root, Clinton gave a brief indication of his views as to
the nature of the proposed Commission.
28. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 140-141,
Letter from Gibbons to Clinton, May 20, 1907.
29. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. l, p. 142, Letter
from Gibbons to Clinton, May 22, 1907.
30. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, p. 143, Letter
from Gibbons to Clinton, May 23, 1907.
31. Gibbons Papers, vol. 5, fol. 4, Letter from Clinton to
Gibbons, May 20, 1907.
32. Gibbons Papers, vol. 5, fol. 4, Letter from Clinton to
Gibbons, May 24, 1907. 
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. I would suggest, however, that the nature of
the prOposed commission will differ greatly from that
of the one existing. Originally the International
Waterways Commission was created to settle various
differences existing and likely to arise on the
boundary running through the St. Lawrence system of
lakes and rivers. Most of these questions involved
difficult hydraulic and other engineering problems.
As a consequence the commission was organized
principally to care for such problems, legal counsel
being added, or, in other words, an engineering
commission with legal advisers as integral parts was
created. The questions which will come before the
proposed commission will involve engineering problems,
it is true, but much more frequently, I imagine,
questions of international comity and law and the
application of principles announced in the reports
of the International Waterways Commission and approved
by both governments, and a new commission should, I
think, have a preponderating legal element.
Following a meeting in Washington among Gibbons,
Clinton, Bryce and Root, Bryce wrote to the Canadian Government
urging that Clinton and Gibbons complete their negotiations on
boundary delineation, fresh water fisheries and enlargement of
the International Waterways Commission, all matters at that
point being considered for inclusion in the treaty, so that the
treaty or treaties could be submitted to the Senate before
December.34
Clinton indicated on June 15 that he had completed
his draft of the treaty but had not yet obtained the approval
of Root. He proposed to Gibbons that they provide in the
commission for a permanent arbitrator "to give the public
more confidence in this Commission."35 Gibbons’ initial
33. Numerical File 1906—10, Department of State, National
Archives, vol. 484, 5934/2, Letter from Clinton to Root,
May 19, 1907.
34. Gibbons Papers, vol. 14, fol. l, Despatch from Bryce to
Lord Grey, June 8, 1907.
35. Gibbons Papers, vol. 5, fol. 4, Letter from Clinton to
Gibbons, June 15, 1907.
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reaction was not unfavourable, 36 but submitting a copy of
his proposed treaty clauses to the Acting Prime Minister ten
days later, he objected strongly to a permanent arbitrator
.to decide between the two sections of the commission when
they differed. His objection was that all would then be
at the mercy of one man; that the policy should be to force
the commission to agree upon conclusions wherever possible;
that having a permanent umpire would remove any pressure to
reach agreement.
I have been correSponding and consulting with Mr.
Clinton over the matter and while adhering to my
own ideas I have been going slowly and not forcing
his hand but if you approve of the resolutions as
I have drawn them I have no doubt I will be able to
persuade him to concur without much if any variation.
37
Commenting on the proposed treaty clauses submitted by
Gibbons, Sir Richard Cartwright raised two objections. He felt
that a tribunal to deal with all manner of disputes arising
between Canada and the United States would "require to be of a
different character than the one proposed" to deal with inter—
national waterways, boundaries and fisheries. He also objected
to it being required to sit exclusively at Washington. "But
it will be to mutual advantage to have a commission to arrange
boundaries in any case."38
Clinton was becoming impatient awaiting comments on the
draft which he had sent to Gibbons and felt that they should
finalize their work.39 Gibbons in response sent to Clinton his
proposed draft urging inclusion of all recommendations made by
 
36. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. l, p. 154, Letter
from Gibbons to Clinton, June 17, 1907.
37. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 170—172,
Letter from Gibbons to Cartwright, June 27, 1907.
38. Gibbons Papers, vol. 5, fol. 4, Letter from Cartwright to
Gibbons (private), June 29, 1907.
39. Gibbons Papers, vol. 5, fol. 4, Letter from Clinton to
Gibbons, July 12, 1907.
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the Waterways Commission and rejecting Clinton's proposal
for a permanent umpire for the same reasons he had stated
to the Minister of Justice.40
Two days later Clinton acknowledged Gibbons' draft
noting that "[i]n some respects the proposed provisions are
much clearer than mine and to that extent, preferable."41
The same day Gibbons replied to Aylesworth's comments on
Gibbons' draft, but not so Charitably. Emphasizing the need
to include the right of free navigation on Lake Michigan to
correspond to the rights which United States' citizens enjoyed
in relation to the Canadian St. Lawrence and to give "Canadians a
foothold for control over Chicago drainage through the Commission",
he rejected the suggestion by the Justice Minister that they
proceed by way of legislation since this would not provide for
the necessary permanence. He added testily that he would be
happy to be relieved of the job if the Government did not
approve of his efforts. "Really my dear Aylesworth--if the
matter is as casual as your letter would imply my time is too
valuable to spend over it."42
In mid—August Clinton got off to Gibbons a full analysis
of Gibbons' draft clauses. He made the following points:
1. Clinton and Gibbons did not quite agree on the main purpose
of the treaty.
2. Gibbons' View seemed to be the enunciation of certain fixed
principles as the main object; the constituting of a commission
was quite secondary.
3. Clinton's view was that the principles would then become
the rigid law of the two countries.
40. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 183-184,
Letter from Gibbons to Clinton, July 13, 1907.
41. Gibbons Papers, vol. 5, fol. 4, Letter from Clinton to
Gibbons, July 15, 1907.
42. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 186-188,
Letter from Gibbons to Aylesworth, July 15, 1907.   
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This leaves no scope for the adjustment of differences
by the commission, and will deprive it of all power to
adjust the rights and interests of parties concerned,
to the particular circumstances which may arise in any
case, for the commission will have nothing to do but
to apply the fixed rules laid down, without regard to
circumstances which may make them inapplicable.
 
4. Clinton would create a permanent commission having public
confidence and the
. . .power to adjust any differences which may arise
as to the diversions or use of boundary waters or waters
crossing the boundary, and which will also have the
power to pass upon other matters connected with the use
of such waters, as well as to relocate the boundary
line
and chart and monument it.
5. Having accomplished this paramount object of the treat
y
one could then lay down certain principles "for the guidance
of the commission" along the lines suggested by Gibbons, "but
not in such form as to tie the hands of the commission."
6. Clinton had no objection to a commission of six me
n although
ii a permanent arbitrator would be preferable.
Your draft also cuts off the use of waters for irri-
gation purposes, and does not provide for adjustment
of differences, which will undoubtedly arise in the
future, caused by pollution of streams.
Clinton noted that he would have included such jurisdi
ctiOn
and, in addition, would have given the commission
jurisdiction
over navigable streams of all types and over fisherie
s. He
concluded his analysis by enclosing his revised draft providing
for the points of criticism which he had offered and expressing
3 the hope that Gibbons would accept his views as t
o the para-
l mount and secondary aspects of the treaty so
that "the Commission
K will have some discretion and not be li
mited to ascertaining
’.‘ in particular cases what treaty rule applies
."43 '
 
43. Gibbons Papers, vol. 5, fol. 3, Letter fr
om Clinton to
Gibbons, August 14, 1907.
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On August 17, the British Ambassador informed his
Government that a draft treaty had been completed.44 Indeed,
Gibbons and Clinton were near agreement. Gibbons found
Clinton's proposals acceptable in the main, urging only the
addition of a final clause providing for the commission to
deal with other questions -— a provision he felt to be
essential.45 Clinton was prepared to concede this point and
on September 24 and 25, they signed and submitted to Root and
Laurier copies of the draft treaty.
Submitting the draft treaty to the Prime Minister,
Gibbons jubilantly announced that he had succeeded in
. getting matters along the line of my original
draft without the surrender of any material point.
In fact, I think you will agree that the matter is
altogether satisfactory.
If it can get through the Senatélit will be the best
thing that ever happened to this country and, in my
opinion, it is the only way of preventing friction
between ourselves and the Mother Country as well as
between Great Britain and the United States.
Once Americans come to deal directly with us they will
play the game fairly. It is only because we have got
John Bull along that they bully us. Once get him out
of the game and there will be no prestige in tackling
 
44. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 3, Despatch from
Bryce to Sir Edward Grey, Aug. 17, 1907; Confidential
Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, p. 10.
45. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 207-209,
Letters from Gibbons to Clinton, Aug 30 & Sept. 3, 1907;
vol. 5, fol. 4, Letter from Clinton to Gibbons, Sept. 12,
1907. NOTE: There is some confusion in the Canadian
archive records as to the identity of the draft treaty
that was submitted in September. Evidence in the records
suggests that the five—article draft was submitted at this
time. However, this does not accord with the American
records which point to the seven—article draft. While it
seems likely that the latter draft is indeed the one sub—
mitted to both governments, texts of both drafts are set
out.
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a little fellow who will kick their shins. I only
pray that Mr. Bryce's view as to the Senate is
correct.
Proposed Treaty Clauses
Article I
Whereas the boundary line passes along and through
the Great Lakes system;
Whereas use for navigation of the said waters is the
common right of both countries and it is desirable
to define the principles which should govern such use;
Whereas there are numerous streams crossing the boundary
and it is desirable to establish principles governing
the use of such waters and tributaries with due regard
for the rights of each country;
Whereas the international boundary in parts of the
international waters has not been definitely located;
Whereas other questions involving matters of mutual
interest are likely to arise and it is desirable to
have in existence a joint board to whom such questions
can be referred with a view to having the facts
ascertained and suggestions made as to proper action
to be taken;
Therefore the High Contracting Parties agree:
1. Waters of the Great Lakes system including Lake
Michigan and Georgian Bay, the St. Lawrence to the
Atlantic Ocean and connecting canals and channels, the
Columbia River and all navigable boundary streams are to
be equally free for navigation.
2. The paramount use of such waters is navigation and
no diversion of boundary waters is permitted save for
domestic and sanitary uses and service for locks on
navigation canals.
3. Where temporary diversions can be permitted for
power purposes of waters passing along the international
boundary line without injury to navigation, the same shall
be authorized so as to insure each country one half of the
surplus available for that purpose.
 
46. Gibbohs Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 222-225,
Letter from Gibbons to Laurier, Sept. 24, 1907; Laurier
Papers, vol. 480, No. 129636-129649.
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4. In navigable transboundary streams, navigation is
paramount, subject to domestic and sanitary needs. No
diversion of such waters or streams tributary thereto
shall be permitted to the injury of the natural right
of user in the other country and no obstruction shall
be permitted to the natural flow in one country which
would have the effect of inflicting injury upon public
or private rights in the other.
5. With the View to the preservation of the scenic
beauty of Niagara Falls, diversion above the Falls is
limited to 18,500 cubic feet per second for the United
States and 36,000 cubic feet per second for Canada.
Article II
The High Contracting Parties agree to appoint a Commission
of three members each.
The Commission shall meet early in Washington to subscribe
an oath of impartiality and to act according to justice
and equity in all matters laid before it by the Government
of the United States and Canada.
The Commission may adopt rules of procedure in accordance
with justice and equity.
The Commission shall be empowered to consider and deter-
mine all matters governed by the principles agreed upon
in clauses one to five inclusive of Article I which may
be referred to it by either of the High Contracting
Parties and of the Dominion of Canada to enforce the
findings of the Commission in these regards.
The Commission is empowered to adopt rules and regu—
lations to govern the use and navigation of international
boundary waters and it shall also exercise such police
powers as may be confided to it by concurrent legislation
of Congress and the Parliament of Canada.
A majority of the Commissioners is empowered to render
a decision but when a majority cannot agree, the Commission
is obliged to endeavour to select an arbitrator to whom
disputed matters may be referred for a final decision.
Where no agreement is reached on the selection of an
arbitrator, then joint or separate reports shall be sent
to each of the Governments showing the various views of
the matter under dispute. '
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Article III
The Commission is empowered to locate the boundary line
through the Great Lakes according to the Treaty of Ghent
of 1842 and in accord with the views of the early
Commissioners. The decision of the Commission shall be
final. '
Article IV
The Commission shall be required to consider and report
upon all other matters which may be submitted by the
High Contracting Parties. Where the Commission is so
authorized by concurrent legislation of Congress and
the Parliament of Canada, it shall determine matters
so submitted, but in the absence of special authority
of this nature, its findings and reports are to be
advisory and not judicial.
All costs of the Commission shall be borne equally by
the two Governments.
Article V
One year's notice shall be given for termination of the
Treaty.
The draft clauses submitted by Clinton to Secretary
Root on September 25 were accompanied by the following
explanation.
The preambleEpresumably Article I]was intended to set
forth in general the subjects over which the Commissioners
are to have jurisdiction, but as the desire of the Dom—
inion Government, expressed by Mr. Gibbons, is to have an
arbitration commission, competent to consider all questions
which may be referred to it, relating to the United States
and Canada, I consented to the insertion of the sixth
article which gives the Commission power to consider any
and all questions which may be referred to it for
decision or recommendation. The preamble embraces
the subjects which have been brought to the attention
of the International Waterways Commission and extends
47. Gibbons Papers, vol. 14, fol. 3, Proposed Treaty Clauses,
Sept. 24, 1907; Laurier Papers, 1907, vol. 480,
No. 129636-129644.
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the jurisdiction of the treaty commission territorially
to all streams upon or crossing the boundary, and their
tributaries. This extension of jurisdiction takes in
the St. Johns (sic) River, between New Brunswick and
Maine, but it was thought best to leave that stream
to be excepted afterwards, if necessary.
Careful study has persuaded me that it is impossible
to create a commission whose decisions shall be not
only conclusive but self—operative in all cases, and
I believe that an attempt to do this would involve so
much complication in discriminating between cases in
which decisions could be made the law of the land and
enforced through the courts, and cases where this could
not be done, but which would require the intervention
of Congress, that it would be unwise to complicate the
treaty by making the attempt. Perhaps it would be
unwise to have the treaty on its face vest the Commission
with too great powers, by special provision. The treaty
itself will create the Commission and give it certain
jurisdiction to determine international questions, and
the power to do this by treaty under the Constitution
cannot be successfully controverted; the decisions of
the Commission will, therefore, necessarily be the law
of the land, so far as they do not contravene acts of
Congress, or the rights of individuals as protected by
the Constitution. Nevertheless the action of Congress
would be necessary from time to time to enable the
Commission to perform its duties, and the questions which
may come before the Commission may be of such a nature as
to require legislation to enforce them. It would seem
to me that such a treaty, being an international obli—
gation, can hardly be ignored by Congress, and that
legislation necessary to preserve the good faith of
the United States, by carrying out decisions of the
Commission, will be forthcoming, almost as a matter of
course.
I would call your attention to the fact that the pro-
visions of article III, giving the Commission power to
exercise such police powers as may be vested in it by
concurrent legislation of the United States and the
Dominion of Canada, was inserted with a View to overcome
the difficulties which may present themselves in the
enforcement of rules and regulations international in
their character, and to the fact that it illustrates a
class of cases in which congressional action will be
necessary.  
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Article IV is an announcement of principles for the
guidance of the Commission, and contains also matters
of definition. The principles involved are sub—
stantially those adopted by the International Wat
erways
Commission and approved by the War Department.
Subdivisions 5 and 6 of this article require very care
-
ful consideration. The irrigation question is difficult
to regulate by a fixed rule, and I therefore pers
uaded
Mr. Gibbons to consent that, subject to the right
of
navigation, the effect of diversion for irrigation s
hould
be cared for "equitably" . . . . Subdivision 6 related to
pollution and was inserted to take care of cases which are
likely to arise in the future when the Northwest becomes
more densely populated; perhaps the language is too
strong.
Subdivision 7 follows the report of the International
Waterways Commission in relation to Niagara Falls . . . .
Dealing with subdivision 9 relating to the limitation
on the right of diversion, Clinton suggested that it might
specifically be excluded from application in relation to
irrigation.
Article V provides for definitely ascertaining and
fixing by monuments and otherwise the boundary line
through Lakes Ontario, Erie, St. Clair, and Huron an
d
the connecting waters. . . . Possibly the River St. Ma
ry,
Lake Superior, and the St. Lawrence should be included.
You will probably notice that I have made the appoint-
ment of the Commissioners rest with the President alone.
Possibly there may be objections to this and, if so,
the approval of the Senate can be added.
I would also call your attention to the fact that the
reports of the Commission are to be made to the
.
Secretary of State and not to the Secretary of War. T
his
seems to me to be necessary because the subjects passed
upon by the Commission will be purely international in
their character and, if the action of the War Department
shall be necessary to carry out the decision or re-
commendations of the Commission, it would seem that
such action would be had without question, if within'
the power of that Department. In this connection
I wish
to say that I think, after very careful consideration,
that the existence of the treaty Commission necessaril
y
negatives the idea of the continuance of the Inter
-
national Waterways Commission, inasmuch as there w
ould
certainly be conflicts of jurisdiction.
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. Protection of the fisheries was inserted on
account of the vexatious questions which are liable to
arise upon the Great Lakes . . . . caused by seizures
and attempted seizures of our vessels engaged in fish-
ing, upon the charge that they were in Canadian waters.
The provision will enable us to settle such questions,
and to provide means for ascertaining whether a vessel
which has been seized, was within Canadian waters,
without vexatious and expensive litigation and without
arousing bitter feelings.
. . . Perhaps I ought to add that I understand the
Dominion Government is extremely anxious, as stated
by Mr. Gibbons, to have created a permanent board of
arbitration, to which all questions which may arise
between Canada and the United States can be submitted
for final settlement, exclusive, of course, of urely
governmental questions and questions of policy.
To--
The Honorable the Secretary of State
of the United States
and
The Honorable the Prime Minister
of the Dominion of Canada
The undersigned have the honor to most respectfully
submit for your consideration the attached draft of
a proposed treaty.
Dated September 24, 1907.
(signed) George Clinton.
(signed) Geo. C. Gibbons.
Proposed Treaty Clauses
Article I
Whereas questions have arisen and may hereafter arise
involving the use and diversion of the boundary waters
48. Numerical File 1906—10, Department of State, National
Archives, vol. 484, 5934/6-7, Letter from Clinton to
Root, Sept. 25, 1907; Anderson Papers, box 68; Senate
Document No. 118, 85th Congress, 2d Session, Legal
Aspects of the Use of Systems of International Waters
Memorandum of the State Department, Apr. 21, 1958,
pp. 10—12 (referred to hereafter as Griffin Memorandum,
1958.)
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of the United States and Canada, and in relation to
the protection of the fisheries therein, the improve—
ment of navigable channels, the location of the boundary
line, the construction of new channels for navigation,
the improvement and maintenance of the levels therein,
and the protection of the banks and shores of such
waters; and whereas it is desirable that the rules of
navigation upon navigable waters forming a part of the
boundary between the United States and the Dominion of
Canada, and the use of signal lights of vessels navi—
gating said waters should be uniform; and whereas the
use of said waters for power and other purposes should
be regulated by joint rules of the United States and
the Dominion of Canada, and such rules must be enforced
by joint action of said countries; and whereas it is
deemed wise by the high contracting parties, in order
to settle all such questions now existing, or which may
hereafter arise, and to dispose of all other matters
above mentioned, that a permanent international commission
be appointed with full powers in the premises; therefore
the high contracting parties agree that all such questions
and matters as they may arise shall be referred by them
to a commission to consist of six commissioners, three
to be appointed by the President of the United States,
and three by His Britannic Majesty; and the high con-
tracting parties agree to appoint the commissioners as
soon after the ratification hereof as may be convenient . . .
Article II
The Commissioners shall meet in Washington at the earliest
convenient time after they shall have been named, and
shall, before proceeding to do any business, make and
subscribe a solemn declaration that they will impartially
and carefully examine and decide, to the best of their
judgment and according to justice and equity, without
feeling, favor or affection to their country, upon all
such matters as shall be laid before them on the part of
the governments of the United States and of His Britannic
Majesty, respectively, and such declaration shall be
entered on the record of their proceedings.
After having organized the commissioners may meet at such
times and places as they may appoint. They shall give all
parties interested in matters which come before them, con-
venient opportunity to be heard, and may take evidence on
oath when deemed necessary. They may adopt such rules of
procedure as may be in accordance with justice and equity
and may make such examinations in person and through
agents, or employees, as they may deem advisable.
__________.L
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The majority of the Commission shall have power to
render a decision, but in case a majority do not
agree, the Commission shall select an arbitrator
or arbitrators to whom the matters in difference may
be referred and whose decision shall be final.
The Commission may employ secretaries, engineers and
other assistants, from time to time as it may deem
advisable. The salaries and personal expenses of
the Commissioners shall be paid by their respective
governments, and all other expenses, including the
pay of arbitrators, shall be paid equally by the
high contracting parties, who shall make proper
provision therefor.
Article III
The Commission shall have power to consider and deter-
mine all questions and matters related to the subjects
specified in Article I which may be referred to it by
the High Contracting Parties.
The decision of the Commission upon any matters sub—
mitted to it shall be enforced by the High Contracting
Parties; and for the purpose of enforcing any rules
and regulations, which may be adOpted by the Commission,
pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by this treaty,
the Commission may exercise such police powers as may
be vested in it by concurrent legislation of the United
States and Dominion of Canada.
Article IV
It is agreed as follows:—-
1. The expression "boundary waters" as used in this
treaty includes the following described waters, to wit:
Lake Superior, Michigan, Huron including Georgian Bay,
St. Clair, Erie, and Ontario; the connecting and tri—
butary waters of said lakes, the river St. Lawrence
from its source to the ocean; the Columbia River and
all rivers and streams which cross the boundary line
between the Dominion of Canada and the United States,
and their tributaries.
2. All navigable boundary waters, and all canals and
channels connecting the same or aiding in their navi-
gation, now existing or which may hereafter be con-
structed are and shall be forever free for navigation
by the citizens and subjects of both countries,
ascending and descending, subject to such just rules
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and regulations as either of the High Co
ntracting
Parties may, within its own territory, i
mpose, pro—
vided that such rules and regulation
s shall not
discriminate between the citizens or subje
cts of
the High Contracting Parties.
3. The right to use said waters for n
avigation is
paramount to all other rights, excep
t that of use
for necessary domestic and sanitary purp
oses and the
service of canals for purposes of navigati
on.
4. Where diversions of water are permit
ted for the
purpose of generating power, upon wate
rs along the
line of the international boundary, the in
terests
of navigation must be fully protected,
and, as far
as possible, the right to use one half o
f surplus
waters available for power purposes shal
l be pre—
served to each country, its citizens or
subjects.
5. Where diversion for irrigation is perm
itted the
paramount right of navigation must be pres
erved and
the rights of each country affected and
of its citizens
or subjects must be equitably protected.
6. The said waters must not be polluted i
n one country
to the injury of health or property in the
other.
7. No water shall be diverted from the Ni
agara River
uor from Lake Erie by way of the Niagara
Peninsula in
excess of 18,500 cubic feet per second in
the United
States, and 36,000 cubic feet per se
cond in the Dominion
of Canada, except for necessary domestic a
nd sanitary
uses, and for service of canals for purposes
of
navigation.
8. Solely for the purposes of this treaty
, the
expression "Navigable boundary waters" sha
ll be taken
to mean all such boundary waters as are su
bject to
public use for the transportation of p
roperty, in
accordance with the common law as recogn
ized in the
Dominion of Canada and in the United State
s; and the
Commission is authorized and empowered to
determine
the navigability of streams, as matter
of fact, when
it becomes necessary to do so in matters r
eferred to it.
9. No diversion or obstruction of bound
ary waters in, or by,
either country, which shall materially i
nterfere with the
natural flow thereof, to the injury of t
he other country,
or of its citizens or subjects shall b
e permitted without
the consent of such other country.
10. The words "citizens" and "subjects
" as used in this
treaty shall be deemed to include indi
viduals, corporations,
joint stock companies, associations
and partnerships.
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Article V
The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to
ascertain the boundary line between the United States
and the Dominion of Canada through Lakes Ontario, Erie,
St. Clair, and Huron, and the waters connecting the same
as laid down by the Commissioners appointed under the
treaty of Ghent, as nearly as possible, and to delineate
the same upon modern charts and to describe it in writing,
and, so far as practical, by reference to fixed monuments
which the Commission may locate and erect and which shall
be so described that they can be readily found.
The Commission shall by report, signed by the Commissioners,
designate the boundary line so ascertained by it and shall
cause to be prepared proper maps delineating the same . . .
The boundary line as ascertained and reported by the
Commission shall be the boundary line between the United
States of America and the Dominion of Canada, through
the waters last above mentioned.
In case a majority of the Commission shall not be able to
agree on the location of the boundary line through the
waters last above mentioned, in whole or in any part, they
shall make joint or several reports in duplicate, to the
government of His Britannic Majesty and to that of the
United States, stating in detail the points on which they
differ.
Article VI
And whereas it is desirable that the said Commission, when
formed, should have authority to deal with all other matters,
which shall, by consent of both the contracting parties, be
submitted to it for decision or which shall with such con-
sent, be referred to it with a View to having the said
Commission consider and report thereon with such recommend—
ations as they may think advisable.
Now therefore the High Contracting Parties agree that the
said Commission shall, as to all matters so referred to them
for decision, have the same powers as are given them with
respect to the subjects mentioned in Article I of this treaty.
As to such matters as are not referred to them for decision
the said commission shall consider and report upon the facts,
with such recommendations as they may see fit.
In case a majority of the Commission cannot, in matters so
referred to them for decision, agree upon findings, they
shall appoint one or more arbitrators as provided for in
Article I, but as to all other subjects referred to them if
the majority cannot agree upon conclusions, the views of the
members shall be embodied in separate reports to be submitted
to both High Contracting Parties.
Article VII
The Commission with all its powers conferred and duties im-
posed by this treaty shall continue during the pleasure of  
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both of the high contracting parties; but if either of the
parties desires to terminate this treaty it shall give to
the other at least one year's notice in writing before
doing so. For all the purposes of these articles the
Dominion of Canada shall be deemed to represent His
Britannic Majesty.
All reports and communications of the Commission are to
be made to the Secretary of State of the United States
and to the Prime Minister of the Dominion of Canada.49
The Prime Minister passed the draft treaty on to
the Minister of Justice for comment50 and replied to Gibbons
that "[pjt first glance it seems to me a very happy solution
of a very dangerous subject." He did, however, have doubts
about allowing the commission jurisdiction over the whole of
the St. Lawrence.51 To this Gibbons replied that it was
necessary to be consistent with the freedom of navigation
clause in article twenty-six of the Treaty of Washington.52
In the United States, Secretary Root referred the
draft clauses directly to Chandler Anderson for his criticisms
and comments.53
From September to December Gibbons held discussions
with Aylesworth and Laurier and corresponded with Clinton.
As a result of these discussions and correspondence several
changes were agreed upon by the negotiators.54 On December 3
49. Numerical File 1906—10, Department of State, National Archives,
vol. 484, 5934/6-7, Proposed Treaty Clauses, submitted by
Clinton to Root, Sept. 25, 1907; Anderson Papers, box 68;
Griffin Memorandum, 1958, pp. 12-15; Gibbons Papers,
vol. 14, fol. 3.
50. Laurier Papers, 1907, vol. 480, No. 129647, Letter from
Laurier to Aylesworth, Sept. 26, 1907.
51. Laurier Papers, 1907, vol. 480, No. 129645, Letter from Laurier
to Gibbons, Sept. 26, 1907; Gibbons Papers, vol. 5, fol. 5.
52. Laurier Papers, 1907, vol. 480, No. 129650, Letter from Gibbons
to Laurier, Sept. 27, 1907; Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letter—
book No. 1, pp. 228-229.
53. Numerical File 1906-10, Department of State, National Archives,
vol. 484, 5934/6-7, Letter from Assistant Secretary Bacon
to Anderson, Oct. 15, 1907; Anderson Papers, box 68.
54. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 265-268, Letters
from Gibbons to Clinton, Nov. 26 & 28, 1907; vol. 5, fol. 4,
Letter from Clinton to Gibbons, Nov. 29, 1907; vol. 8, Letter
book No. 1, pp. 271-272, Letter from Gibbons to Bryce, Dec 2,1901
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and 4, Gibbons and Clinton submitted to the Prime Minister
and the Secretary of State a "new draft", Gibbons announcing
that he was off to Washington immediately to confer with
Bryce and speed acceptance of the treaty by the United States.
The new clauses contained the following changes from those
submitted in September. I
Article III
The Commission shall have power to consider and
determine all questions and matters related to the
subjects specified in Article I or in relation to the
navigation of the River St. Lawrence from the forty-
fifth parallel of north latitude where it ceases to
form the boundary between the countries, and of the
Rivers Yukon, Porcupine, and Stikine from, to and
into‘the sea, which may be referred to it by the high
contracting parties.
  
Article IV
1. The expression "boundary waters" as used in this
Treaty includes the following described waters, to wit:
Lake Superior, Michigan, Huron including Georgian Bay,
St. Clair, Erie and Ontario; the connecting and tri-
butary waters of said lakes, the River St. Lawrence from
its source to the forty-fifth parallel of north latitude;
the Columbia River and all rivers and streams which cross
the boundary line between the Dominion of Canada and the
United States, and their tributaries.
Article IV
7. No water shall be diverted from the Niagara River
above the Falls of Niagara or from Lake Erie by way of
the Niagara Peninsula in excess of 18,500 cubic feet per
second in the United States, and 36,000 cubic feet per
second in the Dominion of Canada, except for necessary
domestic and sanitary uses, and for service of canals for
purposes of navigation.
55. Laurier Papers, 1907, vol. 495, No. 133653—133660,
Proposed Treaty Clauses, Dec. 4, 1907; vol. 493, No.
133290-133291, Letter from Gibbons to Laurier, Dec. 4, 1907;
Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
pp. 15-18; Numerical File 1906-10, Department of State,
National Archives, vol. 484, 5934/10, Letter from Clinton
to Root, Dec. 3, 1907; Anderson Papers, box 68.
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Just before Gibbons' arrival in Washington on December
10, the British Ambassador requested from the Canadian Govern-
ment its views on including delimitation of the boundary line
through the Great Lakes in the treaty on boundary waters as
opposed to providing for delimitation by a separate treaty
and commission.56 The Prime Minister answered this query and
others in an urgent letter which he dispatched to Gibbons in
Washington on December 9. He informed Gibbons that it was im-
perative that the treaty include a settlement of the St. Mary
River irrigation question and provide for all other rivers
flowing across the boundary. With regard to boundary de—
limitation on the Great Lakes, he felt that Article V should
provide for the matter to be determined finally by arbitration
if necessary, rather than having mere separate reports in case
of a disagreement.57
E. Rejection of the Gibbons—Clinton Draft
 
Following consultations between Bryce and Gibbons in
Washington, the Ambassador on December 13 met with Root to
seek favourable consideration by his Government of the pro-
posed treaty. He advanced a number of arguments favouring
the single‘treaty which had been drafted by Gibbons and Clinton.
Article 4 of the draft Treaty on boundaries received re-
cently from the United States Government and submitted
to the Dominion Government provides for the delimitation
by the two geographers of the section of frontier through
the great lakes and their connecting waterways. The
delimitation of that section is already provided for in
the draft Treaty on International Waters. It would seem
that there would be greater advantages in providing for
the delimitation of those waters under the Treaty regu-
lating boundary waters rather than under the general
56. COnfidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
p. 11, Despatch from Bryce to Lord Grey, Dec. 4, 1907.
57. Laurier Papers, 1907, vol. 493, No. 133292—133293, Letter
from Laurier to Gibbons, Dec. 9, 1907; Gibbons Papers,
vol. 3, fol. 5
 Treaty on Boundaries, and this is the view of Mr.
Clinton also, as the Commission executing the former
Treaty will have special expert facilities for de-
limitation and will probably be able to effect the work
in conjunction with their other duties without additional
expense or loss of time. Moreover, it is in this section
that differences of opinion as to the location of the
boundary are most likely to occur, and it is in the
interests of all that such differences, involving as
they will areas of local rather than national impor-
tance should be expeditiously and economically adjusted.
Article 5 of the draft Treaty on Boundary Waters pro-
vides for the settlement of differences by a majority
of the Commissioners which gives a better possibility
of agreement being attained in that Commission which
consists of six members than in the Commission of two
provided by the Treaty on boundaries. Moreover, under
Article 2, paragraph 3, of the draft Treaty on Boundary
Waters the Commission may in cases of difference
appoint an arbitrator and although it does not seem to
have been contemplated in the draft Treaty that this
procedure should be applicable to differences as to
the delimitation work effected under Article 5 it may
deserve to be considered whether its application to
the delimitation might not be convenient.
Further, the powers of the Waterways Commission, as
proposed in the draft scheme would render unnecessary
the Treaty proposed in the State Department's note No.
88 of June 16 last providing for the appointment of a
Commission charged with the distribution of the water
supply of the St. Mary's (sic) and Milk Rivers. This
work would fall appropriately and conveniently to the
permanent Commission established by the scheme under
consideration.
The same day, the Ambassador reported the outcome
of his meeting with Root to his Government. He outlined his
own favourable arguments and those which Root had advanced
in opposition to the proposed treaty.
1. Mr. Root favoured geographers to deal with all questions
relating to boundary delimitation and did not feel such matters
should be subjected to arbitration.
58. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 3, Despatch from
Bryce to Sir Edward Grey, Dec. 13, 1907; Confidential Prints,
International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 14—15, International
Waterways Pro Memoria from Bryce to Root, Dec. 13, 1907;
Numerical File 1906—10, Department of State, National
Archives, vol. 484, 5934/20.
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2. Mr. Root felt that the irrigation questions in relation
to the St. Mary and Milk Rivers should be dealt with by a
special commission.
. . . He observed that the real difficulty in all these
frontier questions lay in the fact that at some places
private persons had already begun to plan and execute
works in their own interest which they would not like
to see exposed to prohibition or alteration on the part
of a Commission armed with wide powers; and that this
alarm might lead them to stir up their senators or
representatives to oppose the Treaty.
3. With regard to the St. John River, "Mr. Root thought it
would be safer, in order to avert possibly dangerous oppo—
sition in the Senate that this river should also be omitted
from the scope of the Commission on Boundary Waters."
4. Mr. Root favoured the recommendations of the International
Waterways Commission in relation to Niagara Falls but felt
that this matter might have to be dealt with in connection
with the Chicago diversion.
It appeared to me that Mr. Root feared that American
opinion might think that the Commission would have
powers rather too wide; especially as the addition
of the arbitration clause would practically exclude
governmental action on matters within its scope; and
though I believe he personally would not object to
their having these powers, he may believe that his
countrymen are hardly yet prepared for so bold a step.
He seemed indeed to be not over sanguine of getting
through a scheme of such importance, which, he observed,
appeared to have considerably outgrown its original
intentions. I replied that no doubt it was desirable
to exercise foresight as to possible opposition, and
consider how far it could be avoided by any concession
or exception on any particular point which did not
prejudice the main object.
He undertook to read carefully the draft Treaty, on
which he had only just before received a report. . .59
The Ambassador expressed much the same View in a
letter to Sir Wilfrid on the next day.
59. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 3, Despatch
from Bryce to.Sir Edward Grey, Dec. 13, 1907; Confidential
Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 12—14.
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. HeERoot] is evidently apprehensive of opposition
from local people who will fear a large strong Commission
and seems to think it would be easier to deal with the
matters likely to raise controversy by referring them
to Special Commissions.
The report to which Root referred in his conversation
with Bryce was one prepared for the Secretary by Chandler
Anderson as a result of the request made in October when the
draft treaty was referred to Anderson.61 A report in extenso
was submitted to Root on December 9.
BOUNDARY WATERS
Report on the Draft Treaty Relating to
International Boundary Waters Proposed by
George Clinton and George C. Gibbons, Members
on the Part Respectively of the United States
and Canada, of the International Waterways
Commission
(Sets out a summary of the major features of the proposed
treaty: creation of a six-man commission; matters within
the jurisdiction of the Commission; powers of the
Commission, procedure of the Commission; principles of
law to be applied by the Commission; referential scope
of the Commission.)
The extent of the jurisdiction proposed to be conferred
upon this international Commission is in some ways without
precedent. Its functions, as appears from the foregoing
summary of the treaty provisions, are twofold -- judicial
and administrative —— and several unusual features are
presented with respect to each.
Taking up first for consideration the judicial functions
to be exercised by this Commission, it will be found that
they show a notable departure from the course heretofore
followed by this Government in delegating by treaty
judicial powers to an international commission. In such
treaties it has been customary to limit the exercise of
the judicial powers of such a commission to some par—
ticular question already at issue and involving matters
not wholly within the jurisdiction of either of the
parties to the treaty, or over which neither of the
parties alone had undisputed control. This treaty,
60. Laurier Papers, 1907, vol. 493, No. 133276-133281, Letter
from Bryce to Laurier (confidential), Dec. 14, 1907.
61. Numerical File 1906—10, Department of State, National Archives,
vol. 484, 5934/6—7, Letter from Bacon to Anderson, Oct. 15,
1907; Griffin Memorandum, 1958, p. 15.
Lr—‘
  
42
however, instead of following such precedents pro-
poses to confer upon this Commission complete
judicial powers over questions both present and
future and involving matters which in some respects
at least are wholly within undisputed governmental
control on one side or the other of the boundary.
Among the matters within the group referred to are
the following: i
The use and diversion of waters tributary to boundary
waters and waters crossing the boundary, such waters
under the definition in the treaty being included
among the "boundary waters" over which the Commission
has jurisdiction.
The improvement of navigable channels and the construction
of new Channels in "boundary waters."
Protection of banks and shores of "boundary waters."
It will be observed that so far as these matters are
embraced wholly within the territory of either the
United States or Canada or relate to waters not
actually contiguous to the boundary line, or to waters
flowing from one country into the other across the
boundary, international law is not directly concerned
with them. The question at once arises, therefore, as
to what principles or system of law will be applied by
the Commission in determining questions involving these
matters.
No particular mode of procedure for referring questions
to the Commission for decision is provided in the treaty,
but presumably questions are to be referred by joint
action of the executive branch of each Government,
and not by a supplementary treaty, and the extent of
the judicial functions intended to be conferred upon the
Commission must, therefore, be measured by the terms
of this treaty. .
(Sets out the major criticisms of the principles to guide
the Commissioners in dealing with boundary and trans-
boundary waters, finding the'principles raise far more
questions than what they settle.)
. . . Apart from any questions as to the advisability of
adapting these principles as presented, which will be
considered later, it is evident that even if these were
adopted, they would not furnish adequate guidance for
the decision of the questions which may arise involving
the use of waters tributary to boundary waters or of
streams crossing the boundary. '
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It follows from these considerations that, as the
treaty now stands, it fails to establish any principles
or system of laws controlling these several matters,
and consequently that with respect to them the
Commissioners are left free to adopt their own ideas
of justice and equity in the decision of questions
arising thereon, which practically amounts to a power
to legislate.
It is not likely that the approval of the Senate would
be given to a treaty delegating to an international
commission such unrestricted powers over matters wholly
within the borders of the United States, and it is
doubtful if any amendment to the treaty could be devised
which would overcome the difficulty presented. Where,
as in this case, international law fails to apply, it
is necessary, if the questions are to be submitted to
an arbitration tribunal, to establish by mutual agree-
ment some other principles or rules of law which will
control. The possibility of this, however, is out of
the question with respect to a commission which is to
exercise judicial functions for a period of years over
questions to arise in the future involving such matters
as these, and particularly such an undeveloped subject
as the use of tributary waters or waters crossing the
boundary. It would be a practical impossibility to
formulate a series of principles or rules adequate to
cover all questions which might arise in these matters
except, perhaps, with reference to the improvement and
construction of channels and the puxection of shores
and banks; and, even if it were possible to accomplish
this with respect to all or any of these matters, there
is no assurance that an agreement thereon could be
reached between the two Governments.
The difficulty might perhaps be met by providing for a
supplemental treaty to cover each case referred to the
Commission, in which the questions submitted could be
precisely stated, and some guiding principles could be
adopted to control the decision. If, however, it is
necessary to do this in every instance, it might quite
as well be done independently of the present treaty,
and in that case there seems to be no particular reason
for including such matters within its scope.
Taking everything into consideration the only satis-
factory solution of the difficulty seems to be to
eliminate from the scope of this treaty all those matters
which lie wholly within the control of the respective
Governments on their own side of the boundary line.
 44
(Sets out five disadvantages to the United States which
would occur as a result of relinquishing to an inter—
national commission matters where "international law re-
cognizes that the right of either country to exercise
full control over such matters, so far as they are
within the territory of that country, does not depend
upon the consent of the adjoining country." United
States would lose the right of exclusive control over
diversions from Lake Michigan and the Milk and St.
Mary Rivers. United States would have to obtain
Canada's consent before dealing with its own tributary
waters. United States has more to gain from diplomatic
bargaining in relation to the St. Mary and Milk Rivers.
The United States Government would be hampered in the
channel improvements which it undertakes in boundary
waters. Bank and shore protection works by the United
States would become subject to approval by the Canadian
Government.)
The judicial functions to be conferred upon this Commission
extend to only two other classes of matters in addition to
those above discussed. These are as follows:
(1) The use and diversion of boundary waters, which in
this connection include only such waters as may
properly be regarded as contiguous to the boundary
in distinction from those classed above as tributary
thereto.
(2) Such other matters as may be referred by mutual con—
sEnt to the Commission for decision, or report and
recommendations.
The jurisdiction proposed to be conferred over the second
of these two classes of matters involves questions entirely
outside of the present discussion, as they are not limited
to the uses of international waters, and the principles
adopted by the treaty do not apply to them. For the purposes
of this discussion, it is sufficient to note therefore, that
if it is not intended that a special treaty shall be entered
into whenever any such matters are submitted to this
Commission for decision, it is hardly likely that the
Senate would consent to that feature of the present treaty,
and if such special treaties are to be entered into, this
provision is surplusage. So far, however, as this pro—
vision gives the Commission jurisdiction merely to report
with recommendations on questions submitted to it, there
probably would be no objection to permitting such submission
to be made by the executive branch of the Government, if
the questions to be submitted were limited to the particular
subjects covered by the treaty.
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of the two above—mentioned classes of matters presents
somewhat different considerations from those heretofore
discussed. Here no particular difficulties arise as to M
the propriety and effectiveness of the treaty provisions V
from a legal standpoint and the chief questions involved '
are the expediency of delegating to this Commission the ,
proposed powers as a matter of governmental policy, and
the sufficiency of the treaty provisions for accomplishing I
the desired results. '
|
The proposed delegation of jurisdiction over the first L
The question of governmental policy can profitably be
postponed until the other questions here presented are
examined.
(Sets out the conflicting principles of international
law relating to the uses and diversions of boundary
waters, noting that none of the principles are firmly
established in all respects.)
In view, however, of the lack of authority for many of
the conclusions above stated, and whether or not they
can be relied in, it would seem to be highly desirable
for the purposes of this treaty, that, so far as possible,
the underlying principles, their application to special
cases and the rules applicable to particular conditions
and uses which are to control the decision of the
commission, should be agreed upon and set out in the
treaty irrespective of whether they are regarded as
merely declaratory of principles of international law
or as modifications or extensions of them.
(Deals with the various "principles of guidance" set out
in Article IV of the draft treaty. Recommends the ex-
clusion of Lake Michigan from the definition of "Boundary
Waters" and the withholding of the right of free navi-
gation of the lake unless something is granted in return.
Doubts the validity of the priorities of uses of boundary
and transboundary waters provided for in the draft.)
This question of the order of precedence among the various
uses of these waters presents many difficulties. Navi-
gation, sanitation, irrigation, power, domestic and canal
purposes are the uses referred to, and each in turn has
some claims for preference over the others, and the
situation is further complicated by the fact that a
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paramount use at one point may be unimportant at
another. But, notwithstanding these difficulties
,
it seems to be essential for the purposes of this
treaty that the order of precedence to be observed
among these uses under the varying conditions foun
d
along the course of the boundary should be determi
ned,
inasmuch as the exercise of each one of these
uses
tends to conflict with or restrain some of the oth
ers.
It is not likely that either Government would b
e
willing to leave the determination of this questio
n
to an international commission, and it is, the
refore,
necessary, if this treaty is to be entered into, for
the Governments themselves to come to an agree
ment
on the question and to incorporate such agreeme
nt in
the treaty. It might be possible to classify the
localities along the boundary in accordance wit
h the
natural conditions presented and prescribe the ord
er
of precedence for the uses of the waters of these
localities, or it might be possible to formulate
some equation to express the values of the several
elements entering into the question, or if no
shorter method was feasible the particular uses to
be
preferred at each point of importance along the bo
undary
might be specified.
In addition to settling the relative importance of
these
various uses, the question of regulating and limit
ing
the extent of such uses on each side of the bounda
ry
must also be provided for.
(Discusses clauses 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of A
rticle IV
regulating diversions, sharing of surplus waters,
pollution, use of Niagara Falls, navigable waters
and
obstruction of boundary waters. Two major critici
sms
of the provisions. They "leave more to the discre
tion
of the Commission than seems desirable, and regard
ed
as defining the jurisdictional powers of the Commi
ssion
they seem to conflict with the general scheme of the
treaty." Second, by making any major diversion subjec
t
to the consent of the other country, the whole qu
estion
is thrown "back into the field of diplomatic negot
iations
for special agreements on each case as it arises, with
complications which would not exist without this t
reaty.")
Apart from the provisions above reviewed, the treaty
proposes no other principles or rules for the guid
ance
of the Commission in deciding questions submitt
ed to it.
No reference is made to action on either side r
esulting
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in the elevation of the normal surface levels of
these waters, and the question of the storage of
surplus waters is not dealt with at all.
Anderson concluded his analysis and criticism of
the draft clauses with three recommendations. He urged
elimination from the treaty of all references to regulation
of fisheries, demarcation of boundaries, construction and
improvement of channels, protection of shores and banks and
all matters relating to the use of tributary and trans-
boundary waters, leaving within the jurisdiction of the
Commission only "uses of contiguous boundary waters." He
noted the danger of leaving the principles to the determination
of the commission. If the body was to determine all questions
relating to boundary waters
. it seems to be essential that the principles
to be followed in deciding such questions should not
be left to the discretion of the Commission, but,
so far as possible, should be agreed upon by the two
governments, and incorporated in the treaty, and that
such principles should control the order of precedence
to be observed among the uses referred to under the
varying conditions found along the course of the boundary,
and the treatment of exceptional cases and also the ex-
tent of such uses to be permitted upon each side of the
boundary under both general and particular conditions.
He also suggested that the governments call upon the
Waterways Commission to investigate and report on a series of
principles for possible adoption.62
Before these views were transmitted to the Canadian
Government in late January along with Root's proposals for a
quite different treaty arrangement, Gibbons was busy in Ottawa
impressing on Laurier the need for his Government to remain
resolute in the face of the apparent opposition from Washington
and insist upon acceptance of the treaty as drafted. In a report
62. Anderson Papers, box 68, Report on the Draft Treaty . . .
Dec. 9, 1907; Numerical File 1906-10, Department of State,
National Archives, vol. 484, 5934/11—12; Griffin Memorandum,
1958, pp. 15521.
 48
to the Prime Minister on his December 10 visit to Washington,
he was very critical both of the Secretary of State and the
British Ambassador. Bryce had not allowed Gibbons to deal
personally with Root and had made a very weak case to the
Secretary himself. In fact, Bryce was of no assistance
at all;
rather, he was "an obstruction to obtaining what ought to be
insisted upon, a permanent commission." As for Root, he was
not convinced of the need for a permanent body and wanted
separate special commissions to deal with the irrigation
question and with delimitation of boundaries in the Great
Lakes.
. Mr. Root pretended to yield but he is evidently
going back again to his natural inclinations. He is
a keen, aggressive and not over scrupulous American
and Mr. Bryce is about as unsuitable, in my opinion,
as any one that can be suggested to combat him.
I think your attitude now should be one of firm
insistence upon a permanent Board to deal with all
these matters and, moreover, I think it absolutely
essential that somebody equal to the occasion should
deal with Mr. Root.
This outburst was followed up shortly with a request that
Sir
Wilfrid instruct Bryce to allow Gibbons to deal directly
with
the Secretary of State, feeling certain that he was the '
some~
body equal to the occasion' of convincing the Secretary of the
desirability of the proposed agreement.
The matter will fiddle along month after month, if
left to the British Ambassador, and I very much doubt
even then of his being able to accomplish anything.64
The Prime Minister acted, although not as positively
as Gibbons would have wished. In a letter to Br
yce he rejected
the United States' argument for three separate tre
aties, insisting
that first and foremost, there must be a single co
mmission created,
designed to apply similar principles in all cas
es.
 
63. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 2
85-290,
Letter from Gibbons to Laurier (personal), D
ec. 16, 1907;
Laurier Papers, 1907, vol. 495, No. 1338
21-133826.
64. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1
, pp. 295-297,
Letter from Gibbons to Laurier, Dec. 21,
1907; Laurier
Papers, 1907, vol. 496, No. 134102-134104.
absence of Gibbons who had not been invited down to Washington
on this occasion) with the Secretary of State.
now read Anderson's report on the draft clauses, rejected
outright the proposed treaty in virtually all respects.
rules should apply to the regulation of all such waters
and that these rules should be under the jurisdiction
of the same Commission, as question after question will
arise.
I will again communicate with the Chairman of our section,
Mr. Gibbons, and ask him to go again to Washington. I
would hope that by your joint efforts you will be able
to come to a speedy conclusion with Mr. Root. Gibbons
is active and energetic; he is familiar with all aspects
of the question and his thorough knowledge of all local
conditions ought to be of great assistance to you to meet 4
objections and to drive matters to a prompt and definite h
issue. 1”
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It is of the greatest importance that the same I
I
I
l;
I
$1
[I
Early in the new year, Bryce met again (in the
Root, having
Bryce
reported the meeting to the British Foreign Secretary.
. HeERooﬁ]. . was confirmed in the View he had
previously expressed to me that the draft in its
present form went too far and could not be recommended
by his Government to the Senate. It handed over to a
permanent commission which would be independent of the %
two Governments a large and unascertained number of ”
questions, many of them still unexplored, many perhaps
of high importance, affecting the economic and industrial
interests of large areas and of populations which might
some day be large. Not enough was known of these issues
to warrant so bold a step, the consequences of which in
particular cases could not be predicted. He added that
it was not the Anglo-Saxon habit to deal in an abstract
fashicn with principles before the cases they were
intended to cover had arisen and been examined; and that
he doubted for instance the wisdom of such a provision
as that contained in the draft treaty that navigation
was always to be the first interest considered. In
particular instances irrigation or the use of water for
generating power might be more important. So he did not
wish to see a declaration that the use of water was always
to be exactly equal as between the two countries. In
taking of water from the Niagara River, for power purposes,
this principle had been departed from. I represented
strongly to him that the very fact that the effect in
 
65. Laurier Papers, 1907, vol. 493, No. 133282—133289, Letter
from Laurier to Bryce, Dec. 24, 1907; Gibbons Papers,
vol. 3, fol. 5, Letter from Laurier to Gibbons (private)
Dec. 26, 1907, enclosing copy of letter to Bryce.
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concrete cases of the general principles which a
commission might lay down and then proceed to apply,
could not be ascertained beforehand had at least
this advantage, that it would enable any disputes
to be settled with more evident impartiality, and that
we might safely assume that over so long a boundary
line there would be no substantial gain to either
country, as against the other in the application of
the same principles to a large number of cases . . .
Admitting that some of the matters to be left to the
Commission might turn out to be of magnitude, still on
the whole the balance of advantage was in favour of
letting this be adjusted by the Commission . . .
To keep them in the hands of the two Governments would
be to leave grounds of controversy which, when pressed
by persons locally interested, might hereafter prove
embarrassing to the Governments and a source of angry
feeling among the inhabitants of the border regions of
both countries. Mr. Root, however . . . adhered to the
view that the issues likely to arise were too grave for
the Governments to renounce control over . . . He
clinched the matter by observing that at any rate the
Senate would think so, and that he entertained no hope
of inducing that body to pass the Draft Treaty in its
present form. This is a result which I had fully
expected and heartily as I share Sir Wilfrid's views,
I cannot but recognize that the difficulties which the
attitude of the Senate presents are insuperable.
When I suggested to Mr. Root that to bring the matter
into a practical shape he should submit the alterations
in the Draft Treaty which he desires, he undertook to
do so and let me have the draft on an early day . . .
I have mentioned in another despatch of even date that
Mr. Root on being pressed to agree to Sir Wilfrid's '
suggestion that the delimitation of the International
Boundary through the Great Lakes should be entrusted
to the International Waterways Commission, agreed that
this should be done.66
 
66, Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
pp. 18-20, Despatch from Bryce to Lord Grey, Jan. 5, 1908,
enclosing copy of Despatch from Bryce to Sir Edward Grey,
Jan. 4, 1908; Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 755, No. 216108—
216112, Despatch from Lord Elgin to Lord Grey, Feb. 8,
1908. Note: separate treaties relating to Inland Fisheries
and to the Delimitation of Boundaries were signed April 11,
1908, thus removing these matters from the draft treaty.
The International Waterways Commission was given jurisdiction
to delineate the boundary through the Great Lakes.
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In knowledge of Bryce's failure to convince Root
of the importance of accepting the Gibbons—Clinton draft
treaty, Gibbons felt it imperative to go to Washington and
again urged Laurier to insist that Bryce allow Gibbons to
deal directly with Root.
Personally, I have not the slightest ambition in
this matter, but if we are to make headway, Canadians
have to meet Americans directly and not through the
intervention of Englishmen, however capable in a
scholarly way.
To which the Prime Minister replied:
I feel pretty certain that you have only to ask Bryce
to allow you to discuss all these questions with Root
and that he will be only too glad to give you the
opportunity.68
In response to the report from Bryce of Root's
intransigence , Laurier merely replied to the Governor
General that "[tjhe only thing for Mr. Bryce to do is to in—
sist upon the treaty as drafted and that no departure from it
can be accepted."69 At the same time he instructed Gibbons
to proceed to Washington, Bryce having informed the Prime
Minister that he had now received the new proposals from the
Secretary of State.70 Gibbons agreed, announcing that he was
going to be absolutely firm with Root.71
67. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 308-309
Letter from Gibbons to Laurier, Jan. 8, 1908.
68. Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 5, Letter from Laurier to
Gibbons, Jan. 10, 1908.
69. Grey of Howick papers, vol. 3, 1908, No. 000691, Letter
from Laurier to Lord Grey, Jan. 20, 1908.
70. Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
p. 28, Telegram from Bryce to Lord Grey, Jan. 30, 1908.
71. Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 503, No. 135806—135808, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier, Jan. 31, 1908; Gibbons Papers,
vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp.319—321; vol. 8, Letterbook
No. l, p. 325, Letter from Gibbons to Bryce, Jan. 31, 1908
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F. Root—Anderson Proposal: A Commission of Inquiry
 
Secretary Root kept his promise to Bryce and had
Anderson prepare an alternative draft treaty which, Root pro—
posed, would replace the unacceptable clauses drafted by
Clinton and Gibbons. Anderson submitted this draft to Root
on January 25 and the Secretary transmitted it to Bryce on-
January 29, just as Gibbons was about to depart for
Washington.72
Draft of Proposed Treaty for the Appointment of
a Joint Commission of Inquiry With Respect to
Questions Arising Between the United States and
Canada Along Their Common Frontier.
The United States of America and His Majesty Edward the
Seventh of the United Kingdom . . . being equally
desirous that provision may be made for an impartial
and expert examination under their joint direction,
whenever desired on either side, with respect to
questions or matters of difference affecting the mutual
relations of the United States and the Dominion of Canada
and arising along their common frontier, with a View to
securing harmonious and mutually acceptable action on
both sides in dealing with such questions or matter,
have resolved to conclude a treaty in furtherance of
these ends, and for that purpose have appointed their
respective plenipotentiaries as follows:
Article I
A Joint Commission of Inquiry, composed of six Commissioners,
three on the part of the United States and three on the part
of Great Britain, shall be referred from time to time for
examination and report any questions or matters of differ—
ence arising between the United States and the Dominion of
Canada involving the rights, obligations, or interests of
either in relation to the other or to the inhabitants of
the other along their common frontier, whenever either
the Government of the United States or the Government of
the Dominion of Canada shall request that such questions
or matters of difference be so referred.
72. Numerical File 1906-10 Department of State, National Archives,
5934/l8a, Letter from Root to Bryce, Jan. 29, 1908;
Anderson Papers, box 68.
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The Joint Commission of Inquiry hereby constituted is
authorized in each case so referred to examine into
and report upon the facts and circumstances of the par-
ticular questions and matters referred, together with
such conclusions and recommendations as may be appro-
priate if called for, subject, however, to any
restrictions or exceptions which may be imposed with
respect thereto by the terms of the reference.
The reports of the Commission shall not be regarded
as decisions of the questions or matters submitted
either on the facts or the law, and shall in no way
have the character of an arbitral award.
Article II
The three Commissioners on the part of the United States
shall be appointed by the President of the United States,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate . . .
The three Commissioners on the part of Great Britain
shall be appoinEdby . . .
It is the desire of the High Contracting Parties that,
so far as may be convenient, one of the commissioners
appointed on each side shall be a lawyer of experience
in questions of international and riparian law, and one
an engineer well versed in the hydraulics of the Great
Lakes.
Article III
The Commission shall hold the first meeting and organize
at such time and place as may be required by the refer—
ence to it of any questions or matters for examination
and report, as above provided, and when organized the
Commission may fix the times and places for its meetings,
subject to special call or direction by the two Governments.
Each Commissioner, upon the first joint meeting of the
Commission after his appointment, shall, before proceeding
with the work of the Commission, make and subscribe an oath
or declaration in writing that he will carefully and im—
partially examine and report upon all questions and matters
referred to the Commission . . .
Article IV
The Commission may employ secretaries, engineers, and other
assistants from time to time as it may deem advisable. The
salaries and personal expenses of the Commissioners shall
be paid by their respective Governments, and all other
expenses shall be paid in equal moities by the High
Contracting Parties.
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Article V
The Commission shall give all parties interested in
questions and matters which come before it convenient
opportunity to be heard, and may take evidence on oath
when deemed necessary. The Commission may adopt such
rules of procedure as shall be in accordance with justice
and equity, and may make such examination in person and
through agents or employees as may be deemed advisable.
Article VI
The Commission shall make a joint report to both Govern—
ments in all cases in which all or a majority of the
Commissioners agree, and in case of disagreement the
minority may make a joint report to both Governments, or
separate reports, each to his own Government.
In case the Commission is evenly divided upon any question
or matter referred to it for report, separate reports shall
be made by the Commissioners on each side to their own
Government.
Article VII
All reports and communications of the Commission shall
be made to the Secretary of State of the United States
and to the (?) Prime Minister of the Dominion of Canada.
Article VIII
This treaty shall remain in force for years after
its date and thereafter until terminated by a twelve
months' written notice, given by either High Contracting
Party to the other.73 ,
In transmitting the Anderson draft treaty to London
and Ottawa, the British Ambassador reported the essence of his
discussions with Root on the matter. This meeting, too, took
place in the absence of Gibbons.
In a conversation which I had with the Secretary of State
several days ago he informed me that the Draft Treaty
which he had sent me . . . was meant to replace the Draft
Treaty prepared by Messrs. Gibbons and Clinton . . . . He
had . . . concluded that it was better to_prepare an
 
73. Numerical File 1906-10, Department of State, National
Archives, vol. 484, 5934/18a, Draft of Proposed Treaty . . .;
Anderson Papers, box 68; Griffin Memorandum, 1958, pp. 21—22;
Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 4, Despatch from
Bryce to Sir Edward Grey, Feb. 3, 1908; Confidentia1.Prints,
International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 30-32, Despatch
from Bryce to Lord Grey, Feb. 3, 1908.
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entirely new draft embodying his views of how such a
treaty should be drawn and what it might effect. This
new treaty need not, he said, interfere with the ex-
isting International Waterways Commission and it might
be thought desirable to appoint as Commissioners under
it the same persons who were now serving on the existing
Commission. The same persons might quite well act in
different capacities under the Statute of Congress which
created the existing Commission and under such a treaty
as he now proposed. I represented strongly to him,
following the same line of argument as was reported in
my previous despatch, the superior merits of Messrs.
Gibbons and Clinton's Draft Treaty, pointing out that
it would be far better that all questions of boundary
waters should be left to one strong and impartial per-
manent Commission whether for arbitration in the manner
indicated in the Gibbons-Clinton draft, or for a friendly
adjustment in a give-and-take spirit, having regard to
local circumstances. He adhered, however, to his previous
views maintaining that the questions contemplated in the
Gibbons—Clinton draft were, or at any rate sometimes
might be too large to be left to any commission. The
two Governments must deal with them directly by nego-
tiation, and this for two reasons: lst, they raised
important questions of policy and involved interests
too large for a commission to deal with; 2nd, their
settlement involved a formulation of principles to govern
matters whose bearing and significance were still un-
explored. General principles could not be laid down
until the whole subject had been thoroughly investigated.
While expressing to him the dissent of the Dominion
Government to his View and the deep regret I should feel
if our discussions should not result in the adoption of
the best means of relieving the two Governments of a long
series of difficult and probably controversial questions
by leaving them to a commission which might be so con—
stituted as to inspire general confidence in both countries,
I observed that even on his own view of the case it would
be proper that a clause should be added to his draft en-
abling both Governments to refer to the Commission any
emerging questions which might require to be arbitrated
on or to be adjusted in a friendly way. Even if he
thought it impossible to secure the passage of such a
treaty as the Gibbons—Clinton Draft, a Commission might
at any rate be utilized for further and larger purposes
than those of reporting whenever the two Governments
thought fit. After some discussion he agreed to this
suggestion and asked me to draft such a clause as would
effect the object I suggested. This I undertook to do
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without prejudice however tothe general question at
issue between us, as I felt sure that the Dominion
Government would continue to prefer the scheme outlined
in the Gibbons—Clinton Draft to that which he now put
forward. Referring to Article 6 of his Draft, I
suggested that if two sections of the commission sent
different reports to the two Governments, it would be
proper that each section should see the report prepared
by the other, though there would of course be nothing
to prevent either section from communicating privately
with either Government. He was disposed to accept this
suggestion. I have asked Mr. Gibbons to come from Canada
to join me in discussing this matter further with the United
States Government and hope to see him shortly here.
In conclusion, I may say that although Mr. Root appeared
to me to speak from personal conviction in pressing the
arguments which he stated to me, the real and ultimate
difficulty may be found to lie not so much with him as
with the opinion in certain quarters and sections of
the United States, and particularly with the United
States Senate . . . 74
Gibbons arrived in Washington in early February armed
with explicit instructions from the Prime Minister that the St.
Mary and Milk Rivers problem must be provided for in the general
treaty and not separately.75 At the same moment, Lord Grey
received from the British Ambassador a note urging Canadian
action on approval of the Delimitation of Boundaries and St.
Mary and Milk Rivers draft treaties which had been prepared
by Anderson and Root earlier and forwarded to Canada. Root
could not appreciate the Canadian argument that the irrigation
question must await conclusion of the wider treaty. 76
Gibbons was successful in this visit to Washington,
not only in meeting with Root personally, but also, as became
74.
75.
76.
Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
pp. 29-30, Despatch from Bryce to Sir Edward Grey and Lord
Grey, Feb. 3, 1908; Numerical File 1906-10, Department of
State, National Archives, vol. 484, 5934/78780; Griffin
Memorandum, 1958, pp. 22-23.
Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 503, No. 135927, Letter from
Laurier to Gibbons, Feb. 4, 1908.
Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 8, 1907-08, No. 002143-002144,
Despatch from Bryce to Lord Grey, Feb. 7, 1908.
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apparent later, in convincing the Secretary of the need for
a more comprehensive scheme than that embodied in the Root—
Anderson draft treaty. His report to the Prime Minister was
enthusiastic and reflected his determination. He had taken
a firm stand against the Commission of Inquiry proposed by
Root, although he conceded that with the inclusion of an
arbitration clause as proposed by Bryce it would be sub-
stantially improved. But he continued to urge the absolute
necessity for principles to be applied by the commission.
On the second day of meetings, Root acquiesced to the need
for enunciated principles and a permanent board to enforce
them, but he doubted that such a treaty would pass the
Senate. Gibbons persisted, pointing out that if the Senate
would not accept a limitation on the right to divert waters,
then they could provide for a principle of the right to divert--
as long as there was a principle enunciated and uniformly applied.
In a 3000 mile boundary the application would cut both
ways, but what we did not want and could not stand for
was that one principle should be applied to their ad—
vantage through pressure of their politicians in one
place, and another principle to equal advantage in
another.
He insisted, too, that any treaty must include rights of navi-
gation on Lake Michigan, provisions for Niagara diversions and
settlement of the irrigation problem on the prairies.
Of one thing you may be sure now. Mr. Root thoroughly
understands our view of the matter and respects us for
standing up for our rights. You can understand, even
when thoroughly convinced that it is their policy to
be honest and decent with us, that it is not so easy,
even then, to get through a treaty on that line. There
seems to be no control at Washington on the part of the
Executive over the action of Congress.
Finally,Gibbons informed Laurier that he had asked Bryce to come
up to Ottawa shortly to discuss with the Prime Minister and him—
self whether to accept "what is offered by Root or to press for
everything."77
 
77. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 329-330, 336-341,
Letters from Gibbons to Laurier, Feb. 10 & 11, 1908; Laurier
Papers, 1908, vol. 504, No. 136170—136171, 136214—136219.  
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While Gibbons was hoping for a rejection of the
proposed Commission of Inquiry and reinstatement of his own
scheme, Bryce was seeking to salvage as much as possible of
the amended Root—Anderson draft treaty. He submitted to
Laurier the proposed arbitration clause which he and Gibbons
had drafted as an amendment to the United States draft treaty.
. . . Mr. Root expressed himself convinced of the im—
possibility of obtaining the consent of the Senate to
the clause as originally framed. He considered that
amendment underlined in red ink, as essential to the
passage of the treaty. In face of this conviction it
seemed that insistence by me on the original clause
would merely cause unnecessary delay and I therefore
agreed to refer it to the Dominion Government.
Although the amendment undoubtedly detracts from the
practical value of this addition by us to Mr. Root's
draft, yet, even as amended, the extension by it of
the Commission's power under the clause is considerable;
and as I do not consider that such an extension would at
any future date have been possible with a similar provision
for control by the Senate, the amendment does not, in my
opinion, prejudice the future development of the Commission's
functions and powers . . .
Draft Clause for Approval
1. If at any time it shall appear to the High Contracting
Parties that any questions or matters affecting the in—
terests of the United States and of Canada can with advan-
tage be referred for determination to the Commission as
hereby constituted, the High Contracting Parties may, by
common consent and on the part of the United States with
the advice and consent of the Senate, so refer such matter;
and the majority of the Commissioners shall have power to
determine the same, and their decision thereon shall be
final and binding on both the High Contracting Parties.
In case the Commission shall be equally divided the
Commissioners shall appoint one or more arbitrators by
whom, or the majority of whom, an ultimate decision shall
be given which shall be final and binding.7
 
78. Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 504, No. 136220-136222, Despatch
from Bryce to Lord Grey, Feb. 11, 1908; Confidential Prints
International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, p. 33.
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In a personal letter to the Governor General,
Bryce expressed his misgivings for the intransigence of
Gibbons and Laurier with regard to Root's compromise offer.
He suggested that if Canada insisted in holding out for
Gibbons' original proposals, it would end up with nothing,
79 He did not,
however, succeed in shaking the Canadians from their position.
for Root had gone as far as he felt he could.
He returned from his visit to Ottawa with the following memo-
randum summarizing his conversations with Sir Wilfrid.
1. International Waterways Commission. Draft submitted
by Mr. Root not acceptable. Draft prepared by Gibbons
and Clinton should be basis of any treaty.
 
2. Draft Treaty Regarding Niagara River. Dominion Govern—
ment thinks this subjegB should be dealt with along with
other boundary waters.
Presumably proceeding on the assumption that the two
governments were deadlocked on the matter of a general treaty,
the Secretary of State called the British Ambassador in on
February 15 to express his disappointment at having received
no reply from the Canadian Government regarding the draft
treaty dealing with the division of the waters of the St. Mary
and Milk Rivers which he had submitted in June of 1907 and to
present the Ambassador with a memorandum for the basis of a
treaty relating to the diversion of waters from the Niagara
River above the Falls. The memorandum proposed a twenty—five
year treaty limiting the quantities of water which each country
might divert for power purposes above the Falls and providing
for a re-examination of the limitations after ten years by a
special commission or by "such standing commission as shall
then exist for the purpose of considering, deciding or reporting
upon questions relating to the boundary waters between the
United States and Canada,81 In transmitting these messages to
79. Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 8, 1907-08, No. 002154, Letter from
Bryce to Lord Grey (personal), Feb. 14, 1908.
80. laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 504, No. 136223, Summary of Memorf
andum prepared by Mr. Bryce, Feb. 23, 1908, of his conversation
with Sir Wilfrid Laurier during his visit to Ottawa.
81. Numerical File 1906-10, Department of State, National Archives,
vol. 484, 5934/13-17, Letter from Anderson to Root, Jan. 30, 1908;
Anderson Papers, box 68, Note from Root to Bryce, Feb. 15, 1908.  
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the Governor General and the Foreign Office, Bryce pointed out
that he had argued with Root once again for inclusion of these
matters in a general treaty establishing a single commission
butthat Root had remained adamant in his opposition to such a
scheme.82
Bryce continued hopeful that some compromise could
be reached on these various matters and requested Gibbons to
come to Washington immediately "to clean things up and if
possible secure fair arrangement."83 It appeared that the
Government of Canada might be prepared to deal with the matters
piecemeal when the Cabinet in earbrMarch proposed that the two
governments appoint representatives to confer on the matter of
working out an equitable apportionment of the irrigation waters
on the prairies. It noted, however, that it was still of the
view that this matter with all others would best be dealt by a
single commission operating under general principles, "but as
there is no prospect of immediate adoption or even consideration
of the views set forth in [the reports of the International
Waterways Commissionl", it had agreed to deal with the urgent
irrigation questions separately.84 The Canadian Government
appointed Dr. W.F. King and the United States Government
appointed Mr. Newell to confer on this question.85
The Canadian Government quickly followed up its agree—
ment on the irrigation question, with an outright rejection of
Root's proposal for a Commission of Inquiry. Recapitulating the
recommendations made by the Waterways Commission and the pro-
posals contained in the Gibbons-Clinton draft treaty, the
Cabinet concluded:
82. Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
pp. 34-37, Despatches from Bryce to Sir Edward Grey and to
Lord Grey (with enclosures), Feb. 15 & 16, 1908.
83. Gibbons Papers, vol. 6, fol. 2, Telegram from Bryce to Gibbons,
Feb. 24, 1908.
84. Confidential Prints, Inernational Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
pp. 38—40, Despatch from Lord Grey to Bryce, Mar. 6, 1908.
"85. Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
pp. 44-45, Despatch from Lord Grey to Bryce, Apr. 8, 1908;
Telegram from Bryce to Lord Grey, Apr. 11, 1908. 
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The Conmittee of the Privy Council are of the opinion
that if any progress is to be made, it is imperative
that some action be now taken to adopt these or other
principles. The present Commission can only advise,
not adjudicate, and some finality must be reached in
dealing with the subjects of reference. Your
Excellency's advisers are disposed to approve of the
provisions of the draft treaty recited above. They
would be satisfied with any convention which may be
agreed upon along the general lines of this suggested
draft, but they feel that to substitute for it the
proposal to create an advisory board, though with
more extensive jurisdiction, would not be a satis-
factory solution of existing difficulties.
The Committee are most desirous to avoid the irritation
which they apprehend will arise if special cases are to
be considered without established principles, as con—
trolling rules of action. Possibly, if the conclusions
suggested by the Commission are not satisfactory to Mr.
Root, others might be suggested by him which would be
acceptable to Your Excellency's Government.86
Transmitting the message to Root, Bryce added his own
plea for cooperation.
Having during my recent Visit to Ottawa discussed this
subject at some length with the Governor General and
his Ministers, I have become impressed with the earnest-
ness of their wish to secure some means of dealing upon
certain settled and definite principles with the questions
regarding waters now pending and likely hereafter to arise.
In their View the best way of precluding any controversial
bitterness in the future is now at once, before vested
interests in the use of waters have become numerous or
important, to determine such principles, the application
of which impartially between the two countries will be
accepted as fair and equitable by both, and powerfully
contribute to the maintenance of thosafriendly feelin
gs
between the inhabitants of the frontier districts which
,
I need not assure you, they heartily desire to preserv
e.8
Root acknowledged without comment the note from Bryce setting
out the Canadian position and the same day, sent the note along
86. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 4, Privy Council
Minute, March 18, 1908; Gibbons Papers, vol. 14, fol. 1,
I
Despatch from Lord Grey to Bryce, Mar. 18, 1908;
Confidential
Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 40—43.
87. Numerical File 1906—10, Department of State, Na
tional
Archives,vol. 484, 5934/19, Note from Bryce to Root, M
ar. 23,
1908; Anderson Papers, box 68; Griffin Memorandum,
1958,
pp. 23—25.  
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to Anderson for his observations.88
Following the signing in April of the Fresh Water
Fisheries and Delimitation of Boundaries treaties, Bryce and
Gibbons approached Root once again in early May urging that
all remaining questions relative to boundary waters now be
dealt with "in some comprehensive way, not by piece—meal
negotiations or a series of special commissions." Bryce
proposed that, assuming it was impossible to provide for a
commission with powers of decision, at least they might agree
upon enunciated principles of water use to guide the two
governments. Root did not feel that even this was feasible.
He did agree to give the matter further consideration. Bryce
was not encouraged.
Strongly as I personally feel the desirability of
securing such a Treaty as that drafted by Messrs.
Gibbons and Clinton, and cordially as I agree with
the ideas which have inspired the policy of Your
Excellency's Government, I entertain little hope
that the United States Government can be induced to
adopt those ideas. The most that these present
negotiations seem likely to secure will fall short
of that Treaty. For even if Mr. Root himself could
be induced to assent to it, his conviction that he
could not get it accepted by the Senate would prevent
him from courting failure by submitting it to that
suspicious body, in which the selfish interests of
the frontier States, acting upon their Senators,
would be sufficient to determine the action of the
whole body.89
The Canadian Government was not to be dissuaded
from its position which it reiterated for the benefit of the
Ambassador and the Secretary of State.
88. Numerical File 1906-10, Department of State, National
Archives vol. 484, 5934/19, Note from Root to Bryce, Mar. 28,
1908; Letter from Root to Anderson, Mar. 28, 1908; Anderson
Papers, box 68.
89. Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 5, Letter from Laurier to Gibbons
May 6, 1908; Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 756, No. 216170-
2161W2, Despatch from Bryce to Lord Grey (confidential), May
8, 1908; Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 4;
Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
pp. 45—46.
 63
The Committee beg to observe that if no principles are
laid down in advance and if each particular case is to
be considered as it may arise, it seems obvious that
local interests, which may be different in different
localities, must of necessity produce friction, often
very difficult to allay. The Waterways Commission was
created for the very purpose of avoiding such friction.
After giving much thought and reflection and considerable
research to the question, they made a report in which
they have affirmed clear principles, and proposed the
creation of a special commission by which every case,
as it arises, may be settled on the principles thus
laid down.
The Committee still believe that the immediate adoption
of this report is daily growing of more importance and
they express the conviction that Mr. Bryce should again
make representations to the Secretary of State in this
direction.
On June 1, the British Ambassador transmitted the
Canadian view to the Secretary of State and the same week he
met with Root to clarify the positions of the two governments.91
At the meeting Root handed Bryce a lengthy note drafted by
Anderson setting out the United States position which remained
essentially as before. The only new suggestion was that all
matters dealt with in the reports of the International Water—
ways Commission could likely be dealt with as problems arose,
under the general arbitration treaty which had just been con-
cluded between the United States and Great Britain. Root
elaborated his opposition to the Clinton-Gibbons proposals.
The difficulty of the United States in assenting to
an agreement that all questions within the broad
field described by the Gibbons—Clinton draft shall
be referred for final determination to such a
Commission as is proposed, is in the main that such
questions necessarily involve, not merely questions
of fact and law suitable for the determination of a
Commission or Arbitral Tribunal, but many questions of
90. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 4, Privy Council.
Minute 2103, May 28, 1908; Confidential Prints, International
Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 47-48, Despatch from Lord Grey
to Bryce, (confidential), May 30, 1908-
91. Numerical File 1906—10, Department of State, National Archives
vol. 484, 5934/25, Note from Bryce to Root, June 1, 1908;
Anderson Papers, box 68.
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policy, of mutual concessions and of the give and
take which is in so great a number of cases the
efficient means of reaching possible settlement of
difficult controversies. Such questions of policy,
of concession, of discretion, it is impossible for
the Government of the United States to commit to any
Commission.
As to the declaration of principles which was incor-
porated in the Gibbons-Clinton draft and which the
Committee of the Privy Council deems it desirable to
incorporate in the treaty, I cannot avoid the con-
clusion that the subject with which we are endeavouring
to deal has not yet been sufficiently developed to justify
the incorporation of such a declaration in the terms of a
solemn treaty. With our meagre knowledge as to what the
numerous questions of the future are to be, the con-
ditions under which they may arise and the considerations
which should govern their determination, I feel that the
data we now have are insufficient to make it safe to en—
deavor now to lay down hard and fast rules of this de-
scription which are to govern the unknown questions of
the future . . .
Pointing out by way of example the flaws which he saw in each
of the enumerated principles, Root concluded:
The Department has assiduously endeavored to devise
modifications of these rules which would avoid the objec—
tions, but the effort has resulted in the conclusion that
this could only be done by so limiting the terms of the
attempted expressions of general principles as to make
them really worthless for any practical purpose. I am
convinced that instead of attempting now to codify the
rules to be applied to this still partially considered
subject, the true method is that which is followed by
the courts of both countries, to permit the Commission
which is to deal with the various questions as they arise
to declare in its decisions from time to time the prin-
ciples which they deem applicable, and, following the
precedents thus established so far as they are applicable
to each successive case, to build up a system of rules
which will be the result of experience and consideration
in concrete cases.92
92. Anderson Papers, box 68, Draft of Proposed Note to British
Ambassador, in answer to his of March 23, 1908, (undated);
Numerical File 1906-10, Department of State, National Archives,
vol. 484, 5934/25, Note from Root to Bryce, June 4, 1908;
Anderson Papers, box 68; Governor General's Papers, No. 268,
vol. 4; Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters,
vol. 1, pp. 51-54; Griffin Memorandum, 1958, pp. 26—29,  
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Reporting the outcome of this meeting to the Governor
General, Bryce did not conceal his discouragement and sug-
gested that perhaps any further discussions should take place
directly between Gibbons and the United States Government.
As Mr. Root and I have now debated this question
thoroughly five or six times, and have shot all the
arrows out of our respective quivers, I doubt whether
more can be obtained by further discussion on the
present lines. He is evidently resolved not to accept
the Gibbons-Clinton Draft Treaty, conceiving that the
Senate would never accept it. The most that can, so
far as I can at present judge, be considered as likely
to be obtainable from him or them is--
(a) The installation by Treaty of the proposed Commission
as a Court of Arbitration for boundary water "questions
of a legal nature" . . .
(b) The recognition by Treaty of the Commission as a body
to which disputes relating to boundary water may be
referred for inquiry and report.
(c) The recognition by Treaty of the Commission as a body
to which the two Governments may from time to time by
special agreement agree to intrust the settlement of
disputes, not of a strictly legal nature, which
negotiation has failed to settle.
Each of these three points taken separately may seem to be
limited in scope and value, but taken together they would
have the advantage, in the first place, of excluding re—
ference to those local and special Commission which Your
Excellency's Ministers disapprove; and, in the second place
of creating a body with functions so wide and so varied
that it might, if it consisted of able, weighty and tactful
men, acquire great moral authority, and be able to con-
stitute an effective counterpoise to those often selfish
and narrow minded local interests whose clamour is apt to
embarrass Governments and to impede and frustrate friendly
negotiations. It might, indeed, become in time a perman-
ently effective agency for the settlement of this class of
disputes such as Your Excellency's Government has desired.
In concluding our conversation I asked Mr. Root whether it
would; in his opinion, be desirable that Mr. Gibbons, to
whose services in these matters recourse has frequently
been had, should meet someone connected with the State
Department to talk over the subject with the advantage of
the special knowledge of the working of the existing
Waterways Commission which Mr. Gibbons possesses. Mr. Root
agreed and said that he would himself be glad to see Mr.
Gibbons on an early day.93
 
93. Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 756, No. 216192, Despatch from
Bryce to Lord Grey, June 8, 1908; Confidential Prints, Inter—
national Boundary Waters, vol. 1. pp. 48—51; Numerical File
1906—10, Department of State, National Archives, vol. 484,
5934/78—80, Griffin Memorandum, 1958, pp. 29-31.  
   66
G. Anderson-Gibbons Negotiations
 
The Prime Minister requested Gibbons to go to Washington
directly to confer with Root on this "most delicate matter"
and agreed that Gibbons should stay in close touch with the
Minister of Justice.94 Gibbons promised to go as soon as he
had prepared a memorandum for Root outlining strongly the
Canadian case. 5 Copies of this memorandum he submitted to
Laurier, Aylesworth and Lord Grey on June 13, presenting Root
with the original on June 18 when he arrived in Washington. The
letter accompanying the copy sent to the Governor General in—
dicated his attitude toward the forthcoming negotiations.
What some Americans desire, including Mr. Root, is to
keep matters open in such a way that they can, as usual,
deal with each one as it arises so as to obtain an
advantage. We are absolutely right in the stand we have
taken, and it should be maintained; and if we have the
nerve and selE—respect to maintain our position, success
will follow.
Memoranda for Mr. Root
ﬁﬁih the signin of the treaties relating to boundaries
and fisheries, at is now desired is the appointment of
a Joint CommiSSion that shall have power to decide
questions as to the use and diversion of boundary waters
upon certain definite principles accepted by the two
countries.
It is suggested by your memoranda that the subject with
which we are endeavouring to deal has not yet been
sufficiently developed to justify the incorporation of
a declaration of principles in the terms of a solemn
treaty. I beg to submit that we have long passed the
stage at which there is a shadow of doubt as to what
principles should be applied in dealing with the use
of the waters of the Great Lakes System. By Treaty
arrangement these waters are open to the use of the
citizens of each country for the purposes of navigation
  
94. Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 5, Letter from Laurier to
Gibbons, June 9, 1908.
95. Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 522, No. 141476—141477, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier, June 13, 1908; Gibbons Papers vol.
8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 390—391. a
96. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 392—393,
Letter from Gibbons to Bryce, June 13, 1908.
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and neither country has now any right to interfere with
the use of these waters to the injury of such interests
(save the use for domestic purposes). The failure to
recognize this principle would lead to endless con-
fusion. Public opinion, without a dissenting voice,
supports it.
It is suggested by you that a different principle was
adopted in dealing with the question of Niagara, but
that is not so. As I explained to you before the
interests of navigation would not be affected if all
the water in the Niagara River were diverted below the
crest of the rapids and returned to the river again
below the present falls. There it was a question merely
of preserving the scenic effect.
It was never contended by us that we were, as a matter
of right, entitled to the use of more than one-half of
the surplus water of these boundary streams, but it is
contended that we are entitled to the use of one-half
and that that principle ought to be established.
Assume that there may be exceptional cases elsewhere
where these rules may be departed from -— is there any
reason why they should not be applied to the Great Lakes
System and is there any reason why a Joint Board should
not be appointed? On the contrary, I submit the adoption
of principles would limit the powers of the Joint Board
and that they should be limited. The main questions of
principle should be settled by the two Governments.
What advantage is there in your suggestion that the
Commission be a Board of Arbitration to deal with dis—
putes in lieu of the Hague Tribunal? If they are going
to be a Board of Arbitration why not give them power at
once to carry out in detail the spirit of an Agreement
entered into between the two countries? The suggestion
that conditions may change is not a reason why the
present conditions should not be met and dealt with.
I do not think there would be the slightest objection
to a provision in the Treaty that it could be terminated.
by either side on giving one year's notice. I am satisfied,
however, by my experience in the workings of the CommisSion
that if the course outlined is adopted the Treaty Will be—
come permanent and will work out to the great satisfaction
of both peoples.
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Dealing with the question of streams crossing the inter-
national boundary, it does seem to me that the two
countries must either accept the principles suggested
by the Commission or reject them and leave each country
free to do as it sees fit within its own territory with
regard to these waters.
The Commission concluded that it should be accepted as
a principle of international law, that no diversion of
such waters should be permitted in one country to the
injury of private or public interests in the other,
without the consent of that other; and to the further
principle that no obstruction should be permitted in such
streams in one country to the injury of public or private
interests in the other, without that other's consent.
Where such diversions or obstructions were desirable, no
doubt such consent could be acquired by obtaining charters
in each country which charters could and would doubtless
provide for the protection of all interests.
The adoption of the principles suggested will not only
be a correct declaration of international law but will
do much towards the maintenance of a kindly spirit be—
tween the two countries. The questions to be submitted
to the Commission would not be, as suggested by you,
questions of policy, concession or discretion. Questions
of policy would be settled by the terms of the Treaty
and the Joint Board would be merely the machinery
necessary for its enforcement.
It was certainly not intended by us to give to the
Commissioners the discretion to deal between different
sets of citizens in the United States but rather, to
use your word, to dispose of simple issues of fact accord-
ing to the law as declared by the terms of the Treaty.
How can a body not having power to decide issues create
precedents? When are these precedents to become the law
and who is to make them the law? They never could be
made law excepting by the decision of some Court having
jurisdiction to decide issues. Laws cannot be made by
an advisory Board.
With so many States and Provinces having or asserting
jurisdiction, is not a Treaty between the two countries,
declaring what the law is to be as between them and
creating a Board under federal jurisdiction a manifest
necessity?
I
o...
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I repeat these matter to you not in any spirit of
controversy, which I certainly seek to avoid, but
because, after the most careful consideration I can
give it, your memoranda has more fully impressed me
than ever of the correctness of our position. I must
confess that to me it seems so simple to place the
government of this whole system of partnership property
under the control of a Joint Board instructed to carry
out the terms of properly defined Articles of Partnership.
On the other hand, it does seem that endless confusion
and, in the end, great irritation must necessarily ensue
if there is no joint control, if there are no principles,
and if the final decision is to be influenced on either
side by political pressures and local influences.97
With the whole—hearted concurrence of the Prime Minister
of Justice but not of the British Ambassador
the Canadians could expect anything further
from Root by way of concession, Gibbons proceeded to Washington
to present these arguments to the Secretary of State.98
Gibbons was elated with his meetings in Washington with
Root, Bacon and Chandler Anderson, the latter being designated
by Root at this meeting to undertake subsequent negotiations
with Gibbons. 99 Gibbons reported to Laurier that they had
[ canvassed his memoranda point by point and that Root had
conceded
(1) That principles or rules must be adopted dealing
with the use of the waters of the Great Lakes
System.
97.
98.
99.
Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 4, Memoranda for Mr.
Root, June 13, 1908; Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 522, No.
141478—141487; Gibbons Papers, vol. 14, fol. 1; Numerical
File 1906-10, Department of State, National Archives, vol. 484
5934/31; Anderson Papers, box 68; Griffin Memorandum 1958
pp. 31—34; Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters,
vol. 1, pp. 55-57.
Gibbons Papers, vol. 6, fol. 2, Letter from Aylesworth to
Gibbons, June 15, 1908; vol. 3, fol. 6, Letter from Bryce to
Gibbons, June 16, 1908; Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 522, No.
141484, Letter from Laurier to Gibbons, June 15, 1908; Grey
of Howick Papers, vol. 8, No. 002251—002252, Letter from Bryce
(in Chicago) to Lord Grey, June 16, 1908} I
Numerical File 1906-10, Department of State, National Archives,
vol. 484, 5934/31a, Letter from Root to Gen. O.H. Ernst,
June 17, 1908.
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(2) That a Joint Commission should have power to
enforce the principles so agreed upon.
The adoption of principles limits the powers of the
Commission. The two countries make the agreements;
the Commission have only the power to enforce them.
While they felt that riparian rights and rights of diversion
might cause difficulties due to States' rights, it was agreed
that the treaty could possibly provide for protecting interests
injured by diversions.
As a final outcome, he left the matter with Mr. Ander-
son and myself to thrash out in detail, which we did
later. Mr. Anderson was the draftsman of the two
treaties which you have completed [Eoundary delimitation
and inland fisheries] and is evidently very familiar
with the whole matter. 00
Agreement was not as complete as Gibbons had suggested,
however, and very shortly the British Embassy was indicating
that Root still strongly favoured his Commission of Inquiry
without governing principles. The Prime Minister was still
standing behind the demands of Gibbons. "If, however, no
rules and principles are to be agreed upon in advance, I do not
see any useful purpose that could be served in further pressing
"101 Bryce was appalled by the inflexibility of thethe matter.
Prime Minister, feeling that Canada must come forth with a new
proposal unless it was prepared to accept that put forward by
Root. He urged the Governor General to convince Laurier that
he should send a new delegation to Washington in November when
the diplomatic corps would have returned from summer residence
and he noted that it was imperative that the Canadian Government
provide him with an official statement in response to Root's
proposal for a Commission of Inquiry. Gibbons' memoranda, in
his view was merely unofficial.
lOO. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, 394-395, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier (confidential), June 22, 1908;
Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 523, No. 141780—141781.
lOl. Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 524, No. 142044-142045, Letter
from Laurier to Esme Howard, chargé d'affaires, British
Embassy, June 29, 1908; Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 3,
No. 000921—000926, Letter from Laurier to Lord Grey,
June 24, 1908. ‘ 
<
—
=1
~s
:=
..
—-
A
 
71
I would try to arrange a compromise myself, but can't
until I know how far your Government will let me go.
My own belief is that if once we had a permanent
Commission, even with the limited powers Root agrees
to, it would practically soon become a Board, first
of Conciliation, then of Arbitration, and would get
us out of our difficulties. 102
Chargé d'affaires Howard persisted in the Embassy's
views of the need for a ministerial level conference in Washing—
ton in the fall and of the need for a "reasoned reply" by the
Canadian Government to the proposals of the Secretary of State.103
His latter’ point was supported by the Colonial and Foreign
Offices.104 Gibbons thought that with the imminent agreement
between Anderson and himself there was no need for such action.
The Prime Minister simply maintained his original position that
if the Waterways Commission's proposals were not adopted there
would be no treaty at all.
Laurier's alternative to a Boundary Waters Treaty with
principles determined in advance is leaving matters in
status quo without any treaty and that, if matters
become acute between the two countries in consequence
of the absence of a Treaty, he would then wish the
questions in dispute to be referred to the Hague. 105
Before Gibbons returned to Washington to resume his
negotiations with Anderson, he reported to Bryce and Laurier in
greater detail on his encounter with Root in June.
I may say to you that Mr. Root during the interview
made a long harrangue about the unfriendly attitude
that Canadians had assumed towards the Americans for
many years in Parliament and through the public press.
He seemed very sore about it.
He spoke about the freedom with which people, who had not
resumed (sic) "responsibilities" of a nation, were able
102. Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 8, No. 112255-112257, Letter
from Bryce to Lord Grey, June 30, 1908.
103. Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 525, No. 142254-142256, Letter
from Howard to Laurier, July 3, 1908.
104. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 4, Despatch from
Howard to Sir Edward Grey, July 15, 1908; Desp
atch from Earl
Of Crewe to Lord Grey, July 23, 1908; Grey of
How1ck Papers,
vol. 3, No. 000949-000951, Letter from Lord Grey to
Laurier,
July 23, 1908; Confidential Prints, Inter
national Boundary
Waters, vol. 1, pp. 58-60. '
105. Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 525, No. 142257,
Letter from Laurier
to Howard, July 7, 1908; Grey of Howick P
apers, vol. 8,
NO. 002263—002273, Letter from Howar
d to Lord Grey, July 6,1908.   
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to talk. He said that it was unbearable; denied that we
had been put to any unfair disadvantage by the Alaska
award or by the Webster-Ashburton Treaty.
I did not answer him in kind but said that, assuming that
all he had said about the Canadian attitude was true, it
was only a stronger reason for accepting our proposals
which would have an immense effect, not only in allaying
the irritation, but in creating a kindly feeling. He got
very pleasant later on and expressed his great desire to
have the negotiations end in a fair arrangement which
would lead to permanent good feeling between the two
countries.
Gibbons felt Anderson was favourably inclined to the Canadian
position and that they would come up with an acceptable plan
106
 
providing for principles and for protection of diversions.
Laurier confirmed his support of Gibbons' position and
of the Commission's recommendations. He was also curious about ‘
Root‘s outburst. ;
This [:I.W.C3 report constitutes a very firm rock. We
should not depart from it and my intention is to adhere
to it.
Do you think that our friend in the State Department was
serious when he made that little display, or was it
simply a piece of bluff? 107
Gibbons felt that Root was indeed angry, but more at being
"foiled" by Gibbons than at the general Canadian attitude.
They have not got any ground whatever to stand upon but
they hate to recognize the existence of another power
on this continent having equal rights.
Gibbons and Howard met in Boston in mid-July to discuss
the next step in the negotiations. Howard felt that Gibbons
and Root had come to a common agreement on the nature of the
commission as a body that would deal with matters as they were
referred by a "special agreement". He was not as optimistic
 
106. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 401—404, Letter
from Gibbons to Bryce (in England), July 3, 1908; pp. 405—407, 1
Letter from Gibbons to Laurier (confidential), July 6, 1908;
Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 525, No. 142314-142319.
107. Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 5, Letter from Laurier to Gibbons
(confidential), July 8, 1908; Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 525,
No. 142320. a
108. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 410—411, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier (private), July 9, 1908; Laurier
Papers, 1908, vol. 525, No. 142387—142388.
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as Gibbons that there was also agreement on the recognition
of some fixed general principles to govern the commission.
In a subsequent conversation with the Acting Secretary of
State, however, he was assured that
. . . Mr. Root was willing to modify his previous
attitude as regards the recognition by the Treaty
of general principles for dealing with these questions,
at any rate as far as the Great Lakes system was
concerned.
He further noted that Mr. Anderson had now been instructed by
the United States Government to discuSs the matter anew with
Gibbons and Bacon to reach a satisfactory agreement.109
In correspondence with Gibbons, Howard seemed more con-
cerned with the nature of the commission than he was with the
need for general principles.
It seems to me that as matters stand we ought to try to
get it framed to be an Arbitration Treaty dealing with
all boundary water questions.
It should establish a strong Commission of jurists (not
experts as you rightly said) to act as a permanent
arbitral tribunal. And the questions to be submitted
to this body would be specified in "special agreements"
under the General Arbitration Treaty concluded last spring
for reference to the Hague. Thus we should be setting up,
as you said, a little Hague over here for all boundary
water questions, which might ultimately develop into a
Tribunal for the settlement of all questions between
Canada and the United States.
For Gibbons, this was but one point to be included in the treaty
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which he was about to negotiate with Anderson. He enumerated
emphatically for Howard all of the points which he felt Root
had conceded in the last meeting during June.
1. The Great Lakes-—including Michigan——were to be fr
ee
to navigation by both countries.
2. There would be a statement of principles gove
rning the
uses of boundary waters and a permanent board
to
enforce them.
109. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol.
4, Despatches
from Howard to Sir Edward Grey, July 15 &
22, 1908;_
Confidential Prints, International Bounda
ry Waters, vol. 1,
pp. 58-60.
110. Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 6, Letter from Ho
ward to
Gibbons, July 26, 1908.   
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3. There would be the adoption of "some principles"
governing transboundary streams.
4. A permanent board to receive references upon the
request of either country and with power to report
findings and make recommendations was to be set up.
5. The board would act as an arbitration tribunal when-
ever this was agreed upon by the two countries.
At the end of July Gibbons and Anderson agreed to meet
about the middle of August in New York, Anderson promising that
 
meantime he would try to formulate a plan as the basis for dis-
cussions.112 In full confidence of early success, Gibbons pro-
ceeded to Washington for consultations. Howard observed:
Gibbons is very sanguine of success in getting a satis- 3
factory Draft Boundary Waters Treaty and I sincerely
hope he may succeed. I think it is possible that more
will be conceded of the State Department to Canadians
negotiating direct than would be to this Embassy if it
is felt that there is no diplomatic triumph over England
to be obtained out of any negotiation (there is ever yet- k
a hereditary and traditional desire even on the part of'
the best disposed to give the lion's ear a tweak or his
tail a little twist) in which Canada is involved.
 
Gibbons and Anderson met on August 22 and 23, discussed
the chief objections to the earlier Canadian and United States
draft treaties and agreed that Anderson should draft a new treaty
embodying the following points: freedom of navigation on the Great
Lakes system, principles of international law governing the ob-
struction and diversion of boundary and transboundary waters,
appointment of a permanent commission to consider and decide
cases involving application of the principles, provision for
the same body to act as an advisory board in respect to any
matters in dispute arising with regard to property rights of
any kind between the two countries and creation of the same
body as a permanent board of arbitration to which by consent
of both countries any matter of dispute might be referred for
 
111. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 412—413, Letter
from Gibbons to Howard, July 30, 1908.
112. Gibbons Papers, vol. 6, fol. 2, Letter from Anderson to
Gibbons, July 31, 1908; Anderson Papers, box 65, pl 159;
box 68, Letter from Gibbons to Anderson, Aug. 1, 1908;
box 65, p. 166, Letter from Anderson to Gibbons, Aug. 11,
1908.
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final decision. Gibbons informed Laurier that Anderson was
favourably disposed to all of these points and that Root was
aware of Anderson's disposition. He promised to submit the
treaty to the Prime Minister in about two weeks in hopes that
Laurier would have it as "good election material for the fall."114
At the same time, Anderson submitted to Root "at the
urgent request of Mr. Gibbons" a draft of a proposed treaty re-
lating to international boundary waters and other matters,
seeking the advice of the Secretary before he proceeded further
in the negotiations. Noting that his discussions with Gibbons
were purely informal and unofficial and that he would not meet
him again unless Root so advised, he went on:
. . . Mr. Gibbons, of course, has not seen this draft,
but at our conference I outlined, without going into
details, the general provisions and method of treatment
which I have since amplified and embodied in this draft,
and at that time he expressed himself as prepared to agree
to a treaty upon the basis proposed, subject to a revision
of details, and he is exceedingly anxious to have another
conference with me on the matter early in September.
0...
In order to avoid many of the difficulties which we
re
presented by the draft treaty prepared by Mess
rs.
Clinton and Gibbons, I have drawn a distinc
tion between
boundary waters . . . and the waters which are t
ributary
to boundary waters or merely flow across the bou
ndary.
With respect to this latter class of waters I h
ave pro—
vided that each side shall retain exclusive j
urisdiction
and control over them within its own bord
ers, and at the
same time provision is made for subjecti
ng any new uses
of such waters on each side to the sa
me legal restraints
and liability with respect to resulting
damages on the
other side as would arise if the dama
ges occurred within
the jurisdiction wherein the uses caus
ing such damages occur.
These provisions are made subject to c
ertain exceptions.
With respect to the "boundary waters"
I have made their
use and diversion in certain cases con
ditional upon the
approval of a joint international comm
ission, and have
proposed certain principles or rules t
o govern the
action of the commission. In addition
to these provisions
114. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterb
ook No. 1, pp. 418-420,
Letter from Gibbons to Laurier
(personal), Aug. 25, 1908;
Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 531
, No. 143873-143875;
Confidential Prints, Internationa
l Boundary Waters,
vol. 1, pp. 62.
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I have also made special provision for the right of
free navigation of boundary waters on both sides,
extending this right to the waters of Lake Michigan
during the continuance of the treaty. Special pro—
vision is also made for the Chicago Drainage Canal
and for the use of the waters of the Niagara River
for power purposes. I have also included in the ;
treaty the provisions of the draft treaty proposed 3
last January for a joint commission of inquiry. The
general provisions relating to the powers and pro-
cedure of the commission follow as closely as possible
the provisions of the draft treaty above referred to
and the Clinton-Gibbons draft.
The priority of uses suggested by Anderson's draft
was to have application only to boundary waters and was based
upon "the greatest number, which recommends itself as the
natural and reasonable basis to adopt, and has the additional
advantage of expediency for it disarms opposition and assures
the support of the great majority of those interested." Domestic
and sanitary uses were put first because they would benefit and
thus secure "the approval and support of all the inhabitants
living along the boundary." Navigation had precedence over
irrigation and power purposes simply because it seemed fmore
important to the general welfare of the country. Uses for
power purposes, generally speaking, benefit only a very limited
number."
You will observe that I have not included any pro—
vision for arbitration in case of disagreements by
the Commission. Instead I have inserted a provision
in Article VIII requiring the two Governments to
endeavour to agree upon an adjustment. If they cannot
agree it is always open for them to submit the dis—
agreement to arbitration, but it seems preferable
that such special arrangement for arbitration as may
be appropriate in each case should be made by the
two Governments rather than by the Commission, as
was proposed in the Clinton-Gibbons draft.
I have made no provision conferring any jurisdiction
upon the Commission to hear and determine generally
any matters of dispute, for it does not seem to me to
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be suitably constituted for this purpose.115
Draft
INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS TREATY C-P-A-
August 1908
Article I
. . . it is hereby agreed b the High Contracting Parties
that the navigation of all boundarilwaters shall forever
remain free and open on each side of the boundary to the
inhabitants and to the ships, vessels and boats of both
countries equally . . .
It is further agreed that so long as this treaty shall
remain in force, this same right of free navigation
shall extend to the waters of Lake Michigan and to all
canals . . .
Article II
Each of the High Contracting Parties reserves to itself ...
the exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and
diversion, whether temporary or permanent, of all waters
on its own side of the line which in their natural channels
would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters ...
and in order to extend the equal protection of the laws on
each side to cover any injury or damage which may result
on one side of the boundary from the exercise in the future
of the exclusive jurisdiction and control hereby reserved
over such waters on the other side, the High Contracting
Parties agree that . . . any interference with or diversion
from their natural channel of such waters on either side ‘
of the boundary, resulting in any injury or damage on the
{
other side of the boundary, shall be subject to the same i
rights and restraints and impose the same obligations,
and entail the same legal consequences, and justify the
same legal remedies as if such injury or damage took place
within the territory and under the jurisdiction of the
Government . . . within whose territory such diversion or
interference actually occurs.
;j
 
115. Numerical File 1906—10, Department of State, National
Archives, .h
vol. 484, 5934/44-45, Letter from Anderson to
Root, Aug. 26, ;‘
1908; Anderson Papers, box 65, pp. 197-203; Griffin
Memorandum v
1958, pp. 35-37. Note: The idea of compensation f
or injury
caused through diversion of transboundary and tr
ibutary waters
included in this draft was first suggested by An
derson to Root
in earlngune when he proposed that "instead of
referring x
questions arising with respect to the use of
such waters to an i
international commission for decision, they m
ight preferably J
be dealt with as if the damages on either
side of the boundary 1
resulting from the diversion of or interfe
rence with such
waters on the other side occurred within t
he jurisdiction of 5
the Government within whose borders the
diversion or inter- »
ference actually took place." : Anders
on Papers, box 68,
Letter from Anderson to Root, June
2, 1908. -
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Article III
With respect to the use and diversion of boundary
waters the High Contracting Parties agree that
. no further or other uses or obstructions or
diversions, whether temporary or permanent, of such
waters materially affecting the natural level or flow
thereof shall be made on either side of the boundary
until and unless the authority to make such uses or
obstructions or diversions shall have been granted in
such manner as may be provided for by the United States
and the Dominion of Canada on their respective sides of
the boundary and approved, as hereinafter provided, by
a joint commission, to be known as the International
Waterways Commission ...
Article IV
It is hereby agreed that the amount of water which shall
be permanently diverted from Lake Michigan for the pur-
poses of the Chicago Drainage Canal shall not exceed
cubic feet per second, so long as this treaty shall
remain in force.
Article V
(Insert provisions covering St. Mary and Milk Rivers if
agreed upon in time.)
Article VI
(Insert provisions relating to Niagara River as proposed
by Root in February.)
Article VII
The High Contracting Parties agree to establish a joint
International Waterways Commission composed of six
commissioners, three on the part of the United States
and three on the part of Great Britain, to be appointed
as follows:
The three Commissioners on the part of the United
States shall be appointed by the President of the
-United States, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate . . .
The three Commissioners on the part of Great Britain
shall be appointed by . . .
It is the desire of the High Contracting Parties that, so
far as may be convenient, one of the commissioners appointed
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on each side shall be a lawyer of experience in questions
of international and riparian water law, and one an en-
gineer well versed in the Hydraulics of the Great Lakes.
Article VIII
This International Waterways Commission shall have juris—
diction over and shall pass upon all applications for the
use or obstruction or diversion of the waters hereinabove
defined as boundary waters in all cases where under
Article III of this treaty the approval of this Commission
is required, and in passing upon such applications the
Commission shall be governed by the following rules or
principles which are adopted by the High Contracting
Parties for this purpose:
It is agreed that the High Contracting Parties shall have
equal and similar rights in the use of the waters herein-
above defined as boundary waters, subject to any paramount
use mutually recognized or otherwise imposed upon such
waters . . . and neither side shall be at liberty to so
use the boundary waters on its own side as to encroach
upon the co-extensive rights on the other.
It is further agreed that the following order of precedence
shall be observed among the various uses enumerated below
for these waters, and no use shall be permitted which tends
materially to conflict with or restrain any other use which
is given preference over it in this order of precedence:
(1) Uses for necessary domestic and sanitary purposes;
(2) Uses for navigation, including service of canals
for the purposes of navigation.
(3) Uses for irrigation and for power purposes; and
among the latter uses, those involving temporary
diversions shall have precedence over those
involving permanent diversions of such waters.
In all cases where any uses or diversions of any portion
of the boundary waters on either side will diminish the
amount available from the same body of water for the same
class of uses or diversions on the other side, the right
of both sides to an equal division shall be observed, but
this requirement for an equal division may in the dis—
cretion of the Commission be suspended in cases of temporary
diversions along boundary rivers or waters at points where
such equal division cannot advantageously be made . . .
and where such diversion does not diminish elsewhere the
amount available for use on the other side.
a...  
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It is further agreed that the . . . boundary waters shall
not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or
property on the other.
The Commission in its discretion may make its approval of
any application conditional upon the construction of
remedial or protective works to compensate so far as
possible for the particular use or diversion proposed.
No remedial or protective works in boundary waters and
no dams or other obstructions to elevate the level of
boundary waters shall be constructed therein until suit—
able and adequate provision, approved by the Commission,
is made for the protection and indemnity of all interests
on both sides which may be injured or damaged thereby.
The majority of the Commissioners shall have power to
render a decision. In case the Commission is evenly
divided upon any question or matter presented to it for
decision, separate reports shall be made by the Commissioners
on each side to their own Government. The two Governments
shall thereupon endeavor to agree upon an adjustment of the
questions or matters of difference, and if an agreement is
reached between the two Governments, it shall be . . .
communicated to the Commissioners, who shall take such
further proceedings as may be necessary to carry out such
agreement.
Article IX
The High Contracting Parties further agree that any
questions or matters of difference arising between the
United States and the Dominion of Canada involving the
rights, obligations or interests of either in relation to
the other or to the inhabitants of the other, along their
common frontier, shall be referred from time to time to
the International Waterways Commission for examination and
report, whenever either the Government of the United States
or the Government of the Dominion of Canada shall request
that such questions or matters of difference be so referred.
The International Waterways Commission is authorized in each
case so referred to examine into and report upon the facts
and circumstances of the particular questions and matters
referred, together with such conclusions and recommendations
as may be appropriate, if called for, subject, however, to
any restrictions or exceptions which may be imposed with
respect thereto by the terms of the reference.
The reports of the Commission shall not be regarded as
decisions of the questions or matters so submitted either
on the facts or the law, and shall in no way have the
character of an arbitral award.
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The Commission shall make a joint report to both Govern-
ments in all cases in which all or a majority of the
Commissioners agree, and in case of disagreement the
minority may make a joint report to both Governments,
or separate reports, each to his own Government.
In case the Commission is evenly divided upon any
question or matter referred to it for report, separate
reports shall be made by the Commissioners on each side
to their own Government.
5...
Article X
(Providing for organization and procedure of the Commission.)
Article XI
116
(Defining the term "special agreements".)
The Prime Minister was enthusiastic at the prospect
of a treaty as described by Gibbons after his meeting with Ander-
son, suggesting such an agreement would be "the greatest benefit
ever bestowed on Canada during the last fifteen years." He fel
t,
however, that in compliance with the request from the Colonial
Office of July 23, Gibbons should prepare a paper for form
al
presentation by the Canadian Government to refute the earl
ier
H proposals of Root.117 Gibbons objected to this
, feeling that
nothing should now be done to embarrass Root who seeme
d to be
Coming around to the Canadian point of View. S
uccess in the
new negotiations, he felt assured, was near at
hand.
It is simply applying, as between these two n
ations,
the principles which have been for ages appli
ed between
individuals of having a judicial tribunal set
tle disputes
instead of the parties fighting it out, or
doing what was
just about as bad —— referring the matte
r to a board of
advocates (called arbitrators) to see who
could obtain
the advantage.
 
ll6.Numerical File 1906-10, Department
of State, National Archives,
vol. 484, 5934/44-45, Draft Intern
ational Waterways Treaty,
August 1908; Anderson Papens box 65, p
p. 197-203; Griffin
Memorandum, 1958, pp. 37—41.
ll7.Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 5, Lette
r from Laurier to
Gibbons, Aug. 28, 1908; Laurier Pap
ers, 1908, vol. 531,
No. 143876.
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I want to emphasize the fact that in our last interview
Mr. Root did concede that principles had to be adopted,
and it was in View of that concession that Mr. Anderson
and myself are continuing our work.118
Laurier persisted in his view that an official reply
119 Gibbons complied, but instead
of preparing the necessarily controversial document, merely
set out the points on
in agreement.
wrote to congratulate
Gibbons—Anderson negotiations.
pared,
which he felt that he and Root were now
120 The
The British
memorandum was, it seems, never sent.
Ambassador, in London during this time,
Gibbons on hearing the outcome of the
121 However, he was still pre—
if necessary, to settle for less. In a letter to the
Governor General he wrote:
dicating that he would try to take it up with Anderson by the
Gibbons is sanguine, and I hope he has grounds for his
confidence. I have always believed we should get a
Treaty worth something, but have fancied that Sir W.L.
might refuse to have one which did not go so far as he
desired. While entirely approving and entering into I
his View, I believe that less than he asked for would
still be worth having. Gibbons thinks so, and L. has ‘
much faith in Gibbons and may be influenced by the I
latter‘s opinion to accept less than he originally '
demanded. 122
Root acknowledged receipt of Anderson's draft in-
end of September.
. . There are a good many things in it which I should
like to talk with you about, and there are some things
which strike me very favorably, but which I ought to
talk with some of the Senators about before we take any
steps towards committing ourselves.
118.
119.
120.
121.Gibbons
122.
123.
Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 426—427, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier (confidential), Aug. 31, 1908; Laurier ’
Papers, 1908, vol. 531, No. 144043. - ‘
Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 531, No. 144046, Letter from b
Laurier to Gibbons, Sept. 2, 1908.
Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 532, No. 144285, Letter from '
Gibbons to Laurier, Sept. 4, 1908, enclosing memorandum for Root-v
Papers, vol.
4, 1908.
Grey of Howick Papers, vol.
from Bryce to Lord Grey, Sept.
3, fol. 6, Letter from Bryce to Gibbons,
Sept.
002200A—002203A, Letter
1908.
8, No.
21,
Anderson Papers, box 68, Letter from Root to Anderson,
Sept. 2, 1908.
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Due to his absence from Washington, however, Root was delayed
in dealing with the draft, and Anderson had to placate the
impatient Gibbons.124 ‘
In early October the Second Assistant Secretary of
State submitted his comments to Root on the "practicability
and advisability" of such a treaty.
"1. As to practicability:
Any scheme by which the determination of questions
and international controversies regarding the use
of boundary waters, the conservation and better-
ment of their navigable conditions . . . should
be relegated to a commission having expert com-
petence and judicial attributes, would be practical,
and therefore practicable.
2. That being so, an adequate scheme, meeting the
conditions of practicability, would be advisable."
The Assistant Secretary found Anderson's draft "quite prac
tical“,
allowing for most conditions which had developed in the in
ter—
national waterways.
Article II is particularly important because dealing w
ith
the question of damage occasioned on one side of th
e
boundary by changes in the use and flow of water on th
e
other side meets the cases of the St. Mary's (
sic) and
Milk Rivers and any other similar cases which ma
y arise.
His major criticism was that
. . Article IX appears to give unlimited powe
rs to the
proposed International Waterways Commission o
ver any and
all controversies between the United States a
nd Canada
involving any and all "rights, obligations or
interests
of either in relation to the other or to t
he inhabitants
of the other along their common frontier."
This would
give the Commission jurisdiction of ever
y possible con-
tention between Canadians and Ameri
cans, from Passamaquoddy
to Juan de Fuca. I think something like
"in respect to
matters embraced in this Convention" mig
ht be added.125
On October 20, Anderson revised the
draft clauses
slightly, adding a preliminary article
defining boundary waters,
rewriting Article II to make its terms
clear and adding a final
124.Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 7, Le
tter from Anderson to
Gibbons, Sept. 9, 1908; Anderson
Papers, box 65, pp. 228;
box 68, Letter from Gibbons to An
derson, Sept. 10, 1908.
125.Numerical File 1906-10, Department
of State, National Archives,
vol. 484, 5934/44-45, Memorandu
m from A.A. Adee to Root,
Oct. 9, 1908.
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article dealing with the duration of the treaty.126 This
revised draft he submitted along with an accompanying ex-
planation to Root. In this note, he pointed out that the
common practice in establishing commissions between Great
Britain and the United States was to have the United States
commissioners appointed by the President without reference
to the Senate.127 In the ensuing discussions between Ander-
son and Root, the only change which the Secretary proposed
to make in the draft was the article dealing with appointment
of the commissioners; they would be appointed by the President
alone.
On November 12 Anderson sent Gibbons the revised
draft and suggested that the two of them get together
128immediately for final discussions. Gibbons was quite
satisfied with the draft;129
proposed at this point was the addition of a clause permitting
the only significant change he
the Commission to act as an arbitral tribunal in cases re-
ferred to it by the Governments.130 He sent a revised draft
to Anderson which, in addition to embodying the arbitral clause
defined boundary waters more broadly, limited the Chicago
diversion to 10,000 cubic feet, provided for appointment of
the Canadian commissioners by the Governor in Council, gave
the treaty a twenty-five year duration and changed the name
to simply "International Commission".13l Gibbons conveyed
 
126. Anderson Papers, box 68, (Revised Draft) International
Waterways Treaty, Oct. 1908.
127. Numerical File 1906-10, Department of State, National Archives,
vol. 484, 5934/50-51, Memorandum from Anderson to Root, Oct.
20, 1908; Anderson Papers, box 65, pp. 283-293.
128. Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 7, Letter from Anderson to Gibbons,
Nov. 12, 1908; Anderson Papers, box 68, Letter from Anderson
to Gibbons, Nov. 12, 1908, enclosing draft treaty; box 65,p.337.
129. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. l, p.473, Letter from
Gibbons to Anderson, Nov. 14, 1908; Anderson Papers, box 68.
130. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 475-476, Letter
from Gibbons to Bryce, Nov. 16, 1908; pp. 477-478, Letter from
Gibbons to Laurier, Nov. 16, 1908; pp. 481-482, Letter from
Gibbons to Aylesworth, Nov. 24, 1908. A
131. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 4834484; Letter
from Gibbons to Anderson, Nov. 24, 1908; Anderson Papers, box
68, Letter from Gibbons to Anderson, Nov. 24, 1908, en-
closing counter-draft of treaty.  
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to the Prime Minister his immense pleasure with the turn of
events.
You will see by the draft that they have yielded
on our every contention. I do not look upon it at
all in the light of a surrender on their part. It
simply means that Mr. Root has brains enough to see
that their policy towards this country has been
foolish and that it is nowzin their interest to play
the game fairly with us.
Gibbons and Anderson met in New York on November 27
and December 2 to discuss their respective proposals and they
agreed that provisions for irrigation on the prairies and for
diversions at Niagara Falls should be included in the treaty.
Anderson agreed to the inclusion of a provision allowing the
commission to act as an arbitral tribunal, but only with the
advice and consent of the Senate. He indicated, however, that
all mention of the Chicago diversion and any limitation thereon
must be omitted from the treaty at the insistence of Mr. Root.
Gibbons acquiesced, but only on condition that Article II have
an additional clause added: I
The foregoing provision shall not be construed as an
agreement authorizing diversions on either side which
in their effect would be productive of material injury
to the navigation interests on the other side.
They agreed to add to Article III a provision placing under the
jurisdiction of the commission cases involving the raising of
the water level across the boundary in transboundary waters.
This provision was then renumbered Article IV and added to it
was the provision prohibiting pollution in boundary and trans-
boundary waters. The clause in Article VII dealing with the
technical qualifications of the commissioners (lawyers and
engineers)was dropped by Anderson because he felt that it was
no longer appropriate if the body was to be required to act as
an arbitral tribunal. The duration of the treaty was set at
five years. Finally, in additiOn to a number of other minor
132. Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 544, No. 147747—147748,
Letter from Gibbons to Laurier (private), Nov. 16,
1908.  
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changes, the name of the commission was finally designated +
' 133
by Anderson as the "International Joint Commission."
The two negotiatiors agreed that Anderson would
now undertake a new draft embodying these changes and pro—
posals and Gibbons again submitted to the Prime Minister an
optimistic report.
It is quite evident to me that these peOple have
determined on changing their entire policy toward
Canada. I think they see the mistake they have
made in the past in that regard and are anxious
now to show their friendliness and are undoubtedly
anxious to enter into reciprocal negotiation. 134
H. Anderson-Gibbons Draft Treaty
On December 3 Anderson completed a new draft which he
sent to Root and to Gibbons on December 5. The draft omitted
all reference to the Chicago diversion but did not provide for
the additional clause in Article II requested by Gibbons.
Anderson explained this omission.
The addition of this clause seems to me on reflection
to renew the difficulty which we were trying to avoid
in regard to the Chicago Drainage Canal, and as I am at
a loss to see how it can be satisfactorily amended, I
have omitted it altogether. Perhaps you will be able
to suggest some other solution which will be satisfactory.
Article IV which had dealt with the Chicago diversion
in the earlier draft now provided:
The High Contracting Parties agree that, except in cases
provided for by special agreement between them, they will
not permit the construction or maintenance on their re-
spective sides of the boundary of any remedial or pro—
tective works, or any dams or other obstructions in
waters flowing from boundary waters or in waters at a
f lower level than the boundary in rivers flowing across
g- ' the boundary, the effect of which is to raise the natural
\
 
level of waters on the other side of the boundary, unless
‘f 133. Anderson Papers, box 68, Letter from Anderson to Root, Nov.
j: 24, 1908; International Waterways Treaty: Revised Draft,
i, .' Nov. 27, 1908; Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters and
'3 Questions arising Along the Boundary Between the United
' ' States and Canada (Revised Draft), Dec. 2, 1908; Griffin
Memorandum, 1958, pp. 41-42.
a gi‘- 134. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 486-487,
‘ 3”? Letter from Gibbons to Laurier, Dec. 2, 1908; Laurier
Papers, 1908, vol. 547, No. 148391—148392.    
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the construction or maintenance thereof is approved
by the aforesaid International Joint Commission.
It is further agreed that the waters herein defined
as boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary
shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of
health or property on the other.
Articles V and VI remained open for inclusion of
the prairie irrigation and Niagara clauses and the remainder
of the draft was essentially in the form in which it appeared
in the final draft, the form agreed upon at the December 2
meeting.135 Anderson also sent along to Gibbons a proposed
clause dealing with the St. Mary and Milk Rivers and a few
days later, one covering the Niagara Falls situation.136
Gibbons first asked Dr. W.F. King who had been studying
the prairie irrigation problem with Mr. Newell of the United
States to prepare a draft clause dealing with the St. Mary and
Milk Rivers as Gibbons was not satisfied with the United States
draft clause.137 He then turned to preparing a reply to Ander-
son's new draft treaty and to the Niagara draft clause.
. . . We seem now to have got everything in fair shape
except Article 2. You must see that this is not in
satisfactory shape. Yielding to Mr. Root's suggestion,
we have left out the provision dealing with Chicago.
As the matter stands now, under Article 2 unlimited
diversion is authorized at Chicago and in Minnesota.
It happens in the working out of matters that the new
Article 4, dealing with obstructions, will work to the
advantage of your people, I think in every case. I have
no objection to it because I think it is right on prin-
ciple, but I think that the other principle adopted by
our Commission was right also —— that diversions should
not be permitted having an injurious effect upon interests
in the other country.
135. Numerical File 1906—10, Department of State, National
Archives, vol. 484, 5934/55-56, Letter from Anderson to
Root, Dec. 5, 1908, enclosing Second Draft, C.P.A., Dec. 3,
1908; Anderson Papers, box 68, Letter from Anderson to
Gibbons, Dec. 5, 1908, enclosing Second Draft, C.P.A. Dec.
3, 1908.
136. Anderson Papers, box 68, Letter from Anderson to Gibbons,
Dec. 8, 1908, enclosing Draft of Provision for the Pre-
servation of the Falls and Rapids of Niagara River; Gibbons
Papers, vol. 3, fol. 7. '
137. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 493—495,
Letters from Gibbons to King, Dec. 10 & 17, 1908.
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I am quite content, however, to waive this very
important point for the sake of the general treaty,
and because I feel that, as a whole, Mr. Root is
dealing with the matter fairly and in a broad spirit,
but it is impossible to let this Article 2 go without
some restriction.
I do not want to interfere with the sovereign right of
each nation to deal with its own, but Article 2 as it
now stands would justify any diversion, no matter how
injurious to the public interests, in boundary waters
or in the other country.
I think it would be wise to get this matter into shape
before seeing Sir Wilfrid, and therefore am postponing
my visit to Ottawa until I hear from you again. I
propose when there to try and get the Milk River
matter into shape also. It did seem that the provision
which we drew when in Washington ought to be added in
Article 2. If that is not acceptable, how would this
do: '
Nothing in this Article is intended to authorize
diversions in one country which will seriously
interfere with public rights of navigation in
boundary waters or in waters at a lower level
than the boundary in rivers flowing across the
boundary; and while each of the High Contracting
‘ Parties reserves its sovereign right of dealing
with such diversions, each recognizes that it is
desirable that such right should not be unnecessarily
exercised to the injury of public interests in such
boundary waters or in waters at a lower level than
the boundary in rivers flowing across the boundary.
P.S. - These suggestions, of course, are only my own
personal views and are subject to the approval of the
Government at Ottawa.
With regard to the Niagara draft, Gibbons rejected the proposal
for a division of the waters below the Falls of 26,000 cubic
feet for the United States and 14,000 cubic feet for Canada,
insisting that the restriction on diversion should apply only
above the Falls, the general principle of equal division having
application elsewhere.138
138. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 490%-492,
Letter from Gibbons to Anderson, Dec. 10, 1908; pp. 498%—499,
Letter from Gibbons to Anderson, Dec. 15, 1908; pp. 506-507,
Letter from Gibbons to Anderson, Dec. 16, 1908; Anderson
Papers, box 68, Letter from Gibbons to Anderson, Dec. 10,
1908;‘Griffin Memorandum, 1958, pp. 42-43.
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Anderson replied with a counter—proposal to Gibbons'
draft of a second paragraph for Article II, and the clause was
incorporated in the final draft in this form.
It is understood, however, that_neither Government intends
by the foregoing provision to surrender any right, which
it may have, to object to any diversion of waters on the
other side of the boundary the effect of which would be
productive of material injury to the navigation interests
on its own side of the boundary.
As Anderson noted, this wording "has the advantage
of requiring no explanation, and if it meets your views it will
"139 Gibbons felt that this proposal met
the problem quite adequately.140
be acceptable here.
On December 16, Gibbons submitted to the Prime
Minister and to the British Ambassador copies of the Anderson
draft treaty as modified by the changes suggested by Gibbons.
He pointed out that the only provision now to be added was the
article covering the prairie irrigation. He explained to the
Prime Minister that while the principle of non-obstruction of
tributary and transboundary waters was provided for in Article
IV, the United States would not agree to a non-diversion prin-
ciple and hence Article II was an attempted compromise. He
wondered, in view of the absence of any clear rule of inter—
national law governing the rights of diversion, if perhaps-
Article II was not preferable in any case preserving as it
did sovereign rights while at the same time protecting injured
private interests where diversions occurred. He pointed out
the value of the protective proviso which he had insisted on
adding as the second clause of Article II. He emphasized the
value of the treaty.
It means that, with the consent of the Mother Country
and greatly to her relief, we are assuming the obli—
gation of dealing directly with the Americans with
relation to matters peculiarly our own. There 15 no
reason why her larger relations with the United States
139. Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 7, Letter from Anderson to
Gibbons, Dec. 14, 1908; Anderson Papers, bo
x 68.
140. Anderson Papers, box 68, Letter from Gibbons to
Anderson,
'Dec. 16, 1908; Griffin Memorandum, 1958, p. 43
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shou1d be subject to constant causes of irritation
by her being forced to play the part of the policeman
for our protection on this continent.
A permanent, judicial body must, of necessity, play
the game fairly. If the commissioners adopted the ,
attitude of the ordinary partisan arbitrator there
would be a deadlock at once. Our Commission 'Waterways
Commission% has unanimously agreed upon every subject
referred to it. Such a body can only exist by its
members being honest with each other. Thus the import—
ance of the conclusion which the Americans have made in
conceding principles applicable alike everywhere is a
tremendous advantage to us.
With the single exception of Article 2, the treaty is
exactly on the lines what we have contended for and,
as I said before, I am not quite sure that Article 2
is not in safer form now than it would have beﬁn if
our original recommendation had been adopted.
SECOND DRAFT
Treaty relating to Boundary Waters and
Questions arising along the Boundary
Between the United States and Canada.
Preliminary Article
"Boundary waters" defined for purposes of the treaty.
Article I
Freedom of navigation ensured for both countries on all
navigable boundary waters and including Lake Michigan.
Article II
Reservation of the sovereign right to Use and divert
transboundary and tributary waters in each country, sub- F
ject to compensation of injured parties on either side by
the other. Preservation of the right of one country to
object where navigation is materially affected by the actions I
of the other.
Article III
Obstructions and diversions of boundary waters to be per—
mitted only with the consent of the Commission.
l4l.Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Leﬂerbook No. 1, pp. 500-505,
Letter from Gibbons to Laurier, Dec. 16, 1908; pp. 508-509,
Letter from Gibbons to Bryce, Dec. 16, 1908; Laurier Papers, 1
1908, vol. 549, No. 148967-148972.
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Article IV
Obstructions of transboundary and tributary waters
raising the level of the waters on the other side
of the boundary to be permitted only with the con-
sent of the Commission. Transboundary water pollution
prohibited.
Article V
Diversion of waters above Niagara Falls to be limited
to 20,000 cubic feet for the United States and 36,000
cubic feet for Canada "so as to preserve the scenic
effect of the River and Falls."
Article VI
Creation of the International Joint Commission and
appointment of the Commissioners by the President
and the Governor in Council.
Article VII
Establishment of the Commission's jurisdiction; order
of precedence in uses of boundary waters; nature of
decisions to be made by the Commission.
Article VIII
Establishment of Commission's reference power on any
other matters which the Commission would study, report
and recommend upon as requested. No decisions permitted.
Article IX
Arbitral power of the Commission established and limited
to any matter referred by the Government of Canada and
the President with the concurrence of the Senate.
Decisions to be binding.
Article X
United States and Canadian Secretaries of State to re-
ceive the reports of the Commission. .
Article XI
Organization and procedure of the Commission provided.
Article XII
Power to the two Governments to avoid treaty provisions
by making special agreements.
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Article XIII
Treaty to continue for five years and after until
terminated by one year's notice.142
On December 19, Gibbons sent to Laurier a letter
assuring him that Article II would work out satisfactorily and
summarizing again the immense values of the treaty.143 Two
days later, he received a letter from Anderson indicating that
he was in agreement on the revised draft with the exception of
the Niagara clause which he noted must be couched in terms of
protection of shipping on Lake Ontario rather than with re-
ference to the protection of the scenic effects due to the
constitutional limitations in the United States. Anderson
agreed that the Milk and St. Mary Rivers article should be in—
cluded if time allowed, noting that the treaty must be finalized
before January 1 because Root would be leaving the Cabinet in
mid-January to take his seat in the Senate. He injected a new
obstacle to quick acceptance of the treaty by Canada, however,
in noting that it was the understanding of his Government
(presumably from Gibbons) that Canada would not, after the
treaty was ratified, continue its objection to permission being
granted by the United States Government to the Minnesota Power
Company to divert tributary waters of the Rainy River in
Minnesota. To accomplish this, he suggested, a note must be
forthcoming from the Canadian Government waiving its alleged
rights under Article II of the Treaty of 1842 to have these
boundary waters "free and open to the use of the citizens and
subjects of both countries."144 He asked Gibbons to come to
Washington immediately to clear up this point and to deal with
the St. Mary and Milk Rivers clause.145
142.Gibbons Papers, vol. 14, fol. 3, Second Draft submitted by
Gibbons to Laurier and Anderson, Dec. 16, 1908; Confidential
Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 63-67;
Anderson Papers, box 68.
143.Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 550, No. 149145-149147, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier, Dec. 19, 1908; Gibbons Papers, vol.
8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 513-515.
144.Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 7, Letter from Anderson to Gibbons,
Dec. 21, 1908; Anderson Papers, box 65, pp. 363—365.
145.Anderson Papers, box 65, p. 369, Letter from Anderson to
Gibbons, Dec. 26, 1908.   
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Gibbons apparently did not communicate this
thorny problem of Article II to Laurier immediately; rather
he pressed upon the Prime Minister the urgency of including
a now-drafted prairie irrigation clause and getting the
treaty signed immediately. Laurier was not to be rushed
after the lengthy negotiations which had taken them to this
point. ‘
Provisions as to Chicago canal should be included.
Nothing about Milk River should be included unless
first submitted to us. Make no haste; better have
treaty postponed for a few days before signature
rather than not have clear understanding upon
everything.146
Bryce replied that a Chicago diversion clause would be impossible
to obtain and that Laurier should not insist.‘ He noted that the
Milk—St. Mary Rivers draft article was acceptable to Gibbons and
himself and that the "Eﬂnmmdments so far agreed upon have been
147
sent to London asking for approval of Treaty." Laurier ine
Vdicated to Lord Grey that there seemed to be no point in pressing
further for the inclusion of the Chicago diversion._l48 The
Governor General remained hopeful of a successful conclusion.
. . . That little grey terrierIFibbons] has done well.
I understand Root wishes to get the Treaty signed by
January 1 and to submit it to Congress (sic) on January
4th.
The old year left an air of optimism. The new was to usher in
some fresh obstacles.
The draft article dealing with the St. Mary and Milk
Rivers had been drawn by Dr. W.F. King and modified slightly by
Gibbons and Anderson. As agreed by them and submitted to Laurier
on December 30, it provided that the St. Mary and Milk in Montana
and Alberta (but not Saskatchewan) were to be treated as one and
l46.Laurie-r papers, 1908, vol. 552', No. 149548, Telegram from
Laurier to Gibbons (in Washington), Dec. 30, 1908.
l47.Laurier Papers, 1908, vol. 553, No. 149726, Telegram from
Bryce to Lord Grey (secret), Dec. 31, 1908.
148.Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 3, No. 001046-001052, Letter
from Laurier to Lord Grey, Dec. 31, 1908.
l49.Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 8, No, 002224A-002230A, Letter
from Lord Grey to Bryce, Dec. 26, 1908.
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the total available water was to be divided equally over
all but not in respect to each stream. Canada was to have
a prior right of appropriation of 360 cubic feet from the
St. Mary during irrigation season and the United States, a
similar right from the Milk with the additional right of
using the Milk channel in Canada to carry waters of the St.
Mary from the United States. Article II was to apply to any
injuries occurring in Canada from diversions in the United
States. Measurement was to be under the supervision of the
Commission.150 Gibbons was angered by Laurier's caution in
relation to this article as well as by his proposal for
inclusion of the Chicago diversion. On January 1, 1909, he
wired to the Prime Minister.
Draft sent you drawn as result of full conferences.
Imprudent to even submit your proposal without friction
and danger to whole treaty. In my opinion they are-not
asking anything whatever more than is perfectly reason-
able. Equal division of the prairie irrigation Waters
highly reasonable. Knowing Mr. Root's attitude am
certain that if we insist on alterations he will let
whole matter go. I cannot take responsibility of
throwing away tremendous benefits of treaty . . .
If you insist and are not willing to have the treaty
signed on basis arranged think someone else than myself
should come here and assume responsibility immediately.151
Laurier sought to pacify Gibbons.
Whole matter about Milk and St. Mary's (sic) is newtn
me. Will send Pugsley to—morrow reaching Washington
Sunday afternoon. Please wait.
In a letter to Gibbons next day, Laurier indicated that he
was not about to change his mind on these matters and, indeed,
was beginning to have "sober, second-thought" about the treaty
generally. "I am more convinced than ever that we must go
 
150.Gibbons Papers, vol. 14, fol. 3, Copy of Preliminary Draft
of Article VI (undated). ~
l5l.Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 553, No. 149724, Telegram from
Gibbons to Laurier, Jan. 1, 1909.
152.Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 553, No. 149725, Telegram from
Laurier to Gibbons, Jan. 1, 1909.   
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slowly and must make sure of our ground before we commit
ourselves."l53
Gibbons returned ouickly, in a fighting mood to
Ottawa to extract from Laurier approval of the remaining
clauses. Lord Grey sent to Bryce an account of the en—
counter in his office.
. Gibbons had a long and loud interview with Laurier
yesterday in my office, lasting over two hours. Gibbonsfought splendidly. Sir Wilfrid adhered to the positionthat Gibbons' duty and his own was finished when they
had secured the assent of the United States Executive
to the Draft Treaty: that it should not rest with the
Dominion Government to consider the attitude of the
Senate.
Laurier objected strongly to the argument advanced by the United
States Government that while it agreed with the Canadian Govern-
ment on the desirability of controlling the diversion at Chicago,
it could not include such a provision because the Senate would
inot ratify it. Gibbons persisted in his arguments and finally
Laurier deferred to Gibbons on all matters but the Milk and St.
Mary Rivers apportionment arguing that Gibbons did not under—
stand irrigation matters.154
Gibbons returned to Washington immediately to see if
some other arrangement could be worked out in relation to the
prairie irrigation situation since Laurier still insisted on
an equal division of the waters for irrigation throughout the
year. On January 8, he reported to the Prime Minister and the
Minister of Justice that Laurier's proposal was "physically
impossible if rivers are connected and illogical since our needs
are for much water from St. Mary and almost none from Milk. On
the other hand U.S. requires most water from the Milk" during
the irrigation season. He sent along a new draft clause pro-
viding for equal apportionment of the combined waters of the
two rivers in Montana, Alberta and Saskatchewan for irrigation
153. Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 5, Letter from Laurier to
Gibbons, Jan. 2, 1909.
154. Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 9, No. 002244A—002247A, Letter
from Lord Grey to Bryce, Jan. 5, 1909.
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and power purposes, subject, during the irrigation season, to
a prior appropriation to the United States of 500 cubic feet
or three—quarters of the flow of the Milk River and a like
prior appropriation for Canada on the St. Mary. Gibbons
pointed out that the Canadian Cabinet had the choice of
accepting this draft or the earlier one, but not the one pro-
posed by Laurier. Noting his distress in finding "all my work
depreciated (sic) by those from whom I have the least right to
expect it", he indicated that he was coming to Ottawa on the
understanding that the Cabinet would take speedy and positive
action on the treaty.155 ,
I repeat, little as it seems to be appreciated, that
its every clause is of advantage to us. Even as to
the Milk River difficulty, this settlement, in my opinion,
is advantageous.156
 
Bryce, meanwhile, had submitted the draft treaty to
the Foreign Office for its approval. That Office proposed a
number of changes, all of them of a formal nature, but each
indicating the plain fact that Canadian foreign relations were
under the prerogative domain of the Imperial Government. Every
reference in the treaty to the "Government of Canada" was re-
placed with the term "High Contracting Party" (Great Britain).
"Citizens of Canada" became "subjects and citizens of the High
Contracting Party" and "Secretary of State for Canada" became
"Governor General". Appointment of the Commissioners would be '
done not by the "Governor in Council" but rather by "His Majesty,
on the recommendation of the Governor in Council". The only
concession to Canadian autonomy appeared in the arbitration
provision (Article X) where such matters might be submitted
"on the part of His Majesty, with the consent of the Governor
 
155. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 522-526,
Letter from Gibbons to Aylesworth (private and confidential),
Jan. 8, 1909.
156. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 533—535,
Letter from Gibbons to Laurier (confidential), Jan. 8, 1909.  J.
  
General of Canada in Council".
consent was given to sign the treaty for Great Britain.
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Subject to these changes,
157
Lord Grey promptly brought pressure to bear on the
Prime Minister.
Gibbons' Treaty I regard as a triumph for him
personally and Canadian diplomacy, and the
loss of this treaty which gives Canada so big
a Niagara Preference, which gives effect to the
policy you have by means of Gibbons' ramrod
forced down Root's reluctant throat qua uniform
Principles, and which provides a Joint Commission
to which International disputes can be referred,
would in my opinion be a national calamity.
Laurier, noting that "the U.S. meet our views at
159
every point", agreed that Bryce could now sign the treaty.
The
January 11,
Ambassador was informed forthwith and on the same day,
1909, the Treaty was signed by Elihu Root and
160
James Bryce on behalf of their respective governments.
157. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(a), Despatch
from Bryce to Lord Grey, Jan. 6, 1909; Confidential
Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 67-69,
Despatch from Bryce to Lord Grey, Jan. 6, 1909, enclosing
aide-mémoire; Telegram from Bryce to Lord Grey, Jan. 7, 1909.
Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 3, No. 001058-001059, Letter
from Lord Grey to Laurier, Jan. 8, 1909.
Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 3, No. 001064, Letter from
Laurier to Lord Grey, Jan. 11, 1909.
Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(a), Telegram
from Lord Grey to Lord Crewe, Jan. 10, 1909; Telegram
from Lord Grey to Bryce, Jan. 11, 1909; Telegram from
Bryce to Lord Grey, Jan. 11, 1909; Confidential Prints,
International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 70—71.
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III RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY
 
A. Advice and Consent of the
United States Senate
The Boundary Waters Treaty was sent to the Senate
immediately and that body referred it to its Foreign Relations
Committee amid confident predictions that the treaty would
receive swift and unanimous approval when the Committee met
on January 20.1
The first and principal witness before the
Relations Committee was Secretary Root in one of his
acts as Secretary of State. In a lengthy statement,
explained the reasons for entering into the treaty.
proposed a treaty governing Niagara Falls. This was
Foreign
final
he
He had
followed
by his proposal to reach an agreement relating to irrigation
on the prairies where each country was appropriating trans—
boundary waters to the detriment of the other. Next, problems
arose in relation to the waters of Lake Champlain, Rainy River
and the St. Mary's River.
There were a number of other enterprises, points
where questions arose, and it seemed as though all along
the whole 3000 mile boundary, with these new developments
of the use of water for power on the one hand and for
irrigation on the other, it seemed as though the Popu‘
lation were going to grab everything they could get,
and we were going to be involved in a great multitude
of disputes. We were actually in a number of them,
and a cloud of others were arising before us.
1. Governor General's Paper, No. 268, vol. 5(a), Despatch from
Bryce to Lord Grey, Jan. 14, 1909; Confidential Prints,
International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 71-72.
2. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Treaty
between the United States and Canada concerning boundary waters,
signed at Washington, January 11, 1909. Hearing and proceedings,
January—February, 1909, p. 269. (referred to hereafter as
Foreign Relations Committee hearings); Other sources of this
document: Numerical File 1906—10, Department of State, National
Archives, vol. 484, 5934/64; Decimal File 1930—39, Department
of State, National Archives, 711.42155/587; Anderson Papers,
box 69; I.J.C., U.S. Sect. Library (bound volume);
p. 7.Can. Sect. File F-l-l; Griffin Memorandum, 1958,
I.J.Cc I
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The existing diplomatic machinery for dealing with
problems between Canada and the United States the Secretary
described as cumbersome and frustrating.
It would take six months to get through each
item, particularly if we had an ambassador here who
didn't care anything about it [the problem at hand}.
These people in London don't care anything about it——
do it when they get time. Another incident to that
situation is that Canada was never satisfied with
anything that was done. The Canadians did not have
to come up face to face themselves with the necessities
of negotiation and to feel that it was necessary in
order to get what they want to do what other people
want—-that mutual concessions and accommodation is
essential to the conduct of business between nations,
as it is between men. So they were always dissatisfied.
They were continually finding fault with Great Britain
and finding fault with us and looking with suspicion
on everything that was done, suspecting that we were
continually getting Great Britain to betray their
interests.
We have undertaken in this treaty, with the consent
of Great Britain, to create a Commission which will
enable Canada and ourselves to settle our own affairs
to a very great degree without going through the long
and serious circumlocution.3
Secretary Root then commented on some of the major
terms of the treaty. Article II he felt was important in pre—
serving the sovereign rights of each state while at the same
time protecting injured parties by putting "people in one
country in the relation to people in the other side as people
in New York stand in relation to the people in Pennsylvania."
The article would avoid the nations becoming embroiled in
international questions, leaving their settlement to decisions
of the domestic courts. Root was emphatic, in response to
a
question, that Article II had no application to tributaries of
boundary waters. He was equally certain that Lake Michigan
was neither a boundary water nor a tributary water under the
treaty. With regard to Niagara Falls, Root explained the highe
r
appropriation to Canada on the basis of the
greater flow on the
3. Foreign Relations Committee hearings, p
p. 269—274. See
footnote 2 for other sources.
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Canadian side and the Chicago diversion. In its lack of
interest for the preservation of the Falls,-Root suggested
Canada was much like the United States had been fifty or sixty
years earlier. The Secretary then concluded his presentation.
In other words, we take this machinery, having this
practical tribunal created, we give them authority to
pass on the waters, the use and disposition of the
water; we provide that on the request of either Govern—
ment they may be called upon to investigate and report,
perform the functions of a master, and we provide that
the tribunal may be used by the consent of both Govern-
ments for any other purpose.
The alternative
. . . is continual irritation and hard feeling, and the
irritation is greatest among the people of the weaker
nations, and I have been very much surprised to find
what intense feeling and what feeling and prejudice have
been created about things on the Canadian side of the line
that we would pay no attention to.
Despite the convincing argument of the Secretary of
State, several members of the Committee had reservations which
they wished clarified before they would recommend the treaty
for advice and consent of the Senate. Senator Lodge of
Massachussetts proposed an amendment to Article VII which would
require the consent of the Senate to appointment by the Presi—
dent of the United States commissioners. This proposal was at
first accepted but later rejected by the Committee. Senators
Nelson and Clapp of Minnesota and Heyburn of Idaho were concerned
over the possible effects of Article II on projects undertaken on
United States streams tributary to boundary waters. They wanted
further clarification of the protective provisions of Article
11.5 Senator Nelson voiced three objections. Article II granted
a right of action where none had previously existed. Article III
precluded development on tributary streams without the consent of
the United States Government and the commission. Article IV
created a police power at the federal and international levels
over water pollution. Each of these was an invasion of States'
4. Foreign Relations Committee hearings, pp. 274-278. See
footnote 2 for other sources.
5. Foreign Relations Committee hearings, pp. 281-283. See
footnote 2 for other sources.  
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rights and there should be an amendment to the treaty preserving
the rights of the States to deal with their waters.6 The most
serious objection to the treaty was raised by Senator Smith of
Michigan who, though not a member of the Committee, was granted
the privilege of stating his case before the Committee at a
later day. He argued that the equal division of waters provision
of Article VIII had the effect of interfering with the proprietary
rights of Michigan Citizens (power interests) in the St. Mary's
River at Sault Ste. Marie (the 800) where the flow of the boundary
waters was greater on the United States side.7 Concern was rising
that the Senate might not so readily give its consent to the
treaty.8
In the face of mounting opposition to various clauses
of the treaty, Secretary Root called upon Anderson to prepare a
rebuttal to the arguments of the Senators. Anderson made his
statement before the Foreign Relations Committee on January 30
and February 3. He made the following points:
1. The distinctions drawn between boundary waters,
boundary tributary waters and transboundary waters
were fully preserved in Articles II and III.
2. Article II referred only to transboundary waters.
and water flowing into boundary waters. It did not
include use, obstruction or diversion of boundary
waters.
3. Article III had reference only to boundary waters
.
4. Article IV (apart from the pollution provision) re-
ferred only to waters flowing from boundary waters and
to transboundary rivers after they had passed the boun
dary.
5. The Commission was given jufisdiction under Articl
e
VIII over waters coming under Articles III and IV but
not over waters coming under Article II.
6. The right of action under Article II applied
to
private or individual interests in distinction to
public
or governmental interests ("parties'versus "Parties")
and the right of the parties was to enter the court
s of
6. Anderson Papers, box 69, Letter from Sen. K
. Nelson to
Chairman Sen. S.M. Cullom, Jan. 29, 1909.
7. Foreign Relations Committee hearings, pp. 281—28
3. See
footnote 2 for other sources.
8. Governor General's Paper, No. 268, vol.
5(a), Despatch
from Bryce to Lord Grey, Jan. 30, 1909.
 
 102
the other country (jurisdiction) and sue under the law
of that place for damages as if the injury had occurred
there.
7. Articles II, III and IV had no application where
special agreements were undertaken by the Parties.
8. Senator Nelson's concern over the effect of Articles
II and III on the drainage of the Minnesota swamplands
into tributaries of the Rainy River and the Lake of the
Woods was unfounded. First, the case came under Article
II (if, indeed, drainage could be considered a "diversion")
and not Article III and hence did not require the approval
of the Commission. Second, since the right to damages
was limited to private parties and since Minnesota law
provided no right to damages in such cases, there could
be no action by injured Canadians in the Minnesota courts.
9. Senator Heyburn's fears over the effects of Articles II,
IV and VIII were equally unfounded. The principles enun—
ciated in Article VIII had application only to boundary
waters and not to others. Article II had no application
to Lake Michigan and even if it did, the Chicago diversion
was expressly excluded under the "existing works" clause.
The Commission had no jurisdiction over the water pollution
clause and since that clause referred only to pollution on
one side of the boundary having an adverse effect on the
other, there would seldom be an occasion on which it could
be invoked by either country. There was little possibility
of pollution of boundary waters becoming a serious problem.
10. Senator Smith's proposed amendment to protect the
greater use by American citizens of the boundary waters
at Sault Ste. Marie was unnecessary since Article VIII pro—
vided for the greater use by one side, on the approval of
the Commission, where the natural conditions favoured it.
The equal use provision of Article VIII was reasonable
and logical since the Treaty of 1871 defined the boundary
throughout the boundary waters as the center of the lakes
and rivers. In addition, it was important to note that
Article VIII subordinated private uses (power) to public
uses (sanitary, domestic and navigation).9
In addition to this elaborate explanation before the
Committee, Anderson was seeking by letter to placate the con—
cerned Senators lo and to answer the unfounded allegation of
10.
Numerical File 1906-10, Department of State, National Archives,
vol. 484, 5934/64, Memorandum for Foreign Relations Committee
of the Senate, (undated); Foreign Relations Committee hearings,
pp. 284,285; Anderson Papers, box 69; I.J.C., U.S. Sect. Library
(bound volume); I.J.C., Can. Sect. File F—l-l; Griffin Memorandum
1958, pp. 46—48.
Numerical File 1906-10, Department of State, National Archives,
vol. 484, 5934/99, Letter from Anderson to Sen. H.C. Lodge,
Feb. 6, 1909; Anderson Papers, box 65, pp. 396—399.  
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Smith as to Anderson's financial interest in securing
approval of the treaty.ll
On February 15, Senator Smith was invited to
state his case before the Committee for an amendment to the
treaty providing for the protection of the riparian rights of
Michigan citizens at the 800. He pointed out that the flow of
the St. Mary's River at the 800 was two-thirds on the Michigan
side and one—third on the Ontario side. Thus, the "equal and
similar rights" provision of Article VIII would divest the
Michigan power companies of their "proprietary interests" in
a part of the water flowing over Michigan territory. He also
objected to passing over to an "international tribunal" power
to decide "rights which presently are purely American". "Why
turn a proposition over to a foreign state when you are absolutely
supreme without the treaty?" His amendment would merely pro—
vide that uses of the boundary waters be determined on the basis
of territorial ownership and would not affect Canadian ratification
of the treaty. "It would [have] if I said so in so many words that
we were to take three-fourths and they one—fourth. If we fixed
on an arbitrary amount."12
The Canadians, however, were not to be beguiled so
easily by the Senator from Michigan. This became readily apparent
as Anderson and Root moved to modify the provisions of the treaty
which had given rise to the opposition in the Senate committee.
On February 1, Anderson sent the following telegram to Gibbons:
Would amendment striking out pollutionclause in
Article four be acceptable. Local interests insist
that water at 800 rapids be divided on basis of terri—
torial ownership at that point -- would this be
acceptable. Do you interpret Article two as giving
right of action for damages resulting from increaSing
flow of tributary waters by drawing swamps into them.
May have to ask for an exchange of notes stating
official understanding that no action would lie in
such case. Please treat inquiry as confidential and
ll. Numerical File 1906-10, Department of State, National
Archives, vol. 484, 5934/66, Letter from Anderson to
Secretary R. Bacon, Feb. 10, 1909.
12. Foreign Relations Committee hearings, pp. 287-296, See
footnote 2 for other sources.
1m v.ml" 4_
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telegraph answer here today.13
He also asked for a meeting with Gibbons at an early date.14
Gibbons replied:
Have no authority to consent to amendments. Never
thought to interpret Article Two in way you suggest.
Do not think it was so intended. That matter might
be covered by note but do not think the Soo matter
could be. Pollution clause ought to stay in but be
only enforced in more serious cases.
Gibbons transmitted Anderson's proposals to the Prime
Finister noting that Article II was quite clear and a valuable
provision and that an understanding concerning the application
of the second article of the 1842 Treaty could be given by Canada
without creating any problems. He insisted, however, that Laurier
should not agree to the Soo amendment giving the United States
users more than one—half of the water simply because they had mmm
territory bordering on the river than Canada did.v The pollution
clause was not important but should be retained for application
in extreme cases.16 In a second letter the next day, he
 
13. Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 7, Telegram from Anderson to
Gibbons, Feb. 1, 1909; Anderson Papers, box 65, p. 391.
14. Anderson Papers, box 65, p. 392, Telegram from Anderson
to Gibbons, Feb. 1, 1909.
15. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. l, p.507, Telegram
from Gibbons to Anderson (confidential), Feb. 1, 1909.
16. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 571—577, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier, Feb. 1, 1909. Note: It will be re-
called that Anderson had raised the question in December of
Canada giving an understanding in writing that Article II of
the 1842 Treaty would no longer be invoked with the signing
of this treaty. At that time Gibbons was evasive with Ander-
son and avoided mention of the matter to Laurier. In early
January Anderson pressed Gibbons again. The reply was that
he could get no concession from Laurier and in any case, would
give his own assurance that the 1842 Treaty article would
never be invoked. This was not enough for Anderson and he
informed Gibbons that the Secretary of State was communicathw
to Bryce the fact that the U.S. Government would now refuse
to recognize the rights Canada claimed under this article. '
Gibbons then indicated that he would try to deal with Laurier
on the matter once again. "Our people are not as strong in HE
back as they ought to be at Ottawa." See: Anderson Papers b0x
69 Telegram from Anderson to Gibbons, Jan. 9, 1909; Telegram
from Gibbons to Anderson, Jan. 9, 1909; Telegram from Gibbons
to Anderson, Jan. 10, 1909; Telegram from Anderson to Gibbon&
Jan. 14, 1909; Telegram from Gibbons to Anderson, Jan. 16, 19M‘  
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elaborated on the interpretation of Article II, noting the
distinction which must be drawn between injury to public rights
caused by an upstream diversion and an injury to private interests.
He felt that Article II was completely in accord with the so-
called Harmon Doctrine despite earlier United States views. He
did not think it would be wise for him to go to Washington until
the Senate had approved the treaty since he would otherwise be
17
 
pressured for concessions.
Laurier agreed with all points raised by Gibbons 18
save the question of the application of Article II of the Treaty
of 1842. The Prime Minister had received word from Bryce that
 
r Root had indicated that following signing of the treaty he
would now permit the Minnesota Power Company to proceed with
e diversions of the Rainy River tributaries.19 Laurier now pointed
out to Gibbons that he was not to make any agreement with Ander—
son concerning the non-application of the 1842 Treaty to these
boundary waters, noting that he would sign nothing based upon
any such understanding.20 He asked Gibbons, at the request of
Bryce,21 to go to Washington to work out the existing problems.
Gibbons returned from Washington concerned over the
apparent support in the Senate for the Smith "rider" concerning
rights at the 500 but convinced that Canada must insist on equal
division of boundary waters throughout.22 Indeed, to Secretary
Bacon he wired:
17. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 571-577, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier, Feb. 2, 1909.
18. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 559, No. 151481, Letter from Laurier
to Gibbons, Feb. 9, 1909.
19. Gibbons Papers, vol. 14, fol. 3, Letter from Root to Bryce,
Jan. 11, 1909.'
J 20. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 560, No. 151791, Letter from Laurier
to Gibbons (private), Feb. 15, 1909; Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol 5
21. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 560, No. 151789—151790, Telegram from
Bryce to Lord Grey (secret), Feb. 12, 1909.
K 22. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 608—610, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier, Feb. 17, 1909; Laurier Papers, 1909,
vol. 560, No. 151938-151940.
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On reflection think any amendment to be avoided;
the principal (sic) of equal division is the only
fair one and must be maintained, otherwise endless
confusion.23
He felt that, on the other hand, Laurier was being completely
unreasonable in insisting on the application of the 1842 Treaty
to the diversions in Minnesota and that this opposition, coupled
with the Smith support, could kill the treaty in the Senate.24
Laurier at this point remained adamant: there was going to be
no "secret" agreement concerning the non—application of the
1842 provisions. Either Article II of the Webster—Ashburton
Treaty was to be abandoned formally or it was to have appli—
cation in appropriate cases.2
When it became apparent after Senator Smith's appear-
ance before the Senate committee that advice and consent of the
Senate without an amendment or interpretation of Article VIII
and without protection of rights in Minnesota was unlikely,
Secretary Bacon proposed an understanding to be approved by
Canada
. . . that nothing in this Treaty shall be construed
as affecting or changing any existing territorial or
riparian rights in the water, or rights of owners of
lands under water on either side of the International
Boundary at the rapids of St. Mary's River in the use
of waters flowing over such lands, subject to re-
quirements of navigation in boundary waters and of
navigation canals; and further, that nothing in this
Treaty shall be construed as interfering with drainage
of wet swamps and overflowed lands into streams flowing
into boundary waters, and that these interpretations
will be mentioned in the ratification . . .
Bryce communicated the proposal to Canada, assuring the Govern-
ment that Root agreed that the understanding changed nothing in
1% '; the treaty and urging the Prime Minister to adopt the understanding
(t 23. Numeridal File 1906—10, Department of State, National-Archives
i ' vol. 484, 5934/65, Telegram from Gibbons to Bacon, Feb. 16,1909.
i3 ‘ 24. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 560, No. 151942-151944, Letter from
lk-i. Gibbons to Laurier (private), Feb. 18, 1909.
25. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 560, No. 151945, Letter from Laurier
to Gibbons (private), Feb. 19, 1909, Gibbons Papers, vol. 3
fol. 5.
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in order to save the treaty.26 He urged Gibbons to go to
Ottawa to convince the Prime Minister of the acceptability
of the proposal.27
Bryce had Anderson send his interpretation of the
amendment to Gibbons.
The effect of interpretation is to leave undisturbed
present legal rights on each side at the Rapids, sub-
ject to requirements of navigation. This has always 28
been my understanding of the true intent and meaning.
Gibbons disagreed.
We entirely differ in understanding. The principle
of equal divisions is fair. Was approved by Commission
and intended to be provided for by treaty. Appreciate
difficulty of situation but if you develop power at
rapids, provision should be made for preserving our
right to divert our share above.
He suggested postponement of any immediate action on the matter.29
When Gibbons replied to Bryce that Root's proposal was not as
modest as Secretary Bacon had indicated and that it would indeed
take water from Canada at the Soo,30 Bryce replied that Root
felt Gibbons misunderstood the import of the "rider" and had
better come to Washington immediately.31 Gibbons agreed to go
to "denounce the rider as dishonest" and to insist on a fifty—
fifty division of the waters at Sault Ste. Marie.32
Lord Grey informed Bryce of the position in Ottawa
concerning Article VIII.
26. Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 9, No. 002307-002308, Despatch.
from Bryce to Lord Grey (secret), Feb. 20, 1909; Confidential
Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 83-84.
27. Gibbons Papers, vol. 6, fol. 4, Telegram from Bryce to Gibbons,
Feb. 21, 1909.
28. Anderson Papers, box 65, p. 410, Telegram from Anderson to
Gibbons, Feb. 23, 1909; box 69.
29. Anderson Papers, box 69, Telegram from Gibbons to Anderson,
Feb. 23, 1909.
30. Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
p. 84, Telegram from Gibbons to Bryce (secret), Feb. 23, 1909.
31. Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
p. 85, Telegrams from Bryce to Gibbons and Lord Grey (secret),
Feb. 24, 1909; Gibbons Papers, vol. 6, fol. 4.
32. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 616—617, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier, Feb. 24, 1909; Laurier Papers, 1909,
vol. 562, No. 152407-152408.
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I do not think Sir Wilfrid Laurier is quite con—
vinced by Gibbons' talk, but as Gibbons takes this
strong attitude, Sir Wilfrid Laurier cannot act in
defiance of the opinion of his expert.33
Even Bryce, despite his earlier assurance of the harmlessness
of the proposed "rider", was now having doubts as to its import.
He wrote to Lord Grey:
Between ourselves, the last stages of the treaty were
handled hurriedly, and some of the points less thoroughly
scrutinized than should have been the case. Hence the
difference of view between Gibbons and Anderson.34
On February 24, the Foreign Relations Gommittee re-
ported the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent, subject
to the addition of a "rider" preserving riparian rights on the
St. Mary's River and securing the right to drain swamp lands
in Minnesota.35 Action was now imperative and Gibbons agreed
to meet in New York with Root, Anderson, Bacon and Bryce to
attempt to clarify the meaning of the "rider" in relation to
the 800. He pointed out, however, that Laurier was going to
have to concede the Minnesota diversion issue.
. That we should insist upon raising a contention
which it is conceded we cannot enforce, seems to me
not justified by any form of reasoning unless indeed
it is desired to drop the treaty.
He reminded Laurier that they could drop Article II entirely
if Laurier insisted, but if they retained it, then Laurier must
be prepared to give an understanding regarding the 1842 Treaty.36
At the same time, Bryce was asking Gibbons to be reasonable in
his demands.
From what you tell me, I am not sanguine that an
arrangement can be made in time, but after all the
trouble spent on this Treaty, we must try to give
it every chance. Even if an agreement can't be
33. Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 9, No. 002311—002312, Letter
from Lord Grey to Bryce, Feb. 24, 1909.
34. Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 9, No. 002313-002315, Letters
from Bryce to Lord Grey, Feb. 24, 1909.
35. Foreign Relations Committee hearings, p. 297. See footnote
2 for additional sources.
36._Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 562, No. 152431-152434, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier, Feb. 25, 1909; Gibbons Papers, vol. 8,
Letterbook No. 1, pp. 622A—624.   
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reached now, I will not despair of saving the Treaty
in the long run. The consequences of losing it would
be serious. -
Following the meeting in New York on February 26,
Gibbons informed Laurier that Root and Bacon would agree to
add to the "rider" the following words:
. without prejudice to the right of Canada to
take within its own territory not exceeding one-half
of the total amount of the waters flowing from Lake
Superior in the St. Mary's River available for
power purposes,
and that he, Gibbons, found this fully acceptable. He insisted
that the resolution protecting swamp land drainage in Minnesota
38
should be conceded. Laurier replied, after consulting with
Aylesworth, that the Canadian Government must adhere to its
original position and, in any case, the matter was too important
9 .
to settle by telegram.3‘ Gibbons was annoyed and told Laurier
that he was being unreasonable.
Please don't have further hindrance. Minnesota people
have right to drain their swamps into streams tributary
to Rainy river. Concession amounts to nothing but is
excuse to secure support their senators. R. acted
splendidly.40
He pointed out that his fellow—members of the Waterways Commission
agreed with him that neither the Smith "rider" nor the Minnesota
provision caused any harm to Canada.4 He explained the position
of the Senators.
They conceive that the Resolution does nothing more
than take out of the Operation of the Treaty riparian
rights over the land water therein mentioned. It leaves
untouched all other general provisions. . . including
37. Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 6, Letter from Bryce to Gibbons,
Feb. 25, 1909.
38. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 562, No. 152435—152438, Telegrams
from Gibbons to Laurier, Feb. 26, 1909; Grey of Howick Papers,
vol. 9, No. 002316, Letter from Bryce to Lord Grey, Feb. 26,
1909; Anderson Papers, box 69, Memo of New York Meeting,
Feb. 26, 1909.
39. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 562, No. 152436-152439, Telegrams
from Laurier to Gibbons, Feb. 26, 1909.
40. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 562, No. 152440, Telegram from
Gibbons to Laurier, Feb. 27, 1909.
41. Numerical File 1906-10, Department of State, National Archi
ves,
vol. 484, 5934/64, Memorandum by O.H. Ernst to Root on Saul
t
Ste. Marie, Jan. 29, 1909; Anderson Papers, box 69.
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that contained in the words "equal and similar rights"
in Article VIII. It is merely safeguarding of one
particular private interest in certain land and the
water flowing in its natural course over that land.
Laurier, bending slightly, suggested that the new draft might
be acceptable but he would have to consult with Aylesworth
before he could agree.43
Lord Grey sought to encourage the Prime Minister,
urging that "it would be better to lose the battle of the
Sault than to lose the Treaty".44 He was so optimistic that
he informed Bryce that Canada would accept the "rider" as long
as the clarification reached in New York was added.45 He in—
formed the Foreign Office that the last obstacle to acceptance
46 Later the sameof the treaty seemed to have been removed.
day, after a meeting with Gibbons, Laurier and Aylesworth, he
had to note in a memorandum that the latter two were completely
opposed to the "rider".47 He advised Bryce to inform the
Secretary of State to have the Senate proceed with the amendment
trying to draft it in such a way as to make it palatable to
Canada.48 Gibbons reported to Anderson: "All right, put it
through."49
 
42. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 562, No. 152686-152687, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier, Feb. 28, 1909; Gibbons Papers, vol.
14, fol. 3, Memorandum by Gibbons on meeting with Bacon and
Root, (undated). '
43. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 562, No. 152442, Telegram from
Laurier to Gibbons, Feb. 27, 1909.
44. Grey of HoWick Papers, vol. 4, No. 001108, Letter from Lord
Grey to Laurier, Mar. 1, 1909.
45. Governor General‘s Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(a) Telegram from
Lord Grey to Bryce, Mar. 1, 1909.
46. GovernOr General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(a), Telegram from
Lord Grey to Lord Crewe (secret and confidential), Mar. 1,1909.
47. Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 9, No. 002318—002320, Memorandum
of meeting with Laurier, Gibbons and Aylesworth, Mar. 1, 1909.
48. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(a), Telegram from
Lord Grey to Bryce, Mar. 2, 1909; Confidential Prints, Inter-
national Boundary Waters, vol. 1, p. 88.
49. Anderson Papers, box 69, Telegram from Gibbons to Anderson,
Mar. 1, 1909.  
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On March 2, Root sent Gibbons a note indicating that
Senator Smith insisted on deleting the New York amendment to
his "rider" and that it appeared most unlikely that anything
else could be substituted before the Senate terminated its
work on March 4.50 Gibbons replied directly:
Cannot get our people to accept without consideration.
Think you had better let the treaty pass in best shape
you can. Will try to get assent here later and think
I can. A letter from the [new] Secretary of State to
Mr. Bryce confirming interpretation as reserving our
right to use of half the water would no doubt make it
acceptable.51
On March 4, Bryce informed the Governor General that
the treaty had been approved by the Senate along with the Smith
52 He noted,"rider" and without the New York clarification.
however, that Root still felt that the meaning of the amendment
was clear and did not deprive Canada of any rights. In addition,
he noted, with the passage of the legislation by Congress expro—
priating the power interests at the 800, Canada need have no
worry since the land in question would then be owned by the United
States Government and it would undoubtedly guarantee "equal and
similar rights" under Article VIII.53 Gibbons replied to the
Ambassador that he thought Bryce could give his assurance that
the Canadian Government would accept the treaty as long as it
could get written statements from Senator Root and the Secretary
of State assuring Canada that the "rider" meant
Lt]hat each country reserves its right, within
its own territory to take not exceeding one-half the
50. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 566, No. 153653-153654, Note and
Draft of Senate Resolution from Root to Gibbons, Mar. 2, 1909;
Anderson Papers, box 69, Letter from Root to Bryce, Mar. 2, 1909
51. Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 7, Telegram from Gibbons to Root,
Mar. 2, 1909; Anderson Papers, box 69.
52. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(a), Telegram from
Bryce to Lord Grey, Mar. 4, 1909; Numerical File 1906—10,
Department of State, National Archives, vol. 484, 5934/80A,
Note from Bacon to Bryce, Mar. 5, 1909.
53. Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 9, No. 002322-002323, Letter from
Bryce to Lord Grey, Mar. 4, 1909; Confidential Prints, Inter-
national Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 69—91; Gibbons Papers,
vol. 3, fol. 6, Letter from Bryce to Gibbons, Mar. 5, 1909.
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quantity of the water flowing from Lake Superior into
the St. Mary giver and Sault Ste. Marie, over and above
the needs of navigation.54
It was about this time that Senator Root prepared in
  
I longhand an extensive memorandum stating his impressions of
the treaty.
1. Each country is now entitled to use all water flowing
in its own territory.
2. Each country can construct in its own territory what-
ever works it wishes.
3. There is no right in either country or its citizens
to restrain or interfere with the use of water on the
other side of the boundary because of any effect upon
riparian owners on its own side of the boundary below
the point of construction.
4. The pending treaty declares a rule not before existing
for the exercise of the rights above stated, viz: the
rule of equal and similar use.
5. The Senate resolution creates no new rights but saves
already existing rights of riparian owners at the Sault
rapids from destruction or diminution by the treaty itself.
  
6. As without the treaty the riparian owners of one country
have no right to interfere with the taking by the other
country of any quantity of water by works in its own terri—
tory higher up the streamreither the treaty nor the reso-
lution saves or creates any such right.
7. The riparian rights on the American side referred to in
the resolution will not require any recognition from Canada
and will not limit or affect action by Canada on the
Canadian side of the St. Mary's River._ '
8. There will be no limitation upon Canada's taking in the
Rapids all the water she can get by construction in her own
territory. -
9. The only limitation upon Canada's taking above the Rapids
all the water she can get by construction in her own terri—
tory will be the rule of equal division prescribed by the
treaty.
10. The rule of equal division will be equally binding upon
the U.S. in any taking of water above the Rapids.
11. The U.S., taking above the Rapids, will be limited by the
rights of riparian owners in U.S. downstream to prevent d1-
version in U.S. territory of water naturally flow1ng over
their land.55
54. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 628-629, Letter
from Gibbons to Bryce, Mar. 4, 1909.
55. Anderson Papers, box 69, Memorandum written by Secretary Root,
March,-l909, with reference to Boundary Waters Treaty Approved
by Senate on March 3, 1909. ‘
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B. Approval of the Government of Canada
 
Action in Canada following the signing of the Treaty
on January 11, 1909, was very much slower than in the United
States. Not only did the Executive have yet to be convinced
of its desirability, but the Prime Minister had to decide if
and when the Treaty would be submitted to Parliament. Laurier
explained the problems to Gibbons.
. . . Aylesworth is of the opinion, as you stated to
me, that it is preferable not to insert in the treaty
a provision for its ratification by Parliament. This
reasoning is strong, though he did not fully convince
me, but my confidence in both of you combined is such
that I yield.
With regard to Article II, he noted that the United States
wanted to keep the provisions of that article "subject to ex-
isting treaties" and he felt this was of benefit to Canada since
. . .[w]e will be able to make use of your argument
about the treaty of 1842, bad as it was. I suspect
that this (Article II) will be strongly objected to
and attacked. I wish you were in the House of Commons
to defend it, but you are not, and I write now to ask
you to set down to work and to prepare me a brief for
the discussions, which will not be very far off.
Before I conclude, let me offer you my sincere gratitude
for the labour, energy and bull work which you have given
us for the last three years.56
Gibbons agreed to prepare a brief for Laurier covering
Article II and other provisions, but he was dismayed with Laurier's
intention to invoke the navigation protection of the Treaty of
1842 after Gibbons had assured the United States that in return
for Article II, Canada would make no assertion of right under the
earlier treaty provisions. In two letters he tried to convince
Laurier that Article II obviated the need for invoking the 1842
Treaty since the commission would protect navigation interests
affected by any Minnesota diversion.
 
56. Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 5, Letter from Laurbr to
Gibbons (confidential), Jan. 12, 1909.   
  
113
Public rights are not interfered with but left just
as they were. Private rights are fully protected.
Diversions are permitted in all civilized countries
for the greater good, subject to indemnity to those
injuriously affected.
Our citizens are given exactly the same rights as
citizens of Minnesota. What more can they ask?
Without the treaty the right to divert would have
been given without any such protection. As a matter
of fact this protection will put an end to the Minnesota
project. The conditions as to non-interference with navi—
gation are of the most stringent character and if in addi—
tion they have to recognize the claims of Canadian private
interests there will be no work done.
There is no trick at all in Article 2. It is distinctly
understood and was as good an arrangement as we could get
and I am not at all certain it was not the very best
arrangement and better than our original suggestion.
Under Article 2 the private interests in Canada are now
protected. Public interests were also provided for by
the last paragraph, the law being left just as it was;
but the American authorities pointed out that they were
going to make the most stringent provisions, which they
have done, for the protection of navigation interests.
He noted that he had warned Root that if permission were now
granted to the Minnesota Power Company, such action would render
the role of the commission futile .
Kindly do not forget that you repeatedly assured me
that the conditions existing were intolerable, —— that
under them you must necessarily yield in every case —-
that it was most desirable that principles should be
adopted —— that a permanent board was essential to their
enforcement -- and that a permanent board of reference
was just what was desired.
Gibbons concluded by thanking Laurier for his expression of
appreciation, noting wryly: "I would have thought from Mr. Pugsley's
anxiety to claim the making of the treaty that he, at least was embued
(sic) with its greatness."57
57. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 538-543, Letters
from Gibbons to Laurier (private), Jan. 13 and 16, 1909-
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Laurier was dubious of the value of Article II and
cautioned everyone to avoid any public utterance on the treaty
which might indicate that the United States had come off better
once again. Bryce gave him his assurance.
. . . You need be under no apprehension as regards
anything being said here to let it be thought that
the U.S. has got a good bargain in the Boundary Waters
Treaty. To my thinking, the advantages of the bargain
are with Canada, and I do not think any influence weaker
than Root's could have got the treaty through the Senate.
As to Article II of the Treaty, I like yourself, was not
satisfied and argued with Root in the earlier stages for
mine. But it is nevertheless a very great gain over
having nothing at all.58
To Gibbons, Laurier wrote that
. . . I find that it is an excellent arrangement, with the
exception of Article II. I am rather nervous about that
article. The diversion of running water is against all
principles of international law . . .. Vattel is very
positive that running waters cannot be diverted to the
detriment of the country into which they flow.
You told me that the British and American authorities,
on the contrary, proclaim with absolute certainty the
sovereignty of the country through which the stream runs,
whilst it is within its own boundaries. This is the point
as to which I would like to be informed.
While Gibbons searched for legal authority to substantiate
the provisions of Article II, he tried to convince Laurier of the
merits of the clause, regardless of what the international law
might be.
It would not be wise that either country should be absolutely
precluded in that regard because some private interests in
the other country would be affected, any more than they
should be precluded because private interests in their own
would be so affected. It is because private interests can
be protected that these interferences of property rights
are justified anywhere.
The whole objection to such interferences is removed if
the private interests affected in the foreign country are
placed in exactly the same position as if they were in the
country where the diversion takes place.
58. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 556, No. 150717—150720, Letter
from Bryce to Laurier (private), Jan. 20, 1909.
59. Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 5, Letter from Laurier to
Gibbons (private), Jan. 27, 1909.  
  
on the Harmon Doctrine as the accepted rule which excepted
sovereign states from the same domestic law as riparian owners
on the same stream and thus gave great value to Article II which
clearly does "away with the right to exercise the sovereign
power without furnishing redress to parties who may be injured",
Gibbons sent his opinion to Laurier.
obtain reassurance for himself and his Cabinet that the treaty
Was good, he was faced with the first of a ser
ies of political
115
It would never do for either country to absolutely agree
that no work should be permitted of injury to private
interests in the other. As under the 14th Amendment
to the American Constitution no rights of property can
be interfered with without compensation, we are a good
deal safer under this provision than they are. Un-
fortunately, under our constitution the Legislature can
do anything it wants with other people's property.60
After obtaining from George Clinton a legal statement
61
I found no established rule of International law which
would protect private interests in one country injured
by diversions in the other. I sought then to make one
which was all to our advantage, and Mr. Bacon made the
concession which we have in Article 2, and which every-
one which I have consulted on the matter, save yourself,
thinks is a first—class protection.
I had, as I told you before, in getting this concession,
to agree that we would not raise the exceedingly doubtful
plea of the Treaty of 1842. There was no point in making
an issue over that treaty whatever.
Am I to understand you now as repudiating my arrangement?
If so, of course, I must communicate it to the other side
and that will end the treaty. Tremendous pressure has
been brought on their side in opposition to this Article 2.
The senators from Minnesota and Vermont all oppose it as
inflicting an additional obligation on them which does not
exist under present law.
At the same time that the Prime Minister was trying
to
60.
61.
62.
Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 5
63—564, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier, Jan. 28, 1909; Laurier
Papers, 1909,
vol. 557, No. 151106-151107.
Gibbons Papers, vol. 6, fol. 4, Letters from
Clinton to
Gibbons, Jan. 29 & 30,1909.
Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 611-613: Lett
er
from Gibbons to Laurier (private), Feb. 18, 1
909.  
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storms in the House of Commons, with demands for tabling the
treaty in the House at the same time that it was being dis-
cussed in executive session in the Senate of the United States.
To quell the disquiet in the House and in the Canadian press,
the Colonial Office issued a communique pointing out the peculiar
role of the United States Senate in the treaty-making process
and emphasizing the role of the Canadian Government in the making
of the Boundary Waters Treaty.
. . . It should, however, in the first place, be pointed
out that this treaty was in effect drafted by an officer
of the Canadian Government; that every amendment made in
it was either made at the suggestion of, or was reported
to and approved by that Government, and that therefore,
the Dominion Government have the full text of the Treaty
in their hands. The full text of the Treaty has not
actually been received in the Colonial Office up to the
present date, This fact is mentioned because the quotation
from the Nontreal 'Star‘ in the "Times'of the 29th of
January would seem to imply that in some way the Canadian
Governnent had been ignored in the negotiations. This is,
of course. not the case and the only point at issue is the
feet that the Senate of the United States see the treaty
before it is seen by the Parliament of Canada. Reference,
indeed, is node in the ‘Times‘ to with-holding from "the
Canadian Parliament or people a treaty given to the Senate
and people of the United States': but it is understood
that the treaty has not been officially published in-the
@nited States, whether or not its contents have been
allowed to leak out.
hiter enginining the treaty‘naking and treaty—implementing pro-
tesses in the united States and the United Kingdom, the
emnndniqee concluded:
It will be seen. therefore, that the reason why the
ﬁxated States Senate sees a treaty before it is seen
by the Parliament of Canada is not that there is any
neaessity for a treaty to he sent to Downing Street
snd.retnrned house. as apparently stated in the
thnadian.nress and in the Dominion House of commons.
but hotness the Senate is a part of the treaty-
making power under the constitution of the United
States. Eh’dmnht the feeling of dissatisfaction in
the louse of tenuous in Canada.weuld he renamed it
tnds‘uere known. and if it were clearly understood
thet.ewery word of the treaty has teen anpremed by the
tnnadﬁsm Genernment‘ Even time to time in the Imperial
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House of Commons it has been represented that Parliament
is entitled to be consulted before any treaty is ratified
and in fact that Parliament should have an active share
in the making of treaties; but these representations
have never been given effect to and in this matter the
relations between the Dominion Parliament and the
Dominion Government is practically analogous to that
between the Imperial Parliament and the imperial
Government.53
The Prime Minister reported the Colonial Office state-
ment to the House on February 4, 64 but the press was not
satisfied and continued demanding information; meanwhile
criticizing the treaty in ignorance of the provisions.65 When,
on February 18, the full text of the treaty appeared pre-
maturely in the United States papers, the pressure on the Canadian
Government became acute. Laurier sent, confidentially, a copy of
the treaty with explanations to the Leader of the Opposition.66
He sent an urgent request to the Colonial Office for permission
to table the treaty in the House67 and enjoined Gibbons from
speaking on the treaty before the Canadian Club until it had been
officially communicated to the House.68 The Foreign Office
simply replied that "the United States Government deprecate
69
publication until passed by the Senate".
63.Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(a), Colonial Office
Communiqué to the Press, Jan. 29, 1909; Confidential Prints,
International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 72-73; 79-80.
64.cOnfidentia1 Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
p. 81, Telegram from Lord Grey to Colonial Secretary, Feb. 4,
1909.
65.Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 594, 601-603,
Letters from Gibbons to J.A. Macdonald, Editor, The_Globe,
Feb. 9 & 11, 1909.
66.Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 561, No. 151987, Letter from Laurier
to Borden (confidential), Feb. 18, 1909. _
67.Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(a), Telegram from
Lord Grey to Lord Crews, Feb. 18, 1909.
68.Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 5, Letter tram Laurier to Gibbons,
Feb. 22, 1909.
69.Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(3), Cable from Lord
Crewe to Lord Grey, Feb. 22, 19091 Conﬁidential Prints,
International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, p. 34.   
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On top of the difficulties which the Prime Minister
was having with his own feelings over the treaty and the ill-
informed reactions of the Canadian public and press, the news
reached Ottawa on March 4 that the United States Senate had
given its advice and consent, subject to the inclusion of the
Smith "rider" as originally drafted. As noted, Gibbons moved
quickly to forestall the added ire which he knew this develop—
ment would arouse in Sir Wilfrid and his Government. His
request for an official opinion from Secretary of State
Philander Knox stating that the interpretation of the amend—
ment would not be harmful to Canada was greeted with reluctance.
"He did not consider that such an assurance would be binding
on his successors, and . . . the Senate would resent what
would . . . amountto an agreement made without their consent."70
Bryce did, however, obtain from Senator Root a "purely personal"
opinion which he sent to Ottawa.
. . . [Tlhe Senate resolution merely takes out of the
operation of the Waterways Treaty the riparian rights
and rights incident to the ownership of land under
water therein mentioned, leaving the provisions of the
Treaty operative except as they would interfere with
those rights of ownership. This, of course, leaves
the "equal and similar rights" provision in Article
VIII binding upon both Governments so far as the
exercise of those rights of ownership is not involved.
If the United States should acquire the rights of
present riparian owners it would, I suppose, take
the same right now preserved to the present owners,
but could not go beyond them except under the
limitations of the Treaty.
To this, Bryce added that Root had also stated that in his View
there was no right in a riparian owner of land to the natural
flow of the stream over or past that land.71
 
70. Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
pp. 91-92, Despatch from Bryce to Lord Grey, Mar. 5, 1909.
71. Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
pp. 95-96, Despatch from Bryce to Lord Grey, Mar. 10, 1909,
enclosing memorandum of conversation with Root and letter
from Root to Bryce; Gibbons Papers, vol. 14, fol. 3, Copy
of Letter from Root to Bryce, Mar. 8, 1909.  
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The British Ambassador, the Governor General and
Gibbons all sought to bring pressure to bear on the Canadian
Government to accept the treaty even with the "rider".72
Mitchell Innes, British charge d'affaires in Washington,
indicated, however, that the new Secretary of State was
not happy with the amendment and might be willing to re-
introduce the treaty to the new Senate without the "rider".73
Gibbons wrote to the Minister of Justice urging quick acceptance
of the treaty as it stood.
If the treaty is rejected, what have we got? Certainly
our rights are not less under the treaty than they would
be without it. If the principle is right for which we
contend as a matter of international law, then we run
the risk in accepting the amendment. If there is no
established principle then we have the benefit of the
provision in Article 8, and the benefit of Mr. Root's
moral support which to my mind is all important.
I am prepared anywhere and at_any_time to defend the
treaty and justify myself againSt all the world and to
get ninety-nine out of a hundred to agree with me.
The Prime Minister was not appeased and felt that his
only recourse at this point was to table the treaty and all
related correspondence in the House at the earliest moment.
In requesting the necessary permission from the Colonial Office
he urged the British Government not to recommend ratification
of the treaty to His Majesty until it had been fully discussed
in the Canadian Parliament and the views of the Canadian Govern—
ment communicated to London. 5 Permission and reassurance were
forthcoming from London immediately as was permission from
72. Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 9, No. 002330, Letter from Lord
Grey to Bryce, Mar. 8, 1909; No. 002334, Letter from Bryce
to Lord Grey, Mar. 8, 1909.
73. Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 6, Letter from Innes to Gibbons,
Mar. 10, 1909.
74. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 630-633, Letter
from Gibbons to Aylesworth, Mar. 8,1909.
75. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(a), Telegram from
Lord Grey to Lord Crewe, Mar. 10, 1909.
76. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(a), Telegram from
Lord Crewe to Lord Grey, Mar. 11, 1909; Telegram from
Lord
Crewe to Lord Grev, Mar. 12, 1909; Telegram from Lord Grey
to
Lord Crewe, Mar. ‘12, 1909; Confidential Prints, International
Boundary Waters, vol. 1, p. 97.
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Washington to table certain correspondence with the exception
of Root's opinion on the Smith amendment.77 Laurier then in-
formed Gibbons of his intention and instructed him to find out
what the practical effect of the Smith "rider" would be in
Canada.78
Gibbons replied to Laurier that he was trying to get
an official statement from the United States Government which
accorded with the views of Root as to the meaning of the "rider"
and if he were successful, Canada could accept the amendment
without any fears for, in his View, there was nothing in the
treaty which indicated that the United States was entitled to
more water than Canada. He cautioned Laurier against accepting
any Views that Canada was entitled to anything less than one—
half of the waters at the 800.79 He subsequently obtained a
legal opinion from a Toronto law firm and armed with this, he
and Aylesworth proceeded to Washington to meet with Root,
Anderson, Knox and Attorney General Wickersham to attempt to
obtain a consensus on the meaning of the "rider".80
Gibbons returned from Washington to report that Anderm
son would persuade the Attorney General to release for Canadian
use an opinion on the effect of the Smith "rider" which he had
prepared for the Secretary of War. 81 Wickersham agreed to
77. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(a), Despatch from
Innes to Lord Grey, Mar. 23, 1909; Confidential Prints,
International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 97-100.
78. Gibbons Papers, vol. 6, fol. 4, Letter from Laurier to
Gibbons (private), Mar. 13, 1909; Laurier Papers, 1909,
vol. 565, No. 153248.
79. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 637-638,
Letter from Gibbons to Laurier, Mar. 12, 1909; pp. 640—644,
Letter from Gibbons to Laurier, Mar. 15, 1909; Laurier Papers,
1909, vol. 565, No. 153246-153247; No. 153250—153255; vol.
566, No. 153651—153652, Letter from Gibbons to Laurier,
Mar. 17, 1909.
80. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 567, No. 153991—153994, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier, Mar. 24, 1909; Confidential Prints,
International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 98-99, Telegram
from Innes to Lord Grey, Mar. 24, 1909.
81. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 570, No. 154752—154753, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier, Apr 14, 1909.   
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2 . .Anderson's request.8 The opinion was sent to the Governor
General on April 14.
The net effect of this resolution, therefore, wouldseem to be that a riparian owner of land on eitherside of the river at the rapids, retains preciselythe rights in and to such lands and the waters flowingover or along such lands which he would have in—dependently of the Treaty; those rights being (andrecognized by the Treaty as being) subject to the re-quirements of navigation, and to the paramount right 1 _{of each of the respective nations to use the water 1*?in its own territory . . . . The rights of riparian 'owners below the rapids on the American side of the
water thus preserved can have no relation to the takingof water by Canada on her own side of the river above g Lthe rapids. The only limitation upon Canada taking _3ﬁabove the rapids all the water she can get by con— ‘2;struction in her own territory is the rule of equal 4V5division established by the Treaty.
It follows, therefore, that the principle of equality
of use established by the Treaty applies both above ‘qand below the rapids. The reservation by the resolution :3?of existing rights at the rapids does not affect or 'disturb the application of such principle above or
below the rapids as the rights of riparian proprietors
on either side of the boundary have no relation to the
use of waters on the other side. The taking of water
above the rapids on the American side of the boundary
will, however, be subject to the rights of the American
riparian owners below, to prevent diversions in American
territory of water naturally flowing over their land.
 
."
w-
jl
ﬁr
z‘
 
In any case, the Attorney General concluded, once the United
States Government expropriated the power interests at the Soo,
. . there will be no riparian rights in the water and
no rights of owners of lands under water which will
fall within the protection of the resolution above
quoted, and the provisions of the Treaty will then
become fully operative over the waters at the rapids
in a like manner, as is provided with respect to the
82. Numerical File 1906-10, Department of State, national
Archives, vol. 484, 5934/83—84, Letter from Wickersham
to Bacon, Apr. 10, 1909, enclosing opinion; Anderson
Papers, box 65, pp. 444—445, Letter from Anderson to
Wickersham, Apr. 8, 1909.
 P
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other waterways fallin
visions of the Treaty.
Although the Governor General rejoiced once more over
this "final settlement"84
within the general pro-
and Gibbons assured everyone that
there could now be no doubt that the Senate resolution was
8 . . .
harmless to Canada, Laurier expressed nothing but confu51on
over the explanations given by Wickersham and Gibbons of the
"rider", and added that he could not agree with their views.
Neither do I agree with the conclusion of your letter
that the whole Treaty is a generous concession on the
part of the United States. I do not think so. There
are in it valuable concessions which have been made
to us by the United States and there are other con-
cessions made by us of equal importance. I have not
come to any conclusion, but if I were to follow my
own inclination at the present time, we would decline
the Treaty. Article II has always seemed to me a
very serious source of trouble, but in view of the
other concessions I have been disposed to accept. The
black eye which has been given us on the St. Mary's
River puts another face altogether on the matter.86
To the House he indicated that his Government had reached no
decision on the acceptance or rejection of the Smith "rider".87
To Bryce, the Prime Minister was little kinder. Pointing out
to him that the amendment was anything but "meaningless", as
 
83. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 734, No. 206041-206048, Letter
from Lord Grey to Laurier, Apr. 17, 1909; Gibbons Papers,
vol. 14, fol. 3, Opinion of Attorney General Wickersham to
Bryce, (undated); Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol 5(b)
Despatch from Bryce to Lord Grey, Apr. 14, 1909; Confidential
Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp.100—103;
Anderson Papers, box 69.
84. Gibbons Papers, vol. 6, fol. 4, Letter from Lord Grey to
Gibbons, Apr. 17, 1909.
85. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 671-672, Letter
from Gibbons to Lord Grey (strictly private), Apr. 19, 1909;
p. 670, Letter from Gibbons to Bryce (strictly private),
Apr. 19, 1909.
86. Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 5, Letter from Laurier to
Gibbons (private), Apr. 20, 1909; Laurier Papers, l909;vol.
570, No. 154754-154755.
87. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, llth
Parliament, lst Session, vol. 3, p. 4471, Apr 19, 1909.  
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suggested by Bryce,88 he added: "turn it in any way we may,
it comes to this: that it nullifies the provisions of
Article III insofar as the rapids of the St. Mary's River
are concerned." He concluded, that quite apart from the
amendment, he was still reluctant to accept Article II and
he was not sure that Council was about to accept the treaty.89
On April 23 Gibbons submitted to the Prime Minister Ln
and the Minister of Justice a comprehensive brief on the treaty, TW'
prepared at the behest of Aylesworth.90 In it he sought to “
substantiate every provision of the treaty, with particular
attention to Articles II and IX and the Senate amendment.
Citing Harmon, Oppenheim and Phillimore, he concluded that
there was no authority which limited the absolute sovereignty
of a state within its territory and hence, all another state
could do was seek to protect its citizens against injury.
 
. It certainly cannot ask that its citizens, with
respect to their private rights, shall have a greater
protection than is given to riparian interests similarly
affected in the country where the diversion takes place;
nor would it be politic that either country should agree
to an absolute prohibition of its rights to diversions
which might be of great advantage solely because some
private interests in another country might be injuriously
affected.
Without the provisions of this treaty, the private in—
terests in the one country injured by diversions on the
other would be without any remedy. The treaty practically
removes the boundary line in dealing with these interests
... The citizens of a foreign country can demand no
higher rights than those of the State or Province where
the diversion is made. They are given the same rights
under the provisions of this Treaty.
Article IX is a step in advance of anything previously
attempted in the way of providing for the settlement
88. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 572, No. 155291, Letter from
Bryce to Laurier, Apr. 26, 1909.
89. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 572, No. 155292—155294, Letter
from Laurier to Bryce, Apr. 28, 1909.
90. Gibbons Papers, vol. 6, fol. 4, Letter from Aylesworth
to Gibbons, Apr. 16, 1909.   
Eiifa
124
of international disputes. Its importance cannot
be over—estimated. In it the Commissioners are half
Canadian and half appointed by the United States. To
this Board either nation may demand that any matter
of dispute arising along the frontier may be referred.
The Board are to have the powers of a Court with full
facilities for getting at the truth with regard to
matters referred to them. The Board is permanent
in its character and its members are not appointed
for the special purpose of accomplishing certain
results; on the contrary, they are sworn to faithfully
and impartially perform the duties imposed upon them.
After the disputants have threshed the matter out
beforeisuch a Court and a report has been furnished to
the respective Governments with findings upon the facts
and advice as to the action that shall be taken, there
will be little room left for international complications.
As to the Senate resolution, it was clear, said Gibbons, that
Canada was not precluded from taking her half of the water
above the rapids at the 800. "The Treaty does not do anything
more than preserve . . . 'precisely the rights which these
riparian owners would have independently of the treaty.'" The
opinions of Senator Root and Attorney General Wickersham were
"quite in accordance with the principles of international
law, which I have always insisted upon . . ."91
When Aylesworth promised to submit Gibbons' brief
to the Cabinet, optimism among the proponents of the treaty
rose again.92 But it was shortlived once more, for Laurier
reverted to all of his old objections, fearing the hostile
reaction of Parliament and the public to the provisions of
93Article II and the Senate resolution. His fears were for-
tified when he received a telegram from the Premier of Ontario
 
91. Gibbons Papers, vol. 14, fol. 3, Brief as to Waterways Treaty,
Apr. 23, 1909; Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 570, No. 154756s
154773; I.J.C., Can. Sect. File F-l—l, vol. 6.
92. Gibbons Papers, vol. 6, fol. 4, Letter from Aylesworth to
Gibbons, Apr. 26, 1909; Letter from Bryce to Gibbons (private)
Apr. 28, 1909. '
93. Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 9, No. 002410, Letter from
Bryce to Lord Grey, May 1, 1909; No. 002411-002415, Letter
from Lord Grey to Bryce, May 3, 1909.  
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indicating strong opposition to the amendment on the part
of the Ontario Government.94
The Governor General decided to try once more to
convince the Prime Minister that the Senate resolution was
innocuous. He wrote to Bryce asking for a clarifying state-
ment on the matter.
Sir Wilfrid still adheres to the position, that he
gave up most reluctantly the right of protest against
a diversion of waters. He thinks that the Americans
are less likely to divert their waters to our loss
when they have to face a protest from a friendly
neighbour, than they will be if they feel that they
have the right to divert waters on paying compensation
to Canadian interests adversely affected. He has been
consistently uneasy on the subject of Article II ever
since Gibbons made the concession. He can only defend
this concession so he says, by showing he has secured
as a result, the right to half of the surplus water
in the boundary waters, and is very indignant at
having made a concession against his will, to obtain
a certain result, he should not be deprived of the
full benefit of that concession.
I had formed the opinion that Sir Wilfrid Laurier
was only marking time until Parliament prorogued,
but my last talks with him have caused me to fear
that he is seriously contemplating the refusal on
the part of the Government of Canada, to accept the
treaty with the Senate Resolution. He thinks the
dignity of Canada, and the hope of conducting future
negotiations with the United States on fair and equal
terms, require a protest, even at the risk of losing
the Treaty. ,
Bryce responded with a lengthy memorandum dealing with
the import of the Smith "rider". He concluded with an interesting
paragraph on a matter which was to raise serious problems many
years later.
As regards the rest of the Treaty, you are already well
aware how many troubles might arise all along the Inter—
national Boundary regarding the use of water in case the
94. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 574, No. 155937, Telegram from
Whitney to Laurier, May 12, 1909.
95. Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 9, No. 002433-002434, Letter
from Lord Grey to Lord Bryce, May 17, 1909, No. 002439—
002443, Letter from Lord Grey to Bryce, May 18, 1909.
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Treaty were to fall through. There would again be
a fight over the Milk River and the St. Mary's River
up in Montana and Alberta, and one cannot say how many
other fights in other places. No doubt it is a pity
that Article 2, which relates to waters crossing the
boundary from one country to the other, has not been
so worked out as to provide for the settlement of all
questions that might arise upon certain fixed principles
by the International Commission, or some other authority.
But at present there is no international law whatever upon
the subject, and although the Treaty does not go so far as
we could wish, still, in providing that there should be
a claim for compensation, it goes farther than the exist—
ing law and therefore on this point represents a distinct
advance. I may mention that I had lately a conversation
on the subject with Mr. Chandler Anderson, who, as you
know, took a large part in drafting the Treaty, along
with Mr. Gibbons. When I referred to Article 2, he
joined in my regret that it did not go farther, and
said that he had always hoped that the subject of waters
crossing the boundary would be worked out further and
that principles would be laid down applicable to it. He
still hoped that this might be done by the help of the
International Commission, if the Treaty were ratified.
Meeting Mr. Secretary Knox two or three days afterwards,
I raised the subject with him and asked him whether he
did not think that it would be desirable to try to work
out these principles as Mr. Anderson suggested. Mr. Knox
said that he saw no objection to that course. I should
hope, therefore, if the Treaty is ratified, that one of
the first things that we might set the Commission to do
would be to work out these principles. We should then
not only render a great service to Canada and the United
States, but should make a great and novel contribution
to international law.9
The Governor General communicated these views to Laurier
along with the assurances of Root and Knox that the real pur—
pose of the Smith amendment was "to increase the value of the
Power Company's riparian rights, not as against Canada, but
as against the United States Government, so as to compel them
to pay more when they proceed to acquire them compulsorily as
they are about to do". He further noted that the opinion from
 
96. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 734, No. 2061454206150, Memorandum
from Bryce to Lord Grey, May 18, 1909; Confidential Prints,
International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 106-107.  
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the Attorney General was official and would be followed by
the United States Government.97
On May 27 the Minister of Justice prepared for the
consideration of the Cabinet a confidential memorandum on the
treaty, based largely on the earlier memorandum prepared by
Gibbons for the Minister. He felt that the provisions of
Article II were entirely consistent with "the dignity of any
independent sovereign State" and that "any obligation there
may be upon the upstream country not to interfere with the
natural flow must be a mere matter of comity between nations."
Article III, in his View, had application as well to the Chicago
diversion since that diversion could not be classed as an
"ordinary" diversion for sanitary purposes. Article V showed
Canada's readiness to cooperate with the United States in pre-
serving the scenic beauty of the Falls and the provision could
be abrogated later if necessary for increased power production.
Article VIII was so important that a failure to ratify the
treaty would result in a loss "probably impossible for anyone
adequately to realize at the present time." Article IX was
essential for fair play and harmony all along the border and
Article X created a "minature Hague Tribunal" which would keep
the Imperial Government from having to intervene in North
American disputes.
Upon a mature consideration of the whole Treaty, as
signed by the Plenipotentiaries, I would strongly
urge its acceptance as a fair and just international
agreement in which the interests of Canada have been
kept in View and are honourably conserved.
As to the Senate resolution, the Minister was convinced, after
reading the opinions of the United States officials and making his
own assessment of it, that it did not detract from the benefits
97. Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 4, No. 001206-001207, Despatch
from Bryce to Lord Grey, May 19, 1909; Governor General 5
Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(b), Telegram from Bryce to Lord Grey,
May 19, 1909; Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 734, No.
206137-
206143, Letter from Lord Grey to Laurier, May 20,
1909;
Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, v
ol. 1,
pp. 108-111 (including Memorandum from Governor
General
to the Privy Council, May 21, 1909.)
r,
.
-.
,_
_
,._
.‘
‘
z
‘
ﬁ
z
‘
i
o
—
r
—
u
—
v
r
a
s
.
    
128
received by Canada under the treaty and therefore, should
not preclude acceptance of the treaty by Canada. 98
While Laurier was trying to digest and analyse the
advice coming to him from these many sources, he was being
urged by one of his Senators first, to submit the treaty to
Parliament for formal ratification and not mere approval and,
secondly, to defer action on the whole thing for a couple of
years to see if some of the more objectionable features might
be removed.99 The Prime Minister was not moved by these
suggestions.100
The Prime Minister was also under attack in the House.
In the ﬁrst full—scale offensive by the Opposition against the
treaty, Magrath suggested that the provisions were "selling
Canada down the river". Several Conservative members urged
rejection of the treaty on the basis of the "rider" provisions.
Borden felt that several parts of the treaty were probably
outside of the powers of the Parliament to implement. To all
the critics, Laurier replied that the provisions of the treaty
were excellent; as for the "rider", this might preclude acceptance
of the treaty by Canada.101 4
Gibbons, perhaps showing some doubt in his own mind,
wrote again to Clinton at the end of June asking for a formal
legal opinion on Article II, wondering if there were authorities
supporting the assertion of sovereignurights.102 At the same
98. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 565, No. 153256—153262, Memorandum
of the Minister of Justice on Proposed Treaty between Great
Britain and the United States Regarding Waters between United
States and Canada, May 27, 1909; Confidential Prints, Inter—
national Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 111—117; I.J.C., Can.
Sect. File F—l—l, vol. 6.
99. Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 570, No. 154715, Letter from
Senator Ross to Laurier, Apr. 13, 1909; vol. 579, No. 157062-1570Wr
Letter from Senator Ross to Laurier, June 17, 1909; vol. 580 No.
157214, Letter from Senator Ross to Laurier, June 24, 1909.
lOO.Laurier Papers, 1909, vol. 570, No. 154716, Letter from Laurier
to Senator Ross, Apr. 14, 1909.
101.Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, 11th Parliament,
lst Session, vol. 4, pp. 6583—6624; 6630—6650, May 14, 1909.
102.Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, p. 565, Letter
from Gibbons to Clinton (confidential), June 28, 1909.  
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time he wrote to Anderson, assuring him that the Canadian
Government would accept the treaty as soon as the Cabinet
resumed its sessions in the autumn, although it found the
Smith amendment bothersome.103
At the end of July, Gibbons reported to the Prime
Minister that Anderson was proceeding with the acquisition
of the Chandler-Dunbar (power company) property in the St.
Mary's River for the United States Government and consequently,
as Gibbons optimistically believed, this resolved all Canadian
opposition to the treaty.104 Laurier replied that his concern
now was not with the "rider" but with Article II and par—
ticularly with Article VI and that he was awaiting advice
on these points from "experts". He was not at all sure that
Article VI gave Canada what it was entitled to.105
The "expert" was George C. Anderson, a consulting
engineer of Denver, Colorado who submitted his report in mid-
September. He described Article VI as "greatly unjust to the
interests of Canada" for six reasons.
and was beneficial to the United States only.
2. Equal apportionment ignored Canada's prior rights . F
to St. Mary water in Canada. _ W
3. No provision was made for periodic division of the g 1?
waters. ‘ t
4. Canada received no compensation for use by the
United States of the Milk River channel in Canada
to convey irrigation waters.
5. Canada received no compensation for maintaining afi
the Milk River channel for the United States. 3;?
6. The Commission was defective since no impartial E5:
arbitrator was provided for and no guidance was . g x
1. Equal apportionment ignored geographical factors ‘ ﬁﬁ
 
103. Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol. 7, Letter from Gibbons to
Anderson, June 30, 1909; vol. 8, Letterbook No. l, p. 714,
Letter from Gibbons to Anderson (confidential), July 2, 1909;
Anderson Papers, box 69.
lO4.Gibbons Papers, vol.8, Letterbook No. l, p. 718, Letter
from Gibbons to Laurier (private), July 31, 1909.
105.Gibbons Papers, vol. 6, fol. 4, Letter from Laurier t0
Gibbons, July 30, 1909.
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given for carrying out the task under Article VI.106
The Anderson report was turned over to Dr. W.F. King
who shortly submitted a report to the Minister of Public
Works, refuting at every point the arguments advanced by
Anderson. He felt that as there was no international law
defining equitable apportionment, equal apportionment was
equitable apportionment. Canada got a more consistent supply
of irrigation water by the agreement than she would get under
prior rights on the St. Mary. Periodic divisions of the waters
would be made by the commission under general principles laid
down by that body and there would be no need for reference to
arbitration; agreement would be reached by negotiation. As to
payments to Canada by the United States, there was no such need
if the United States was willing to provide storage of waters
needed by Canada. He raised some doubt as to this, but concluded
that Canada would be better off with her own storage facilities
and noted that the Canadian Pacific Railway, owner of the
irrigation operation in Alberta agreed with this View.107 The
memorandum of Dr. King was supported by a general memorandum
prepared at the same time by Louis Costé, a Canadian member of
the Waterways Commission who suggested that Canada had everything
to gain and nothing to lose since otherwise there was nothing to
stop the United States diverting the entire flow of both rivers.108
The Prime Minister decided, on the basis of these con—
flicting reports, to send Mr. Pugsley, the Minister of Public
Works, and Dr. King to Washington to confer with Chandler
106. Canada, Sessional Paper No. l9e, Correspondence and Documents
relating to St. Mary and Milk Rivers, 1910, Report on Treaty
relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising along the
Boundary between Canada and the United States, Sept 19, 1909.
 
107. Canada, Sessional Paper No. 19e, Correspondence and Documents
relating to St. Mary and Milk Rivers 1910, Memorandum upon
Mr. George C. Anderson's Report, dated 18th September, 1909,
upon Article VI of the International Waterways Treaty (undatedL
108. I.J.C. Can. Sect. File F-l-l, vol. 4, Memorandum by Louis Costé
for the Minister of Public Works, September, 1909.  
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Anderson on the meaning of Article VI and on the prospects
of the United States building storage facilities on the upper
St. Mary River which would benefit Canada.109 It was felt
that another "rider" might be necessary to clarify the meaning
of Article VI.110
Following the conference in Washington, the British
Ambassador wrote to indicate that he had received assurance
from Anderson that the United States was prepared to proceed
with the construction of a reservoir on the upper reaches
111of the St. Mary River. This was subsequently reiterated by
the Secretary of State.
. .[ﬁjt is the definite intention of this Govern-
ment to proceed with the storage works on the St.
Mary's and Milk Rivers, the construction of which
the Dominion Government regard as essential for
securing the Canadian interests in a due supply of
water in that part of the Milk River which passes
through Canadian territory.
The United States Government declined the Canadian offer to
pay one half of the cost of construction on grounds that
Congress had already appropriated ample funds to cover the
112
cost.
The Minister of Public Works concluded, however, that
the reservoir to be built by the United States was not to serve
the purpose desired by Canada (to provide a regulated supply
of water down the St. Mary River to Canada) but only to
facilitate the diversion of the St. Mary waters in Montana V”
into the Milk River channel for the benefit of the United - j
States territory. He would accept the United States proposal
109. Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 9, No. 002488-002491, Letter from
Lord Grey to Bryce, Nov. 12, 1909.
110. Canada, Sessional Paper No. 19e, Correspondence and Documents
relating to St. Mary and Milk Rivers 1910, Memorandum from
Dr. King to Pugsley, Nov. 15, 1909.
111. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol; 5(b), Despatch from
Bryce to Lord Grey, Dec. 15, 1909. ‘
112. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(b), Despatch from
Brvce to Lord Grey, Jan. 4, 1910; Grey of How1ck Papers, vol. 9,
No: 002550—002552, Letter from Bryce to Lord Grey, Jan. 1, 1910;
Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
pp. 118—122.
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only if assurance was given that the storage in Montana would
be for the benefit of the flows of both the Milk and the
St. Mary.113
Meanwhile, in response to a query in the House as to
the status of the treaty, the Prime Minister replied that
subsidiary negotiations were in progress "to enable his
Government to reach a judgment on one of the points at issue."114
The Prime Minister asked the Governor General to seek the
necessary assurance from the Secretary of State who at that
moment was reviewing the status of the treaty.115 After a second
conference in Washington, it became evident that the United States
would not provide the additional storage in Montana requested by
Canada. The Secretary of State pointed out that he was informed
by the Department of the Interior that it was physically impossible
to build a reservoir of sufficient capacity to provide as well for
Canadian needs. In addition, he noted that
.[aJn examination of EArticle Vi] will show that it
provides merely for an equal division between the two
countries of the waters of the St. Mary's and Milk rivers,
with certain prior appropriations of the natural flow
apportioned to each side. There is no requirement that
the United States shall store any waters for the use of
Canada, in fact no mention is made of the storage of
waters, and the waters which the United States proposes
to store are to be taken from its half share of the
natural flow and are intended for use on its own side
of the boundary. The proposed storage of waters,
therefore, by the United States will in no way diminish
or interfere with the half share of the natural flow
to which Canada is entitled under the Treaty.
113. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(b), Letter from
Pugsley to Laurier, Jan. 20, 1910; Confidential Prints,
International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 122—123.
114. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, 11th
-Par1iament, 2d Session, vol. 1, p. 1802, Jan. 13, 1910.
115. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(b), Letter from
Laurier to Lord Grey, Jan. 21, 1910; Numerical File 1906—10,
Department of State, National Archives, vol. 484, 5934/97,
Memorandum on Status of Waterways Treaty, Jan. 26, 1910.   
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It further appears . . . that on the Canadian side
of the boundary the natural conditions are more favorable
for the storage of Canada's share of the water at less
cost and with greater assurance of permanence and safety ‘
than at the outlet of St. Mary's Lake, where the works '
to be constructed by the United States must be located.116
The Prime Minister was most displeased with this atti-
tude and combined with the current hostility in the United
States over the tariff concessions granted by Canada to France, 'pgﬁ
he felt that it might be best to let the treaty fall.ll7 uﬁi
Gibbons, discussing with him the matter of power development I V
at Cornwall, an issue presently before the Waterways Commission,
took the opportunity to remind Laurier of the problems in the
absence of a treaty.
‘75
If the treaty were in force, we would be in a perfectly
safe position at Long Sault. The treaty provides that
there shall be no diversion without the consent of the .w
Commission, and then that there shall be equal apportion— gli
ment as between the two countries. Without the treaty, ﬁﬁi
if the interests of navigation are not interfered with, “'
(and the American members of the Commission think they
will be greatly improved), there is no power that I
know of to prevent the Americans doing as they please
in their own territory, and, unfortunately for us, at
this particular point the great flow of water is on
their side, a very small proportion being on ours. I
see that Mr. Sifton said at Brantford that he is going H
to see (among other things) that we get our half. a
Unless the treaty goes through, I think he will have "i?
his hands full carrying out his contract. The ﬁgh
Americans will do just as they please within their
own territory.
Laurier informed the House that he hoped to make an i{
. 119 .
announcement soon in relation to the treaty and instructed
  
116. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(b), Telegram from
Bryce to Lord Grey, Jan. 31, 1910; Despatch from Bryce to Lord
Grey, Feb. 10, 1910; Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 4, No. 001309—
001310, Letter from Lord Grey to Laurier, Jan. 31, 1910; No.
001320, Letter from Lord Grey to Laurier, Feb. 12, 1910; Con—
fidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp.123—127.
117. Grey of Howick Papers, vol. 10, No. 002630, Letter from Lord
Grey to Bryce, Mar. 18, 1910.
118. Laurier Papers, 1910, vol. 617, No. 167693—167696, Letter from
Gibbons to Laurier, Mar. 2, 1910.
House of Commons Debates, 11th Parliament,
1, 1910.
119. Canada, Parliament,
2d Session, vol. 3, p. 4403, Mar.  
 ——?
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the Minister of Public Works to obtain from the C.P.R. a
statement of its views on Article VI in face of the United
States refusal to provide storage facilities for Canadian
water. Following a favourable report from the President of
the railway that Article VI was thoroughly equitable "and
amply protects our interests in as far as they are concerned
120 the
Prime Minister finally authorized the Governor General to
provide for the exchange of letters of ratification121 and
with the Alberta Railway and Irrigation Company",
announced to Parliament on March 30 that, in View of the
ratification of the treaty, all documents and relevant
correspondence would be tabled in the House forthwith.122
Bryce informed the Secretary of State of Laurier's decision,
observing that
the Treaty is one which appears eminently cal-
culated to benefit both our countries not only by
settling a number of questions which it is desirable
to remove from the sphere of possible controversy
and by providing for the settlement of other questions
which may arise hereafter, but also by facilitating
the use and development of streams valuable both for
navigation, for power and for the generation of power.123
Knox agreed that the treaty seemed "to be one of those fortunate
international arrangements which is equally advantageous to
both parties . . 3124
While the approval for and the preparation of ratifi—
cations was following the circuitous route from Ottawa to
120. Canada, Sessional Paper No. 19e, Correspondence and Documents
relating to St. Mary and Milk Rivers 1910, Letter from
Shaughnessy to Pugsley, Mar. 4, 1910.
121. Governor General's Papers, N0. 268, vol. 5(b), Letter from
Lord Grey to Bryce, Mar. 8, 1910; Telegram from Bryce to
Lord Grey, Mar. 28, 1910; Confidential Prints, International
Boundary Waters, vol. 1, p. 127, Letter from Laurier to Lord
Grey, Mar. 25, 1910.
122. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, 11th Parliament:
2d Session, vol. 4, p. 5932, Mar. 30, 1910.
123. Decimal File 1910—29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6601, 711.42155/103, Note from Bryce to Knox, Mar. 29,19lm
124. Decimal File 1910—29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6601, 711.42155/103, Note from Knox to Bryce, Mar. 30,
1910.   
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Washington to London and back again, Bryce reminded the
Secretary of State and the Canadian Government of the need
under Article XII to provide the necessary legislation. The
Secretary of State agreed to have the legislation introduced
in the present session of Congress. The Canadian Cabinet
felt, however, that the present session was too far advanced
to act and suggested that during the recess concurrent legis—
lation might be prepared by the two Governmentsto be intro—
duced in the autumn.125 Mr. Knox replied that under the two
constitutions it appeared that different legislation might be
required in each country and, therefore, his Government would
proceed immediately to introduce the enabling legislation in
the United States Congress.126
The instruments of ratification were exchanged between
127Knox and Bryce in Washington on May 5, 1910 and Root and
Gibbons were able to congratulate each other on a task finally
done. Said Gibbons:
. . For the first time it puts into practice the
principle which you have so strongly approved ——
a judicial forum to deal with international matters.
I can only trust that it will be the forerunner of
others.12
 
m
;
And Root replied:
I think you are to be especially congratulated on the
ratification of the International Commission treaty.
The making of the treaty and its ratification are
largely due to your personal ability and force of
character, and I think that you have rendered a
very great service to your home country and to the
United States as well. The public has no adequate
«
4
5
2
7
?
”
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125. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(b), Telegram from
Lord Grey to Lord Crewe, Apr. 5, 1910; Cable from Lord Crewe
to Lord Grey, Apr. 6, 1910; Despatch from Lord Crewe to Lord ‘
Grey, Apr. 12, 1910. ﬁg
126. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(b), Despatch from if I
Bryce to Lord Grey, Apr. 15, 1910; Privy Council Minute 778, ‘
April 26, 1910; Confidential Prints, International Boundary
Waters, vol. 1, pp. 128—131. ‘ W
127. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 51b), Despatch from ‘A:
Bryce to Lord Grey, May 5, 1910; Confidential Prints, :ﬁﬁ
International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 131—132.
.
128. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, p. 822, Letter from
Gibbons to Root, Apr. 1, 1910.
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conception of the tremendous scope and importance
of the thing which has been done as a preventative
of controversy in the future. The time will come,
however, when this will be recognized.
Others, including Anderson himself, thought that the
State Department adviser should be given greater credit for
the treaty. The Assistant Secretary wired his congratulations
and thanks from Paris. A prominent Washington lawyer, offering
his congratulations, observed:
. . . I do not think credit is always extended in the
right direction, and that in a certain circle there
does not seem to have been credit enough to go around .
To which Anderson replied:
. . You will be interested to know that Mr. Root
always referred to this treaty as the "Anderson—Gibbons
Treaty", and I have always said to him that to that
title should be added "by and with the advice and
consent of Secretary Root." On the other hand I was
much interested, but not altogether surprised, to
learn from Warren the other day that in Canada Mr.
Gibbons is receiving entire credit for it. As a
matter of fact the original treaty was prepared by
me without consultation with Mr. Gibbons, and after
being submitted to Mr. Root was forwarded to Gibbons
without change. Since then the only changes which
were made in it were in phraseology, in the omission
of one article and in the addition of another
article 130
The State Department in a press release emphasized the
importance of the treaty and suggested the active role which
the Commission would play as the populations and uses of waters
along the boundary increased. The problems were ones which
could be dealt with adequately by neither country acting alone —-
they required action by mutual agreement. Of Article IX, the
release observed:
. . . Either country, therefore, may call upon this
Commission acting jointly, or upon its own section
129. Gibbons Papers, vol. 3, fol.7, Letter from Root to Gibbons,
May 16, 1910.
130. Anderson Papers, box 69, Telegram from Bacon to Anderson,
May 6, 1910, Letter from C.H. Butler to Anderson, May 7,
1910; Letter from Anderson to Butler, May 9, 1910.
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of the Commission acting separately, to examine into
and report upon any question or matter of difference
arising between them along their common frontier
There are now pending between the two countries many
such questions, some of them of long standing and many
more will necessarily arise in the future, all of which,
under the provisions of this treaty, may appropriately
be referred to this Commission for examination and
report . . . Although the reports of the Commission
on questions so referred are not in themselves binding
upon either country, they will inevitably exercise a ‘,¢E
strong influence upon the ultimate settlement of such _ﬁﬁ
questions; and even if the Commissioners are not entirely '
in accord in the conclusions reached, their reports
will at least furnish a common fund of information which
will be of immense assistance in reaching a final adjust—
ment by diplomatic negotiations.131
C. Implementation of the Treaty by Congress
On May 23 Secretary Knox reported to the President the
importance of enacting legislation to give effect to the Boundary in
Waters Treaty. He recommended on the basis of a memorandum from
Anderson, legislation providing for the appointment of three
commissioners, a secretary and clerical staff and compensation
therefor, and necessary funds for the operation of the United states
 
section plus the payment of one-half of the expenses of the
Commission, not to exceed seventy—five thousand dollars. He 6:;
also recommended legislation to implement provisions of Article
XII.132 The President transmitted the request to Congress with
a draft bill.133 The bill was referred directly to the Senate “=y
Committee on Foreign Relations where it was subjected to some
131. Decimal File 1910—29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6601, 711.42155/109, State Department Press Release, May
5, 1910.
132. Decimal File 1910-29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6601, 711.42155/122, Memorandum from Anderson to
Knox,
May 14, 1910; Anderson Papers, box 69; Confidential Prints
,
International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, p. 133, Letter from
Knox to Taft, May 23, 1910.
133. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(b), Despatch from
Bryce to Lord Grey, June 3, 1910, Confidential
Prints, Inter—
national Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 132—133, Message_from
President Taft to Senate and House of Representa
tives, May 24,
1910; Congressional Record, 6lst Congress, 2d
SeSSion, 1909—1910,
vol. 45, part 7, p. 6773.
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amendments before it was reported back to the Senate on
June 1.134 One amendment was concerned with the imposition
of additional duties on the members of the United States
135 As approved by the Senate, the bill providedsection.
that the United States section might "perform such other
duties of like or similar kind as they may be called upon to
perform under the direction of the Secretary of State . . .",
that the commissioners should be appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate, that the Secretary
should be appointed by the Secretary of State and that the
appropriated funds should be expended under the direction of
the Secretary of State.136
In the House of Representatives, the bill ran into
considerable opposition on many of its points. Particularly,
objections were raised to the imposition of additional duties on
the commissioners and the requirement that their appointments
be confirmed by the Senate. No compromise appeared possible
and eventually the bill expired, the only legislation bringing
the Commission in to existence in the United States being I
the appropriation enactment of June 25, 1910.137
134. Congressional Record, 6lst Congress, 2d Session, 1909-
1910, vol. 45, part 7, p. 6771; Decimal File 1910-29,
Department of State, National Archives, Box 6601,
711.42155/115, Memorandum from Knox to Rep. J.S. Fassett,
June 13, 1910.
135. Decimal File 1910—29, Department of State, National
Archives, box 6601, 711.42155/115, Memorandum from Knox
to Rep. J.S. Fassett, June 13, 1910.
136. Congressional Record, 6lst Congress 3d Session, 1910-1911,
vol. 46, part 1, pp. 491-492; Confidential Prints, Inter-
national Boundary Waters, vol. 1, p. 134.
137. Congressional Record, Slst Congress, 3d Session, 1910—1911,
vol. 46, part 1, pp. 491—492; Sundry Civil Appropriation
Act, June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 384.
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D. Implementation of the Treaty by Parliament
 
   
  
   
   
With the Canadian Parliament in recess for the summer,
nothing could be done to expedite matters in Canada. In July,
Bryce reminded the Canadian Government that the President was
most anxious to appoint the United States Commissioners and
wanted to know when the Canadian Government would be prepared
138 In November the Prime Minister was asked
when he proposed to reply to the July request.139 Pope
to do likewise.
replied that there was no communication from the Prime Minister
on the matter.140
On December 6, 1910 the Minister of Public Works
submitted to the House of Commons a resolution on a bill
relating to the "Establishment and Expenses of the International
Joint Commission under the Boundary Waters Treaty", giving the
Canadian Parliament its first real opportunity to discuss the
treaty.141 In the ensuing debate on the resolution, the
 
opposition members took full advantage of the opportunity to
expand upon the doubts which they had expressed earlier as to
the value of the treaty and the worst fears of the Prime
Minister were confirmed when the Government was called upon
to explain and defend Articles II and VI. So protracted was
the Opposition to the treaty that it was not until May of
1911 that the bill was given third and final reading.
The Minister of Public Works led off the debate
with a defensive analysis of Article II. With reference to
the right of diversion under the first paragraph, he s
aid
that
138. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(b), Des
patch
from Bryce to the Administrator, July
16, 1910.
139. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol.
5(b), Letter
from the Governor General's Secretary t
o Pope, Nov. 3, 1910.
Letter from
140. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 5(
b),1910
Pope to Governor General's Secretar
y, Nov. 4,
141. Canada, Parliament, House of Common
s Debates, Session
1910:1911, vol. 1, p. 867, Dec. 6, 19
10.
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that is simply an affirmance of what has alwaysbeen contended by the United States to be internationallaw, and of what I do not think has been disputed bythe jurists of this country, that is to say that sofar as the waters which are wholly situate within thecountry are concerned, that country may make a diversionof these waters and prevent them from flowing into
boundary waters.
After explaining the evolution of the Harmon Doctrine in the
United States, the Minister drew the attention of the House
to the final paragraph of Article II noting that in
all future cases the citizens of either country
are placed in exactly the same position as a riparianproprietor lower down the stream would be placed in re—gard to any diversion of water by a private riparianowner further up the stream by which his rights wouldbe interfered with. In other words, both nations, bythe latter clause of this article, making provision forthe recognition and payment by the country whose subjectcaused the injury, recognize that there would be thesame obligation to make payment for that injury as if4itwas a question between citizens of the same country.
The Leader of the Opposition, Robert Borden, found
neither of these contentions plausible.
If the Minister's statement could be added as a rider tothe treaty it would make it very plain, but there is
nothing in the treaty to that effect. On the contrary,
there is a direct statement that the United States re-serves absolute jurisdiction and control over that very
thing, and therefore can pass such a statute as I havealluded to without apparently infringing the terms ofthis treaty, rather in accordance with its very terms.Then the citizen would not have in the United States
the same rights as he would have if the diversion had
taken place in Alberta. Therefore I do not think that
you could work out the provision of the treaty in theway the Minister suggests.
I am not so sure as the Minister is that it is a re—
cognized principle of international law that one country
142. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Session
1910—1911, vol. 1, pp. 869—871, Dec. 6, 1910; Griffin
Memorandum, 1958, pp. 48-49.   
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or its citizens under its law can divert a stream
that runs into an adjoining country. I have alwavs
had it in mind, although I have not looked carefully
into the question, that the general rule of inter—
national law was quite the reverse of that.
Mr. Pugsley pointed to the Allegash—Penobscot
diversion by the United States as an example of recognition
by Canada of the Harmon Doctrine. As he understood the com—
pensation provision of the second paragraph, it placed an
obligation on the two federal governments, so that even if a
State or Province made no provision in its law for compensation,
"it would be the duty of both countries . . . to make provision
for the payment of any damages." Mr. Borden felt that while
this was an excellent principle, the right to compensation might
prove completely illusory in practice.144
Mr. Magrath pursued his Leader's line of questioning,
asking the Minister of Public Works if, indeed, the treaty would
preclude a State from authorizing a diversion of water flowing
through it without providing for compensation of injured parties
in Canada. Mr. Pugsley insisted that this was his understanding
of the constitutional position in the United States: "the spirit
of the treaty" is to give "an absolutely new right to subjects
of the two countries." He hastened to add, however, that this
did not mean that the rights of the provinces were in any way
affected in relation to their control over water resources. A
province could still authorize the diversion in its jurisdiction
of waters flowing across the international boundary. What the
treaty did was to enable injured parties on the other side to
complain to their federal government, who in turn would take
the matter up with the other federal government "to see that
compensation is provided for the injury, and vice versa, the
same obligation that is imposed upon the people of
the United
143. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Session
1910-
1911, vol. 1, pp. 871—872, Dec. 6, 1910; Griffin M
emorandum,
1958, p. 49.
144. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Se
ssion 1910—
' 1911, vol. 1, pp. 872-874, Dec. 6, 1910; Gri
ffin Memorandum,
1958. pp. 49—50.   
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. . .. - 14States is also imposed upon the peOple of Canada.” 5
While the Minister was discussing Articles III, IV,
V and VI, the Leader of the Opposition was searching the law
books for authorities in relation to Article II. When the
Minister concluded his statement on Article VI, noting that
in the absence of this provision, the United States would
have every right to divert the flows of the St. Mary and Milk
Rivers before they entered Canada, Mr. Borden asked him once
again to justify his statement in international law. Mr. Borden
said that international law forbade the diversion of trans-
boundary waters where there was interference with navigation,
and although he had found no authority, he was convinced that
this rule applied to interferences with other uses as well. The
Minister referred him to "a very valuable opinion” given by
United States Attorney General Harmon in 1895 in which it was
made clear that, except for navigation purposes, no nation could
claim a right to preclude another from using water in its terri—
tory in whatever manner it wished. Mr. Borden replied:
I do not know what argument might have been made by the
Attorney General of the United States. I would pay as
much respect to that as the reasoning contained in it
would demand, but I would not regard the argument of
the Attorney General of the United States, made with
respect to a matter in controversy between his own
government and the government of Mexico, as absolutely
conclusive of the international law upon this subject
. . . I do not feel myself bound at all by the opinion
of the Attorney General of the United States making an
argument for the interest of his own country. . .
The Minister merely replied that in his view a diversion
. . . would be an act of discourtesy which would be
greater or less depending upon the extent of the
waters which were diverted, but it would not be a
casus belli. It would not be a ground upon which the
government would feel warranted in taking hostile
action against the government which authorized such a
diversion to take place.
145. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Session 1910-
1911, vol. 1, pp. 875-880, Dec. 6, 1910; Griffin Memorandum,
1958, p. 50.
146. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Session
1910-1911, vol. 1, pp. 893—896, Dec. 6, 1910; Griffin
Memorandum, 1958, pp. 51~53.  
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By the time the Minister of Public Works had com-
pleted his statement on the treaty, the Leader of the Opposition
had laid his hands upon a copy of Oppenheim's International Law,
and he launched a full attack upon Article II.
If the writer of this book had intended to use language
absolutely descriptive of the very point we are debating
now he could not have used any more apt for that purpose.
It seems to me that the Minister of Public Works and the
government must have been altogether too much influenced
by the opinion of the Attorney General of the United
States . . . and must have accepted as a thoroughly
reliable statement of international law what was, after
all, only an argument made by the Attorney General of
the United States in opposition to a claim for damages
from Mexico. I would be inclined to think that the
government in entering into this treaty have had a
wrong impression as to the international law on this
subject. The Minister of Public Works took pains to
state that the rule of international law as he understood
it was embodied in the terms of this treaty except that
a right of action was provided. It would appear that
international law is not embodied in the terms of this
treaty, that a very different principle is laid down
and recognized by this treaty, one for which my hon.
friend says the United States has made contention in
the past . . . I think that my hon. friend the Minister
of Public Works has not made good his position or the
position of the government; he has merely made it
apparent to the House that the government, in entering
into this treaty, have done so with not very much regard
to international law . . .
The Minister lamely replied that the Harmon Doctrine was more
than a mere statement of the Attorney General; "it was the
deliberate action of the government of the United States."
Mr. Borden must remember that
. . it was the settled determination of the United
States to maintain the sovereign right to do as they
pleased with the waters of their own country, except
so far as it might interfere with navigation in the
neighbouring country.
The Opposition leader took this to mean that Canada allowed the
United States to dictate what international law should be and
demanded to know if the government, like the Minister
of Public
Works, accepted the United States' view of internation
al law.
Mr. Pugsley grew more confused and confusing.
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No, the treaty is not framed on that theory. I was
presenting that view as a reason why this treaty
might be regarded even as more satisfactory than
one might regard it simply having reference to its
terms, and if one were to take that view of inter—
national rights and obligations. What I said before,
and what I say now, is that, apart altogether from
the question of the right of either country to divert
water, this provision under Article VI is eminently
fair to both countries because it provides, in respect
of both these streams which take their rise in the
United States and pass through Canadian territory,
that the water shall be equally divided between the
two countries . . . So altogether, apart from the
question of international rights, this treaty affords
us, so far as the St. Mary's and Milk rivers are
concerned, provisions eminently fair and calculated
to do complete justice to the people of the two
countries. I move the adoption of the resolution.
Mr. Borden was not letting the Minister off so lightly and wished
to discuss the very point which Pugsley was putting aside, Article
II. He again accused the government of entering the treaty in
ignorance of international law as it related to diversion of
transboundary and tributary waters.147
The Minister of Justice, realizing that to continue
the line of argument espoused by Pugsley would be to put the
government in an untenable position, decided to place the plain
facts before the House.
. . . The question which had to be considered as a
practical question, in coming to a conclusion on that
point, was, whether or not we were better off with such
an international arrangement as this is, than we would
be without any at all. It is all very well for the
learned leader of the opposition to cite us the opinion
of a very well known text writer, stating that a nation
is not allowed to divert a river which crosses the
boundary between its territory and that of another
nation, if such diversion will injure property the
territory of the downstream nation. That is a very
good principle; it is exactly the principle of law
which.wouli be enforced as between an upstream
riparian owner, who was seeking to divert, and a
downstream riparian owner, who was to be hurt by it,
147. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Session
1910-1911, vol. 1, pp. 903-907, Dec. 6, 1910; Griffin
Memorandum, 1958, pp. 53-55
145
if the two properties were in the same countrv.
But how are you going to enforce such a provision
of international law -- if it be a settled principle
of international law —— when the property injured is
in a different country from that in which the diversion
takes place?
  
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
 
He explained that Canada had contended for this common law rule
to be included in the treaty as recommended by the Waterways
Commission but that Mr. Root had rejected outright such a
proposal. Noting that he would have been much happier with
the common law rule than with the one included in the treaty,
he went on:
But when you are making a bargain of any kind,
whether it be an international treaty or a compromise
between two individuals, you have got to get the best
terms you can secure, and frequently you have to
compromise, and do a considerable amount of give and
take. Now, we could not induce the representatives
of the United States in this matter to go the length
we would like to go, the length of declaring the
principle of common law that water flows and ought
to be allowed to flow. But we have induced them to
go a considerable distance.
 
After explaining the compensation provision of Article II in
some detail Aylesworth concluded:
. . I fully concede, as I have said, that if we could
have got the right to prevent diversions . . . I would
have been personally better pleased, and would have
thought that it was more fully carrying out the principle
of the common law. But unable to get that, we have got
certainly the next best thing, and a very great advance
upon nothing at all, because if there had been no tre
aty
you could not have prevented the United States doing
these very same things. It is all very well to cite
Oppenheim to them, but what do they care for O
ppenheim
when there is no court to enforce the rules of la
w he
lays down? You could not have any redress sho
rt of
an agreement to go to the Hague. The utmost we co
uld
do would be to expostulate, to complain,
to grumble,
to protest, and what good would it have done
us?
I think, taking a practical view of the Situa
tion, that
it was wiser to take what we could get
than to refuse
and get anything (sic) at all.148
148. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons
Debates, Session
1910-1911, vol. 1, pp. 908-910; Dec
6, 1910, Griffin‘
Memorandum, 1958, pp. 55-56.  
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Mr. Borden was unimpressed.
. I would not be inclined exactly to accept the
View which the Minister of Justice puts forward, namely
that when an attitude is taken by the United States in
disregard of accepted authorities on international law,
we are obliged to recognize that as a sound position
simply because if we do not, nothing will be left to us
but to expostulate.
However, he did not pursue his contention that the provisions
of Article II were unacceptable and Sir Wilfrid Laurier took
the opportunity to conclude discussion of Article II.
. . I may say that it was only after careful and
exhaustive consideration on my part that I agreed to
accept the treaty as it has been written. I would
have regarded the international law as my hon. friend
opposite does, that is to say, that the same principle
should prevail in international law as prevails in the
common law and the civil law, namely, that a man may
make such use as he pleases of the water which flows
over his prOperty so long as he does not do so to the
detriment of anybody else. But we were in this position,
that whilst there are authorities in EurOpe which con—
tend for that View, there are men on this continent who
contend for the other View .What were we to do? They
might [follow their View] , and if they did so, they
might do it to our injury and we had no recourse whatever
. . . . It seems to me that any man who reflects upon
the condition of things that we had to deal with must
agree that the course we took was the proper course.
I, for my part, have always believed that the Americans
are very good and very fair neighbours, but they always
stand for their own View of things and in this matter
they did. They said: This is international law and we
do not admit any other interpretation than this one.
It was no use to argue with them. We might have quoted
Vattel and a number of the other writers that we know of,
but it would have no effect. Therefore, we took this
course under the circumstances and said: Very well, if
you insist upon your View of it we want our law the
same as your law and the consequences will be the same
on either side.l49
Charles Magrath from Medicine Hat was the chief oppo—
sition critic of the provisions of the treaty dealing with
irrigation on the prairies. He pointed out on December 6, 1910
that he felt the provisions of Article VI were completely unfair
149. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Session
1910-1911, vol. 1, pp. 911—912, Dec. 6, 1910; Griffin
Memorandum, 1958, pp. 56-57
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to Canada but he waited until the debate on the bill in May
to make his major denunciation.150 His criticism centered
about the fact that Article VI had been drafted and accepted
without consultation of persons who were knowledgeable of
the conditions in Alberta. In his view, there should have
been no special provision made for the Milk and St. Mary
Rivers; they should have been left to be governed by the
provisions of Article II where Canadian farmers could have
obtained damages in the Montana courts when the United States
diverted the waters. Under Article VI, he contended, Canada
had given the United States a right to waters without any
compensation to the injured interests in Alberta. He accused
the Government of misleading the House by informing it in May
of the past year that the United States would provide storage
facilities for the waters of the St. Mary River used in Canada.151
The Minister of the Interior, Frank Oliver, replied
that Canada's choice under Article VI was between one—half of
the waters and no waters at all since the United States possessed
the power to divert both streams before they entered Canada. He
admitted that, as with Article II, the provisions under Article
VI were not completely favourable, but the best that Canada
could get.152 Pugsley seconded this statement and added that,
after all, the Canadian Pacific Railway was satisfied with
the bargain.153
After discussion of various other features of the
treaty, first reading was given to the bill. As originally
drafted, it did little more than provide for the appointment
150. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Session
1910-1911, vol. 1, pp. 897-899, Dec. 6, 1910.
151. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Session if
1910-1911, vol. 5, pp. 9101-9122, May 16, 1911. ml
152. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Session 1
1910—1911, vol. 5, pp. 9123-9127, May 16, 1911.
153. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Session
ﬂ
1910-1911, vol. 5, pp. 9139-9156, May 16, 1911.
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they became the laws of Canada. It was contended that in
allowing the United States citizens access to the Exchequer
Court rather than to the provincial courts, they were being
placed in a more favourable position than Canadian citizens
who must use the provincial court. Section three was criticized
for amending wholesale the provincial laws without any consul—
tation with the provincial governments.158 These objections
went largely unanswered and the bill was given third reading
on May 16 and sent to the Senate.159
On May 19, 1911 the bill passed through the Senate
after a desultory and uninformed encounter between Sir Richard
Cartwright and Sir MacKenzie Bowell. Sir MacKenzie suggested
that there had been some amendment to the treaty in the United
~-States Senate.
 
Sir Richard: There was something of that kind. We
rather objected to the amendment, but it was a question
of allowing it to pass or losing the treaty altogether.
Sir MacKenzie: I thought it affected the rights of
fishermen in Lake Erie and Huron.
Sir Richard: I think it had more to say to the fishing
part than anything else. An amendment was brought in a
by Senator Stone, which was finally incorporated in ‘w
the treaty as we now have it. '
The bill received Royal Assent on the same day and
thus became law at about the same time as the United States
Congress was enacting the second annual appropriation for the
. . 161
United States section of the Comm1551on.
158. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Session
1910-1911, vol. 5, pp. 9091—9219, May 16, 1911.
159. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 6(a), Despatch
from Lord Grey to Bryce, May 18, 1911.
160. Canada, Parliament, Senate Debates, Session 1910-1911 _w
pp. 733-735, May 19, 1911. ycﬁ
161. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 6(a), Despatch i?
from Innes to Lord Grey, Apr. 21, 1911; Despatch from
Lord Grey to Bryce, June 1, 1911: Confidential Prints,
International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 179-184.
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E. Creation of the United States Section
 
The United States Government was anxious to establish
the Commission and shortly after the first appropriation for
the Commission was made, the Department of State urged the
President to make the necessary appointments, noting that
under the treaty the President was free to name the Commissioners'
without reference to the Senate since the legislation which would
have required such consent had failed to pass the House of
Representatives.162
An inquiry was made as to the Canadian Government's
readiness to make its appointments and,163 after a lengthy period
of no reply, another note was sent in December, pointing out that
the President was under increasing pressure to make the appoint-
ments.164 Discovering that there was little likelihood of the
Canadian appointments being made at an early date, the Secretary
of State advised the President to proceed with naming the
commissioners.165
Following another slight delay during which the House
of Representatives briefly reconsidered the legislation which had
been introduced in June of the previous year and again failed to
enact it,166 the President, after a final inquiry as to the
readiness of the Canadian Government,167 informed the Secretary
162. Decimal File 1910—29, Department of State, National Archives
box 6601, 711.42155/118, Memorandum from State Department
Solicitor to White House, July 14, 1910.
163. Decimal File 1910—29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6601, 711.42155/116A, Telegram from Acting Secretary of
State to Bryce, July 15, 1910; Confidential Prints, Inter-
national Boundary Waters, vol. 1, p.135.
164. Decimal File 1910-29, Department of State, National Archives,
» box 6601, 711.42155/127, Letter from Taft to Knox, Dec. 24, 1910 J
165. Decimal File 1910—29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6601, 711.42155/127, Letter from Knox to Taft, Dec. 31, 1910 ;
166. Decimal File 1910—29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6601, 711.42155/132, Letter from Knox to Taft, Jan. 4, 191L
1671 Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 6(a), Telegram from
Bryce to Lord Grey, Mar. 11, 1911.
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of State that he would appoint Thomas H. Carter of Montana,
J.A. Tawney of Minnesota and Frank S. Streeter of New Hampshire
with salaries of seventy-five hundred dollars, the maximum
allowed under the appropriation legislation.168
169
The Secretary
in turn informed the British Ambassador.
Before the Canadian Government completed the establish—
ment of its section of the Commission, however, Carter had died,
and in early December, the President named George Turner of
Washington State to replace him.170
F. Creation of the Canadian Section
 
The appointment of the members of the Canadian section
of the Commission was delayed first by confusion as to the mode
of appointment and, second, by the change in administrations
1911.
early as February to serve as Canadian chairman but no appoint—
which occurred in late September, Gibbons was asked as
ment could be made until the legislation implementing the treat
y
had been enacted.171
The Government finally acted in August, informing the
Governor General of the selection of George Gibbons o
f Ontario,
A.P. Barnhill of New Brunswick and Aimé Geoffrion
of Quebec as
Canadian commissioners and requesting that the Br
itish Foreign
Office be so informed in order that the commissions mi
ght be
172
signed by the King. While this procedure was corre
ct,
Decimal File 1910—29, Department of State,
National Archives,
box 6601, 711.42155/141, Letter from Taft t
o Knox, Mar. 9, 1911.
Decimal File 1910-29, Department of State
, National Archives,
box 6601, 711.42155/141, Letter from Knox
to Bryce, Mar. 11,
Decimal File 1910—29, Department of State
, National Archives,
box 6601, 711.42155/173, Letter from Taft
to Knox, Dec. 1,
1911; Governor General's Papers, No. 268,
vol. 6(b), Note from
Knox to Bryce, Dec. 20, 1911; Confiden
tial Prints, International
Boundary Waters, vol. 1, p. 202
.
Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook N
o. 1, pp. 950—951, Letter
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the British Ambassador promptly informed the Foreign Office
and Knox that the Canadian Government had "appointed" its
commissioners and suggested an early meeting with the United
States section.173 The Secretary of the Department of Public
Works fell into the same error when he informed the three
nominees of their "appointments" at seventy-five hundred dollars
per annum.174
By the time this confusion had been cleared away and,
despite numerous urgent cables to the Colonial Office and Foreign
Office during September,175 the commissions of appointment had
not been signed by the King when the Laurier Government was swept
from office. One of the first acts of the Borden Government was
to inform the Governor General that the new cabinet wished to re—
consider the appointments previously recommended by the former
176 To this the Colonial Office acquiesced and,administration.
on October 23, the new Governor General (the Duke of Connaught)
was requested by Privy Council minute to recommend to His Majesty's
Government the cancellation of the earlier nominations and to sub-
stitute therefor the names of Thomas Casgrain of Quebec, Henry
Powell of New Brunswick and Charles Magrath of Alberta.177
173. Decimal File 1910-29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6601, 711.42155/159, Note from Bryce to Knox, Aug. 16,
1911; Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. L
pp. 187—188, Despatch from Lord Grey to Harcourt,-Aug. 17, 1911;
Despatch from Bryce to Lord Grey, Aug. 26, 1911.
174. Gibbons Papers, vol. 7, fol. 2, Letter from Department of
Public Works to Gibbons, Aug. 17, 1911.
175. Canada, Sessional Paper No. 119, 1912, Letter from J. Pope to
the Deputy Minister of Public Works, Sept. 5, 1911; Letter
from Pope-to Lord Grey, Sept. 5, 1911; Telegram from Lord Grey
to Harcourt, Sept. 6, 1911; Telegram from Harcourt to Lord Grey!
Sept. 21,,1911; Telegram from Lord Grey to Harcourt, Oct 3, l9lh
Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, PP-
190, 192, 194.
176. Governor General‘s Papers, No. 268, vol. 6(b), Memorandum from
Borden to Lord Grey, Oct. 11, 1911.
177. Canada, Sessional Paper No. 119, 1912, Telegram from Lord Grey
to Harcourt, Oct. 11, 1911; Governor General's Papers, No. 268:
vol 6(b), Telegram from Harcourt to Lord Grey, Oct. 14, 1911:
Privy Council Minutes 2471 & 2472, Oct. 23, 1911; Confidential
Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 195—197.
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Despite some lobbying by Gibbons to have the original
appointments confirmed,178 commissions for the new nominees were
signed and transmitted to the Governor General179 and in late
November the Clerk of the Privy Council informed Gibbons,
Barnhill and Geoffrion that their "appointments" were cancelled.180
Secretary Knox was informed immediately of the new appointments
and, by common consent, January 10, 1912 was fixed as the date of
the first meeting of the two sections of the Commission in
Washington.181
******
At this juncture it became imperative that serious con-
sideration be given to the nature and character of the role and
functions of the Commission and the commissioners. The ensuing
discussions of these matters were many and varied and they con—
tinue even today as the commissioners, government officials, and
numerous others attempt to explain, assess and reassess the role
of the International Joint Commission in the relations between
Canada and the United States.
In the following pages an attempt is made to assemble
this multitude of expressions of views, interspersed with factual
information, in a meaningful fashion. Following a collection of
 
the general commentary on the character, functions and roles of the
Commission, documentation relating to the appointment of personnel,
organization and reorganization of the Commission is assembled.
The volume is concluded with a collection in chronological order
of the miscellaneous documentation including treatises, periodical
articles, speeches and governmental papers relating in some way
to the International Joint Commission and Boundary Waters Treaty.
178. Gibbons Papers, vol. 7, fol. 2, Letter from Geoffrion to
Gibbons, Oct 23 & Nov 2, 1911; vol. 9, Letterbook No. 2,
Letter from Gibbons to Geoffrion (private), Nov. 17, 1911.
179. Canada, Sessional Paper No. 119, 1912, Despatch from Harcourt
to Duke of Connaught, Nov. 18, 1911.
180. Canada, Sessional Paper No. 119, 1912, Letters from Clerk of
the Privy Council to Gibbons, Barnhill and Geoffrion,
Nov. 29, 1911; Confidential Prints, International Boundary
_ Waters, vol. 1, pp. 199-200.
181. Decimal File 1910-29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6601, 711.42155/ Note from Bryce to Knox, Dec. 1,
1911; Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters,
vol. 1, pp. 202-205.  
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IV THE CHARACTER AND ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION
 
A. Defining the Functions: 1911-1912
 
The first recorded expression of view as to the nature
of the International Joint Commission appeared in a letter
written by James Tawney to the President immediately after the
former's appointment. He viewed the Commission as a purely
judicial body.
A careful study of the Treaty creating this Commission
and defining its jurisdiction and powers will show any
one that it is the most important permanent international
tribunal ever created to consider questions arising be—
tween Great Britain, Canada and the United States, and
in going over some of the cases now pending in the State
Department which this Commission will have to hear and
determine, I am convinced that it is not in fact a
commission but an international court. Its proceedings
will have to be conducted as those of any other judicial
tribunal, for it not only deals with the rights and
interests of the respective countries, but also finally
determines the rights and interests of the citizens of
both countries where the claims of such citizens in
respect to their rights are in conflict.
There is also a great deal more work for this Commission
to do in the next few years which will involve a great
deal more time than was supposed. It will have to deal
with questions‘which are entirely new, and as the
counsellor for the State Department said a few days ago,
in dealingﬁwith these questions there are no precedents
to follow.*
This View he reiterated in rejecting the arguments
by Chandler Anderson and Chairman Carter that private applicants
under Articles III and IV must be passed upon by the appropriate
government department prior to their transmission to the Commission.
Such procedure "would reduce the International Joint Commission
to an administrative tribunal rather than a judicial one."2
When Tawney succeeded Carter as chairman of the
l. W.H. Taft Papers, Presidential Series No. 2, file 516, Letter
from Tawney to C.D. Norton, Secretary to the President, Mar.
14, 1911.
2. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—l-l—l, Letter from Anderson to
Carter, Apr. 29, 1911; Letter from Carter to Anderson, May
26, 1911; Letter from Tawney to L.W. Busbey, Secretary,
U.S. Section, June 16, l9ll.  
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United States section in December, he took the opportunity
to raise the issue with the Canadian chairman while making
arrangements for the first meeting in Washington.
Inasmuch as the jurisdiction of our Commission is
unlike any similar tribunal in either country, the
work of preparing these Rules of Procedure will
undoubtedly require some time. There are a number I.of fundamental questions pertaining to the functions "iand jurisdiction of the Commission that the Commission “‘"will have to settle at the outset. Among these, is
the question of whether or not the functions of the
Commission, under the Treaty, are wholly judicial,
or only partially judicial and partially administrative.
Upon the determination of this question rests very
largely the nature of the Rules of Procedure to be
adopted.
 
Chairman Casgrain had not formed any Opinions on this matter
but thought that "our functions are partially judicial and
partially administrative. This, I believe, is the view taken
of the matter by our Government."4
The Commission met for the first time on January 10
in Washington to draft the rules of procedure and each chairman ";
had an opportunity, at the opening session, to express his ‘
initial views of the role of the Commission and its commissioners.
Tawney left no doubt as to his concept of the judicial body.
Personally, and on behalf of my colleagues, I express
the belief that upon the interpretation of the powers
and duties of this Commission and the ability of its
members to disassociate themselves in their service
on this Commission from their individual relations to H__
their respective governments, depends the success or “Em
failure of this international effort to create a =,l
judicial tribunal, broader than our respective I 3.5
nationalities and almost continental in its juris-
diction, for the adjudication of differences that now
exist or may hereafter arise along our common frontier.
. . . [i]n our judgment this International Joint Commission
is the most promising agency that has yet been created for
3. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-l—l—l, Letter from Tawney to
Casgrain, Dec. 26, 1911.
4. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—l-l—l, Letter from Casgrain to
Magrath, Dec. 30, 1911.
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the settlement of controversies between these two
nations; because it brings together, face to face,
representatives of Canada and the United States
to impartially consider and adjudicate the questions
that now exist or that may develop along our inter—
national boundaries . . . where two great nations
are living as neighbours but under two national
jurisdictions.
. . . This Treaty of 1910 begins the 20th century with
a commission to which may be referred for inquiry and
adjudication all possible questions of disagreement
between the Dominion of Canada and the United States,
their provinces and states and their respective peoples.
This is an effort to write into international law the
sentiment of the peoples of two great countries . . .
The chief cause for congratulation, however, is that this
Treaty has provided a means for frank, direct and constant
relations between the two great neighbouring peoples who
inhabit the greater part of the North American continent,
and who must live in amicable relations to realize the
ultimate ideal of our Anglo—Saxon civilization. This
Commission constitutes the medium for this direct
communication, and to it, by the express terms of the
Treaty, may be referred for consideration and settlement
all questions of difference that may arise between the
people living along our common frontier. Although the
Treaty was signed on January 11, 1909, it expressly
authorizes and clothes this Commission with jurisdiction
to consider and determine all questions of difference,
without reservations or qualifications of any kind. As
a distinguished Canadian jurist, Mr. Justice Riddell . . .
has well said: "This may be called a minature Hague Tribunal
of our own; just for us English —speaking nations of the
continent of North America."
I am not idealist enough to assume that any of us can wholly
divest himself of national sentiment to here assure the
world that he has reached that stage of human perfection
that constitutes the absolutely impartial judge in inter-
national affairs; but I believe we all realize our obligation
to fairly and fully examine every question that may be pre—
sented and try to reach a judicial settlement that may con-
tribute to the better understanding and bear out the spirit
of the Treaty, which is an agreement in part for the joint
regulation of common property of great value to the peoples
on both sides of the International Boundary. I do not
understand that we are the agents of separate governments  
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to meet and bicker over contested questions, but rather
the joint representatives of the two governments to co—
operate in the examination and judicial settlement ofquestions that are of mutual interest.
As members of this Commission, we are, therefore,
neither Canadians nor Americans, but we are each and
all representatives of all the people on both sides of
our International Boundary line. We can have before us
no disputes or disagreements about where the boundary
is, and in so far the employment of the terms "Boundary
Treaty" or "Waterways Treaty" is misleading. We are to
consider the uses, diversions and obstructions of the
boundary waters as a primary duty and also adjudicate
any and all other questions of difference or disagreement
between the peoples of the United States and Canada as may
from time to time be referred to the Commission by the
mutual action and consent of the two governments. It is,
therefore, no insignificant or mere temporary and incidental
work we face in the organization of this Commission. We
have a great responsibility resting upon us to shape our
work so as to vitalize the international powers conferred
by the Treaty . .
I hope that whatever else we may accomplish we shall de-
monstrate the wisdom of Great Britain in clothing the
Dominion of Canada with responsibility of conducting her
own foreign relations with the United States that fall
under the jurisdiction of this Treaty through the medium
of this Commission, and that the present neighbourly feeling
will be strengthened by the manner in which we consider and
determine the questions that will be presented.
Tawney thought the credo of each Commissioner might be:
Although I am a citizen of but one nation I am constituted
a judge for both. Each nation has the same, and no greater
right, to demand of me fidelity and diligence in the exam—
ination, exactness and justice in the decision.
In reply, Casgrain was brief and most reserved in his
remarks, emphasizing more the fact that this was a British
commission.
. . . We concur with the Chairman in the belief that the
appointing and bringing together of this Commission will
go far to settle amicably between tWo neighbours questions
which otherwise might become embarrassing.
5. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—l-l-l, Mr. Tawney's Remarks;
Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
pp. 212-215; Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 6(b).  
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We feel sure that working in conjunction with gentle-
men who have distinguished themselves in the service
of their country, and who are known not only for their
profound knowledge of public affairs, but also for the
broad spirit with which they approach matters of im-
portance, we will be able to contribute our share towards
maintaining that "firm and universal peace between His
Britannic Majesty and the United States" of which the
Treaty of Ghent speaks.
We are fully alive to the honour and responsibility of
the position to which we have been appointed by His
Majesty the King. We are citizens of an integral part
of the British Empire, one of the Dominions beyond the
seas, and by the very nature of things, living on this
continent and being in constant communication with our
very good neighbours, the citizens of the United States,
we are in a position to see with our own eyes and judge
with our own minds what is to the best advantage of the
Empire we represent. For this reason, His Majesty's
Government, which is ever solicitous of giving to
British subjects, in whatever part of the Empire they
may be, and whatever may be their race, creed or colour,
the greatest measure of liberty and autonomy, has dele—
gated three of His Majesty's Canadian subjects to meet
the delegates of your great Republic and to deal in a
fair, impartial and judicial spirit with the important
questions mentioned in the Treaty.
The first draft of the rules of procedure which was
agreed upon by the Commissioners after several days of con-
sultations, reflected strongly Tawney's views of the Commission
as a judicial body. The two governments were characterized as
"applicant" or "respondent" as the case might be in appearances
before the Commission. Applications were to be made by way of
petition, in form corresponding to that before a court of law.
An "answer" was to be filed in reply to the "petition", followed
by a "formulation of issues”, with no "further pleadings" in the
absence of permission from the Commission. Interested private
parties might intervene on application and the Commission might
hold a "preliminary hearing". Parties could obtain an order
for "production and inspection of documents" and might apply
6. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-l-l—l, Mr. Casgrain's Response:
 
Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
pp. 215-216; Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 6(b).   
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for permission to take "depositions".
received under oath,
Evidence was to be
with examination and cross—examination
of witnesses permitted. All "briefs, factums, pleadings and
documents" were to be printed and filed as in a court of record.
The only reference to proceedings under ArticlesIX and X was
the final rule which made the foregoing rules apply insofar
as they were applicable.7
The draft rules were submitted to the two govern—
ments and several other persons for comment and the observations
which were forthcoming were illustrative of the diverse views
of the role and functions of the Commission. But first, it is
instructive to observe the comments of the British Ambassador
on the proceedings of the first meeting of the Commission in
Washington.
The proceedings were very amicable throughout, but as
the meeting was of a preliminary character [iti] might
have been expected to be merely formal and devoted
exclusively to settling points of procedure. In the
opening speech, however, of the Chairman of the American
section . . . considerable, and in the opinion of some,
excessive stress was laid on the international and '
judicial features of the Commission. One object of
the Commission is no doubt that of "promoting closer
and more direct relations between the two great peoples
of this continent" and the Commission does no doubt
"constitute a medium for this direct communication".
It may even be called a "minature Hague Tribunal" and
will also without doubt "demonstrate the wisdom of Great
Britain in clothing the Dominion of Canada with responsibility
of conducting her own foreign relations with the United States
that fall under the jurisdiction of this Treaty through the
medium of this Commission." But the propriety of the reply
of the Chairman of the Canadian section in bringing into
equivalent prominence the fact that they represent Canada
as "an integral part of the British Empire" and feel their
responsibility to aim at "what is to the best advantage
of the Empire" deserves to be noted and commended as
eminently fitting.
Connected with this difference in point of view and of
much more practical importance to the utility of the
\
l
I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-l—l—l, (First Draft) Rules of
Procedure of the International Joint Commission, January 1912;
Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
pp. 216—221; Decimal File 1910—29, Department of State, '
National Archives, box 6601, 711.42155/181; Governor—General 3
Papers, No. 268, vol. 6(b).
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Commission was the line taken by the United States
section of the Commission in regard to the judicial
character to be given to its functions and status.
The View was advanced and pressed on the acceptance
of the Canadian section that the Commission was a Tri—
bunal in which neither section were to have any re—
presentative Significance or any separate relation to
the Governments. The Governments would be represented
before them by Counsel like any other private party.
Neither section would take action apart from the
Commission as a whole in regard to matters concerning
it; or would even take cognizance of any such matter
until it was submitted to the whole Commission. And
further various forms of declaration were presented
to and pressed on the Canadian section the effect of
which was that they would only deal with matters
judicially and "according to law.” To these proposals
the Canadian Commissioners prudently demurred for
various reasons. Mr. Magrath who has, I understand,
considerable practical exnerience as an Engineer and
whose oresence on the Commission will be of corres-
ponding value pointed OUt that to recognize such a
View of the Commission's powers and duties would make
him useless. I may observe that all these American
Commissioners are lawyers which may account to some
extent for their wish to place the Commission on a
purely legal basis. But taking a larger view ——
such a limitation would have not cnly been quite
different from the intentions of those who established
this interesting and important innovation in inter—
national relations ~— but would have gravely compromised
its value, and was finally in no Way ﬁustifiable by
the terms of the treaty.
As I pointed out to the Canadzan Commissioners when
they consulted me, they were reouired by Article XII
of the Treaty to make declaration at their first meeting
to "faithfully and impartially perform” their duties;
and that they could not properlv do more or less than
that. Further, that such a step as was proposed was
one which should not be taken without reference to the
Governments concerned. They were omits of the same
opinion and their only difficulty was in devising a
course which would render abortive the scheme of the
American Commissioners without disturbing the harmony
of the first meeting. '
This task was, however, eventually facilitated by the
withdrawal of two of the United States Commissioners
from the position they had assumed. It is possible
that this position may have been taken up under the
influence of a small group of international jurists
of somewhat purist and unpractical tendency known to
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exist here and may have been abandoned under the
influence of opinions of the opposite character
emanating from the State Department. The question
has nominally been merely postponed but will not,
I think, give more trouble.
I was much impressed by the aptitude and ability in
a situation of some diplomatic difficulty shown by
Mr. Casgrain, . . . This, combined with the legal
reputation enjoyed by Mr. Powell and the practical
experience of Mr. Magrath promises well for the
furtherance of Canadian interests before the
Commission and for the success as a whole of this
very interesting experiment in the adjustment of
international claims or controversies.
Bryce's views on the Commission were supported by
the Canadian authorities to whom the draft rules and a confi-
dential memorandum thereon prepared by a United States com-
missioner were submitted for opinions. Chief Justice Charles
Fitzpatrick was highly critical of the attempt in the memorandum
and in the rules to assert a judicial character for the Commission.
Further reflection has confirmed the impression received
when I first read the Treaty, the proposed Rules of
Procedure and the draft Memorandum with reference to
the duties and functions of the International Joint
Commission. The Treaty is most inartistically drawn
and the legislation passed last session to give effect U
to it is, in my opinion, in some respects, of doubtful 4%
validity. For instance, section 2 is undoubtedly 1
within the legislative power of a provincial legislature
or ancillary to the treaty-making power of the Imperial ‘
Parliament; but I do not quite see how it is possible :
for the Dominion Parliament to justify such a provision.
"Canada a nation" is a good thing to talk about; but
remember that there is no such "diplomatic entity".
However this is as to the past.
Now dealing with the documents submitted. I am firmly
of opinion that any dogmatic assertion of the judiCial
status of the Commission is in the first place certainly
premature and in the second probably prejudicial to its
usefulness. I should have thought that the CommiSSion
was intended to be administrative as well as a judicial
 
8. Governor General's Papers, No. 268, vol. 6(b) Despatch
r from Bryce to Sir Edward Grey and the Duke of Connaught
(confidential), Jan. 19, 1912; Confidential Prints, _
International Boundary Waters, vol. 1, pp. 211—212. f
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body and therefore authorised to deal with all matters
submitted to it ex aeguo et bono on the broadest basis.
In my opinion, the treatv will require very liberal
interpretation and for this reason alone its inter—
pretation should be left to be worked out in practice
rather than laid down in principle beforehand. But,
loose as the language of the Treaty is in places and
confusing as some of its provisions are, I have not
been able to find any justiﬁcation in it either for
the principle of judicial solidarity of the Commission,
or for that of judici,al segregation of the Sections
from the Governments which the American section advanced
and which is embodied in the memorandum.
 
Moreover, as one may suspect, (?) a political design in
this attempt at an interpretation of the treaty, and as
it might tend, if accepted, to affect the imperial
element in the relation of Canada and the United States
by setting up across it a sacrosanct international
judicial bench, and this attempt, if realised should
not recommend itself to any Government least of all
the present one; and as the result of this inter-
pretation would be to so prejudice the practical use
of the Commission, there seems really any (no?) need
to expose in detail the defects and difficulties
inherent, in this memorandum. Any attempt to put that
memorandum forward at the next meeting should, in my
opinion, be resisted by the Canadian Section on the
simple and sufficient ground that I have already put
forward in the course of our conversation, viz, that
the treaty requires you simply to make declaration at
your meeting "to faithfully and impartially fulfill
your duty"; and to do more would be useless, perhaps
harmful. I
As to the rules of procedure in so far as these are
formal or relate to organisation, etc. they are
unobjectionable and can be left to the Commission. The
chapter in them in which I think changes chiefly
necessary is that as to procedure entitled "application".
The theory underlying this procedure is the judicial one
already referred to. Its most objectionable results is
the requirement that makes the two Governments —— on
whose mutual relations the whole guxﬁion of the Commission
rests —- appear as "petitioners" and as parties contestant
before it as a tribunal. This is a confusion of substance
in an attempt to represent the unity of person of the
Commission. It could not but embarrass rather than
expedite settlements. At present I am disposed to think
the right procedure would be for a private interest to
present its petition to the competent Department which
here would be the new Department of Foreign Affairs --
if endorsed by them it would be sent to the Commission
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and represented before them by Counsel. If either
Government wishes to come before the Commission, it
could do so in the person of the competent expert
Department which, with the formal approval of the
Foreign Department, would appear by Counsel --
thereby leaving the Governments as Governments, free
to support the decision of the Commission or to decide
on its recommendations or at the worst to overrule
its mistakes.
The matter may have an importance even outside that
of Canada-American relations, for this Commission
was taken as a precedent for the Anglo—American
Commission in the General Arbitration Treaty now
under discussion here. As to the intention of that
Treaty in this respect, I can speak with assurance and
affirm, but very confidentially, that a "judicial"
body as is now suggested for the Canado-American
relations was never theoretically contemplated nor
would have been considered practical for the purpose
in view in Anglo-American relations. This being so
it seems even more unsuitable to the former in which
mostly administrative questions will be handled;
whereas in the latter they will be mostly though by
no means exclusively "justiciable".
It is the old attempt which has done —- as we know --
so much harm already, to try and go too fast in
developing judicial settlement of international dis—
putes via arbitration out of diplomatic settlement. _;)
In a word, I recognized throughout the voice of
Senator Turner, but the hand of Mr. James Brown Scott.
We should stand for the old favorite "International
Commission" by "diplomacy out of good relations“,
whereas Mr. Scott wants an "arbitral tribunal" out
of'the Hague".9
A memorandum prepared by the Deputy Minister of
Justice was of similar tenor.
A draft memorandum (confidential) with reference to the
status and functions of the tribunal . . . said to have
been prepared by the Commissioners or some of them, has
been referred to me, also copy of draft rules of
procedure (confidential).
9. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-l-l—l, Letter from Fitzpatrick
to Magrath (private), Jan. 30, 1912.
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The draft memorandum, upon the recital that the Commission
is an international court, proposes that the Commission
resolve that it shall approach and consider all questionssubmitted to it under a high sense of judicial respon—sibility in accordance with the principles of law and
justice applicable thereto.
By article 8 of the treaty certain rules and principles
are adopted . . . for the government of the Commission,and by article 12 it is provided that each commissioner
shall . . . subscribe a solemn declaration in writingthat he will faithfully and impartially perform the
duties imposed upon him under the treaty.
The principles and rules so established, to be observed
by the Commission, are rules of policy dependent upon
the sanction of the High Contracting Parties, and not
rules of law.
The treaty by article 2 provides for legal rights and
remedies, but these are to be enforced in the courts
and not by the Commission.
It is submitted, having regard to the provisions of these
articles, that the ordinary questions with which the
Commission is concerned are questions of expediency and
not questions of law, although of course legal questions
may occasionally present themselves. The tribunal is by
its constitution a commission, not a court, and the pro—
posed resolution is inappropriate, first because it claims
for the Commission a character which it does not inherently
have, and, secondly, because the Commission has no power
by its declaration to affect its own constitution or powers.
The Commission is given power by article 12 to adopt such
rules of procedure as shall be in accordance with justiceand equity. It cannot of course by these rules limit orextend its jurisdiction. Some of the rules are of
questionable validity, for example, Rule 24, authorizing
the issue of commissions, and Rule 29, with regard to the
service of process; but the principal objection to the
rules as drafted is that they seem to be framed upon the
assumption that the proceedings before the Commission are
to be inter artes, and that the two contracting powers
are to be impleaded before the Commission as suppliants
and respondents. The treaty and the legislation by which
it is sanctioned, so far as I am able to understand, do
not contemplate any such procedure, and it is moreover
inconsistent with the constitution of the tribunal and
the dignity and relations of the contracting parties that
they should be put in that position.   
 l65
Rules 6 and 7 refer to procedure by petition, naming
the King and United States as petitioner and respondent,
as the case may be.
Rule 17 enables the Commission to direct the preparation
of issues, and there are similar provisions in other
rules pointing to the notion on the part of the drafts—
men that the tribunal is exercising compulsory juris-
diction over the two governments as litigating parties
subject to the authority of the Commission, similar to
that which a court of justice has with respect to
ordinary suitors. This misconception is founded doubt-
less on the draft resolution which underlies the rules,
and which enunciates the principle that the Commission
is an independent court of justice; whereas in truth its
functions are mainly administrative, and should consist
for the most part of inquiry and report upon references
made by the respective governments, not necessarily
or prima facie involving disputes or litigation.
It may be observed that even the Hague rules, which
provide for the procedure of a very elaborate court
to determine international disputes, do not attempt
to assert jurisdiction in the manner of these rules.
The quality of the Latin in Rule 7(d) is remarkable.10
The draft memorandum concerning the duties and
functions of the Commission referred to in the foregoing memo-
randa was one prepared by Commissioner F.S. Streeter for the
three members of the American section in advance of the first ' ‘ly
meeting. It set forth his case for ascribing to the Commission
a purely judicial status.
I. The Treaty contains no grant of power to either i
Section of the Commission acting independently except
vi
to organize by choosing a Secretary and, by necessary
a-
inference, a Chairman.
All other powers conferred by the Treaty are vested
in the Commission acting as a joint tribunal.
II. If the Commission were a body of negotiators and
each Section represented its own Governmen
t, its pro—
cedure and rules would necessarily have to be elas
tic
and conform to diplomatic usages and methods.
But the terms of the Treaty furnish no warrant f
or
such construction.
III.If the duties and functions of the commis
sion are ' E”
in their nature judicial, then of neceSSity
the Comm1551on :m
 
10. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-l—l—l, Memor
andum from E.L.
Newcombe to the Prime Minister, Jan.
31, 1912. .
.
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is an International Court and its procedure must be
judicial and its rules be Court rules.
IV, Examining the sc0pe and provisions of the Treaty
it appears (1) that certain matters are to be sub—
mitted to the Commission for final decision, (2) others
for investigation and report to either or both Governments.
Certainly with reference to the first class of questions
and, in a broad View, the second class also, the Commission
will act as a judicial tribunal and should therefore decide
all matters submitted to it under a high sense of judicial
responsibility. Its procedure should be strictly judicial
and in the exercise of its functions it should be as in-
dependent of the two Governments as a Court or any judicial
tribunal is independent of the Executive.
V. At the first formal meeting of the Commission for
organization a preamble and resolution in substance as
follows should, we think, be adOpted, spread upon the
records of the Commission and published as a general
principle governing this Commission and the procedure
before it:
Whereas the duties and functions of the International
Joint Commission as prescribed by the Treaty between
the United States and Great Britain proclaimed May 13,
1910, are in their nature judicial and its decisions
final, therefore, be it,
RESOLVED that this Commission will approach and consider
all questions submitted to it under a high sense of
judicial responsibility in accordance with the principles
of law and justice applicable thereto,
and in matters of procedure will be governed as nearly as
may be by the general usages and practice of judicial
tribunals in the United States and in the Dominion of
Canada.
On January 16 Streeter moved adoption by the Commission
of a somewhat varied version of this resolution.
Whereas, the Treaty contains no grant of power to either
Section of the Commission to act independently except
to appoint a Secretary and by necessary inference a
Chairman, and all other powers conferred by the Treaty
are vested in the Commission as a joint tribunal, and
Whereas, the duties and functions of the Commission as
prescribed by the Treaty are in their nature judicial,
therefore,
Resolved, that this Commission will approach and consider
all qUestions submitted to it under a high sense of
 
11. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—l—l—l, Draft of Memorandum with
Reference to the Duties and Functions of the International
Joint Commission under Treaty Proclaimed May 13, 1910 (undated).
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judicial responsibility, in accordance with the
principles of law and justice applicable thereto.
On motion of Commissioner Powell, consideration of this resolu—
tion was deferred until the rules of procedure had been drafted
and considered by the Governments.12 It was not subsequently
adopted.
In the United States, Knox had Anderson undertake
a consideration of the draft rules of procedure. Anderson,
after consulting Root for his views on the question of the
position of the governments before the Commission,13 prepared
a memorandum which the Department sent to Tawney.
. . In forwarding this memorandum the Department
desires to have it understood that the suggestions
made in it and the omission to make suggestion with
regard to the rules not mentioned in it, are not to
be regarded as committing the Department on any
question which may ultimately arise as to the inter—
pretation of the treaty.
In accordance with your suggestion that it would be
advisable to lay the questions under consideration
before Senator Root inasmuch as he could speak with
more authority than any one else with regard to the
purpose and meaning of the treaty which was negotiated
under his direction, I have submitted to him the pro—
posed rules and the Department's memorandum thereon.
He has found it imeSSible to examine them in detail,
but at an interview which I had with him this morning
he expressed the View that the rule requiring that a
petition affecting boundary waters should be authorized
by one of the Governments before it is submitted to the
Commission for approval, would be more likely to arouse
controversies between the Governments than to settle
them, and-that the chief purpose of this treaty was to
settle or avoid controversies. He pointed out that
the granting of authority by the Government in many
Cases would involve the exercise of the political
power of the Government, and that this is a power
over which even the Supreme Court of the United States
does not undertake to exercise control; and that
naturally the national members of the Commission would
be inclined to support their own Government in such.
a matter, which would result in bias and partisansh
ip,
and not only prevent the Commission from settling '
questions, but might produce controversies which
might
12. I.J.C., Can. Sect. Library, Record of Proceedings: V01- 1'
p. 15.
13. Anderson Papers, box 11, Letterbook p. 218,
Anderson to Root, Jan. 30, 1912.
Letter from  
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not otherwise arise. On the other hand if an appli—
cation is submitted to the Commission for its approval
before it is finally authorized by either Government,
the Commission will not be confronted with any question
involving national feeling, and they will be more likely
to come to an agreement, and whatever conclusion they
reach will have much greater weight. If the application
is denied by the Commission, that would probably put an
end to the question; or, if the application should be
granted, that would unquestionably influence the Govern—
ment concerned to follow the same course, but in either
case a controversy between the two Governments is less
likely to arise if neither Government is required to take
final action before the question is submitted to the Commission.
 
In his memorandum, Anderson did not concern himself
with how the Commission was to be characterized but rather, dealt
with the practical operation of the Commission. He did, however
suggest a number of changes in the rules designed to de-emphasize
He insisted that
neither government stood in the relation of a petitioner or a
the proposed litigative nature of the process.
respondent in proceedings before the Commission. Nor did a
government present a case on behalf of a private party; it
merely transmitted the petition in its discretion. He also
emphasized throughout the document that the governments were in
no way made subservient to the Commission; they retained their
complete sovereignty, and any of the rules that suggested other-
wise must be changed.14
George Turner of the United States section, a former
judge, submitted a lengthy brief on the proposed rules, admitting
no doubt as to the judicial status of the Commission and devoting
much attention to the question of the right of private individuals
to appear before the Commission. Examining the preamble and
clauses of the treaty, he concluded that it was demonstrably clear
. . . that one of the nations must be in court, either
as petitioner or respondent, in every case, because
it can not be supposed that the Commission, devoid
of final process or of power to enforce its awards,
is invested with power to determine disputes between
14. Anderson Papers, box 11, Letterbook, p. 222, Letter from
Anderson to Tawney, Jan. 31, 1912, enclosing Memorandum
upon the First Draft of Rules of Procedure for the Inter—
national Joint Commission; I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—l-l-l;
Decimal File 1910—29, Department of State, National Archives,
711.42155/181.box 6601,  
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If one nation then must be in
court in every case, it follows that the other
nation must likewise be in court. It would be
preposterous to suppose that either nation had
consented to be haled into court at the instance
of every irresponsible inhabitant of the other
nation. Moreover, since the Commission is power-
less to enforce its awards, but the latter are
dependent for their sanction on the good faith of the
two nations, the nations must be before the tribunal
in every case as a party, that no other parties are
needed, and therefore that no other parties were con—
templated.
individuals alone.
If, as it seems to me, there can be no formal parties
before the Commission, other than the two governments,
then the rules suggested, while not inapplicable, are
not those best adapted to the needs of the litigants,
and the convenience of the Commission. In causes
submitted by the two governments, no process is
necessary, and the causes had best proceed under the
rules of the permanent Hague Court, modified where
necessary to suit changed conditions.
If the Hague rules should be adopted, in a modified
form, the rules of evidence and the method of pro-
ducing evidence, should be those prevailing in
courts administering the civil law, because the
evidence should have a broader scope, and be more
conformable to the needs of an international tribunal,
than that receivable under the rules prevailing in15
the courts of law and eguity in the two countries.
The commissioners met again on February 1 and 2 to
consider the observations and suggestion which had been made.
Although changes were made to avoid the appearance of the
governments as "petitioner" and "respondent" and to modify the
procedure for private applications, the rules of procedure as
finally adopted reflected very strongly the judicial character
16
of the Commission as originally asserted by Tawney and Streeter.
And, to add early emphasis to his contention that as a judicial ﬁg;
15.
16.
I.J.C. Can. Sect. File E—l—l—l, Observations on the Proposed
Rules for the Consideration of the American Comm1551oners,
(undated). .i
I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—1—2-l, Rules of Procedure of the
International Joint Commission.
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body the Commission could act only as a single entity,
Tawney returned to the Acting Secretary of State the first
application transmitted to the United States section, in—
structing the Secretary that all matters under the treaty
must be addressed to the International Joint Commission since
neither section constituted the Commission. 17 Acting Secretary
Wilson, resubmitting the application properly noted tartly:
his
I have'the honor to make, for the consideration of
the Commission, the suggestion that the form of
question to be presented and the course to be pur—
sued by the Parties to the treaty in submitting
questions to this Commission, which they have con—
stituted for their own convenience, would seem to
rest with the parties themselves for determination,
and for the present the Department reserves that
question for further consideration.18
'Tawney continued to seize every opportunity to spread
gospel on the nature of the Commission. At one of the first
hearings held by the Commission, he reminded his colleagues and
the public:
. . . It [the Commissioﬁ] is the first organization of
its kind —- permanent institution I should say —- ever
created by two nations for the purpose of settling
controversies that may arise between them from time
to time, which institution is composed wholly of
citizens of the two nations who are parties to these
controversies. Our success will depend not only upon
the personnel of the commission and the degree of
effort that we put forth for the purpose of bringing
about the amicable and satisfactory settlement of
these controversies, but it will depend, to a certain
extent, upon the inhabitants of the two countries
and the extent to which they bring themselves to
realize the difficulties and the conflicting interests
with which we have to deal. If the members of this
commission took into consideration or were influenced
by their own citizenship, it is likely that the
commission would fail; but to the extent to which we
can disassociate ourselves from our national citizenship
and consider and determine these questions upon an
international citizenship; to that extent our organization
will be a success in the determination of these questions.19
l7.
l8.
l9.
I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—l—l—l, Letter from Tawney to
H. Wilson, Apr. 2, 1912.
I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-l-l-l, Letter from Wilson to
Tawney, Apr. 4, 1912.
I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-12, Statement by J.A. Tawney
at Hearing in Kenora, Sept. 1912.  
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He also set forth his views of the judicial processes of
the Commission in the editorial pages of an international
law journal.20
On the Canadian side, the commissioners were less
assertive of the role of the Commission. In an elaborate
brief on the treaty prepared by Magrath in 1912, it was merely
pointed out that the purpose of the treaty and the Commission
was to remove the various categories of issues from the realm
of local prejudices and politics and to place them in the hands
of an impartial tribunal. Magrath noted the emphasis placed bythe
United StateScommissioners on the judicial role of the Commission
and confined his observations to reiterating Bryce's opposition
to this View.21
Gibbons, however, who apparently was not consulted by
the government when the rules of procedure were under con—
sideration, had very definite views on the role and functions
of the Commission. He had, in fact, indicated his views on
the matter during the negotiations and they corresponded essentially
with Tawney's. Addressing the Empire Club in 1911, he explained
the treaty as establishing fundamental principles of international
law to govern the uses of international waters and described the
Commission as the judicial tribunal charged with applying these
principles. He ascribed particular importance to the provisions
of Article IX.22 In a later address to the Canadian Bar
Association he laid great stress on the judicial character.
The Commission is not, as some members of Parliament
thought, a diplomatic body in any sense. It is a
judicial body sworn to decide in accordance With
justice. It is not a Board of Arbitration comp
osed
in whole or in part of members appointed With th
e
special object of obtaining victory for thei
r Side
in any special controversy. The permanen
t character
of the Commission is its greatest strength.
Its
success, and in fact its very existence, de
pends upon
20. "The International Joint Commission
between the United
States and Canada", 6 A.J.I.L 191—197
(1912).
Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 25, Confi
dential Brief on
Waterways Treaty (undated).
G.C. Gibbons, "The International
Waterways Treaty",
Empire Club Speeches, 1910-1911,
pp. 241—252.
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its members carrying out their work in the spirit
of their oath of office. If the sole object of
the Board is to find out what ought to be done,
having regard to the principles adopted, its task
will be comparatively easy, whereas if the members
representing each country seek in any case to obtain
an unjust advantage the Commission will be a failure
and its members will find it impossible to continue
their work successfully.
Support for this View of the Commission was forth—
 
coming from the editorial pages of the American Journal of
International Law, presumably from the pen of its editor in
chief, James Brown Scott. Analysing the operative articles
of the treaty, the editorial concluded:
That is to say, in the differences Specified in
Articles III and IV of the treaty the commission is to
act as a court of law and render judgment, whereas under
Article IX the commission shall on the request of either
government examine and report on the law and the facts,
but their findings shall not be binding either as a
decision or as an arbitral award. It is, however,
important to note that the contracting parties agree
to refer questions from time to time and that an obli-
gation to do so is created by express language, for in
such cases the word "shall" is construed as mandatory.
Were the commission limited to these important categories
it would be able to render signal service to the cause
of international peace and understanding; but the tribunal
is invested with a greater usefulness by Article X,
although a moral, rather than a legal, obligation is
created . . . . It is not too much to say that this article
constitutes a permanent international tribunal between
Canada and the United States to which any questions or
matters of difference arising between them may be referred
and decided by the principles of law and justice.
The opportunity is afforded the commission to establish
beyond preadventure the advantages of a permanent inter-
national tribunal in deciding according to law and
justice controversies that arise between the United
‘3 States and the Dominion of Canada, and it is gratifying
‘ to learn from the addresses delivered by Mr. Commissioner
Tawney . . . and by Mr. CommissiorrCasgrain . . . that
the importance of the tribunal and the services it may
 23. G.C. Gibbons, "International Relations", Papers Relating tothe Work of the International Joint Commission, 1929,pp. 7-17; Gibbons Papers, vol. 14, fol. 3. 
  
  
 
years when it was subjected to considerable criticism, par-
ticularly in Congress, for the small amount of work which it
seemed to be handling.
of speeches and articles in defence of the Commission, seeking
to define and clarify its role in light of experience.
of the United States section outlined the nature and role of
the Commission, emphasizing the fact that the Commission could
deal with any matter provided the governments were prepared to
make the necessary references.2
States counsel reminded his government that
Commission.
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render, if it acts under a sense of judicial
responSibility, are fully appreciated by the tri—
bunal as a whole . 24
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
B. Testing the Theories
 
The Commission had been operative only a couple of
This criticism brought forth a spate
In a memorandum to the Secretary of State, R.B. Glenn
George Koonce as United
i t should be remembered that the commission is
two Governments, and that its power
and authority are only such as have been vested in
_it by the treaty. I do not think that it has any
administrative functions, certainly it has no powers
of an executive character. It has no way of enforcing
its orders, it must rely upon the executive authority
of the respective Governments. In fine, it is an
instrumentality for ascertaining, fixing, and expressing
international purposes concerning the things with which
it has to do, but i is not an arm for executing the
international will.
Canadian Counsel also came to the defence of the
a creation of the
 
F. H. Keefer felt that
24.
25.
26.   
"Boundary Waters Treaty Between the United States and Canad
a"
4 A.J.I.L. 668—675 (1910); "The International Joint Commis
Sion
Between the United States and Canada", 6 A.J.I.L. l9l-l97
(1912).
Decimal File 1910-29, Department of State, National Arc
hives,
box 6602, 711.42155/250, Memorandum on the Internat
ional
Joint Commission——Its Duties and Scope, A
pr.l, 1914.
Can. Sect. File E—12, Statement by Geor
ge Koonce,I.J.C., ‘ _
f the Comm1551on, 1914.Excerpts from Early Proceedings 0
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. . . a fter three years experience with the members
of the Commission, I am unable to thoroughly express
my admiration for their impartiality, for their
judicial manner, and for their intention, which they
have always revealed, to reach the truth and rightness
of the international problem.
 
C. S. MacInnes was more explicit in his rebuttal.
It is clear that by the constitution of the International
Joint Commission very complete machinery has been pro—
vided for the removal of difficulties between the United
States and Canada. The Commission can prevent any mis-
use of the common waters. On the request of either
country it can examine into any question concerning the
frontier. With the consent of both countries it can
decide any question arising between them. It is not a
self-acting body, however, so that its value Will depend
‘ upon outsideﬂcircumstances, as well as upon the character
of its work.‘
At the congressional level, Senator Wesley L. Jones
of Washington rose on the floor of the Senate to "answer and
refute reckless statements recently made to the effect that
this Commission was an unnecessary organization and had thus
far accomplished practically nothing." Pointing out that in
its three years of existence the CommiSsion had settled more
problems than were settled by diplomacy and had settled them
in a judicial manner, he concluded:
Without an international tribunal of some kind whose
jurisdiction, in the settlement of international con-
troversies or in the determination of individual rights
and interests, may be invoked by the people of these
two countries as well as by the Governments themselves
for the prompt settlement of such controversies or for
the ascertainment and determination of their respective
rights and interests, there is no existing instrumentality
available for that purpose except the diplomatic agency
of the two Governments. Diplomacy does not afford the
.‘ people of the two nations, whose rights and interests
’li‘ are involved in any international controversy or in a
" controversy between themselves, the opportunity to
3w; appear face to face to have their controversies
3 determined upon sworn testimony and according to the
 
hit‘ 27, I,J,C., Can. Sect. File E-12, Brief by Keefer, Excerpts
‘KHWi from Early Proceedings of the Commission, Mar. 31, 1916.
kW" 28. C.S. MacInnes, "The International Joint Commission", (1915)
' Papers Relating to the Work of the International Joint
Commission, 1929, pp. 43—47 (underscoring added).  
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principles of law. The necessity, therefore, for the
existence of this International Joint Commission or of
some similar international tribunal will exist as long
as there is necessity for the existence of courts either
in the United States or Canada for the determination of
controversies arising among their own people. This is
so because of the intimate commercial, industrial, and
financial relations, and also because of the exercise
. within their respective governmental jurisdiction of
their common right to the use of the water which marks
5 the international boundary between them.
The treaty between Great Britain and the United States
creating this international court of justice marks the
most advanced step yet taken by any two nations in the
history of the world, not only for the settlement of
international questions arising between them, but also
for the settlement of questions of less consequence
from an international standpoint between the people
of both nations.
 
. . . This Commission, therefore, charged as it is with
the duty, and having the power to work out practically
the great problem of whether or not the theory of
international peace through the instrumentality of a
court of arbitral justice can or can not be made a
success, should have the hearty support and encourag -
ment of both Governments and their representatives. 9
The commissioners, too, passed up no opportunity to
explain and to publicize the work of the Commission, attempting
to justify its existence and continuance. Tawney, before the
Canadian Club of Ottawa, wondered if the public indifference
to the work of the Commission stemmed from the fact that the
body operated so effectively, harmoniously and quietly. He
emphasized the Commission as an "international judicial tribunal
 
settling all matters of a justiciable character", noted its
special feature as an international court allowing individuals
to appear before it and predicted that there would be a constant
stream of matters coming before the Commission for dec151on in
the future.30    29. W.L. Jones, "International Joint Commission of the UnitedStates and Canada", (speech in the United States Senate, _Feb. 26, 1915) Papers Relating to the Work of the InternationalJoint Commission, 1929, pp. 18—26. I
30. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 20, J.A. Tawney, "The International
Joint Commission", Oct 6, 1915.
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Senator Obadiah Gardner on his appointment to the
 
. American section extolled the virtues of the Commission:
impartiality, fairness and equity.
And without regard to the personnel of the
commission I contend that as long as there is cause
in either Canada or the United States for the main—
tenance of the courts of justice, just that long
there will be reason for the maintenance of the
International Joint Commission.
To demonstrate the impartiality, Glenn added:
I can say to you that when these questions funder the
treaty] come before us, whenever it appears to me that
a Canadian Government is right, I would give them my
decision and my vote if it was contrary to the wishes
of every man and woman in the United States of America.31
Even Magrath broke his silence and, in a speech pre-
pared for delivery before the International Polity Club of Yale,
he explained the importance of having dedicated commissioners
able to perform in a judicial rather than a diplomatic role.
He quickly added, however, that it was desirable to have laymen
as well as lawyers on the Commission.32 This he re-emphasized
in a letter to one of his colleagues, complaining of the lack
of cooperation and support which he felt he was getting from
his fellow Canadian commissioners.
. . I have no legal training and I must assume so
long as the Government feels fit to keep me on the
Commission that it does not consider the Commission's
functions purely judicial . . . I fear that there is-a
tendency both on your part and Mr. Powell's,to look at
questions as if you were in a court of law.
However, the chief advocate, defender, expositOr and
propagandist of the International Joint Commission was the long—
time Secretary of the Canadian section, Lawrence J. Burpee, who,
from 1912 until his death in 1946, produced some dozen or more
lengthy papers relating to the nature and work of the Commission,
attempting to make it known and to defend it from attack. In
31. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—16, Speeches delivered by the
Commissioners at the Manitoba Club, Winnipeg, Feb. 4, 1916.
32. Magrath Papers, vol. 1, Letterbook No. 21, pp. 226-250, Speech
' for delivery to the International POlity Club of Yale,
Mar. 30, 1916.
33. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 20, Letter from Magrath to
Mignault (confidential), Oct. 24, 1916.
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his first publication he stressed the relatively speedy
process of dealing with problems by the Commission in
comparison to the cumbersome process of diplomatic settle-
ment. This coupled with the real impartiality of the
commissioners led to satisfactory settlements. There was
no doubt in his mind that the Commission would have a con—
tinuing role after the first five years.34
In his next few publications, he dwelt on the nature
of the Commission, attempting to answer what he felt were the
flaws in the arguments of the Commission's detractors. The
Commission was, after all,
. . a radical new experiment with a body of unusual
jurisdiction and it is not self—acting and therefore,
will depend in large part for its success on the
willingness of the two governments to make use of it.
One may not perhaps realize at first the very unusual ‘ M
character of this tribunal. There is nothing else quite ‘;35
like it, nor has there been in the past. We have here i f‘
three Americans and three Canadians, sitting not as "
national sections, more or less antagonistic, but as
one judicial body, and pledged to give their best
possible judgment, with utmost impartiality, to the
settlement of questions that arise sometimes on one .,4
side of the boundary and sometimes on the other . . . .
The Commissioners have not approached these questions
as two distinct groups of national representatives, .‘
each jockeying for advantages for its own side, but 2m
rather as members of a single tribunal, anxious to '
harmonize differences between the two countries, and r a
to render decisions which would do substantial justice .Jég
to all legitimate interests on both sides of the boundary, u‘
and particularly to those of the common people.
Unintelligent or narrow criticism, based upon the wrong
ideas pf the Commission's functions and powers, or based
upon the hypothesis that its membersshould think and
act as partisans of their respective countries, must
inevitably weaken the influence of the Commission,
and nullify to a very large extent the effectiveness‘
34. L.J. Burpee, "The International Joint Commission", I
University Magazine, Oct. 1915; Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 25;
Decimal File 1910—29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6602, 711.42155/290.
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of its work in removing points of international
. . ‘2 7 '
friction . . .95
'Sir Robert Bordem as Prime Minister, pointed to
the Commission as an outstanding example of the growth of
Canada's international status.
I pause here to say that I think the negotiation of
that treaty and the establishment of the International
Joint Commission was a very notable achievement in the
government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and I am not at all
sure that either the people of this country or the
members of this House realize adequately the immense
advantages which have resulted from the establishment
of that commission.
The members of the International Joint Commission
do not in one sense exercise diplomatic functions,
but they exercise certain functions which are very
closely allied thereto.36
This latter statement of the Prime Minister was
challenged by the press about a year later when the new Prime
Minister, Mackenzie King, was seeking to replace the incumbent
commissioners.37 It was also attacked by Sir William Hearst
‘ in letters to Magrath and to the Prime Minister.
I notice by the press that the Prime Minister suggests
that the Commission is a diplomatic body. The argu-
ments of the Right Honourable Sir Wilfrid Laurier
and Dr; Pugsley in the debate on the subject in the
House of Commons in 1912 in favour of the View that
the duties of the Commission were judicial and not
diplomatic were unanswered then and in light of ex—
periences are absolutely unanswerable now. Undoubtedly,
the Commission should be diplomatic in their conduct and
tactful in their actions, but no person knows better than
you do that there is nothing in the Treaty under which the
Commissioners are appointed that give them any power or
 
35. L.J. Burpee, "The International Joint Commission," The Round
3‘ Table, No. 20, (Sept-Nov 1915), pp. 851-856; "Our North
American International Court", American Review, Feb. 1916,
pp. 181-184; I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-8—10, "A Successful
Experiment in International Relations", Address to the
Victorian Club of Boston, Feb. 17, 1919; Papers Relating to
the Work of the International Joint Commission, 1929, pp.27‘427
"What is the International Joint Commission," Journal of the
Engineering Institute of Canada, 1919, pp. 499—504; I.J.C.,
Can. Sect. File E—8—10.
;,V 4 36. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Session 1921,
:EQI vol. 3, pp. 2388 & 2420, Apr. 21, 1921.
37. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 20, Toronto Star, Jan. 31, 1922.  
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authority to carry out diplomatic negotiations with
the United States that would require the Government
of Canada to intrust them with State secrets or
information political or otherwise of a confidential
character. Should the Commission ever undertake to
perform duties of this character they would soon
destroy their influence as Commissioners, and in
any event, such duties would not be undertaken as
Commissioners under the Treaty but as special envoys
of the Government given direct authority in some other
way by the Government of Canada.3
Support for Sir William's position was forthcoming'from the
Christian Science Monitor which took the opportunity to praise
 
the ten years of work by the Commission, describing its functions
as purely judicial, operating not as a representative of each
nation but in the joint interests of the two.39
In the following year, after serving on the Commission
for over a decade, Magrath attempted to set forth his views on
the status and functions of the Commission in a letter and
accompanying memorandum to C.E. Townsend who had just been
appointed to the United States section.
We have been operative for twelve years and have been
able to accomplish some splendid work. The St. Mary's
River dispute between Montana and Alberta, if it had
been dealt with in London or Paris, with distinguished
counsel on both sides, would havecaused a stir equal to the
Alaskan boundary question. The solution, however, was found
by us at a very quiet meeting out in Montana and little or
nothing was said about it. That is alright except that we
are still young and if we are to measure up to the possi-
bilities that lie before us, public opinion must get be—
hind us as it is behind the judiciary of both countries.
So far as I can see no one is doing anything toward the
creatian of such public opinion.
President Taft I understand was disappointed when the
Canadian Government failed to appoint three lawyers to
the Commission, his idea being to develop it into a
purely legal tribunal. As a result of our experience I
am disposed to think that he was wrong. The two out-
standing features of value in the CommiSSion, as at
present constituted, are that we have no umpire and that
38. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 20, Letter from Hearst to Magrath,
Feb. 20, 1922; Letter from Hearst to King, Feb. 25, 1922.
39. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—16, Christian Science Monitor,
June 19, 1922.
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every issue as between the two countries is dealt
with by an organization in which each is equally
represented. May not the purely judicial determin-
ation of a question involve the necessity of an
umpire? Judges reach conclusions based solely on
their interpretation of the law. If they divide
equally, as is frequently the case, it means that
the question goes before another court . . . . In
other words, there is no such thing as an attempt
at adjusting differences. That is only possible
in the quasi—judicial body such as ours.
. . I am not prepared to say that it is possible
to destroy the national viewpoint in members of
our organization, but it is quite astonishing how
one finds himself gradually moving into the middle
of the road in dealing with international questions.
he described the advantages of
40
the Commission thus:
Enforcement
astuteness or any special
umpire is impossible, because
view of the continuance of the
work, no member can afford to lose the confidence of his
associates. The impelling force in the conduct of the
work is that settlements must be found and the permanency
of the organization compels members to seek for decisions
that will be reasonably fair to both countries. Where
the diSpute is at some point on the international boundary,
settlements are facilitated by having the case heard in
the locality. Each side hears the other and comes to
realize that there are two sides to the issue. Further—
more, it is important that they see the judges, whose
decision they will more readily accept, if in the conduct
of the investigation in their midst, confidence is in-
spired in the minds of the disputants.
. . . Anything savoring of
pleading for benefit of an
there is no umpire, and in
of decision, he noted, is not in the hands of the
Commission.
The two countries have not created a super power to
enforce the Commission's decisions. Those that
negotiated the treaty realized the great danger in
attempting such a thing. Public opinion in both
countries is the power that will see to enforcement
of the Commission's decision.
 
40. file 19, Letter from Magrath to
1923.
Magrath Papers, vol. 5,
Townsend (personal), June 14,
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Magrath concluded that the Commission had achieved concrete
results and could no longer be considered an experiment.41
Magrath sent a copy of this letter and memorandum
to the Prime Minister. King responded by asking the chairman
for more detailed information on the work of the Commission,
particularly for a list of matters with which the Commission
might deal. He suggested that, in his view, there was no
matter of difference which might arise between Canada and the
United States with which the Commission could not deal. He
agreed that much more should have been made of the Commission
at the Versailles discussions.
I am convinced that it contains the new world answer
to old world queries as to the most effective methods
of adjusting international differences and avoiding
the wars to which they give rise. In some respects
it constitutes the most important contribution which
has thus far been made to the practical solution of
international differences.
Magrath quickly prepared a memorandum for the Prime Minister
emphasizing the all—embracing scope of the Commission's functions.
Noting the recent speech by Secretary of State Hughes to the
Canadian Bar Association calling for a permanent body like the
Commission to deal with all matters between the two countries, :_¥p
he pointed out that in his opinion the International Joint
Commission already possessed such capabilities. He suggested
that the only real limitation was the failure of the Government
to realize that the Commission was the one place in which Canada
possessed a voice equal to that of the United States.43
This view was seconded by Burpee who produced another
series of articles on the Commission, seeking to publicize its
work. In one of these, the first official handbook on the
Commission, he set out in illustrative fashion summaries of the
first eighteen cases handled by the Commission. Describing the
nature of the Commission, he said:
§
41. Magrath Papers, vol. 5, file 19, Memorandum re
International
Joint Commission; King Papers, vol. 90, No. 76363—7
6370.
42- Magrath Papers, vol. 5, file 19, Letter from Kin
g to Magrath,
July 21, 1923; King Papers, vol. 90, No. 76372—76375.
Memorandum re International
18, 1923; King
 
43. Magrath Papers, vol. 5, file 19,
Joint Commission from Magrath to King, Sept.
Papers, vol. 90, 76381—76385
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. . ﬁkmgjurisdiction is not altogether that of acourt of law, nor of an umpire, nor of an investi—gatory body, but it combines some of the character—istics and a good deal of the spirit of all three. 44
In letters to R.A. MacKay who was preparing a thesis
on the Commission, Magrath and_Hearst added several comments
on the nature of the Commission. Magrath noted that it was
imperative for the Commission to reach a satisfactory settle-
ment in every matter to come before it if it were to maintan
its integrity. He felt that this objective was facilitated
by the Commission's decision not to retain a permanent technical
staff since this obviated the danger of such personnel developing
strong national views to the embarrassment of the commissioners.
He further added that the Commission was not judicial in nature
for it lacked the necessary umpire.45 Hearst described the
Commission as essentially an adjudicative body and consequently,
one on which the commissioners must always maintain utmost
impartiality.46
Hearst, of course, disagreed with the final obser—
vation of Magrath, and pointed out to him why he felt that the
presence of an umpire on a body was not an indication of its
judicial character, but rather the reverse.
The fact that the International Joint Commission hasno umpire to my mind rather adds to than detracts fromits judicial character and imposes upon the members ofthe Commission a strong obligation to act in a judicialmanner in all matters coming before the Commission fora decision. The idea of the Commission I think we bothhave and the one that I believe was behind the authorsof the Commission is that the members of the Commissionshould not act as partisans representing the Government
44. The International Joint Commission--Organization, Jurisdictionand Operation under the Treaty of January 11, 1909, between theUnited States and Great Britain, Washington, U.S.G.P.O., 1924See also: L.J. Burpee, "Insurance for Peace," Kiwanis MagazineSept. 1924; Papers Relating to the Work of the InternationalJoint Commission, 1929, pp. 63-70; L.J. Burpee, "An Inter—national Experiment", 1923, An address to the Michigan LawSchool, Papers Relating to the Work of the International JointCommission, 1929, pp. 48-62
45. Magrath Papers, vol. 5, file 19, Letter from Magrath to MacKaY:June 22, 1926.
46. Magrath Papers, vol. 5, file 19, Letter from Hearst to MacKayJune 22, 1926.
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by whom they are appointed and striving at all timesin international disputes to secure the greatest
advantage for the country appointing them, but a
judicial or at least quasi—judicial body deciding the
cases coming before then impartially, honestly and
fairly no matter what the consequences may be to
one country or the other.
Although he agreed that the Commission had more latitude in
making its decisions than did a court, not being fettered by
precedents and being free to make necessary adjustments as
equity required, Hearst added that the rendering of compromise
judgments was not unknown in judicial practice.47
In his paper, the first study of the Commission and
the treaty prepared by someone outside of the Commission, MacKay
saw the functions of the Commission as quasi-judicial (admini—
strative and judicial), executive, investigative and arbitral.
The first power encompassed matters falling under Articles III,
IV and VIII; the second applied to Article VI. As for the
investigative role, this related to Article IX and, with the
power of recommendation, he felt the Commission was placed in
a strong position of influence over public policy. MacKay
thought that the arbitral power under Article X was perhaps
illusory since only matters which had aroused national feeling
were likely to be referred and, in such circumstances, it would
be unlikely to refer a matter which would cause a split along
national lines. The author suggested that there were three
main reasons for the relative success of the Commission: the
permanency and esprit de corps of the commissioners, the in—
dependence of the commissioners and the simplicity and direct-
ness of the procedure.48
In a letter to Burpee, Magrath touched upon the
solidarity of the Commission.
You speak of our unanimous decisions. We w1ll always
have unanimous decSions, because we have got to that
47. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-6, Letter from Hearst to Magrath,
Dec. 27, 1928.
48. R.A. MacKay, "The International Joint Commission Between the
United States and Canada", 22 A.J.I.b. 292 (l928); EEEEEE
Relating to the Work of the International JOint Comm1551on,
1929, pp. 71—100
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point‘ﬂkre we appreciate that if we tried to use
force to get anything through—-even by a majority
vote-~it would more or less develOp a cleavage in
our relations. My View, therefore, is that until
everyone around the Board is satisfied it is
better to keep the matter open, and unconsciously
that is what has happened, resulting in unanimous
decisions.
In balance, the expressed views up to this point,
with the exception of those of Magrath, tended to favour
the concept of the Commission as essentially a judicial
forum, dealing with matters much in the same fashion as a
court.
C. Shifting Concepts
 
In the early "thirties", the Trail Smelter investi—
gation provided an opportunity for some serious consideration
of the investigatory and recommendatory roles of the Commission
and to the position of the governments in relation to a report
made under Article IX. Magrath had some early fears that the
Commission for the first time might not submit a unanimous
report. These proved to be unfounded.50 The report, however,
was not acceptable to the United States Government but it was
reluctant to indicate an outright rejection. The Secretary
of State explained the difficulty.
. . Where an international commission have reached
a unanimous decision it is a very serious thing to
give any appearance of hedging on it. It tends to
discredit the whole system of international arbitration.51
The legal adviser to the Secretary agreed. Even though the re-
port was merely recommendatory it should be given great weight
unless the procedure under Article IX was to be an "idle gesture".
He suggested adopting the report as a basis for negotiations
49. Magrath Papers, vol. 5, file 19, Letter from Magrath to
Burpee, Sept. 20, 1929; I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—8-10.
50. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 20, Memorandum from Magrath
to O.D. Skelton (confidential), Mar. 7, 1930.
51. Decimal File 1930-39, Department of State, National Archives,
711.4215 Air Pollution /400, Memorandum of Secretary of State
on Conference re Trail Smelter, Mar. 27, 1931.
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leading to a determination of damages subsequent to 1932.52
The Secretary instructed the legation in Ottawa to take up
this proposal with the Prime Minister, noting that
of the Commission report,
the United States'
report.
the United States'
The Canadian minister in Washington agreed that the United
States was
A
.Eﬁjhe Government of the United States shares
with the Government of Canada a certain pride in
the helpful work of the International Joint
Commission since its establishment, and this feeling
has impelled me to regard the report of February 28,
1931, as a recommendation which, while not satis—
factory to the injured parties in the United States,
is entitled to the most serious consideration of
this Government.
Canada agreed to negotiate a settlement on the basis
54 but was very critical in private of
attitude toward the Commission's unanimous
The Under Secretary of State for External Affairs felt
position unwarranted.
. . . The mode of settlement——reference to the Inter-
national Joint Commission—- was one of their seeking
and seeing that the three United States members, who
not ordinarily take a particularly international point
of view, joined with the three Canadians in a unanimous
recommendation, the recommendation should not lightly
be disregarded. Such action is a black eye for the
Commission and for the principles of conciliation which y
they are to establish and maintain.55 I 5%
repudiating its own members of the International
of the CommissionJoint Commission, and the prestige
is bound to suffer . 56
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
Decimal File 1930—39, Department of State, National Archives,
711.4215 Air Pollution/408, Memorandum from Hackworth to
Stimson, Dec. 27, 1932.
1930—39, Department of State, National Archives,
711.4215 Air Pollution/407B, Note from Stimson to U.S.
Legation, Ottawa, Feb. 10, 1933.
Decimal File 1930—39, Department of State, National Archives,
711.4215 Air Pollution/414, Telegram from Boal, U.S. Legation {2
to Hull, Mar. 1, 1933. -31
Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 103-34, Note ‘ ;@
from Skeiton to Herridge, Canadian Legation, Feb. 2, 1934. lg?
Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 103-34, Noze :_L%
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The Prime Minister sent a strong note to the United States
legation
 
The parties concerned are not merely those immediately
interested in the solution of the present problem. The
people of both countries are concerned to maintain and
extend the established agency for the solution of
boundary disputes. The United States has long held
a foremost place in the advocacy of international
arbitration. Through the conclusion and execution of
the Boundary Waters Treaty it has cooperated in building
up on the North American continent one of the most dis-
tinctive and significant experiments in this field. The
International Joint Commission . . is an embodiment
and an instrument of our common standards of neighbourly
intercourse. I am sure your Government will agree in
that it would be calamitous to weaken the position of
the Commission and imperil the future of this North
American experiment by rejecting outright, save upon
grave and plainly evident grounds, its unanimous re-
commendation upon any question.57
The United States persisted, however, and when, on introduction
of the Trail Smelter Arbitration Treaty in the House in 1935,
the Prime Minister was asked why the Commission was not given
the matter under Article X, he replied:
I believe it is only necessary to say that the United
States was not prepared to accept the International
Joint Commission as the tribunal to deal with the
matter. Perhaps it will be recalled . . . that it
was agreed between the two nations that the conclusion
arrived at by the International Joint Commission with
respect to damage up to January lst, 1932, would be
advisory, rather than in the nature of a judgment.
Meanwhile, differing views as to the general nature
of the Commission continued to be voiced. Chacko, in the first
major treatise on the Commission, felt that it was basically
judicial in nature but possessed significant investigative and
administrative powers.59 The United States commissioners agreed
in part. John H. Bartlett, the chairman, felt that
 
57. Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 103-34, Note
from R.B. Bennett to Robbins, U.S. Legation, Feb. 17, 1934.
58. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Session 1935:
vol. 4, pp. 3453—3456, June 10, 1935.
59. Chacko, C. Joseph The International Joint Commission Between
the United States and Canada New York, Columbia Univer51ty
Press, 1932.
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character of the Commission in preparing an answer to a question
in the Senate as to why the Canadian section did not file an
annual report with Parliament.
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generally speaking, this is a fact-finding
commission, and I have come to the belief that the
most valuable function of the commission, as
supplementing the work of diplomacy, exists in the fact
that the treaty gives the commission, consisting of
three judges from each country, the power to summon wit—
nesses of both countries and cross—examine them in order
to get the facts, which tend to reduce the distance be-
tween the conflicting allegations before them in any
diplomatic negotiation; whereas under the other system
without a fact—finding commission each side began its
diplomatic negotiations with a wide chasm between the Hi}
facts as alleged. “(I
McCumber saw the duties as
such a mixture of judicial, administrative and .g‘j
diplomatic phases that it would be fatal to go into '
a hearing and thence into executive session and dip-
lomatic discussion unless we could know all about the
case in its preparation and development—-that is, all
that could properly be known from the American standpoint.
as to the continuing need for the Commission:
If one should venture to suggest that the treaty should
be abrogated . . . it must then be understood that the
rights of the nationals along the border must be pre—
served and that agencies must be in some way maintained }
to preserve their rights and to settle differences that
may arise with reference to possible future cases. It
would seem to be the latest development of civilization
that these international differences should be settled
judicially on fact, rather than by diplomacy. But as
a matter of expense we believe it is cheaper to maintain
the judicial attitude toward these questions than to
abandon such a policy and go back to the method of
handling them by arbitration through departmental bureaus.
Burpee re—emphasized the indivisible international
 
60
The Commission does not prepare annual reports since
this would be out of character with it being an inter-
national body. This was decided when Mr. Casgrain was
Canadian Chairman. It would be inconsistent With one
of the basic principles governing the work of the I
Commission, which was that the two Sections, Canadian
and United States, should under no circumstances
60. United States, Congress, 72d Congress, 2d Session, 1933,
Hearings of the Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Appropriations.
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function separately but should act as one complete
tribunal.6l
 
J. M. Callahan in a book on Canadian—American re-
lations stressed the judicial role of the Commission. Describing
it as a "permanent international commission tribunal" to which
"individual citizens of either country might present cases
directly, instead of indirectly through their governments",
he felt that the Boundary Waters Treaty
. . . marked a notable advance in international
arbitration. For the contentions and delays of
diplomacy it substituted an international judicial
tribunal which might be used both as a means to pro-
mote joint economic interests and as an agency to
promote peace by conciliation, and which represented
the hopes of Root and Bryce to dispense with the Hague
tribunal in the decision of questions between the United
States and Canada. It also reflected an advance in the
diplomatic status of Canada.
 
. . . Immediately after the first meeting of the
International Joint Commission it became a constant
medium for direct communication to settle questions
at issue between the two neighbors and to prevent
disputes by amicable and impartial judicial methods.
It blazed a new trail for the judicial settlement of
international disputes.
Others placed greater emphasis on the investigation
and conciliation functions of the Commission. This was par-
ticularly the view of Mackenzie King, reflecting perhaps his
wide experience in the settlement of labour disputes. Speaking
in 1938, he said of the Commission:
. . . It was created to adjudicate all questions of
difference arising along our four thousand miles of
frontier. In the quarter of a century of its existence,
by substituting investigation for dictation, and con-
ciliation for coercion, in the adjustment of inter—
national disputes, the Commission has solved many
questions likely to lead to serious controversy. 3o
 
61. Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 45-34, Returns
to Parliament, June 26, 1934.
62. Callahan, James Morton American Foreign Policy in Canadian
Relations New York, Macmillan & Co., 1937, pp. 506; 538-539.
63. W.L. Mackenzie King, "The Bridge-Builders", Ottawa, King's
Printer, 1938; I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-16.      
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The Ottawa Citizen too, espoused this view of the Commission.
The International Joint Commission record could be
cited as an example of the soundness of the plan of
conciliation where the parties immediately concerned
set out to settle differences between themselves,
without bringing in any third party to act as
arbitrator. Cooperation is found along this path
of conciliation. It could be extended with advantage
to other countries, as it surely must be in the march
of civilization towards the course of law above the
law of force.
As to the arbitral role of the Commssion under
Article X, the general feeling seemed to be that such activity
would be out of character for the Commission -— despite its
judicial character. Percy Corbett thought that
.[i]t is doubtful whether any use will ever be
made of Article X. The International Joint Commission
has shown admirable competence in dealing with questions
of a technical nature relating to water levels and the
measures necessary to preserve them against unreasonable
obstruction or diversion. But it can scarcely be said
to have been manned with a View to the legal solution
of disputes which diplomacy has proved incapable of
settling.65
John Read felt
. . .[tJhe real difficulty with the use of the
Commission for arbitrations generally is not any
defect in the existing personnel. The basic diffi-
culty is that a tribunal of even numbers is unsuitable
for a strongly contested case. This is particularly
so when there are no neutral members of the tribunal.66
 
Surprisingly, Read subsequently, but in another context,
suggested that the Commission was
. . . fundamentally a judicial tribunal acting as an
arbitral body, and as a mediator between the govern—
mental agencies in Canada and the United States.. Its
usefulness depends upon its preserving its p051tion as
 
64. Ottawa Citizen, Jan. 12, 1937; I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-16.
65. Corbett, Percy E. The Settlement of Canadian-American
Disputes New Haven, Yale University Press, 1937, pp. 116—119.
66. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—8-10, Letter from Read to Burpee,
Nov. 9, 1938.  
 190
a dignified international organization. I should
be the last to want to see it develop into a legalistic
court. On the other hand, there is a middle ground be—
tween the legalistic conception of a court and an
administrative agency.
 
The commissioners, too, continued to ponder the role
of the Commission. To chairmen Stewart and Stanley, Hearst
expressed his concern over the lack of solidarity within the
Commission.
If I may be permitted to say so there appears to
me to be a tendency in later years to divide the
Commission into two parts rather than to work together
as one body. This . . . is a mistake, and one that .
should be resisted as far as possible. The Commission,
as I look upon it, is not made up of two parts, but of
one organization, and should work together as closely as
possible.
Stanley agreed.
. . . The fact that we are or should be one court, not
two separate sets of diplomats each with an eye single
to some advantage accruing to its own country, is a
thing that distinguishes us from the arbitral boards
which formerly attempted the adjustment of differences
between the two countries, usually to the dissatisfaction
of one or the other country, and often to both.
In my opinion the usefulness of this body, its claim
to distinction and for that matter to life, depends upon
the capacity of its members to sit as judges not as
nationals.6
Magrath, even in retirement, heﬂ to his early View of the 3
Commission, although he thought that it might change.
. . . I am aware that there are some who have held in
recent years that the International Joint Commission should
be a great judicial body. That may come in time, but the
rigidity of the Law Court, with the power of the State
behind it to enforce its decisions, is still some distance
beyond our horizon, so far as attempting to bring out any
international cooperation of that character.70
 
67. Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 2492—D—40,
Memorandum from Read, Legal Counsel to the Under Secretary
of State, Dec. 29, 1939.
68. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—l6, Letter from Hearst to Stewart,
Oct. 7, 1940.
69. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-l6, Letter from Stanley to Hearst,
Oct. 17, 1940.
70. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 20, Foreward to the International
Joint Commission Album, prepared by Magrath, May 1938.   
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D. Other Considerations
 
In the 1940s, an interesting question arose con-
cerning the role of the Commission in references under Article
IX and, specifically, whether the Commission could or should
be used by one government to force the other into a course of
action which it may be reluctant to pursue.
The question of procedure for submitting references 1,%
to the Commission was raised early by the United States with “i
the Lake of the Woods reference in 1912. The Secretary of
State suggested to Bryce that since both countries had an
equal interest in the questions to be submitted, "it would
probably be the wish of the Government of Canada that they
should be brought before the Commission at the joint request ;
of both Governments." However,
. . .[thould Canada see any objection to that the “pf”
United States would be quite prepared to make the V
request on their own behalf only pursuant to the 3-l
provisions of the Treaty which permit either party I
to bring a matter before the Commission 71 . ‘ V
The Canadian Government, without disputing the interpretation
of the Article by the State Department, concurred in the proposal
  
that the reference be made jointly.72
Thus began the unbroken practice of references under
on the joint initiative of the two govern-
 
Article IX being made
ments. This, despite
the State Department,
writers at the time. Indeed,
reference to the CommiSsion but a govern—
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Commission for report and recommendation.
Later writers such as Chacko and MacKay found the tug
interpretation otherwise, perhaps fortified by the evidence of
71. Confidential Prints, International Boundary Waters, vol. 1,
p. 241, Despatch from Bryce to the Duke of Connaught, A
pr. 24,
1912.
Confidential Prints, International Boundary
Waters, vol. 1,72.
p. 247, Privy Council Minute, June 6, 191
2.
"Boundary Waters Treaty Between the United States and
Canada",
4 A.J.I.L. 668 at 672 (1910).
73.
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practice by the governments in the intervening years. Chacko's
view was that although either government could request the
other to join in a reference, neither could so direct the
74Commission without the concurrence of the other. MacKay
agreed, observing that the rationale was "obviously to prevent
either government from using the Commission as a means of prying
into the domestic concerns of the other."75
Nevertheless, Stanley was not deterred by practice or
theory from suggesting that unilateral action by one government
under Article IX was both desirable and justified.
. . If I may, I shall take advantage of this occasion
to call to your valued attention another matter of prime
importance which in time past has caused much unnecessary
delay to the proper functioning of this body and has been
the occasion of much wasted effort on the part of the
State Departments of both countries —— that is, the
unwarranted assumption . . . that when either country
seeks the advice of this Commission upon any controverted
matter that it is obligatory upon the country receiving
such request under Article 9 of the Treaty, to carefully
analyse every phase of the proposal in order to determine
‘ -: the wisdom or propriety of the proposal as an abstract
proposition and thereafter to act accordingly, by approving
or disapproving, as the case may be.
It is my fixed and long considered opinion that this treaty
is ndzcapable of any such interpretation and that the re-
peated delays occasioned by it are derogatory to the
dignity and tend to impair the usefulness and efficiency
of this body . . .
It appears to be to me perfectly manifest that it is the
plain intent of Article 9 to place the services of this
:. Commission, whenever either country seeks to have it
in; "examine and report" upon any controverted matter, and
; " that whenever one country makes such a request, in con-
} formity with the provisions of this Article, it is
\ obligatory upon the other to accede to such request.
Ia; ' a o o
gti Since by the explicit terms of this Article, the powers
of the Commission are strictly confined to an "examination
and report" to the two governments concerned, and can never
be treated or considered as a final determination of any
question of law or fact, neither government need by
74. Chacko, C. Joseph The International Joint Commission Between
the United States and Canada New York, Columbia University
Press, 1932, pp. 241-245.
75. R.A. MacKay, "The International Joint Commission Between
the United States and Canada", Papers Relating to the Work
of International Joint Commission, 1929, p. 71 at 88.  
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apprehensive of any premature or injudicious deter-
mination of any matter vitally affecting the welfare
or security of either country, this Article providing
explicitly that "such reports of the Commission shall
not be regarded as decisions . . . . '
Our Commission, I am sure, recalls with genuine
gratification that both of those learned and accomplished
jurists John B. Read and Green H. Hackworth . .
were disposed to concur in [this View] and that accounts
in great measure for the admirable celerity with which
such references were handled during their capable admini-
stration of such affairs . . . .
Stanley concluded by suggesting to Perrault that the Commission
urge the two governments to immediate action on the proposed
76
Souris reference.
Perrault felt that Stanley's views were in accord
neither with the actual wording of Article IX nor with the
consistent practice before the Commission. But
.[sjupposing that your interpretation is right,
do you not think that the procedure and the modus
vivendi which were adopted during more than thirty
years by our two governments is in line with the
aim and spirit of the 1909 treaty, and is conducive
to entertain friendly relations and understanding?
And, as a consequence, is it advisable to change
this interpretation of Article 9 and this procedur
Burpee, however, advised Perrault that the Commission
e?77
had never taken the position that it was necessary to have the
concurrent action of both governments and that such action was
not dictated by Article IX. Prior discussion and agreement on
a joint reference were adopted merely as a matter of courtesy.
"I do not recall any authority in international law who has
discussed the meaning of the treaty taking the ground that under
Article 9 both Governments must concur in the reference."
79
Despite further lobbying by Stanley, the disruptive
76. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File F-2—7, Letter from Stanley to
77.
78.
79.
Perrault, Aug. 23, 1946.
I.J.C., Can. Sect. File F—2—7, Letter from Perr
ault to
Stanley, Sept. 4, 1946.
I.J.C. Can. Sect. File F—2—7, Letter from Burpee t
o Perrault,
Sept. 4, 1946.
I J.C. Can. Sect. File F—2-7, Letter f
rom Stanley to W.R.
Vallance, Assistant Legal Adviser, July
10, 1947.
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practice which he advocated has never been adopted by the
governments and, in consequence, the Commission enjoys
the confidence of both parties in undertaking its investi-
gations and in reporting thereon.
Returning to the more general observations on the
role of the Commission, the Minister of External Affairs in
1946 felt that the juridical qualities of the Commission could
be adopted for the settlement of boundary questions in other
countries. Addressing the Italian Political and Territorial
Commission on the determination of the Italo—Yugoslav boundary,
he said:
We in Canada know how fortunate we are in having a
frontier which acts not to divide the two peoples
but to link their common interests yet it would be
a false rendering of history to say that there have
never been difficulties between Canada and the United
States arising out of our common frontier. There
have been frictions and real conflicts over the past
century. The significant point, however, is that to
deal with such disputesthe two countries have worked
out orderly and judicial processes through the Inter—
national Joint Commission. The International Joint f
Commission is a permanent judicial organization composed
of three members named by the Canadian Government and
three by the United States Government . . . .
. . . The Canadian delegation is fully aware of the
fact that the procedures which have been evoked to
deal with our own frontier can hardly be automatically
applied in areas of postwar Europe which are still so
near the immediate consequences of the last great
conflict. Such procedures presuppose the establishment
of normal economic relations and of an atmosphere of
mutual confidence between the neighbouring states. We
are convinced, however, that whatever the final frontier
settlement that may be reached, a durable peace in this
area can only be secured through the establishment of
judicial procedures for the settlement of frontier
difficulties as they arise.
George Brown also found many features of the Commission
to commend its adoption to others. Discussing a number of the
Commission's dockets, he concluded:
  80. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-l6, Excerpt from a Speech bythe Hon. Brooke Claxton, Sept. 19, 1946. , 
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These examples may serve to illustrate not only
the nature of the Commission's work, which has
combined in a practical way the functions of judge,
administrator, and arbitrator, but also some of the
reasons for the Commission's success . . . This
success has been based on a number of factors: the
tradition of mutual confidence built up gradually be—
tween the two countries, the determination of the
Commission's members to make its work a success, the
development of effective procedures, and the constant
effort to reach practical, fair and reasonable con-
clusions. The Commission has displayed remarkable
unanimity in its opinions and has by all these means
established its prestige. Its informal but thorough
methods of obtaining opinion and evidence, and its
practice of holding hearings, when advisable in the
locality of the problem have developed public confi—
dence in its integrity. Perhaps its greatest contri-
bution to peaceful settlement has been that it has
dealt with matters involving conflicting interests
before they got to the stage of international
bitterness.
While the work of the International Joint Commission
has been limited in scope, and while it has not in-
volved any restriction in national sovereignty . . .
it has nevertheless provided an example, and pointed
the way to methods which are capable of far—reaching
application in international affairs . . . 81
E. New Concepts
 
It is only within the last two decades that any pro
—
nounced recognition has been given to the fact that the
dominant
character of the Commission was perhaps not so
much judicial as
it was investigative and advisory. This shift i
n View was attri—
butable, possibly to a number of factors:
the simple magnitude of the various
not the
the increasing ratio
of references to applications,
international matters coming before the C
ommission and,
least, the personalities of some of the
men who served as
Commissioners during this period. Wh
atever the reasons, the
responsible officials of the two
governments found it necessary
The Growth of Peaceful Settlem
ent Between
es (C.I.I.A. Contemporary Affai
rs)
26—31.
81. Brown, George W.
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to give some consideration to the basic character and role
 
of the International Joint Commission. Views on the matter
have also been expressed by some members of the Commission
and, of course, writers and speakers have continued to assess
and reassess the nature of the Commission. As before, not
all of the views are compatible.
Appearing as a witness before the External Affairs
Standing Committee in 1950, the Minister read a lengthy paper
on the work of the Commission in which he characterized its ‘
principle function as advisory.82 This view of the Commission '
was, not surprisingly, reflected the following year in the
monthly bulletin of the Department of External Affairs, where
scant mention was made of the juridical nature of the Commission
but considerable detail of the reference procedure was given
with accent on the consultative and advisory role of the
Commission.83
The Canadian chairman, General A.G.L. McNaughton, appear-
ing for the first time before a parliamentary committee, also paid
particular attention to the "advisory" role of the Commission in
providing guidance for the two governments in the international
development of water resources. He made no mention of the judicial
powers and, in fact, suggested that the proposal in 1921 to vest
the Commission with powers of enforcement would have been completely
out of character for the Commission. Dealing with a question
on the resolution of differences within the Commission, he felt
that these were worked out through "patience, reason and fairness"
on both sides. In specific comment on the Red River reference,
he noted that "[tlhe principal concern of the IJC from the
Canadian viewpoint is to insure that nothing done in the United
States will aggravate the situation in Canada."84 1
82. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on_
External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, SeSSlOn
1950, June 3, 1950.
83. "The International Joint Commission", 3 External Affairs
90—95, (March 1951).
84. Canada, Parliament, Senate, Committee on Banking and Commerce,
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, let Parliament 6th
Session, June 25, 1952.
I   
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The more interesting role which the General saw
for the Commission was set out in part in a memorandum pre-
pared in 1953. He was seeking to persuade the Department
of External Affairs that orders of the Commission under
Article VIII, although perhaps not strictly within the
terms of the Article, were nevertheless quite valid.'
In practice the Commission is much more than just
an international court. It is in some sense a part of
the diplomatic machinery of the two countries, created
to carry out the purposes stated in the preamble to the
Treaty of 1909: ". . . to make provisions for the adjust-
ment and settlement of all such questions as may here-
after arise . . . . .
Noting that the orders of the Commission reflected the specific
rule of the treaty and also the general intention of the parties
to the treaty, he went on:
. . . This has helped to make the Treaty of 1909 a
flexible basis of agreement, rather than a rigid,
inflexible document requiring frequent formal amend—
ment and clarification by the two Governments in order
to be appropriate for specific cases and to keep it
abreast of current developments. The authors of the
Treaty could not have foreseen in 1909 the full scope
of the developments which have since taken place and
which will take place in years to come along the
boundary between the two countries, developments which
need of course to be effected in accord with the intent
and general terms of the Treaty but not necessarily
confined within the provisions of a particular clause
which may not prove enirely appropriate as written but
which are within the authority of the High Contracting
Parties to modify by consent. Experience shows that the
authors planned well in providing for the creation of a
body like the International Joint Commission to deal
with specific problems within the framework of the
general principles and rights laid down in the Treaty.
Noting that whenever the Commission departed from the "strict
legalistic procedure" in interpreting Article VIII from time
to time it had always been encouraged by counsel for the
governments, McNaughton suggested that it might
be wise, when
al limits of the Article,the Commission did go beyond the leg
In conclusion,
for the governments to formally express
agreement.
the General cited the Waneta Dam and
St. Lawrence Power orders
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by the Commission as examples of the Commission operating
quite properly as a "forum of negotiation" rather than as
a court, and thus coming up with an order acceptable to
all though not strictly within the provisions of Article
VIII 85 °
Burbridge was not in total agreement with the
General's view of the Commission's role.
In my View, the Orders of the Commission are in the
nature of and have the status of, authoritative
interpretations of the Treaty and authoritative
definitions of the rights and obligations involved
therein. The conditions, written into the Commission's
Orders of Approval, pursuant to the rules or principles
enunciated in Article VIII of the Treaty, relate to
the practical steps which must be taken to preserve
the rights, obligations or interests which the Treaty
is designed to protect. This does not mean, in my View,
that these conditions can be such as to alter these
rights, obligations or interests.
He did agree, however, that the Commission was more than a court.
"It is able to approach the problem more from the practical than
the strictly legalistic point of View and its success and value
depends on such an approach."86
E. A. Coté in a talk to Heads of Divisions also felt
that the Commission's flexibility, which could never be achieved
in a court, was the prime virtue of the Commission. Reviewing
the work of the Commission in the past, the present matters
before it and the possible work for the future, he offered the
following observations:
The first is that though the Commission's work ﬁs not
spectacular it is of prime importance to Canada and
the United States.
The second conclusion is that its work is sucCessful
largely because it is not too much before the public
eye. When citizens of either country have a cause of
complaint and bring them before the Commission, the
 
85. Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 2492-40, Con-
fidential Preliminary Draft on International Recognition
of Water Rights in Streams Crossing the Boundary, submitted
by McNaughton to Burbridge, Legal Devision, Feb. 10,1953.
86. Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 2492—40, Letter
from Burbridge to McNaughton (personal and confidential)
Mar. 18, 1953.  
   
199
very act of bringing of them to the Commission
helps take the steam off the case. It can then
be studied very rationally and a solution can be
arrived at which is usually satisfactory to all
concerned.
Another conclusion is that the interests of Canada
and the United States in boundary matters will be
served in direct ratio to the ability, intelligence
and wisdom of the Commissioners appointed.
Finally, noting the increasing demand for water in
both countries, he suggested that it was imperative that
equitable arrangements be worked out to protect both countries'
resources.
The International Joint Commission is probably,
set as it is in the diplomatic framework of both
countries, as flexible and as useful an instrument
as could be devised to ease tensions along the boundary
waters and to solve their attendant problems.
In 1955 and 1956, McNaughton made extensive appearances
before the External Affairs Committee. In dealing with the
Columbia River reference,‘he made it clear that the Commission
had a dual role. While it was charged with developing plans of
water resource development which were mutually beneficial to
both countries, each section was responsible for guarding and
preserving the interests of its own nation. The goals of each
role, it seemed, might not be mutually compatible, in which case
it was the function of each section to advocate that which best
benefited its country. The role of the Commission and its
sections, however, was purely investigatory and recommendatory,
and thus the initiative for action rested with the governments.
As to the differences of opinion which had developed in the
Commission over the Columbia River reference, the General
explained the positions of the Commission and the governments
as he saw it.
The differences have been sharp and they should be
sharp
because I think that people should realize that
under.
this treaty tremendous and far reaching resp
onSibilities
have been given to this Commission. We are in f
act set
87. Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 2492:D-40,
Outline of Talk to Heads of Divisions by E-A- COter Unlted
S tastes Division, Jan. 18, 1954.    
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up as an equally constituted body to arrive at the
equitable and best use of the most important resource
which the two countries have along the boundary that is,
water. Out of our recommendations have got to come pro—
posals which will divide this resource fairly for the
benefit of the two countries down the years and in
perpetuity. That is a tremendous responsibility. It
is not to be expected that there will not be sharp
differences of opinion, and it is not to be expected
that you won't need on occasion to use what the drafters
of the treaty foresaw--that the governments themselves
will have to pick up a difficulty and go into it by
diplomatic means and to tell us, on a particular point,
what the answer is that they are agreed upon. We, in
due course, will salute and say "That is that! That
settles that point and we will get on with the rest of
it." There is no other way by which these things can
be ironed out.
  
We are going to have sharper and more acute differences
but not because of any deterioration of relations be-
tween our two countries; that does not exist——but because
of the increasing awareness that water is the limiting
factor in the development of civilization on the North
American continent itself. There is only a limited
amount of water and we cannot afford to let any of it
go unless it is equﬁably and precisely apportioned. We
have got to maintain——our section has got to maintain
the claims of this country and to do the best we can
with them always and in all fairness.
The Chairman of the United States section seemed to
share the General's View of the Commission's dual role. In
a speech in 1955, he said that it was his duty "along with my
two colleagues to safeguard the interests of the United States
  
in our dealings with Canada over boundary waters and rivers
which cross the boundary."89 And, in a later appearance before
two committees of the United States Senate, he emphasized
the essentially advisory role of the Commission.90
88. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on
External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 22d 1
Parliament, 2d Session, March 10, June 1 & 7, 1956. y
89. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—8—2, Len Jordan, Address to the
Oregon Farm Bureau Federation, Salem, Nov. 15, 1955.
90. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File F—l—Z, Len Jordan, Statement before
the Senate Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs and
Foreign Relations, Mar. 22, 1956.
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The status and role of the Commission was never
brought more sharply in focus, particularly in Canada, than
when the decision was taken to pursue the Columbia River
negotiations at the governmental level. This decision raised
the question of whether or not the commissioners or any of
them should have a place in the inter-governmental discussions.
The background to the decision also raised the matter of trying
to delineate the scope of the Commission's considerations when
it was given a reference.
In suggesting that the Canadian Government seek
direct negotiations with the United States, the Minister of
Northern Affairs stated clearly that he felt the realm of the
Commission was the practical, not the political. Engaging in
the latter was the cause of the present impasse between the
two sections.
Apart from the difficulties that are presented by the
publicity that has attached to exchanges in the Commission,
it seems to me that the question of downstream benefits
and the problems relating to discussions of fundamental
questions of policy on which discussions to arrive at
solutions of principle have to occur first on a direct
government—to-government basis. The International Joint
Commission has been able to deal effectively with problems
relating to boundary waters because the principles were
worked out in advance and incorporated with clarity in
the Boundary Waters Treaty. The reason, I think, that y
it has been impossible to deal successfully in the
Commission with recent questions of benefit—sharing in
the case of rivers that cross the boundary is because
the problem of downstream benefits has not been settled
at all as between the governments and the position under
Article II with regard to diversion leaves a great many
unanswered questions. I think that only the two govern-
ments can negotiate as to aCCeptable arrangements for the
respective national points of View on the problem of down-
_‘W
stream benefits, and only the Government of Canada
can I
consider how far, if at all, it should modify its
p051t10n
with regard to rights to divert and the characte
r of
compensation. Only the two_governments also can s
ettle
the points unanswered in the Treaty, and to
what con—_
stitutes a downstream appropriation which gi
ves a right
to compensation when a diversion takes place . .
. .
They are questions of high policy of the
kind that should,
I think, be settled directly between the gove
rnments.
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As to the question of the Commission's participation in
 
subsequent developments, Lesage emphasized that there should
be no indication of a slight to the Commission in proceeding
with direct negotiations and that he felt the Canadian chair-
man should participate fully in any inter—governmental
discussions.
Anticipating the proposal from the Minister of
Northern Affairs, the Under Secretary of State had prepared
for his Minister a memorandum on the matter of diplomatic
negotiations. In it he dealt with the question of participation
by the Commission.
One question which requires early decision is whether the
Commissioners of the IJC should be members of this dele-
gation. Their knowledge and experience in the matters
under discussion would be of great value. On the other
}hand, there might be a conflict of interests between
their status as Government representatives and as
Commissioners serving in an international quasi—judicial
capacity on the IJC, particularly with respect to the
Columbia River reference. Another consideration is, of
course, that the Chairmen of the two Sections have taken
strongly opposed positions in public with respect to the
matters under discussion, and this fact might start off
the discussions in an undesirable atmosphere.
Leger also pointed out the possibility that the governments
   
might decide to refer subsequent questions relating to the
Columbia to the Commission for examination, recommendation or
implementation and, the Commissioners would then be placed in
 
an untenable position if they had been associated with or
committed to the stands taken by the parties. On the other
hand, difficulties might arise if the chairman of the Canadian
section were not included. The Minister indicated that,
personally, he felt the General should be included in any
. . 92
discuSSions. ,
L
'91. Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 5724-40,
Letter from Jean Lesage to L.B. Pearson, (confidential),
Feb. 3, 1956.
“92. Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 12355-40,
: Memorandum from Leger to Pearson Re Composition of
Delegation for Diplomatic Talks (confidential), Jan. 17,
1956.
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The Minister of Trade and Commerce agreed that the
policy questions could never be settled by the Commission
and suggested formation of a Cabinet Committee to consider
the possibility of proposing to the United States that
"a special tribunal be established to deal with this one
"93
matter. To this proposal, the Under Secretary of State for
External Affairs advanced the following objections. 1. It would
.
a.
-.
.
take long negotiations to set up such a body. 2. It would be
objectionable for Canada to appear before such a body to defend
its rights under Article II. 3. The IJC already existed for
such purposes. 4. The new body would be no more private than
the IJC insofar as the discussions were concerned. 5. If the
new body were to be arbitral, it would be undesirable to have
Canada's interests decided by such a body.94
While the Minister of External Affairs was cautious
about proposing immediate negotiations with the United States,95
the Cabinet approved the suggestion of Lesage, agreeing that the
Commission's role was not to fill in gaps in the Boundary Waters
Treaty relating to downstream benefits and diversions but merely
to interpret the provisions spelled out therein.96 The Canadian
9
Ambassador in Washington was not certain that a proposal for
7%
negotiations would be immediately acceptable to the United States, I;
but he agreed with the need for removal of the matter from the
"ﬁg
purview of the Commission.
. . The conclusion that I am inclined to dr
aw at this
point is that the IJC although competent, is
not the I
best channel for negotiating these basic issu
es of prin—
ciple and policy on which the two governmen
ts have_not
yet agreed.97 ‘fy
93. Canada, Department of External Affairs,
File 12355—40, Letter g;
from C.D. Howe to Lesage (confidential)
, Feb. 6, 1956.
. . _40
94. Canada Department of External Af
fairs, File 12355 ,
Memorandum from Leger to Pearson (
confidential), Feb. 13, 1956.
xternal Affairs, File 12355-40
, Letter
(confidential), Feb. 17, 19
56. .
' ' -40 Memorandum
=.
96. Canada De artment of External Af
fairs, File 5724 , I
‘g
from Lesagg to the Cabinet,
Feb. 22, 1956; File 12355-40,
DeSpatch , i:
from External Affairs to Canadian EmbassY. WaShington (Secret
) Z,ﬁ%
Feb. 24, 1956.
’;
97. Canada, Department of External
from A.D.P. Heeney, Canadian Emb
y
(Confidential), Feb. 27, 1956.
!Jgg
95. Canada, Department of E
from Pearson to Lesage
 
Affairs, File 12355-40, Tele
gram
assy to External Affairs
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The chairman of the Canadian section favoured top-
level governmental negotiations but did not see the objective
as "filling_in gaps" in the treaty?8 He defended the publicity
attached to the Commission discussion of the Columbia River
as a legitimate part of the Commission's role.
Following some preliminary approaches, including a
meeting between the Prime Minister and the President in March,
it was publicly announced that the two governments would under-
take a discussion of international water problems; meantime,
the Commission would continue its studies of the water resources
of the Columbia.100
In the United States, Senator Neuberger publicly
welcomed the announcement of governmental negotiations, pointing
out that he had frequently criticised these negotiations being
left in the hands of the commissioners. He felt that if the
commissioners were to carry on what he saw as "foreign service
activities" such as the Columbia River negotiations, then he
would insist that the American commissioners be confirmed by
the Senate.101
In the autumn of 1956, the Under Secretary of State
advised against the Commission being allowed to delve into policy
matters on the Columbia now that the Cabinet Committee had taken
a position, and recommended that, if anything, the commissioners
might be brought into the policy committee but on a consultative
basis only.102
 
98. Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 5724—40, Report
of the Advisory Committee on Water Use Policy, Feb. 28, 1956-
99. Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 12355—40, Memo-
randum from McNaughton to Pearson (confidential) Mar. 5, 1956-
100.Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 5724—40, Memo-
randum from Lesage to the Cabinet, Mar. 2, 1956; Telegram
from External Affairs to Canadian Embassy, Mar. 12, 1956;
Press Reports, Mar. 28, 1956; Telegram from Canadian Embassy
to External Affairs, Apr. 25, 1956; Statement in the House
by Jean Lesage, May 23, 1956.
lOl.Congressional Record, 84th Congress, 2d Session, vol. 102,
part 5, pp. 7053—7054, Apr. 26, 1956.
102.Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 12355—40, MemO‘
randum from Leger to Pearson (confidential), Oct. 23, 1956;
Memorandum from Leger to Pearson, Dec. 18, 1956.
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When, after the change of administrations in 1957,
it seemed that the new government might abandon the governmental
negotiations, returning the discussions to the Commission, the
Under Secretary strongly advised against such a course of action.
The members of the Commission were not selected for their abilities
to negotiate since the Commission was a quasi—judicial body designed
to make recommendations to the governments on specific problems.
The Commission had never been used to negotiate treaties and such
a move would constitute abandonment of its impartial, quasi-
judicial position. Further, in the United States, the members
were selected from the federal service and were not responsible
to the State Department as negotiators must be.103
In further memoranda the following May, the Under
Secretary set out at length the objections to allowing the
Commission to carry on the negotiations relating to the develop-
ment of the Columbia River.
12. Another point which may require clarification is
the status of the International Joint Commission. From
the records, it is clear that the intention was that
Commissioners should act in a quasi—judicial capacity
and not as advocates for the government which appointed
them . . . . Undoubtedly Commissioners will have a
national bias and be alert to ensure that the interests
of their own country are adequately protected; but there
is a clear distinction between this situation and one in
which the Commissioners are witnesses, advocates, and
negotiators on behalf of their own countries as well as
quasi—judicial functionaries purporting to make objective
recommendations to governments. In the latter situation
the integrity of the Commission is compromised and their
recommendations are invalidated ab initio. Accordingly,
if an argument between governments is to be worked out '
within the framework of the International Joint CommiSSion,
counsel for the respective governments, and not the
Commissioners, will put forward government Views and
conduct negotiations, albeit under the good offices of
the Commission.
With reference to the Columbia negotiations, he noted the stale—
mate within the Commission since 1954.
103-Canada, Department of External Affair
s, File 5724, 14
Memorandum from Leger to the Minister (secret), Nov. ,
1957, Memorandum from Chatillon to Cleveland (secret),
Dec. 27, 1957.
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. . . It is obvious that no progress can be made in
the Commission until the two governments agree upon
a formula for compensation by the United States in
return for certain action by Canada. There is no
unresolvable dispute over engineering matters. In
order to take some step to get consideration of the
application [for Libby Dam] in the Commission, the
United States is seeking through diplomatic channels
ﬁnited States submitted an aide-memoire on April 22, ‘
1958 urging negotiations] to reach an agreement with '
Canada on the formula which both might agree should
be applied in the International Joint Commission in
dealing with the application.
 
14. The foregoing paragraphs suggest that the questions
of policy involved in this regard cannot be resolved
by an independent Commission—-even an important one
like the IJC. Such questions of political policy
inevitably have to be dealt with at the highest level,
through governmental channels, and, if experience provides
any indication, in non—public negotiations.
Leger deplored any decision which would direct discussions
on the Columbia through the Commission.104
In November the arguments against the Commission
carrying on diplomatic negotiations were reiterated by the
new Under Secretary.
. . . Such a decision should be discouraged as it would
appear that the Canadian Government would be seeking
to delegate responsibility in making policy on inter—
national affairs to a bi-national, independent, semi-
judicial body constituted for other purposes. Furthermore,
although the Commissioners are undoubtedly alert to insure
that the interests of their own country are adequately pro—
tected, their integrity and the value of their future.
decisions can be invalidated if on one particular occasion
they act as advocates and negotiators as well as quasi—
judicial functionaries at the same time.
  
lO4.Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 5724, Memo—
randum from Leger to the Minister (confidential), May 12,
1958; Memorandum from Leger to the Minister (secret), May
29, 1958.
105.Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 5724-1-40, ;
Memorandum from N.A. Robertson to the Minister (secret),
NOV. 4, 1958. 
  
207
The Under Secretary of State fully approved of
the reference to the Commission of the problem of coming up
with principles of equitable apportionment, noting that these
would be purely recommendatory and hence, in line with the
role of the Commission.106
Following the press publicity attendant on the
Columbia River negotiations within and without the Inter—
national Joint Commission, a spate of articles and books
appeared, considering again the role and functions of the
Commission. Analysing the treaty provisions and the work of
the Commission in recent times, Bloomfield and Fitzgerald
concluded that
. .[ﬁjince many of the problems that could arise
under Articles III and IV have been settled, more
frequent use has been made, in recent years, of the
investigative machinery provided by Article IX. Moreover,
as the most obvious problems now requiring settlement are
such as would come before the Commission by way of refer-
ence, rather than through an application, it would appear
that the main role of the Commission in the future will
lie in the field of investigation and recommendation.
The authors felt, however, that the Commission still had an
important judicial role but, had shown an "apparent reluctance" ‘%
to grapple with and settle legal issues as it did in the earlier "
years. They suggested the possible reason for this was the lack
of lawyers on the body.
. It is rather disquieting that a body which has
an important judicial role in the relationship between .
two large nations, and which also acts in an investigative
capacity in regard to questions involving complex and
important legal issues, should, at the very moment when
it is seised of some of the most difficult issues ever
to come before any international body, number not a Single
lawyer in its membership. This is a far cry from the early
years when five of the Commission's six members belonged to
the legal profession. ‘:J
Theyrecognized, however, the possible values in avoid
ing an
overly—judicial approach to the Commission's work, echoing the .
-
0
:
»
Jr
"
sentiments of General McNaughton.
106. Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 57?4-405
Memorandum from Robertson to the Minister (confidentia
l),
June 23, 1959; Memorandum from Robertso
n to the Minister,
July 7, 1959.
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It is, of course, appreciated that the Commission's
reluctance to settle legal issues may also stem
from the practical consideration that, if a diffi-
culty can be settled without pronouncing on the law,
prudence may dictate that such a pronouncement should
not be made. Thus, it could be argued that pragmatic
solutions adopted by the Commission have given it more
flexibility in solving difficulties than would be found
in solutions based on strict, though admissible, legal
interpretations of the Boundary Waters Treaty.107
Joseph Barber was concerned about the possible impact
on the status and role of the Commission of the partisan positions
taken by the respective chairmen in the Columbia River reference
and Libby Dam application.
. For diplomatic negotiation at a high level was
now to accompany the relatively informal, judicial
deliberations of the long established Joint Commission.
Could this mean a return to bargaining tactics employed
before the days of the Joint Commission when, it was
recalled, Canada usually came out on the short end of
the stick.108
Charles Dunlop in an analysis of the Commission as a
judicial tribunal found that while in history and in theory the
body was considered to be essentially judicial, in practice
it was becoming a "diplomatic bargaining agency entering the
market place to reach a decision." This he found not surprising
in light of the changes in the nature of the matters coming
before it and thought that had the Commission attempted to exist
as a strict court of law, it would not have survived. Nevertheles&
Dunlop believed that it still had a number of judicial tasks and
felt that there should be greater legal representation on the
. . 109
Comm1551on.
 
lO7.Bloomfield, L.M. and Fitzgerald, G.F. Boundary Water
Problems of Canada and the United States Toronto,
Carswell, 1958, pp. 61-62.
108.Barber, Joseph Good Fences Make Good Neighbors: Why the
United States Provokes Canadians New York, McClelland &
Stewart, 1958, c. 10. -
lO9.Dunlop, Charles Clifford The Origin and Development of the I
International Joint Commission as a Judicial Tribunal Queen 5
University, M.A. Thesis (unpublished), August 1959.  
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Professor Waite, dealing with the practice and
procedure of the Commission, described its process of deli—
beration as more akin to a legislative committee than to a
court of law. He found the rules under which the Commission
operated very much out of line with the practice, particularly
in relation to references and he noted that this was due in
large part to the changing emphasis in the work of the Commission.110
Recognizing this discrepancy between the rules of pro—
cedure and the present practices of the Commission, the legal
adviser to the Canadian section in 1963 called to the attention
of the chairman the fact that the rules had not been revised
since their adoption in 1912, and suggested amendments and
additions designed to cover activities under Article IX.
The Rules envisaged the Commission as essentially
a court handing down decisions in response to
applications by or on behalf of one or both Federal
Governments. Viewed in the light of experience, the
rules are not too clear in the division of responsi—
bilities and rights as between the Commission, the
Governments and interested parties. Neither do they
make specific provision for handling References under
Article IX and X. This is a serious lack, in View of
the increasing importance of this aspect of the
Commission's activities.
This recommendation resulted in the adoption in December
1964, of a completely revised set of rules of procedure which, as
well as streamlining the rules relating to applications,pr
ovided
a number of rules relating specifically to proceedings
on a refer—
ence, emphasizing the investigative and recommendatory natu
re of
the procedure.
Finally, the pre-eminence of the investig
ative, re-
commendatory and indeed, planning roles of the C
ommission over
the judicial or quasi-judicial function
s of the body has been
 110.6. Graham Waite, VThe International Joint Commission—Its.Practice and Its Impact on Land Use", 13 Buffalo Law ReView93-118 (1963) '111.I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—l—S, Memorandum from MacCallum toHeeney re Review of IJC Rules of Procedure, Sept. 10, 1963.112.I.J.C. Can. Sect. File Efl-§—2,International Joint CommisSion, Rules of Procedure of theadopted December 2, 1964.
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recognized implicitly in a number of statements and speeches
by Commission personnel in recent years. It has been explicitly
suggested in an examination in 1964 of the various references
which have come before the Commission. In appearances before
the House of Commons committees in 1964 and 1966 the Canadian
chairman repeatedly emphasized the investigative nature of the
Commission's work, noting that the body "acts not as a continuing
conference of two national delegations under instruction from
their respective governments, but as a single body seeking solutions
in the joint interest and in accordance with the principles set out
in the treaty" and, observing that
. .frjt pursues its investigations and obtains advice
by means of specially constituted boards the members of
which are selected by the Commission from the departments
and agencies of government, on both sides of the boundary,
where the best technical knowledge and competence are to
be found.
While agreeing that in its investigations, particularly in
relation to pollution of international waters, the Commission
must cooperate with national agencies engaged in similar work
to avoid duplication, the chairman pointedly observed, lest
there be any doubt that the Commission as an investigative body,
no less than as a judicial body, was purely international, that
the Commission as an international body could not establish
any formal relations with national groups.ll3
Speeches and articles by the engineering and legal
advisers to the Canadian section and by both American and
Canadian commissioners have also stressed the investigative
functions of the Conmission. In particular, several have
 
ll3.Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on
External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 27th
Parliament, lst Session, June 2, 1966. See also: Standing
Committee on Mines, Forests and Waters, Minutes of Proceedings
and Evidence, 26th Parliament, 2d Session, Oct. 29, 1964;
Standing Committee on External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings
and Evidence, 26th Parliament, 2d Session, July 22, 1964.
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illuminated the increasing reliance placed upon the work of
the control and advisory boards created in increasing numbers
to assist the Commission in the important technical aspects
114
of its work.
Finally, a study undertaken in 1964 of the changing
role of the International Joint Commission has drawn the
tentative Conclusion that
. . .Eﬁ]oday the major role of the International
Joint Commission is one of planning and advising
to assist the Canadian and the United States
Governments in reaching accord on the cooperative
development of the common water resources of the
two nations on a scale which will result in the
optimum benefigial use of these resources to each
nation.
114.
115.Jordan, Frederick J.E.
I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—8-6, Dr. René Dupuis,
Speech to the Montreal Port Council, 1964; File E-8-7,
M.W. Thompson, Speech to the Engineering Institute
of Canada, Banff, May 1964; Speedltc the Twelfth
Industrial Waste Conference at Bigwin Inn, Ontario,
June 14, 1965; File E-8-8, J.L. MacCallum, Speech to
the Iambton Branch of the Association of Professional
Engineers, Sarnia, Feb. 23, 1965; File Ef8-10, Cha
rles
Ross, Statement on Boundary Water Pollutio
n Abatement:
United States and Canada, Senate Subcommittee on A
ir
and Water Pollution, Buffalo, June 17, 1965.
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V PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION
The questions of the qualifications of personnel
appointed to the International Joint Commission and of the
functional organization and proposals for reorganization of
the Commission are not only closely related to each other but
are in many ways inseparable from the subject matter of the
previous chapter dealing with the nature and character of the
Commission itself. The division in treatment is essentially
arbitrary, dictated mainly by the bulk of documentation.
Arbitrary too, in a number of cases, is the decision as to
the chapter in which certain documents are placed, the objective
being to reduce repetition to a minimum.
Even with this artificial division the documentation
remains large in this chapter. However, the two questions of
personnel and organization are so much intertwined that separa-
tion is virtually impossible; reorganization has seldom been
considered except in terms of vacancies on the Commission at the
time. The proposal is thus to consider chronologically the
appointments as they were being made, fitting into this order
the suggestions for "reform" as they have been advanced from
time to time.
A. Initial Canadian Personnel
 
The question of Canadian appointments was first publicly
raised in December 1910 by the Opposition in the House of Commons.
when asked if the members of the Commission would be skilled
engineers, the Minister of Public Works replied that consideration
had not been given to appointments as yet but that the government
would appoint only men "eminently fitted for the discharge of these
duties . . . " In speaking of the importance of Articles IX and
X and the treaty generally, the Minister said:
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Honourable members will see that it is a very far
reaching provision, and one which, if the Commissioners
are qualified for the performance of their duties, will
be likely to make for peaceable relations between the
two countries in the future.
. LIJf this Commission is what we hope it will be;
if the gentlemen who are appointed are the right men,
and if they proceed to discharge their duties animated
by a desire not alone to defend the interests of the
country which they represent, but to recognize the
right of the neighbouring country, it seems to me that
this tribunal will be a most important one in making
for permanent peace between the adjoining countries.l
Mr. Magrath of the Opposition urged the appointment
of "scientific men who can stand up and face the representatives
of the United States and do business for this country." In the
May debate on the bill to implement the provisions of the treaty,
he was most critical of the Canadian appointments to the Water—
ways Commission, suggesting that because of their lack of
scientific training, the Canadian members were forced to rely
upon United States engineering skill in every matter dealt with
by the Commission. He delivered an impassioned plea for the
appointment of top-flight talent to the new Commission. .%
I consider that our government has a great opportunity
to render a signal service to Canada in the selection ‘
of the three Canadian representatives. In my opinion, i
it is not a question of obtaining gentlemen with legal 3
lore, as the questions which will be involved are en—
gineering questions . Then, it appears to me that
this is the time for Canada to hunt for a man who stands
pre-eminent in that branch of the engineering profesSion,
which this commission will be called upon to deal With,
namely, water questions. Let us get that man, regardless
of price or where he comes from . . . HaVing secured
such a man, let our government place a copy of the tre
aty
in his hands with instructions to carry on inve
stigations
along the international boundary, so that when
the five—d
year period for which the treaty was made co
mes to an en ,
he will be able to point out all the weak pla
ces so far.
as Canada is concerned . . . . Tell him to study Ca
nada 5
problems of industrial development so as to
be able to
lay down a policy of water-power developm
ent and water
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transportation that will permit this country to
get its products into markets of the world at the
lowest possible figure . . . .2
Under the legislation introduced, it was merely pro—
vided that the commissioners should be appointed by His Majesty
on the recommendation of the Governor in Council and should
receive for services an amount to be fixed by the Governor in
Council, not to exceed seventy-five hundred dollars per annum.
In answer to a question concerning the amount of the salaries,
Pugsley stated that they should be the same amount for com—
missioners on both sides and added that, in his opinion, if
the commissioners received the full salary they should work
full time for the Commission, but the government had not yet
decided whether they would be full-time appointments.3
Gibbons, informing Pugsley that Laurier had offered
to him the chairmanship of the Canadian section, had suggested
to the Minister that he not be given a salary which in any way
would prevent him from carrying on his law practice. "The
Commission will not require, in all likelihood more than two
or three days a month at most of my time." As to the other
two appointments to the Canadian section he observed:
The Americans intend to make the Commission an important
one by the high standing of their appointees. I think
it is absolutely essential that we should adopt a
similar policy and I should like very much to be con—
sulted before anything final is decided with regard
either to the secretaryship or the other names to be
suggested on this commission.
In response to a query from Gibbons as to how he
expected to retain his law practice and yet receive seventy-
five hundred dollars per year from the government,5 nominee
 
2. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Session
1910—11, vol. 1, pp. 912-913, Dec. 6, 1910; vol. 5,
pp. 9101-9109; 9122, May 16, 1911.
3. 1—2 George V, c.28, ss. 6 & 7; Canada, Parliament, House
of Commons Debates, session 1910—11, vol. 5, pp. 9218-9219
May 16, 1911.
4. Gibbons Papers, vol. 8, Letterbook No. 1, pp. 950-951,
Letter from Gibbons to Pugsley (confidential), Feb. 14, 1911
5. Gibbons Papers, vol. 9, Letterbook No. 2, p. 43, Letter from
Gibbons to Geoffrion (confidential), Aug. 30, 1911.
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Aime Geoffrion replied that he had accepted the appointment
only on the basis that it would be part—time and would not
interfere with his practice which he intended to continue
regardless.6
When the Borden administration recommended the
cancellation of the Liberal nominations and substituted
therefor the names of three Conservative party supporters,
Casgrain, Powell and Magrath, the last-named nominee be
ing a
survey engineer, Gibbons wrote to Geoffrion:
The objection to having an engineer on the
Commission is manifest. It is a Court. An en
gineer
on the Commission will want to give his own
opinion,
not take evidence from experts. There is n
o more
reason for putting an engineer on the Cou
rt than
putting one on the Supreme Court at O
ttawa, but, Mr.
McGrath (sic) wants a job.
Laurier observed of the new nominees th
at "Casgrain and Magrath
will be good men, but Powell will be an ex
treme partisan."
Tawney regretted the loss of Gibbons.
With your intimate knowledge of t
he Treaty,
its purposes, and also your familiari
ty with many
of the subjects now in controversy
between the two
countries, your services would hav
e been invaluable
to the Commission as well as to
Canada and to the
United States.
The official reason given by th
e Borden Government
for cancelling the original no
minations was that
. the new Government desi
re the appointment of
Commissioners who will be
in sympathy with their
policy respecting matters w
hich will come before .
the Commissioners for co
nsideration and determina
tion.
The action and the explanati
10
on were seveniy criticized
by the
Liberal Opposition in the
House. Laurier stated tha
t the action
6. Gibbons Papers, vol
. 7, fol. 2, Letter fro
m Geoffrion to
Gibbons, Aug. 31, 1911.
7. Gibbons Papers, vol.
9, Letterbook No. 2, pp.
81-82, Letter
from Gibbons to Geoffri
On (private), Nov. 17, 1
911.
8- Gibbons Papers, vol.
3, fol. 5, Letter from La
urier to
Gibbons, Nov. 30, 1911.
9. Gibbons Papers, vol. 3
, fol.
Gibbons, Dec. 4, 1911.
5, Letter from Tawney
to 2
No. 268, vol. 6(b), De
spatch from
arcourt, Oct. 25, 191
1; Confidential
dary Waters, vol. 1,
p. 197.
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of the government "gives a partisan character to the Commission
which it should not have." The Minister of Trade observed that
the Liberal nominations had reflected exactly the same thing and
suggested that this was not unreasonable. He did not think that
it was desirable for a Conservative government to have Liberal
commissioners in "this very important and confidential office."
. . . It would seem to me to be inconsistent and absurd
that a government coming into power as this did, should
be required to have as its confidential commission,
engaged in that important business, dealing with this
government and to a certain extent with other govern-
ments, men who are not in thorough sympathy and accord
with the government by whom to some extent they would
be directed, and with whom they would have to consult
in a confidential way.
Dr. Pugsley, the former Minister of Public Works,
attacked what he called the "dismissal" of the Liberal "appointees
and condemned the expression of partisan desirability by George
Foster, suggesting that this view meant that with every change
in government there would have to be new and sympathetic com—
missioners appointed.
. . . These gentlemen were appointed to what is to be,
to all intents and purposes, a court. The commissioners
are not to act either for the United States or for Canada,
but are to consider as a judicial tribunal all questions
of an international character . . . They are to be
something like the Hague Tribunal but in a smaller way.
They are, as I say, to all intents and purposes a
judicial body.
When the Minister of Public Works, Mr. Monk, suggested that the
commissioners possessed a representative character as well,
Pugsley retorted:
I do not think they have a representative character;
I think they have a judicial character. Why, the treaty
contemplates, and so provides, that there might be a
division of opinion between the commissioners appointed
on either side . . . . It was expected, as I say, not
that they would voice the opinions of the government
they represented, but that they would act in a judicial
capacity, forming a tribunal of a most important character
 
ll. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Session 1911—12,
vol.l, pp. 896-899, Dec. 6, 1911.  
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to determine the questions of an international
nature arising from time to time.
The Liberal Opposition demanded and obtained the
tabling of all correspondence relating to the appointment of
the commissioners. With this before the House, Pugsley continued
his attack, noting from the tenor of the correspondence that the
Borden Government felt that the Liberal commissioners would not
be in sympathy with the water policies of the new government.
He criticized the appointment of Powell of New Brunswick on
grounds that as former counsel for the United States in the St.
John River dispute, he could not be an impartial commissioner.
As for the other two nominees, their only qualifications, he
observed, seemed to be that both were defeated Conservative
candidates.
When the Prime Minister rose to defend the appointments
on grounds that the commissioners must be in sympathy with the
government's policies, Laurier dissented.
I take direct issue with that View of the case. The
commissioners appointed have nothing to do with the
policy of this government; the duties they have to
discharge are quasi-judicial if not absolutely judicial.
The tribunal has been appointed to prevent the diversion
j
of the waters of the St. Lawrence, the St. John and other
‘3
international rivers and to protect the rights of Canadians
.
Water has become so valuable that it is to the interest of
H
one side or the other to divert its course, and the object
5
of appointing the commission is to prevent this be
ing done. T
That duty is most important and must command the best
judgment of the people of Canada.
He concluded that by its action, the Borden Government had
con-
veyed to the United States the View that the
positions of the
commissioners were to be purely partisan.
The Minister of Public Works again asked wha
t was
wrong with that View. '
. It [the Commission} has a judicial
character, .35
undoubtedly. It would be absurd to p
retend that these ,;5
three commissioners, who are not ex
clu51vely and
absolutely judges, should not be in
perfect harmony “
with the government, because t
hey must be in frequent,
V“
almost daily, communication with th
e government whom
12. Canada, Parliament, House of Common
s Debates, Session J
1911-12, vol. 1, pp. 966—969, Dec. 7, 1911
.
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they represent. That is my contention. They will
require information at every moment from the officers
of the government, they require assistance from the
government, they require to get information and advice
from the ministers of the different departments. It
therefore seems altogether reasonable that they should
be men who have always had the confidence of, and been
in political intimacy with, the government whom they
are serving. That does not at all mean that the
relations between the government and this body of men
should be of a political nature in the wrong sense of
the word. It means that, for the efficient discharge
of their functions, they require to be men who have the
confidence of the government in power, always provided
of course, that they have all the high qualifications
which are needed in that position.
As to the nature of the mission confided to these gentlemen,
it is in a high degree a judicial mission, but it is not
exclusively judicial. They have a representative character,
they must keep in constant communication with the govern-
ment that has constituted them, and it seems to me a proper
principle to lay down that they should be men possessing
the intimate confidence of the government.13
At least one of the Canadian commissioners disagreed
with the views of Mr. Monk. Magrath in a letter to Streeter
of the United States section expressed his surprise at the
suggestion that the commissioners must be in political harmony with
the government. He felt that the present commissioners, with the
exceptions of Tawney and Casgrain, had divorced themselves from
politics on their appointments and he asserted that this must
be the case if the Commission were to enjoy the respect and the
confidence of the public.14
B. Initial United States Personnel
In the United States the qualifications of the com-
missioners and their relationship to the government were also
13. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Session 1911-12,
vol. 1, pp. 981-984, Jan. 10, 1912; vol. 3, pp. 6680—6707,
Mar. 30, 1912.
14. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 20, Letter from Magrath to
Streeter, (private), Sept. 23, 1912.   
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considered at an early date although not under the same
circumstances or to the same length as in Canada. In the
draft bill to give effect to the treaty, it was provided
that the commissioners, to be appointed by the President by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, should "perform
such other duties as they may be called upon to perform under
the direction of the Secretary of State." The salaries, to
be fixed by the Secretary of State, were not to exceed those
paid to the Canadian commissioners and, in no case, were to
exceed seventy-five hundred dollars per annum. Anderson, submitting
the draft to the Secretary, explained that by these provisions,
the Secretary would be able to keep the salaries in line with
those of the Canadian commissioners or to provide the United States
commissioners with an additional amount "to cover the work to
be performed by them for the Department of State apart fro
m
their joint duties with the Canadian Commissioners."15
Senator Cullom shortly reported objections by the
Foreign Relations Committee to the provisions of the An
dersor
draft bill. He asked what the State Department had
in mind in
providing for the performance by the commissione
rs of other
duties, doubting the desirability of such a requ
irement. He also
noted that at least one member had reserv
ations about the es—
tablishment of any body which was to be a
"permanent adjunct of
the state department."16 Knox replied t
hat the United States,
by the treaty, was obliged to provide
for a permanent body and,
as for giving the Secretary authority
to impose "other duties",
. . . we are obliged permanently t
o maintain those
three highly efficient Commissione
rs to perform the
variety of duties indicated in t
he treaty. Other
matters calling for similar qua
lifications and germane
or similar to the regular duti
es of our Commi551oners
may possibly, from time to
time, arise, and it would
seem economical and wise t
o give the Secretary of St
ate
authority, on occasion, to u
tilize the CommiSSioners
15. Decimal File 1910—29, Depa
rtment of State, National Arch
ives,
box 6601, 711.42155/112,
Memorandum from Anderson
to Knox,
May 14, 1910; Anderson Pa
pers, box 69.
£
Department of State, Natio
nal Archives,
‘ Chair
man,16. Decimal File 1910-29,
box 6601, 711.42155/114,
Letter from Sen. Cullom,
Foreign Relations Committee
to Knox, May 25, 1910
.
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so far as their re ular duties might permit for
any such work. .
After amending "other duties" to read "duties of a
like or similar nature", the Senate approved the bill and trans-
mitted it to the House of Representatives. In the House, the
bill ran into more serious objections. Not only was the pro—
vision for additional duties found objectionable, even as
amended, but also, representatives were opposed to Senate con—
firmation of the commissioners, to the annual salary for com-
missioners and, indeed, to providing for a permanent commission
in any case.18 Knox sought to counter the objections. He
pointed out the numerous matters awaiting the attention of the
Commission and, noting that the Commission under the treaty
must last at least six years, suggested that there was enough
present work to keep it going for probably ten or more years.
As to the House proposal that the commissioners be placed on a
per diem allowance, he replied that
[iln view of the high international character of the
Commission, the character of the work to be performed
covering the most important relations between the United
States and Canada requiring practically continuous service ...
the Department felt that a per diem allowance would be highly
inappropriate.19
Due to the numerous objections, the bill was never
enacted by the House. The only legislation was the appropriations
law providing seventy—five thousand dollars "to be expended under
the direction of the Secretary of State." Thus appointments to
the United States section and the salaries of the commissioners were
left entirely to the Executive and, no duties other than those
l7. Decimal File l9lO—29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6601, 711.42155/114, Letter from Knox to Cullom, May 28,
1910.
18. Congressional Record, 6lst Congress, 3d Session, l9lO—ll, vol.
46, part 1, pp. 491—492.
19. Decimal File l9lO-29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6601, 711.42155/115, Memorandum from Knox to J.S. Fassett,
House of Representatives, June 13, 1910.  
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under the treaty were imposed on the United States section.20
When the President named the first commissioners,
two were recently defeated members of Congress and all were
active Republicans.21 This was in accord with his statement
to Governor Osborn of Michigan that he had no intention of
22
appointing a Democrat to the Commission. Noting the poli-
tical complexion of the United States section, Bryce also
observed that all three members were from border states. This,
he felt, might mean that they would be knowledgeable of boundary
matters, but, created a danger of "influences unfavourable to
the exercise of a dispassionate judgment."
If appointments on this Commission are to be looked
upon as party patronage and to be given as conso—
lation prizes to politicians who have suffered
defeat in their constitutencies probably no better
chOices could have been made than Messrs. Carter
and Tawney. Both are men of good character with
considerable experience of affairs. But it may be
questioned whether an exclusive experience either
as politicians or as lawyers will enable members of
this Commission to approach its important duties
with that judicial detachment and conciliatory
disposition on which the services of the institution
will depend. A Commission including a judge and an
engineer would probably have promised better.2
With the death of Chairman Carter six months after
his appointment, Taft indicated that he would name only a
20. Decimal File 1910-29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6601, 711.42155/118, Memorandum from State Department
Solicitor to White House, July 14, 1910; 711.42155/132, Letter
from Knox to Taft, Jan. 4, 1911; 711.42155/137, Letter fro
m
Knox to Sen. W.E. Purcell, Jan. 23, 1911; 711.42155/141,
Letter from Taft to Knox, Mar. 9, 19115 Sundry Civ
il
Appropriation Act, June 25, 1910, Public Law 266, 36 Stat. 984.
See also Sundry Civil Appropriation Act, Mar.
4, 1911, Public
Law 525, 36 Stat. 285, empowering PreSident to
fixsalaries
of commissioners.
21. W.H. Taft Papers, Presidential Series No. 2, file 1041,
White
House Memorandum for the President, Mar. 9,
1911.
22. W.H. Taft Papers, Presidential Series No. 2
, file 1041, Letter
from Taft to Osborn, Mar. 8, 1911.
23. Governor General's Papers, No. 268,
vol.
Bryce to Lord Grey, Mar. 14, 1
911.
6(a), Despatch from
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strong and able lawyer to the post and, after two con—
versations with his Secretary of State, was persuaded to
appoint a Democrat, former Senator George Turner of
Washington State, providing the Canadians would not resent
the appointment in View of the Senator's earlier connection
24
with the Alaska boundary settlement. Commissioner Streeter
thanked the President for appointing such an able man as
Turner.25
Criticism of the appointments was soon voiced in
Congress--along with criticisms of the Commission generally.
Affairs Committee thought that
justify the "extravagant offices"
Members of the House Foreign
the Commission did little to
and handsome salaries (fixed at $7500 per annum) and indeed,
was little more than a haven for defeated Senators and
Representatives. Representative Townsend, later to become a
commissioner himself, summed up the views of the critics thus:
ﬁt was a lame-duck proposition, and the lame-ducks had.not been
trained to show a good exercise for their living." When
Senator Borah suggested that Congress cease providing paid
vacations for defeated congressmen, Senator Curtis thought
that this was perhaps unnecessary for the Commission would
finish its work shortly and cease to exist. Senator Root
offered a strong defence.
. I do not anticipate that the time will ever come
when this Commission will not be needed. I think that
as the two countries along this tremendous boundary line
become more and more thickly settled the need for it
will increase. I do not think we shall ever see the
time when this Commission will not be needed to disposer
of controversies along the boundary line in their
inception, furnishing a machinery ready at hand for
the people to get relief and redress without going into
24. Decimal File 1910-29, Department of State, National Archiv
es,
box 6601, 711.42155/165a, Letter from Knox to Turner, Nov.
14,
1911; W.H.,Taft Papers, Presidential Series No. 2, file 1
041,
Note from Knox to Taft, Nov. 22, 1911; Presidential
Memorandum to Knox, Nov. 14, 1911.
W.H. Taft Papers, Presidential Series No. 2, file 1041,
Letter from Streeter to Taft, Dec. 5, 1911.
25.
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long processes of diplomatic correspondence. I think
it will have to continue as long as the ordinary
courts of the countries continue.26
C. The Commission 1912-1920
 
While the Commission during its first eight years
saw some of its most active times as seventeen matters were
brought before it and thirteen of them effectively disposed of,
there was growing dissatisfaction both with the work of the
Commission and with the personnel. This unrest was evident
within and without the Commission and led in 1919 to the first
serious consideration for change in the basic nature of the body.
It also led to the first call for abrogation of the treaty.
With the election in 1912 of a Democratic President,
the first change in the membership of the United States section
on the basis of political partisanship was made. On the advice
of several Democratic senators and his Secretary of the Treasury,
Wilson agreed to appoint Obadiah Gardner, defeated Senator from
on the advice of Secretary Bryan,Maine, to the Commission and,
27
to obtain the resignation of Streeter to make room for Gard
ner.
Streeter complied, submitting his resignation effec
tive October 1,
1913 when he completed his study of pollution o
n the Niagara
Gardner was chosen in December to replace T
awney as
Bryan had also suggested to the Preside
nt that he
River.28
chairman.
remove Tawney although he noted later that with Streeter's
removal and Gardner's appointment, they now had a section w
ith
two Democrats and one Republican, a bal
ance in accord with that
29
maintained by Republican President Taft.
62d Congress, 3d Session, vol. 4
9,
26. Con ressional Record
9 I 13, 1913;
vol. 49, part 5, pp.
part 4, pp. 3117-3131, Feb.
4171—4177, Feb. 27, 1913.
27. Wilson Papers, File IV, c
ase 155, Memorandum for the Pr
esi-
dent, Julv 14, 1913; Letter from
Gardner to Secretary of the
Treasury McAdoo, July 29, 191
3.
28. Decimal File 1910-29, Department
of S
box 6601, 711.42155/230, Letter
from
Letter from Bryan to Wilson
,
Sept. 25, 1913;
tate, National Archives,
Streeter to Bryan Sept 2,1913.
29. Wilson Papers, file IV, case 155,
‘
sept- 4, 1913; Letter
from Bryan to Wilson,
Letter from Bryan to Wilson, Sept. 27
, 1913-
.
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In connection with the proposal of Bryan to remove
Tawney as well, Gardner saw the inherent dangers to the United
States section, and cautioned the President of the need for
stability in the Commission.
Will say since I have had the honor of being a member
of this Commission I have been seriously impressed
with the magnitude and importance of its work and in
order that the usefulness of the American Section of
the Commission may not be in any way lessened or impaired
I must respectfully call your attention to the fact that
since the creation of the Commission through the joint
action by treaty between the United States and Great
Britain the personnel of the Canadian section has not
been changed but all of the original members from that
side of the line are still members. On the other hand
the only one of the original members of the United States
section that remains is Mr. Tawney. I have no desire to
dictate or interfere except to call your attention most
respectfully to this fact; that the work of the Commission
up to this time has been largely in the initiatory stage
in some of the large and important work it has before it
to do without referring to any part of the work in detail.
I will say I would regard it to be a serious set—back to
the work before the Commission to have Mr. Tawney re-
placed by another at this time. He is I find a very
able man and is intensely interested in his work and by
reason of his longer service is thoroughly conversant
with all the details which a new member no matter how
able would not be. He is the only Republican member and
maintains the bi—partisan character of the Commission
which was adopted at the first and as it appears to me
is of the utmost importance to continue in order that
the Commission be kept free from becoming a partisan
political board which would result in great damage to
its usefulness in the great work it is employed in
carrying out . . .
I understand Judge Turner is to be replaced in March by
another who as I have been informed says it will not
take much of his time from his other business which if
true clearly shows he has no appreciation of the character
and importance of the work the Commission is engaged in
working out . . . . I am sure you are concerned about
maintaining the highest staggard in the personnel of the
United States section . .
30. Wilson Papers, file IV, case 155, Letter from Gardner to
Wilson, Jan. 30, 1914.   
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Although the President gave his assurance that
Gardner's advice would guide his actions,31 he promptly secured
the resignation of Turner and on March 1 appointed R.B. Glenn, i
former Democratic Governor of North Carolina, to fill the
position.32 The Canadian chairman expressed to Turner his
regret at the loss of a second United States member. "I believe ,“?f
the Commission will gradually work into performing most valuable f
service to both countries. At least it is possible to do so with
33ll
 
men of your standing. The President soon learned the wisdom ,3d
of Gardner's caution concerning the new appointment. In a letter
to the Secretary of State he remarked: '"g
I have learned to my surprise that ex-Governor Glenn is
actively continuing his lecture engagements since accepting ‘.
the place on the Canadian Boundary Commission (sic). _,
You may have noticed that the Appropriations Committee
of the House has become rather critical of this commission
and has begun to doubt whether it is doing work that
justifies the expenditure. It undoubtedly is doing work
and the work assigned to it is of capital importance, but
the criticisms will naturally be strengthened if-it appears . 1
that the Commissioners do not have to devote much attention 3
to their duties. I wonder if you could get hold of Bob in
some way and see what his plans are. I am afraid he is
making a great mistake.34
Congress was indeed becoming increasingly critical of
  
the COmmission. In two appearances before the House Foreign
Affairs Ccmmittee in 1914, Tawney and Gardner were repeatedly
called upon to justify the existence of the Commission and its
requests for funds. Asked how much time he devoted to the
Commission's work, Gardner estimated about half of his time;
agreed that all three should be devoting full time to it. Tawney,
however, thought that most of the members did work nearly full
time and that the work they did was not of a nature that could
31. Wilson Papers, file IV, case 155, Letter from Wilson to
Gardner, Feb. 3, 1914.
32. Wilson Papers, file IV,
Wilson, Mar. 5, 1914.
33. Magrath Papers, vol. 5,
Turner, Feb. 21, 1914.
34. Wilson Papers, file IV,
Bryan, Mart 24, 1914.
case 155, Letter from Glenn to
file 19, Letter from Magrath to
case 155, Letter from Wilson to
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be handled just as effectively by the State Department. In
reply to a suggestion by one member of the Committee (speaking,it seemed, the suspicions of most) "that this commission andits clerical help are mere sinecures", Tawney retorted: "It
and I want to tell you that
we are dealing with very important problems,
"35of them.
is a mistake, a positive mistake,
and there are many
Despite the dissatisfaction with the Commission, the
President still contemplated the removal of its most effective.
member. Glenn joined Gardner in protest.
From a source that I deem absolutely reliable I heardthere was an effort being made to get you to removeHon. James A. Tawney of Minnesota from the Commission,and to substitute in his stead a democrat. While theact putting in force the treaty, and the treaty itself,does not forbid all of the members from being of thesame political faith, in my judgment it would be againstpublic policy not to have the minority represented onthis Commission. President Taft recognized this byappointing two republicans and one democrat, and nowunder the democrats, it seems to be decidedly best forus to retain one republican.
In no sense should thi
the contrary should be
to the greatest extent.
5 Commission be partisan, but on
International and non—partisan
He concluded that Tawney was by far the most knowledgeable and
dedicated of the commissioners.36 Certain government officials
also supported Tawney as a most effective commissioner.37 Wilson
was impressed by these representations and was giving "very
serious thought" to the matter.38 Indeed, when pressure was
brought to bear to have representation from the Northwest on the
United States section,39 Wilson confessed his dilemma.
35. United States Congress, House Committee on Foreign Relations,Hearings on the Diplomat ic and Consular Appropriation Bill,63d Congress, 3d Session, Jan. 30 & Feb. 4, 1914, Dec. 17—25,l9l‘L
36. Decimal File 1910-29, Department of State, National ArchiveS,box 6602, 711.42155/255, Letter from Glenn to Bryan, Nov. 16,1916-
37. Wilson Papers, file IV, case 155,
I.C.C., to Wilson, Apr. 13, 1917.
38. Wilson Papers, file IV,
Daniels, Apr. 16, 1917.
Letter from W.N. Daniels,
case 155, Letter from Wilson to
39. Wilson Papers, file IV, case 155, Letter from Sen. J.F. Shaforthto Wilson, June 15, 1917.    
  
227
That is a commission whose duties and whose performance
of its duties I have been studying a good deal recently,
and I find the possibilities decidedly uncertain there
The trouble is that there is no vacancy on the Boundary
Commission (sic), and I cannot create one without doing
one or other of two things, namely, either securing the
resignation of the Republican member, who is really doing
the best work of all our commissioners, or else bring
very great mortification to one or other of the Democratic
members, who I must say are not proving of any particular
value so far as I can make out. It is a very embarrassing
quandaryto me and so I have not permitted myself to 28n-
sider the matter further since Senator Kern's death.
 
About this time, attention shifted from Tawney to Glenn
who had become incapacitated through serious illness. Gardner
and Tawney strongly urged the Secretary of State to have the
President request Glenn's resignation since they felt it was
harmful to the Commission to be operating without the full con—
tingent, the first time this had occurred.
You will readily appreciate the fact that for the Com-
mission to proceed irregularly under the Treaty or with
only part of its members present to hear and determine
important cases involving international questions of
serious moment and weight will inevitably affect public
confidence in the efficiency of our organization as an
instrumentality for the settlement of international
disputes.41
Gardner urged the reappointment of George Turner, a suggestion in
which Secretary Lansing concurred.42 However, he noted that it
would be most indelicate to recommend the removal of Glenn when
he was so close to death.43 Glenn remained in office until
40. Wilson Papers, file IV, case 155, Letter from Wilson to Shafonh
June .325, 1917; Letter from Wibon to Shaforth, Aug. 29, 1917.
41.Decimal File 1910—29, Department of State, National Archives,.
box 6602, 711.42155/335C, Letter from Secretary of State Lansing
to Gardner, Sept. 20, 1918; 711.42155/338A, Letter from Lan
Sing
to Wilson, Sept. 20, 1918.
42.Decimal File 1910—29, Department of State, Natioi
al Archives,
to an81ng
box 6602 711.42155/337, Letter from Ga
rdner .
(confidential), Sept. 24, 1918; Letter fr
om Lan51ng to Gardner
(confidential), Sept. 26, 1918.
43.Decimal File 1910—29, Department of Sta
te, National archives,
box 6602, 711.42155/346, Letter from Gar
dner to Lan81ng
(confidential), Oct. 9, 1918; Letter from
Lan51ng to Gardner
(personal and confidential), Oct. 1
7, 1918.
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his death, May 16, 1920. In the meantime Tawney had died in
June, 1919 and his position was filled almost immediately
by former Senator Clarence Clark of Wyoming.
In Canada during this period there were fewer changes
in personnel and less political overtones relating to the Com-
mission, a consequence in part, no doubt, of the fact that
there were no changes in government. To keep the Commission
out of domestic policy considerations, the Cabinet early in
1914 laid down the procedure for bringing private applications
before the Commission. Each such.application was to be first
-submitted to the appropriate government department for a
determination if the proposal should be forwarded to the
Commission. This decision would be taken by the Cabinet.
. . . [IJt objectionable on principle that a
scheme, to which exception might be taken on grounds
of domestic policy, should be allowed to go to a
Tribunal whose jurisdiction only arises when inter-
national considerations come into play, before it has
been fully considered from the domestic standpoint.
In October, 1914 the Canadian chairman resigned from
the Commission to enter the Cabinet of Borden. Casgrain was
replaced almost immediately by a Conservative lawyer from
Montreal, P.B. Mignault. There appear no records of any
comment on this appointment and the only recorded dissension
within the Canadian section centered about the role of the
commissioners, when Magrath, the new chairman, complained of
the lack of cooperation from his fellow members and their
insistence on considering the Commission's functions as purely
judicial.45
However, in 1918 when Mignault resigned to be elevated
to the bench of the Supreme Court of Canada the question of
regional and racial representation on the Canadian section was
44. Decimal File 1910-29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6601, 711.42155/246, Copy of Privy Council Minute 305,
Feb. 9, 1914. -
45. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 20,Letter from Magrath to
Mignault (confidential), Oct. 24, 1916.
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raised. The Premier of Ontario and the federal Minister of
Justice urged Borden to make an appointment from that province
since it was vitally concerned with boundary water problems.46
On the other hand, argued the Minister of Justice, Quebec must
retain its representation on the Commission under all
circumstances.
Magrath in knowledge of the situation in the United
States section and in view of the problems he felt to exist in
his own section, took the opportunity to urge upon Borden the
need for reconsidering qualifications of the personnel on the
Commission. He first suggested retention of Mignault on the
Commission while he was at the same time serving on the bench
and then added that Borden would do well to take up with the
Secretary of State the possibility of each side appointing at
least one member from the highest court "to bolster the image
of the Commission."48 He then called upon an official of the
State Department to urge upon the Secretary the need to give
some serious consideration to the future of the Commission.
A memorandum prepared for Lansing to take with him to the
Paris Peace conference made the following points:
. . . He [Magrath] said he regretted to have to inform
me that the Commission had lost caste in Canada an
d
in the United States to such a degree that it seem
ed
to have no standing; the members had little int
erest
in the work . . and that for one he had decid
ed that
unless the Commission could be rejuvenated a
nd given
a dignified position as an international trib
unal he
would resign.
It pointed out that the major problem a
t the moment was the fact
that both the United States and Can
adian commissioners carried
on duties, private or otherwise, outside
of their work with the
Commission. It indicated that the Cana
dian Prime Minister was
97, O.C. 489, Telegram from Hearst
to
46. Borden Pa ers vol.
p I Letter from White
to Borden, Oct. 28,
Borden, Oct. 25, 1918;
1918.
47. Borden Papers, vol. 97, O.C. 489,
Letter from Doherty to
Borden, Oct. 29, 1918.
48. Magrath Papers, vol. 6,
Borden (personal), Nov. 7,
file 20, Letter from Magrath
to
1918.  
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sympathetic to the idea of appointing a Supreme Court judge
to the Commission and thought that the United States might
do the same. It observed that Magrath had suggested that
Lansing might talk the matter over with Borden while both
were in Paris and the writer seconded this proposal.
. . . The Commission has done good work; it has
powers under the treaty which will enable it to
consider many difficult questions which are likely'
to arise between the United States and Canada in
the future; it is in short, an institution which
may bring the two countries very close together.
I do not think the Commission is doing the great
work which the negotiators of the treaty thought
that it would accomplish, chiefly, I believe, because
the members are not required to give their whole time
to its work.
To Borden in London, Magrath wrote that he must meet
Wilson in Paris to discuss "future policy on appointments to
the Commission designed to enhance its stature."
. . The position demands broad-minded men of out—
standing integrity, with a fair measure of diplomacy;
men with capacity to understand engineering problems,
and men versed in law.
The Prime Minister met in Paris with Wilson and Lansing
and in a memorandum to the Acting Prime Minister indicated that
as a result a reorganization would likely occur.
1. They entirely agree as to the great importance of
the Commission to both Countries for peaceful and
expeditious determination of international questions.
2. They also concur in the advisability of selecting
personnel of the Commission from Judges or from persons
presenting judicial status.
3. They consider it impractical to select Federal Judges
as in all Federal Courts work is greatly in arrears.
Moreover, the constitution forbids any additional
remuneration to Federal Judges.
4. They believe that retired State Judges of education
could be secured, whose status would assure judicial
 
49. Decimal File 1910-29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6602, 711.42155/340%, Memorandum for Mr. Lansing to take
with him to Europe, Nov. 21, 1918.
50. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 20, Letter from Magrath to
Borden, Nov. 30, 1918. ‘ '
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determination of all questions submitted to the
Commission.
5. President is to confer with Lansing and has
promised he will take up the questions immediately
after his return to the United States . . .
Meantime there are two possible alternatives for
Canada either to make an immediate appointment and
defer reconstruction of Commission until after
President's return or to reconstitute immediately,
selecting one Supreme Court Judge preferably Duff,
one Ontario Judge and one Quebec Judge. I favour
latter course but I think we should follow example
of United States by appointing Counsel of high
standing who should reside in Ottawa and devote
himself unreservedly to protection of Canadian
interests in all matters coming before the
Commissbn.5l
White reported that Council felt that an appointment should
be
made immediately and suggested that the practice of jud
icial
appointments might be adopted later.52 In this Borden
con—
curred but insisted that the Commission must be gi
ven a
judicial character and hence a judge should
be appointed and,
noting that since representation from Quebec
must be considered,
suggested that a temporary appointment migh
t be made from that
province.
Action on appointments was also being
urged in the
United States. Acting Secretary Polk
cabled Lansing in Paris
informing him that Glenn had not atte
nded the Commission
meetings and that Tawney reported t
he Commission unable to
function and under heavy criticism
in both countries because
of this, causing a loss of prest
ige due to the fact that the
United States Government show
ed so little interest in the
Commission.
As the International Joint C
ommission is really an
experiment in a standing tr
ibunal for the settlement
51. Borden Papers, vol. 9
7, O.C. 489, Memorandum f
rom Borden
(in Paris) to White, Jan.
24, 1919.
52. Borden Papers, vol. 97,
O.C. 489, Telegram from Whi
te to
Borden (Paris), Feb. 4, 1919
.
53. Borden Papers, vol. 97
, O.C. 489, Telegram from
Borden
(Paris) to White, Feb. 7, 19
19.
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of differences between the two neighboring countries,
it would seem unfortunate if the experiment should
fail merely by reason of lack of confidence on (sic)
the people of the two countries in its ability to
handle the questions before it satisfactorily and with
due regard for the interest of the countries concerned.54
Lansing regretted the situation but pointed out that the Presi—
dent was too preoccupied with the peace negotiations to give
time and thought to the Commission. In view of the recent
discussions with Borden in which he had advanced the case for
appointment of judges rather than lawyers, Lansing suggested,
there could be no immediate action on appointments. "Such
a reorganization of the commission will have to be very
carefully considered."55
The situation in the United States section became
critical with the sudden death of Tawney on June 12,56 reducing
the effective membership of the section to one and, precipitating
action by the President which he might not have otherwise taken
if he had had the time on his return to Washington to consider
fully the matter of reorganization. His office was immediately
inundated with letters from congressmen and other political
friends urging the appointment of favoured candidates. The
majority of the letters recommended the appointment of former
Senator Clarence Clark of Wyoming who had been defeated by the
Democratic candidate in the past election.57 However, a few
others suggested the appointment be made on the basis of more
substantial considerations. The Secretary of the Interior,
noting the importance of the projected St. Lawrence waterway and
the desirability of it being referred to the Commission for study
and recommendations, requested the President to consider appointing
54. Decimal File 1910-29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6602, 711.42155/352a, Telegram from Polk to Lansing,
Mar. 7, 1919.
55. Decimal File 1910-29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6602, 711.42155/357, Telegram from Lansing to Polk,
Apr. 19, 1919.
56. Decimal File 1910—29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6602, 711.42155/365, Telegram from Gardner to Polk,
June 12, 1919.
57. Decimal File 1910-29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6602, 711.42155/380a, Telegram from Polk to Lansing,
June 26, 1919.
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someone who would be able to comprehend the magnitude and
importance of such a project.58 Both Senator Sheppard and
chairman Gardner, as well as the Engineering Council, urged
the appointment of a qualified engineer who could match the
talents of the Canadian section and provide the scientific
skill necessary on the Commission.59 Senator Sheppard further
suggested that it be someone non-political so that he would not
be subject to removal with a change in administrations.6O
Lansing sought to stave off the pressures by indicating
that he wished to discuss with the President the reorganization
of the Commission when they returned to Washington; that the
proposals made by Borden appealed to him. Consequently, there
could be no consideration of appointments until this had been
done.61 However, the President eventually bowed to th
e insistence
of the petitioners and on July 15 indicated that he had
selected
Clark to fill the vacancy. To his Secretary of the Int
erior he
explained that he felt Clark would be able to deal
with the St.
Lawrence reference.
In Ottawa, the belief continued that a reor
ganization
would be undertaken. Magrath offered to s
ubmit his resignation
to Borden so that he would have a free hand
in reorganizing.
To Lansing, Borden recalled the Paris discu
ssions and the agree-
ment for a need to reconstitute the Comm
ission. He suggested
that he was now ready to act, propo
sing that they might consider
58. Wilson Papers, file IV, case
155, Letter from Secretary F.K.
Lane to Wilson, June 27, 1919.
file IV, case 155, Letter from
Engineering
59. Wilson Papers,
Letter from Gardner to
Council to Wilson, July 3, 1919
;
Wilson, July 12, 1919.
60. Decimal File 1910—29, De
partment of State, National A
rchives,
box 6602, 711.42155/380, Lett
er from Senator M. Sheppard t
o
Polk, June 30, 1919.
61. Decimal File 1910—29, Depart
ment of State, National Archives,
box 6602, 711.42155/367, Tel
egram from Lan51ng to Polk,
June
18, 1919.
62. Wilson Papers,
July 15, 1919.
63. Magrath Papers, vol. 6,
Borden, July 28, 1919.
file IV, case 155, Letter
from Wilson to Lane,
file 20, Letter from Ma
grath to
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an informal agreement to each appoint at least two persons
64 There is no recordof high judicial office and experience.
of a reply to this communication, but in September Borden
replied to Magrath, asking him to remain as chairman and
promising once more to give attention to reorganizing the
Commission.65
The "reorganization" which occurred was not what
Magrath had anticipated. The first change was a proposal by
the government to place the staff of the Canadian section of
the Commission within the provisions and jurisdiction of the
new Civil Service Act. Burpee objected to this on the ground
that the Commission was an international organization.66
Magrath wrote:
When the Commission was being organized early in 1912
the six Commissioners after giving the matter of
organization a great deal of attention concluded that
it would be quite unwise to build up staff in both the
Washington and Ottawa offices, fearing that possibly
such permanent officials might develop a national View-
point which would be detrimental to the purposes for which
the Commission was created . . . . it was therefore decided
that we should keep our respective permanent organizations
as small as possible and employ from time to time such
assistance as we might require for specific problems.
Thus, due to the small number of personnel involved and, because
of the international status of the Commission, it would be most
unwise to have the staff appointed by the Civil Service Commission.
The second step in "reform" was a letter from the Acting
Prime Minister to Magrath informing that the "Government have been
giving serious consideration to the position and work of the
Commission" and the Cabinet was thinking, though it had not yet
 
64. Borden Papers, vol. 97, O.C. 489, Letter from Borden to Lansing
July 29, 1919; Decimal File, 1910—29, Department of State,
National Archives, box 6602, 711.42155/284.
65. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 20, Letter from Borden to
Magrath, Sept. 6, 1919.
66. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-16-2, Memorandum from Burpee to
Committee on the Bill to amend the Civil Service Act.
67. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-16-2, Letter from Magrath to
N.W. Rowell (confidential), Jan. 28, 1920.
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decided, of requiring all members of the Commission to live in
Ottawa and to devote full time to the Commission's work. Meantime
he was requesting the chairman to advise members that they were
to give priority to the work of the Commission, all other
activities to be purely subsidiary.68
Finally, and at the same time, Borden filled the
vacancy on the Canadian section with the appointment of William
Hearst, a lawyer from Toronto and former Conservative premier
of Ontario.69 The only public protest this appointment brought
was from certain Quebec Members of Parliament who argued that
the Commission should have a French—speaking representative
from that province. Borden simply replied that "it is generally
desirable to have a member from Quebec on the Commission."70
In February 1920 Representative Smith of Illinois
introduced a resolution calling for abrogation of the 1909 Treat
y
for the reason that "sufficient disputes are not now arising be—
tween the contracting parties to warrant the continuati
on of the
treaty . . . "71 Although he assured the State De
partment that
his only purpose was to ascertain if the Commission was doi
ng
any work at all,72 the House when considering the e
stimates of
the Commission slashed the appropriation from
$75,000 to $25,000
and provided maximum salaries of thirty—five
hundred dollars
for each of the Commissioners. Although
the original appropriations
were ultimately restored by the S
enate, Congress made it clear that
68. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 22
, Letter from George Foster
to Magrath, Feb. 7, 1920; Canada, D
epartment of External Affairs,
File 35—20, Letter from N. Rowell to M
agrath, Feb. 7, 1920.
69. Decimal File 1910—29, Departmen
t of State, National Archives,
box 6602, 711.42155/391, Note fr
om the British Ambassador to
Lansing, Feb. 6, 1920.
70. Canada, Parliament, House of
Commons Debates, 13th Parliament
,
4th Session, 1920, vol. 4, p.
3986; 5th Session, 1921, vol.
1,
pp. 164; 510.
71. Borden Papers, vol.
Embassy to Foreign Office, Feb. 2
8,
66th Congress, 2d Session, vol.
59,
17, O.C. 82(2), Despatch fr
om British
1920; Congressional Record,
part 3, p. 2790, Feb. 11,
1920.
l
72. Decimal File 1910—29, Departmen
t of
box 6602, 711.42155/404, Memoran
dum
289 to dissolve the IJC, Feb.
1920.
State, National Archives,
re Rep. Smith Resolution
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it, at least, was not satisfied with the personnel of the
Commission or with their work.73 ‘
On May 16, 1920 Glenn died while attending a meeting
of the Commission in Winnipeg,74 and once again the lobbying
commenced for the appointment of particular candidates. Among
the suggestions WEiS one from the Secretary of the Interior
again calling for someone competent to deal with the St.
Lawrence reference and, one from the Engineering Association
recommending the appointment of an engineer.75 However, most
of the pressure was for political patronage appointments.76
D. The Commission 1921—1939
During the 19205 and early 1930s little attention was
paid to the Commission in the United States save for a number
of appointments which were made. It was not until the second
term of Roosevelt that action was taken which led to the basic
reorganization of the United States section. It was rather the
Canadian section which attracted the attention during this
period with an attempt by the new Canadian government to mold
its section in its own political image as had become the
practice in the United States.
Shortly after the election of 1921 brought Mackenzie
King's Liberals into office, pressure was brought on the Prime
 
73. Decimal File 1910—29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6602, 711.42155/393, Correspondence and Memoranda re
Salaries of United States Commissioners, Jan—Mar 1920.
74. Decimal File 1910—29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6602, 711.42155/394, Telegram from Kluttz to State
Department, May 17, 1920.
75. Decimal File 1910-29, Department of State, National Archives,
box 6602, 711.42155/405, Letter from American Association of
Engineers, Denver Chapter, to President, July 30, 1920;
711.42155/398, Telegram from W.H. Bixby to Secretary Colby, May
17, 1920; Wilson Papers, file IV, case 155, Letter from Assistant
Secretary of the Department of the Interior to Wilson, June 16,1920
76. Wilson Papers, file IV, case 155, Letter from ex—Sen. F. Dubois
(Idaho) to Secretary to the President, May 18, 1920.  
 237
Minister to replace all of the Conservative appointees on
the Commission with Liberals and to have at least one member
from Quebec. Accordingly King called Magrath in and after
discussing the relationship between the Commission and the
governments, told the chairman that his government wanted
the resignations of the commissioners although he suggested
that he would not accept Magrath's.77
Magrath promptly submitted his resignation, noting
that he did not approve of the practice of removing commissioners
with each change of administration.78 King did not appreciate
this position, feeling that Canada's representation on the
Commission must be a matter of government policy.79
The other commissioners were not so cooperative. Both
refused after meeting with the chairman to submit their resig—
nations on grounds that King had neither the right nor the legal
power to dismiss them.80 In letters to the Prime Minister
and
the chairman, Hearst pointed out the dangers he felt to be
inherent
in the position taken by King that there must be a conf
idential
political relationship between the Commission and t
he government.
Such a relationship would completely destroy
public confidence
in the body. And changing the commissioners
with each new govern—
ment would deprive the Commission of its mo
st valuable character—
. 81
istic: its continuity and permanency of m
embership.
The press was divided over the situation.
Most papers
felt that in principle, there should be
no wholesale changes with
.77. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 20,
Memorandum of Meeting, Jan.
27, 1922 between King and Magrath, Feb.
3, 1922.
78. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 20
, Letter from Magrath to King,
Jan. 28, 1922; King Papers, vol. 78, No. 657
72.
79. King Papers, vol. 78, No. 6577
3, Letter from King to Magrath,
Jan. 31, 1922.
80. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, fi
le 20, Memorandum of Meeting of
CommiSsioners with Prime Ministe
r, Feb. 8, 1922.
' from Hearst t
o
81. Magrath Pa ers, vol. 6,
file 20, Letter .
Magrath, ng. 20, 1922; Letter
from Hearst to King Feb.
25, 1922.
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each new government. On the other hand, many supported the
idea of one member being from Quebec and urged the removal of
Powell to accomplish this.82
Although the Prime Minister was not certain enough
of his legal rights to move quickly on the matter, the fear
of the Commission becoming little more than a haven for retired
politicians on both sides caused a degree of despondency among
its supporters. However, it also spurred a renewed campaign
to give the body vigour and respect. In a letter from Magrath
to Townsend the Canadian chairman suggested that the Commission
would never be respected as long as it was considered solely
as a place for patronage appointments -— and it would not
attract the best men unless there was a degree of permanency
in the position.83 To the Prime Minister he said the same thing,
84urging that the Commission be given more work. The Monitor
also condemned the practice of political appointments.
The tendency of national leaders, both in Washington
and Ottawa, to regard the responsible positions on the
International Joint Commission as suitable rewards for
unsuccessful candidates in party politics is hardly
calculated to lead the public to hold the Commission
in that high esteem which should be accorded to such a
judicial body. A move should be made to give the
International Joint Commission something like the status
of the Supreme Court. . . 85
A speech by Secretary of State C.E. Hughes to the
Canadian Bar Association in 1923 advocating the establishment of
a body like the International Joint Commission to deal with all
matters of difference between the two countries86 was immediately
82. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 20, Toronto Star, Jan. 31, 1922;
Toronto Star, Feb. 3, 1922; Ottawa Citizen, Feb. 8, 1922;
Boston Transcript, Feb. 11, 1922.
83.Magrath Papers, vol. 5, file 19, Letter from Magrath to C.E.
Townsend (personal), June 14, 1923.
84. King Papers, vol. 90, No. 76363-76367, Letter from Magrath to
King, June 9, 1923.
85. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-16, Christian Science Monitor,
June 23, 1925.
86. Hughes, Charles Evans The Pathway t9 Peace: Addresses 1921—1925
New York, Harper, 1925, pp. 3-19, "The Pathway to Peace",
Address to the Canadian Bar Association, Montreal, Sept. 4,1923.  
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taken as a slight by the supporters of the Commission and was
roundly attacked. Magrath noted pointedly that the Commission
was already capable of dealing with all matters which might
arise if anyone were interested in using it.
by his press allies.88
87 He was supported
Burpee came forth with his strongest
plea for recognition of the value of the Commission.
It has, or should have, got beyond the experi-
mental period. It has in very truth reached the
critical stage, where experiments, whether national or
international, must of necessity be either accepted
as sound policies or rejected as failures. It rests with
the people of these two countries, through their govern—
ments, to decide the issue. It rests with them either
to drop the Commission, as something that has been tried
and found wanting, or to accept it as an international
agency whose usefulness has been clearly established.
But mere acceptance is not enough. This tribunal, like
any other human institution, cannot stand still. It must
go forward or backward. If the people and their govern-
ments are convinced that the Commission fills a real need
in the life of these two nations, they are morally and
logically bound to see that it does go forward; to remove
all objects that may lie in its way of greater usefulness;
to build it up into an instrument of such unquestionable
value that it may well serve as an example to the other
nations of the civilized world.
It is perhaps too much to hope that the growth of a wide-
spread sentiment of confidence in and respect for this
international tribunal can be anything more than a very
gradual process. The idea of such an institution is
still apparently a novel one to the eople of both the
United States and Canada . and thej] have not yet
.
grasped the fact that they now possess a really ef
fective
means of settling their differences, a means that 1
8 as
much ahead of the old methods as the automobile
is an
improvement on the stage—coach.
. . . T here is no getting away from the fact
that the
Treaty of 1909 and the International J01nt
Comm1551on
87.
88.
5, file 19, Letter and Memorandum
re
int Commission from Magrath to Kin
g,
76381-76385.
Magrath Papers, vol.
the International Jo
Sept. 18, 1923; King Papers, vol. 9
0, No.
I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—16, Ottaw
a Citizen, Sept. 29, 1923;
Lethbridge Herald, Sept. 15, 1923.
   
  
   
     
    
  
   
   
 
 ﬁ+7
240
will not and cannot realize thetremendous possibilities
of good that lie within them, until the people of these
two neighbouring democracies determine to give them
their intelligent and whole-hearted support.89
Under pressure once again from his party to remove the
Conservative commissioners, King instructed his Under Secretary
of State to obtain from London assurances that any changes which
he recommended in the Commission personnel would be granted without
question by the British Government.90 Pope obtained this assurance
and informed the Prime Minister that all he had to do was to nomin—
ate new commissioners.91 But still King delayed any action in the
matter, simply assuring the questioners in the House that the
government had the matter under consideration.92
In 1925, Magrath accepted an appointment by the govern—
ment of Ontario as chairman of the Ontario Hydro—Electric Commission
and he promptly submitted his resignation to King, noting however,
that he believed that he could handle both jobs. Rather than taking
this opportunity to appoint a chairman of his own choosing, King
asked Magrath to remain on as chairman in addition to his new
duties.93 Magrath agreed to remain for a time but, upon hearing
the rumours that both governments were contemplating the abolition
of the Commission in light of the establishment of formal diplomatic
relations between the two countries, he announced that he was
definitely leaving the Commission and requested the Prime Minister
to appoint a Successor. To Clark of the American section he
expressed his dismay at the new proposal.
 
89. L.J. Burpee, "An International Experiment", Papers Relating
to the Work of the International Joint Commission, 1929, pp.
48—62
90. Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 1514—40, Memorandum
from King to Pope, Jan. 26, 1924.
91. Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 1514-40, Memorandum
from Pope to King, Jan. 29, 1924; Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file
20, Despatch from Lord Byng to Colonial Secretary, Feb. 19, 1924,
Despatch from Colonial Secretary to Lord Byng, Apr. 26, 1924.
92. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, 14th Parliament,
3d Session, vol; 1, p. 324, Mar. 14, 1924; vol. 2, p. 1955,
May 12, 1924. '
93. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 20, Letter from Magrath to O.D.
Skelton, Oct. 6, 1925; King Papers, vol. 119, No. 101550-
101551.  
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I am sure upon reflection, especially in View of the
results of our work as a Commission, you fully realize
that no agency could be as useful in settling differences
as the International Joint Commission.
There will always be a political complexion in approach—
ing problems by the accredited representatives of one
country when coming in contact with members of the
Governments to which he is accredited. Furthermore
they will not have the same patience in dealing with
the problem as a permanent organization like the
Commission.
I am aware that it has taken us some time to deal with
some of the issues that were before us, but is it not
better that that should be done in order to find a
solution more or less satisfactory to both Countries?94
Loring Christie, an officer of the Department, expressed
his opposition to such a move in a lengthy letter to the
Under Secretary.
94.
For myself I feel without any hesitation or reservation
whatever that in the realm of State machinery Canada
has no more vital interest than the insurance of the
full integrity of the system created by the Treaty of
1909; I do not except any aspect of our external
relations; and I think Canadian Governments should
never fail to measure the thing in this sense whene
ver
a decision affecting it is required.
The International Joint Commission is vital t
o facili-
tating our relations with the United States
. In pro-
viding a set of general principles, an i
ndependent
tribunal and a growing body of practi
ce and habit,
to which an important class of specific que
stions
arising from time to time can be delegate
d With a
fair assurance that they will be determ
ined With
something of the certainty that munic
ipal courts
achieve in their sphere, the syst
em has clearly shown
an advance over the precarious meth
od of sporadic inter—
governmental negotiations.
preserve the system at full
ed in the least degree by r
eason
f our Legation at Washingto
n.
Our vital necessity to
strength is not lessen
of the establishment o
ile 19, Letter from Magra
th to
M ath Pa ers vol. 5 f
agr p ' ' 1927.C.D. Clark (personal), Mar. 19,
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A diplomatist is simply an agent; his establishment
no more than a convenient extension abroad of the
departmental machine at home; his job more to bargain
on the lay of cards at the moment than to administer
a set of rules and build an ordered regime . . .
Our own Treaty of 1909 system can handle certain
problems which diplomacy is physically incapable of
handling . . . . The publicity attending the Legation
is inevitable but let us hope that "public opinion"
will not be so naive as to imagine that, having thus
gone into an old game, it is somehow relieved from
worrying about the new 1909 achievement.
Christie pointed out that practically Canada would always bear
the burden of preserving the system because it meant more to
the small nation than it did to the big. Consequently, Canada
should always make appointments of the highest caliber and urge
the United States to do likewise. The Commission served too
important a need for the governments to do otherwise.
The institutional basis thus created is the only one
on which civil relations of any stability or permanency
between the two sovereignties on this continent are
conceivable, and nothing can be more important than to
preserve this or forestall any assault upon it'. . . .
To let it down would really mean that instead of having
a set of principles, a growing body of reasoned practice
with the sanﬁion of habit, we would be relegated wholly
to a mere conception of "comity" 4— a conception which
historically and indeed, given the nature of "sovereignty",
inevitably contemplates in its natural order such practices
as retaliation and the like.
Christie concluded by observing that the attitudes of the two
governments in recent years towards the Commission were certainly
not designed to enhance its status and consequently to be decried.
Much more use should be made of the body.95
Partly perhaps as a consequence of this case made for
the Commission by Christie, any idea of abolishing it in favour
of diplomatic action was abandoned by the governments. Instead,
King again demanded the resignations of Powell and Hearst,
threatening removal if they did not comply with his request,96
 
95. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 20, Letter from Loring Christie
to O.D. Skelton (private), July 12, 1927.
96. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 20, Memorandum for Magrath's
Diary, Feb. 24, 1928.  
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and asked Magrath to resign from Ontario Hydro so that he could
return to full—time chairmanship of the Commission to revitalize
it.97
While Hearst again ignored the threat, Powell relented
and submitted his resignation. He was replaced immediately in
July 1928 by the appointment of George W. Kyte, a lawyer from
Nova Scotia and a former Liberal Member of Parliament. Magrath
was reluctant to leave his work with the Hydro Commission but
did agree to remain as chairman of the International Joint
Commission concurrently with his other duties.98 Thus the
Commission still looked very much like it had when King originally
announced his intention to change it.
The advent of the Conservative Government under Bennett
in 1930 caused no changes in the personnel of the Canadian section.
Neither did it bring about an improved relationship between the
government and the Commission. The slash in the commissio
ners'
salaries as a part of the economy move of 1932 was viewed with
suspicion by the commissioners, Hearst feeling tha
t they should
 
be treated the same as judges who had not had their
salaries
reduced. Magrath agreed but indicated that he w
ould accept the
cut without protest.
’ Magrath's pride in the
Commission but dismay with
the lack of respect for it by the gove
rnment was summed up in
a letter to Percy Corbett of McGill
Law School in 1932.
.[ths soundness rests on the equa
l representation
by the two countries and upon
its permanency. The weak?
ness of the old system lay in th
e creation or a Commission
for each special issue, in which
more attention was paid
to the umpire's casting vote th
an in setting out to find
%
a solution that would be re
asonably fair to the countri
es .
involved, as is necessary und
er the International JOint
Commission, if an agreement
is to be reached. The
97. Magrath Papers, vol. 6,
file 20, Letter from Skelton
to
Magrath (personal and Canide
ntial), Mar. 3, 1928.
98. Magrath Papers, vol. 6, f
ile 20, Memorandum re Internat
ional g
Joint Commission, prepared by
Magrath, Mariggé 1928; Letter
.1
from Magrath to King (personal), A
pr. 14, -
Q
Hearst Papers, General
File, Jan.— 1
W
ath, Feb. 16, 1932;
pp99. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File,
Dec. 1932 Letter from He
arst to Magr
W
Letter from Magrath to Hearst,
Feb. 17, 1932-
& 
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sucCess of the Commission depends on the care that
both countries exercise in finding representatives
with national reputations for integrity, and also
upon a determination on the part of both countries
to build up the organization in the mind of the
public as a great piece of international machinery,
so that once an agreement is reached, that decision
will largely receive the support of the people. For
maximum results prestige is as necessary as authority.
In his opinion, the Canadian Government had always been careful
to avoid political influence on the Commission but, it had
carried the policy of non-interference too far, leaving the
"100 In
Commission with "no place in the machinery of State.
other words, the Canadian Government ignored the Commission
completely.
Magrath maintained this attitude through the balance of
the Bennett administration and when, on his re—election in 1935
King suggested that Hearst should resign to make way for the
appointment of Charles Stewart, former Liberal premier of Alberta
and more recently, defeated minister in the King Cabinet, Magrath
was irate and submitted his own resignation to King. It was
accepted this time and, on January 20, 1936 Charles Stewart
became a commissioner and was made chairman, replacing Magrath.lOl
Stewart had not long been chairman when he began to
have the same feeling of isolation of which Magrath complained.
To the Prime Minister he suggested several matters which he felt
should be referred immediately to the Commission, among them
the salmon fisheries problem on the west coast.102 From the
Prime Minister he received the same assurances that had been
given to Magrath;
I think there is a great deal to be said for utilizing
the International Joint Commission for inquiries into
questions of joint interest to the United States and
Canada, other than those boundary water questions which
are their primary concern. The wider the work of the
 
100. Magrath Papers, vol. 5, file 18A, letter from Magrath to
P.E. Corbett (private), Dec. 19, 1932.
101. Magrath Papers, v01. 6, file 20, Letter from Magrath to
Dr. W.H. Smith, Nov. 15, 1935; Memorandum re Retirement
from the IJC, Dec. 30, 1935.
102. King Papers, unnumbered, Charles Stewart to King, Aug. 25,
1937.
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Commission, within the general field of joint
factual issues, the more likely is its prestige
to be increased and its authority strengthened.
To this Skelton added:
I think there is a good deal to be said on general
principles for giving the Commission more work and to
appoint Commissioners who would be prepared to do more
work 103 '
Stewart did not stop there however. He proceeded to
talk with Chairman Stanley of the United States section and
then called upon the President urging greater and better things
for the Commission. He also discussed certain possible refer—
ences with the provincial officials. From the Canadian
Government the reaction was annoyance.
The International Joint Commission is fundamentally
a judicial tribunal acting as an arbitral body, and
as a mediator between the governmental agencies in
Canada and the United States. Its usefulness depends
upon its preserving its position as a dignified
international organization. I should be the last
to want to see it develop into a legalistic court.
On the other hand, there is a middle ground between
the legalistic conception of a court and an admini-
strative agency.
. . . It has never been considered to be the business
of the International Joint Commission to participate
in any way in the negotiations ending with a reference
to the tribunal for the purposes of deciding the issue
in question between the two Governments.
The memorandum concluded that the chairmen were overstepping
etheir authority and propriety in soliciting business for th105
Commission. It was embarrassing to the senior governments
.
From the United States Government,
the reaction was a
proposal and subsequently, a decision to
reorganize the United
States section of the Commission to provide
for more effective
and efficient functioning of the body. Cana
da did not feel
193. King Papers, unnumbered, King to Stewart, Sept.
2' 1937-
104. King Papers, unnumbered, Letter from
Stewart to King,
Sept. 8, 1937.
105. Canada, Department of Externa
l Aff
Memorandum from John E. Read, Leg
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Secretary, Dec. 29, 1939.
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that the change was in the best interests of the Commission.
But to consider first the changes that had occurred in the
United States section up to that point.
When the vacancy in the United States section caused
by the death of Glenn was filled in 1921 just before Wilson left
office, it was with the appointment of Marcus A. Smith, a lawyer
and former Senator from Arizona, having been defeated in the 1920
elections. At the same time, Wilson demanded the resignation of
Gardner which was submitted, over protest, on February 28. On
March 4 Wilson named his outgoing Secretary of Labor, W.B. Wilson
to the position.106 This appointment was short—lived. Gardner
enlisted the aid of his former Senate colleagues, importuned
President Harding to reappoint him, and suggested to the Canadian
chairman that "if someone in Canada should enter a mild protest
against State Department having two new members placed on the
Commission at this juncture, it would be very effective in results
."107 .Magrath declined the invitation but Gardner succeeded
without the intervention.108 On March 21 Wilson submitted his
resignation to Harding and two days later Gardner was reappointed
and named chairman.109
Two years later Gardner was asked to resign again and
Clark was designated chairman. The vacancy caused by Gardner's
removal was filled by Charles E. Townsend, a former Republican
Senator from Michigan defeated in the 1922 elections. In April
1924 Smith died, leaving another vacancy to be filled. This had
no sooner been accomplished in July with the appointment of former
Republican Senator from Idaho, Fred T. Dubois, when Townsend died
in August. A year later in June 1925 President Coolidge named
P.J. McCumber, a former Republican Senator from North Dakota
106. Wilson Papers, file IV, case 155, Memorandum of President,
Mar. 3, 1921.
107. Magrath Papers, vol. 5, file 19, Letter from Gardner to
Magrath, Mar. 7, 1921.
108. Magrath Papers, vol. 5, file 19, Letter from Magrath to
Gardner, Mar. 16, 1921.
109. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—16, see generally for appoint-
ments of personnel.
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to the vacancy.110
During this whole period the Commission was largely
ignored in Congress. Appropriations were passed each year and,
only in 1927 did one of the members of the House move that the
Commissioners be put on a per diem allowance since there was
"practically no work for them to do."111
President Hoover on assuming office took immediate
steps to remove the incumbent chairman, C.D. Clark. Besides
believing the chairman's health to be such as to preclude him
from engaging in the "important negotiations which are likely
to be designated to the International Joint Commission", the
President observed that the part of the country east of the
Mississippi was unrepresented on the Commission and "[ilhese
areas are pressing strongly that they should be represented,
especially in View of the problems that are likely to arise."112
To replace Clark, Hoover named John H. Bartlett, one-time
Governor of New Hampshire and later assistant Postmaster General
until his appointment to the Commission. Bartlett assumed the
. . l
chairmanship immediately.1 3
In February 1930 the Democratic member of the Commission,
F.T. Dubois died and, in May another Democrat was named by Hoover
to replace him. On the recommendation of Secretary of State
Stimson, A.O. Stanley, former Senator from Kentucky was appointed 14
and, with the resignation of Bartlett in 1933, he became chairman,
a position which he occupied until 1954.
In 1931, an interesting incident occurred. Chairman
Bartlett decided to contest a House district in his home state
110. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-l6, see generally for appointments
of personnel.
111. Congressional Record, 69th Congress, 2d Session, 1926
-27ér
vol. 68, part 3, pp. 2378-2379. See too, 1926-27,
vol. 6,
part 3; 1927—28, vol. 69, part 1; 1929-30, vol. 73, part
5.
112. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File 3-16, Letter from Hoover to C
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Apr. 30, 1929.
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in the 1932 elections. He was defeated and resumed his duties
as chairman of the Commission.115 The situation was roundly
ll6criticised by the Canadian chairman.
This incident was followed by the introduction in
Congress of the President's economy legislation and the House
took this opportunity to question again the value of the
Commission. It was proposed that instead of simply reducing
the salaries of the commissioners from $10,000 to $3000 (they
had been increased by Presidential order in 1930 from $7,500),
the House instruct the President to terminate the Commission.
When the chairman of the Appropriations Committee was asked
if the Commission really had any work to do he replied:
. There are some questions pending before them of
importance. I have felt that so long as the commission
continues there is always this danger. Parties who are
interested in building power dams will make it a point
to bring pressure on the two governments to refer such
questions to the commission when, in fact, there is no
real public need for the matters to be so referred.
Personally, I think when they shall have completed the
inquiries that are now before them there is no pressing
reason why the commission should be continued.
The Canadians were hopeful that the President would
strengthen rather than abolish the Commission.118 The United States
commissioners were opposed to the fifty percent reduction in
salary when all others in the federal service were receiving
only an eleven percent reduction. Said the chairman:
Iva The actual truth is that all three of us are compelled
‘L. : by our duties to live in Washington and are in attendance
here every day. The work of the Commission was never so
i _ llS. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-l6, Christian Science Monitor,
i ‘W‘ Jan. 8, 1932. Note: Although there is no record of his
resignation or reappointment, the State Department files
suggest this occurred.
ll6. Magrath Papers, vol. 5, file 18A, Letter from Magrath to
P.E. Corbett (private), Dec. 19, 1932.
117. Congressional Record, 72d Congress, 2d Session, 1932-33
vol. 76, part 3, pp. 2619-2620, Feb. 20, 1932.
118. Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 1514—40,
Letter from Wrong, Canadian Legation, Washington to
Skelton, Mar. 28, 1932; Letter from Skelton to Wrong,
Apr. 4, 1932.
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was never so extensive as it is now and is constantly
growing. The relation of the two sections is fine
and it would seem to us to be unwise to give it a
special black eye at this time.119
The government and Congress were unsympathetic and the salaries
120 The following
year they were subjected to a further fifteen percent reduction121
were slashed on July 1, 1932 to $5,000 per annum.
where they remained until 1937 when they were restored to $7,500
per annum.
With the election of Franklin Roosevelt there was the
expectation in some quarters that considerable improvements would
be made in the Commission. Such were the hopes of the contributing
editor of the Monitor who felt that Hoover had done little to
improve the quality of the personnel of the Commission.
. . The Commission in the past has done enough to
indicate how much it might do if instead of being
manned by lame ducks of-purely political appointees,
it was composed of men of vision and able to com—
prehend what the commission might be made as an
illustration of the possibilities of international
cooperation.122
Roosevelt's first move was to have Stanley replace
Bartlett as chairman of the section.123 Ignoring pleas from
Gardner for reappointment,124 he requested the State Department
to advise him on proposals for change in the Commission.
The memorandum prepared for the Under Secretary des-
cribed the Commission as basically an international fact-finder
119. Decimal File 1930-39, Department of State, National Archive
s,
711.42152/356, Letter from Bartlett to Assis
tant Secretary
Carr, Apr. 30, 1932.
120. Decimal File 1930—39, Department of State, Nationa
l Archives,
711.42152/362A, Letter from Assistant Secret
ary Carr to
McCumber, July 1, 1932.
121. Decimal File 1930—39, Department of State,
National Archives,
711.42152/371, Letter from Carr to Stan
ley, Apr. 12, 1933.
Department of State, National Archive
s,
122. Decimal File 1930-39, cretary
711.42152/376, Letter from W.J.
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I
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operating under Articles VIII and IX. As for Article X
 
it might be used some day and hence
. . it would be helpful to have as our representatives
on the Commission men of sufficiently high caliber that
the United States could without hesitation make use of
this very important provision . . .
The Department has never been fully satisfied with the
personnel of the American section of the Commission.
To enable the Commission to deal effectively with the
scientific and legal questions referred to it, it is
believed that the American section should include: a
competent engineer familiar with water power and navi—
gation problems, a lawyer with wide experience in
international negotiations, and an able lawyer exper—
ienced in the conduct of judicial proceedings. The
appointment of able men in the vigor of life is highly
desirable, with a View to have the Government receive
the benefit of their services for a number of years
after they have become familiar with the nature of
the work. 'The Chairman of the Canadian section, Mr.
Charles A. Magrath, is an engineer and has been a
member of the Commission since 1912. The other two
Canadian members, Sir William Hearst and Mr. Kyte are
able lawyers.12
The Under Secretary forwarded this memorandum to the
President with the following recommendation.
The standing of the American Section of the International
Joint Commission is, in my opinion, a matter of extreme
importance and I very much hope that everything possible
‘, can be done to give it the dignity and prestige to which
{WV it is entitled under the Root—Bryce Treaty of 1909.
Without adequate personnel, the Commission cannot
properly perform its functions.
The death of McCumber a month later gave the President
...
;
a
.
his first opportunity to reorganize the United States section.
Despite the urgings of the American Engineering Council for the
V appointment of an engineer,127 Roosevelt named Eugene Lorton, a
Sﬁiftﬂz newspaper publisher and party supporter from Oklahoma as new
E‘ V“ commissioner on June 5.
125. Decimal File 1930-39, Department of State, National Archives,
711.42152/376, Memorandum from J.D. Hickerson, Western
European Div. to Phillips, Mar. 31, 1933.
126. Decimal File 1930-39, Department of State, National Archives,
711.42152/376, Note from Phillips to Roosevelt, Apr. 3, 1933.
127. Decimal File 1930—39, Department of State, National Archives,
711.42152/384 & 385, Letters from American Engineering
Council to Hull and Roosevelt, May 29, 1933.  
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With the vital matters that faced Roosevelt during
this period he had no time to concern himself with the problems
of the Commission. To the several Senators who were urging
the need for reform, Secretary Hull could only reply that
several propOsals had gone to the President but he had not
given his approval to changes in the present set—up. The
Secretary could take the initiative only with the prior approval
of the President.128
Meanwhile the Commission existed with little to engage
its time. Lorton was becoming disillusioned and went so far as
to suggest to the President certain matters which should be
referred.129 Hearst was doubtful that this was the proper
approach for the Commission to obtain attention and respect.130
Burpee felt the best way was to publicize the Commission through
articles and statements of the heads of governments.131 The
State Department thought it would take more than publicity to
bring the Commission back to life. Indeed, the legal adviser
thought it undesirable to issue statements designed to propa-
gandize the Commission. Appreciation of it must come from its
accomplishments; these were not particularly great and the
132
Commission 5 work should not be overrated.
Nor was the President moved by the pleas of his
Minister in Ottawa and of an eminent Harvard pr
ofessor. The
128. Decimal File 1930-39, Department of Sta
te, National Archives,
711.42152/406a, Letter from Hull to Senator M.
Sheppard,
May 12, 1934.
129. Decimal File 1930-39,
711.42152/484é, Letter from Lorton to Roos
evelt, June
' 1 File Jan.130, I.J.C. Can. Sect. File, Hearst Pa
pers, Genera , .
l934-Sept. 1935, Letter from Magra
th to Hearst, May 15, 1935,
Letter from Hearst to Magrath,
May 16, 1935. ‘
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Minister, learning that some of the United States memberswere engaging in the political campaign of 1936, suggestedthat the President should be approached
. urging removal of the Commission frompolitics and to have our members appointed forlife, more or less along the lines of the SupremeCourt. This would not only improve the caliberof the Commission, but would probably result inboth Governments referring to the Commissionmatters of more importance. As it is now (Ibelieve I am correct) we hesitate to refer to theCommission questions of prime importance on accountof the uncertainty as to the membership of theCommission, particularly of our own section.l33
The Under Secretary agreed but noted that he had been tryingfor several years to bring about the desired changes.134
Professor W.Y. Elliot of Harvard saw the malaiseof the Commission as symptomatic of the lack of interest bythe United States in Canadian problems generally. Due tothis attitude by President Roosevelt, he wrote, the Commission"threatens to lapse into innocuous desuetude after days ofgreat usefulness."135
Nothing further transpired until 1939 when the
President decided the time had come to act in relation to theCommission. The legal adviser originated a plan of reorganizationbased upon his intimate knowledge of the Commission. Because,it was his impression, the Commission was not very active, therewas no reason why the commissioners' positions might not befilled by regular officials of the government without additionalcompensation being needed. While the officials so designatedshould not all come from the State Department, ("this might,
 
133. Decimal File 1930—39, Department of State, National Archives,711.42152/484, Letter from N. Armour to Wm. Phillips(strictly confidential), June 18, 1936.
134. Decimal File 1930-39, Department of State, National Archives,711.42152/484, Letter from Phillips to Armour, U.S.Legation, Ottawa, June 22, 1936.
135. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-16, Letter from Elliot to Burpee,Oct. 28, 1936; W.Y. Elliot, "Neighboring Up to Canada",Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 29, 1936.
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in the eyes of the Canadian Government, tend to deprive the
Commission of an attitude of impartiality") there was no
objection to the chairman being the counselor of the
Department. The others might be an Army engineer and an
assistant Attorney General. Since such a move would provide
considerable savings to the government,
. . .[£}he only drawback to such an arrangement that
I now think of is the fact that there might arise a
possible feeling on the part of Canada of a waning
interest on our part in the Commission and its work.
I am inclined to think, however, that such a change,
if competent people were selected as Commissioners,
would in fact strengthen the Commission.136
 
Hackworth's proposal was greeted with general favour
by the Department. Most agreed that such a move would re—
vitalize the Commission.
. . . [Wje have never had a satisfactory type of
Commissioner on the International Joint Commission.
Moreover . . . the Canadian personnel has usually
been of a somewhat higher level of ability than ours,
although the present disparity is considerably less
than it has been in the past. Both Governments have
adopted the unfortunate habit of appointing to the
Commission politicians who either failed of re—
election to Congress or Parliament or for some
reason did not fit into their former political jobs.
. For a number of years all three of our Commissioners
’ were former Senators, and at the present time we have
one former Senator on the Commission . . .
The only doubt was that the Canadians would find the plan
objectionable.
. . The Canadians might take the position that by
following this procedure the two Governments have set
up a sort of buffer organization not so directly.
influenced by the point of View of their respective
Governments as would be the Case should either or both
Governments appoint regular governmental employees to
represent them.
 
l36.Decimal File 1930—39, Department of State, National Archives,
711.42152/527, Memorandum from Green H. Hackworth to Hull,
May 1, 1939.
l37.Decimal File 1930—39, Department of State, National Archive
s,
711.42152/524, Memorandum from Phillips to Hickers
on, May S,
1939; 711.42152/525, Memorandum from Hickerso
n to Messersmith .
(personal and strictly confidential), May 12
, 1939. ‘
 
 
    
254
While it was felt that the result of such a change could
only make for a stronger and more active Commission, an
alternative to be considered if the Canadians objected
might be to place the Commissioners on a per diem basis,
remove the present members and appoint in their stead an
outstanding international lawyer, a distinguished civil
engineer and a public citizen from the business world.138
The Secretary was asked by the President to approach the
Canadian Government informally to ascertain its feelimﬁsin
the matter.139
While the Commission had had little to do in recent
years-and seldom received an "important" case, the Secretary
observed, it must nevertheless not be overlooked that it was
important to have a body capable of dealing with difficult
and highly technical questions. With this in mind the President
had decided to undertake "certain changes in the present per—
sonnel of the American Section of the Commission."
It is the President's opinion that the work of the
Commission could best be carried out by a body of
experts. In attempting to appoint such people from
private walks of life, one immediately encounters
the difficulty that appointment to the Commission is
not sufficiently attractive from the standpoint of
public service or personal honor to entice the desired
people to take the positions. The President is con-
sidering, therefore, supplanting the American Com-
missioners on the International Joint Commission by
high ranking Government officials who would receive
no extra compensation for their work on the Commission
other than per diem and necessary travelling expenses
during hearings. It is felt that the Counselor of
the Department should be the Chairman of the American
Section and that the other two places might well be
filled by an Army engineer and an Assistant Attorney
General. Under normal circumstances it is believed
that these officials will be able to carry out the
work of the Commission in addition to their present
 
138.Decimal File 1930—39, Department of State, National Archives,
711.42152/525, Memorandum from Hickerson to Messersmith
(personal and strictly confidential), May 12, 1939.
l39.Decimal File 1930-39, Department of State, National Archives,
711.42152/526, Memorandum from Messersmith to Hackworth,
(strictly confidential), May 18, 1939.
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duties. In the event that important cases requiring
extended hearings should arise, however, it is
intended that the officials in question will be
relieved of their present duties for such periods
of time as may be necessary.
The Secretary requested the Minister in Ottawa to take the
matter up with the Prime Minister personally to ascertain if
the Canadian Government would be willing to undertake a similar
change or, if not, if they would object seriously to the pro-
posed change in the United States section.140
Roper reported promptly on the attitude of the
Canadian Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister, after giving careful attention to
these tentative proposals, said that in the first place
he had the highest regard for the importance of the
International Joint Commission as an outstanding organization
and as having an importance in international affairs which
was increasingly regarded as symbolic of what nations with
good will toward each other might accomplish in th
e way of
machinery for settling their disputes. He said tha
t he
could think of no one organization on our whole
continent
which was so important in this respect.
Mr. King said that he considered it highly importan
t to
have an efficient and trained personnel to re
present Canada
on this important Commission. He said that one
element of
importance in choosing its membership was, i
n his mind,
that of stability and relative permanence o
f tenure of
office. with this in mind, he said tha
t the Canadian
Commissioners had been very carefully
picked, that one
of its members was a former Provinc
ial Prime Minister,
and that there was in the minds o
f the present three
Commissioners a kind of indefinite
, though clearly
recognized understanding that in th
e normal course of
events their tenure of office wo
uld not be disturbed by
political changes throughout the
course of the years.
In these circumstances, it w
as his immediate reaction '
that the Canadian Government
would not be likely to dec1de
on any sudden change in
the personnel of its thre
e
Commissioners; that in the
event that it was dec1ded t
o
replace them by technical e
xperts of the Government, h
e
felt that such changes woul
d be made only gradually an
d
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singly, after termination of the services of any one
of the members in the normal course of events.
As to the advisability of having Government experts
as opposed to permanent people chosen from private
life, Mr. King said that there were strong arguments
on both sides of this question, but he felt that the
Canadian Government would not wish to lose sight of
the independence of position which might be enhanced
and contained by the non-Governmental composition of
the Commission.
The report concluded by noting that while the Prime Minister
wished to consult with his Cabinet colleagues before giving
any commitment as to the nature of the appointees, he could
assure the Minister that the Government had no objection
whatever to the United States' plans for reconstituting its
section.141 .
The President decided to move almost immediately with_
the changes, but would make them one at a time. The Under
Secretary advised him to appoint an Army engineer first, an
Assistant Attorney General second and the new chairman from
 
the State Department (the counselor) last. He also suggested
the order for removal of the present members of the Commission.142
The President wondered if someone from the Federal Power Com-
mission rather than from the Army Engineers might be more appro-
priate. Likewise, would not a legal counsel from the Interior
Department or Federal Power Commission be preferable to one
from Justice?143
At this point a further report from the Minister in
Ottawa indicated that the Canadian Government was not about to
go along with the reorganization. Indeed,
. . . he [king] had come to the opinion that there was a
definite advantage in keeping the personnel of this
l4l.Decimal File 1930—39, Department of State, National Archives,
711.42152/522, Despatch from Roper to Hull, July 29, 1939.
142.Decimal File 1930—39, Department of State, National Archives,
711.42152/522, Memorandum from Under Secretary Welles to
Roosevelt, Aug. 2, 1939; Memorandum from Roosevelt to Welles,
Aug. 3, 1939; Memorandum from Welles to Head, Western European
Div., Aug. 4, 1939; Memorandum from Welles to Roosevelt,
Aug. 9, 1939.
143.Decimal File 1930—39, Department of State, National Archives,
711.42152/522, Memorandum from Roosevelt to Welles, Aug. 13,1939.
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important Commission separated from the administration
of the Government in power . . . . He even went so far
as to indicate a certain amount of regret that there
might be some prospect of a substitution, on the
American side of the Commission, of departmental
representatives for its present personnel chosen from
outside life.
The President had made his decision however and re-
quested the resignation of Lorton so that he could appoint a
"specialist from the Government to deal with the new, specialized
'.145
and technical matters to come before the Commission. Lorton
complied146 and, on the recommendation of Hull, R.B. McWhorter,
chief engineer with the Federal Power Commission was appointed
as commissioner without pay.147
In early October the President requested Hull to
inform the remaining two members of the Commission that
they
would shortly be asked to resign.148 Anticipa
ting the request,
Bartlett submitted to the President his resignation
which was
accepted effective October 31.149 Stanley t
ook no action
although he did comply with a request of the
President to
appoint an executive assistant to the
commissioners in order
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to strengthen the staff of the United States section.150
Reaction to the President's announcement151 of the
reorganization was not altogether favourable. At least one
paper compared this move to his earlier attempt to "pack"
the Supreme Court—-in this case, to get the seaway project
moving. It wasanother attempt by Roosevelt, said the Tribune,
to dominate the supposedly independent agencies.152 In a
memorandum prepared by Burpee for the Canadian chairman and
the Prime Minister, it was suggested that appointments from
the federal service were contrary to the basic principle of
the Commission.
That principle is that the Commissioners should not
only be men of the highest integrity, but there should
be nothing to prevent them from giving the most impartial
consideration to the questions coming before them, no
official or other obligation to judge the problem from
a national instead of from an international standpoint....
Is it possible for a man who in one capacity is res—
ponsible to higher officials to act with strictly
judicial impartiality in another capacity, perhaps in
a case that may directly concern the department of
which he is an officer?
He felt that the Canadian Government had always consciously
sought to avoid trying to influence its commissioners except
in open argument before the whole body. The commissioners
were required to sever all connections with the government.
"To set up against the Canadian Section so constituted an
American Section composed entirely of government officials
would seem to me at the very least discourteous to the
Canadian Government." Burpee also disagreed with Roosevelt's
View that technical men were now essential. While engineering
problems were always involved, he though the wisest practice was
 
150.Decimal File 1930-39, Department of State, National Archives,
711.42152/544, Letter from Stanley to Hull, Oct. 25, 1939.
lSl.Decimal File 1930-39, Department of State, National Archives,
711.42152/548, Summary of President's Press Conference,
Oct. 27, 1939.
152.I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-l6, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 27, 1939.
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'to appoint as Commissioners men of political
experience, accustomed to dealing with public questions
and all classes of people, men of common sense and a
judicial frame of mind; and then let them call to their
aid from time to time for advice men whom are acknowledged
experts from whatever field is under consideration.1
The Canadian commissioners chose to say nothing but
Burpee assured the secretary of the United States section that the
Canadian Government had no intention of abrogating the treaty
as a result of the United States action.154 The Department of
External Affairs was not pleased with the change.4 Skelton after
talking with King met with an officer of the United States
legation to express official disapproval. According to Skelton,
King had never agreed to the change, fearing_that the "prestige
and effectiveness of the Commission would be jeopardized if its
present composition were changed." Neither, he felt, could it
retain the "independent and judicial attitude which was its
essential feature." It was really in the interest of both govern—
ments to maintain the Commission "as a buffer which could deal
with any tangled questions without involving the governments
. . "155
directly in their determination.
The officer reported that Skelton shared King's views
but felt that it was probably too late to expect the President
to reconsider his decision. This being the case, Skelton thought
that it would only be a matter of time before the Canadian section
of the Commission was changed to correspond with the United States
section.156 On the basis of this report, Hull advised the Presi-
dent to make no changes in his programme forlgecrganization of
the United States section of the Commission.
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The President did proceed. Although Stanley gave
no indication of any intention to resign, the counselor of
the State Department, R.W. Moore was appointed a commissioner
in December and the Bureau of the Budget was informed that
a salary need be provided for only one commissioner and, in
the following year, for none. The Secretary indicated that
the President had decided to slow down the change in face of
the Canadian objections, but would not be happy until all of
the commissioners were appointed from the federal service.158
E. The Commission 1940—1966
 
It was soon apparent that complete reorganization
of the United States section of the Commission was not possible
and, indeed, not desirable. It was equally evident that there
was some dissatisfaction with the changes already made. The result
in part at least was that during the war years and beyond the
Commission languished unattended, with only two commissioners
on each section. Not until 1948 were further efforts made to
rejuvenate the body.
Stanley marshalled considerable support in Congress
for his struggle to retain the chairmanship of the section and
159the President, aware of this, and having seen the new plan
in operation for a few months, decided to allow Stanley to re-
main and to make provision for one of the three commissioners
to be paid a full salary.
The experience of several months during which there
have been . . . one full time salaried Commissioner
and two Commissioners who are also the incumbents of
other important Government offices- is believed to have
158. Decimal File 1930-39, Department of State, National Archives,
711.42152/553, Memorandum from Hackworth to Hickerson, Nov. 10,
1939; Memorandum from Hull to Roosevelt, Dec. 29, 1939,
711.42153/513A, Memorandum from State Department to Director
of the Bureau of the Budget, Nov. 8, 1939.
159. Decimal File 1940-44, Department of State, National Archives,
711.42152/560, Letter from Senator P. Harrison to Roosevelt,
May 22, 1940.  
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definitely demonstrated the impracticality of conducting
the work of the Commission efficiently and effectively,
unless there shall continue to be after June 30, 1940,
an appropriation and authority to pay the salary of one
Comm1551oner, who will devote full time to the work of
the Commission and be in attendance at the headquarters
of the Commission when not engaged in field work.
The President also wished legislation to make it clear that all
three commissioners "shall hold office only for such period as
the President may determine and may freely be removed and re-
placed at his pleasure."160
Shortly after this reversal of policy, Moore died
in early 1941 and, although several including the United States
Boundary Commissioner161 sought appointment to fill the vacancy,
no further action was taken until the end of 1948.
The Canadian commissioners were privately unhappy over
the change in the United States section in 1939 and after the
first meeting of the "new" Commission, Hearst noted how different
and difficult the relations between the two sections had become.
. . . The very idea of the Chairman of the Canadian
Section of one of the most important international
organizations on the American Continent, if not in the
world, having to sit around cooling his heels while
American Commissioners attend to some work that the
Government by whom they are employed requires to be
done. I have been on this Commission for over 20
years, and during that time almost every case developed
sooner or later into a contest between the two gov
ern-
ments. To me the situation seems too ridiculou
s for
words, that the United States section of the
Commission
hereafter is to be made up of men in the
employment of
the United States Government. How can yo
u expect these
men to be independent when their bread and
butter de-
pends on the goodwill of the American Gov
ernment?
Shortly thereafter, Hearst submitte
d his resignation,
commenting:
160.Decima1 File 1940-44, Department of
State, National Archives,
711.42152/560, Note from R.W.
Moore to Roosevelt, June 5,
1940; 711.42153/513A, Letter from
Under Secretary to the
Director of the Bureau of the Bu
dget, June 5, 1940.
l6l.Decima1 File 1940—44, Depart
ment of State, National Arigizes,
711.42152/582, Letter from T.
Riggs to Hull, Feb. 14, .
l62.I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-l6, Letter from Hearst to Stewart'
Apr. 15, 1940.
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. . [TJhere appears to me to be a tendency in
later years to divide the Commission into two parts
rather than to work together as one body. This
is a mistake, and one that should be resisted as far
as possible. The Commission, as I look on it, is not
made up of two parts, but of one organization, and
should work together as closely as possible.l63
He was replaced by J.E. Perrault a former Liberal Cabinet minister
in the Quebec Government.164 No sooner was this appointment made
than Kyte died in November. His vacancy was not filled until late
in 1947, a year after a second vacancy had occurred in the Canadian
section with the death of chairman Stewart in December 1946.
With the death of the Canadian chairman the Commission
was without a quorum. The State Department, pointing out that
there were a number of references ready to submit to the Commission,
requested that the Canadian Government appoint at least one member
so that the Commission could function again. There were repeated
urgings from W.R. Vallance,165 State Department counsel, who had
recently been designated counsel for the United States section
and who took an active interest in the Commission and its work,
instituting the practice of submitting to the Department full
reports on the meetings of the Commission. Only after the press
had taken the Canadian Government to task for its dereliction166
did the Prime Minister act, appointing George Spence, a former
Liberal Member of Parliament and cabinet minister in the Saskatchewan
Government, to fill one of the vacancies and designating Perrault
as acting chairman of the section.167
163.I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—l6, Letter from Hearst to Stewart,
Oct. 7, 1940. .
164.Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 2492-B—40, Memorandum
from King to Skelton, June 15, 1940; Memorandum from Skelton for
file, Sept. 25, 1940; Decimal File 1940—44 Department of State,
National Archives, 711.42152/572, Note from Canadian Legation,
Washington to Hull, Oct. 4, 1940.
165.Decima1 File 1945—49, Department of State, Central Files,
711.42155/9—946, Letter from Vallance to R. Atherton, U.S. Minister,
Ottawa, Dec. 30, 1946; 711.42155/4—2147, Memorandum from Vallance
to C. Fahy, Legal Adviser, Apr. 18, 1947; Canada,Department of
External Affairs, File 2492—B-40, Letter from J. Harrington,
U.S. Minister to Pearson, Aug. 28, 1947.
166.I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—16, Montreal Gazette, Aug. 28, 1947.
167.Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 2492—B-40, Memo-
randum from Under Secretary to Prime Minister, Sept. 22, 1947;
Privy Council Order, Oct. 1, 1947.
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With the reference of a number of matters to the
Commission there was a general revival of interest in the body
on both sides in 1948. In Canada, consideration was being
given to an upward revision in the salaries of the commissioners
to bring them more into line with those of the United States
commissioners. The reaction of the Under Secretary of State was
favourable when he discovered that the work of the commissioners
was indeed full-time.168 However, when he recommended favourable
consideration of the proposal, his Minister indicated that the
"[w]hole future policy with respect to the Board is under con—
sideration" and salaries would be dealt with in the context of
the wider question of what was to be done about the Commission.169
At this point Perrault died, reducing the Canadian
section again to one member. Discussions were held at
the cabinet
level about reconstitution of the Commission an
d it was agreed
that this should be done--particularly the appointm
ent of someone
with an engineering background.170 The Prime Mi
nister indicated
that he would make no appointments, leaving t
he decision to the
new Prime Minister following the party lead
ership convention in
August.171 Following formation of the n
ew ministry under St.
Laurent, there was further consider
ation, the general consensus
appearing to favour the appointment
of at least one outstanding
72 The Financial Post strongly
urged avoidance of
engineer.
3 However, when the appointmen
t was
political appointments.
168. Canada, Department of E
xternal Affairs, File 2492—B—
40,
Memorandum from Pearson to
St. Laurent, May 20, 1948.
' External Affairs
, File 2492-B—40,
169. gzgggzndﬁipéiggegza
ggon to St. Laurent (with
penned reply
from Minister), May 20, 19
48.
170. Canada, Department of
External Affairs, File 2492
—B-40, Letter
from C.D. Howe to St. L
aurent (personal), July
6, 1948.
171. Canada, Department
of External Affairs, Fi
le 2492-ﬁgzg,
Memorandum from E.R. Ho
pkins to Pearson, July 1
3, .
172. Canada, Department
of External Affairs, File
249g—ﬁ—406Ct
Memorandum from Esco
t Reid to Pearson (c
onfidentia ), .
7, 1948.
'
11, 1948.
173. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File
E—l6, Financial Pos
t, Dec.  
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announced December 24, 1948, the new commissioner, subsequently
designated chairman of the section,was J. Allison Glen, former
minister and speaker in the King Cabinet, who had recently re—
tired at 71 years of age'.174 The Engineering Institute of Canada
and the press were highly indignant over this appointment. As
well as not being an engineer, the editors felt that Glen, at
71 and in poor health, would not contribute much to the Commission.175
One year later, the Canadian section was brought to full
strength with the naming of General A.G.L. McNaughton as a
176 The commander of Canadian forces during the war
commissioner.
and briefly a minister in the King Cabinet, his appointment was
widely welcomed in both countries for he was not only an eminent
Canadian statesman but also a well respected engineer.
The United States felt that it was high time to fill
the seven year vacancy in its section——particu1ar1y in View of
the fact that the present chairman had been there since 1930 and
was now eighty—one years old. The questions were how to replace
the aged chairman and from where to fill the vacancies-—from
within or without the federal service? The feeling was that Stanley
should be removed and all three appointments should be made from
within-—the Legal Adviser of State, the Chief of the Army Engineers
and a third, rotational appointment from the Federal Power Com—
mission and from Interior. However, in View of the long practice
of appointments from among retired Senators, this might be diffi—
cult to accomplish. Therefore, perhaps the most desirable plan
might be to have all three commissioners selected from outstanding
men outside the federal service.177 The recommendation reaching
174.Decima1 File 1945—49, Department of State, Central Files,711.42152/12—2448, Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Ottawa toSecretary of State, Dec. 24, 1948.
17S.Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 2492—B-40,
Telegram from Engineering Institute to St. Laurent, Dec. 28,1948; I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-16, Toronto Globe and Mail,Dec. 29, 1948; Montreal Gazette, Dec. 28, 1948.
176.Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 2492-B—40, PrivyCouncil Order 387,Dec. 21, 1949.
177.Decima1 File 1945—49, Department of State, Central Files,711.42155/6-1548, Memorandum from E.T. Wailes, Commonwealth Div.to J.D. Hickerson, Western European Div. (secret), June 15, 19487711.42155/6—1648, Memorandum from Hickerson to Wailes (secret),June 16, 1948.
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the Secretary however merely suggested that the President be
urged to appoint an officer from the Army Corps to fill the178 .present vacancy. This the Secretary recommended to the
President179 and in October Truman approved the appointment
of Eugene Weber, a civilian engineer with the Corps.180
During the last fifteen years a number of important
; events have occurred and several proposals have been made in
both countries all of which have had some bearing and effect
on the International Joint Commission. In Canada the most
interesting and significant aspects have been the question of
 
appearances of the commissioners before Parliamentary committees,
the terms of appointment for the commissioners, the reorganization
legislation of 1952, the problem of commissioners engaging in
policy matters, the nature of appointments to the Canadian section
and the reporting on Commission affairs within the Department of
External Affairs. Each of these matters illustrates to some
extent the relationship between the Commission (or a section
thereof) and the government.
From the outset in the United States it was the common
practice for the chairman or other member of the Commission to
be called before the Appropriations Committee of the House each
year to explain and defend the amount of funds being requested
and often, to attempt to justify the continued existence of the
Commission. On frequent occasions he has also been cdled before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, particularly when there
was some important matter between the two countries in which the
In Canada, until 1952, quite the
The annual appropriation for the
Commission was involved.
reverse had been the case.
Canadian section was fixed by statute as were the salaries.
l78.Decimal File 1945—49, Department of State, Central Files,
711.421556—2148, Memorandum from E.A. Gross to Acting
Secretary Lovett, June 22, 1948.
l79.Decimal File 1945-49, Department of State, Central Filesé48
711.42152/9-848, Note from Lovett to Truman, Sept. 17, l .
l80.Decimal File 1945—49, Department of State, Central FSileE,
711.42152/10-448, Memorandum from Truman to Lovett, eP -
29, l948.~ 
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Thus, there was no need to argue for annual support. In
addition, as Brooke Claxton noted in defending the Com-
mission during the Red River flood debate in 1950, the
attitude had always been that it would be quite improper
for a member of an international commission to appear before
a committee of the House, particularly while the matter in
question was under study by the international body.
. I suggest that this would end the usefulness
of the commission as an international organization
which has been remarkably successful and which has
presented an example to the whole world of the way
in which two countries can cooperate. One of the
secrets of its success has been the fact that it has
been objectively representative of both countries,
and Ehat its recommendations have always been carriedout. 81
However, in his appearance before the External Affairs Committee
later the same year, Pearson agreed that a member of the Com-
mission might appear before the Committee to discuss with them
matters with which the Commission was currently dealing.182
In 1952, the government introduced an amendment to
the Boundary Waters Treaty Act which, when enacted, removed the
appropriation for the Commission from the statute and made it
subject to an annual appropriation by Parliament.183 In the
same year, the chairman of the section began what has now become
virtually an annual appearance before a committee of the House
or Senate--most frequently before the External Affairs Committee--
to explain in some detail the nature and extent of the work in
which the Commission is engaged and to answer any questions which
members of the Committee may have concerning the work or amounts
of funds requested by the Commission.
181.Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, let Parliament,
2d Session, vol. 3, pp. 2825-2827, May 25, 1950.
182.Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on
External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, let
Parliament, 2d Session, June 13, 1950.
183.Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, let Parliament,
6th Session, vol. 3, pp. 2973; 3095; 3102—3108, June 6, 1952;
Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 2492-C—1-40,
Memorandum.from S.D. Hemsley to K. Burbridge, Jan. 15, 1952.
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The 1952 amendment to the Act also provided for
increases in the salaries of the commissioners and for a
greater amount for the person elected chairman of the section.
The maximum amounts authorized were $15,000 for the chairman
and $10,000 for each of the other commissioners. Finally, the
amendment placed the secretary and the staff members of the
section under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Act—~a
change which had been successfully opposed in 1918 as being
out of character with the nature of the Commission. As justi—
fication for the salary increases, Pearson advanced the following
reasons: the increased work load of the body, the increased im—
portance of matters being dealt with by the Commission, and the
need for an upward revision of the salaries after forty years
at the same level. He observed that while in the past the jobs
had not been considered full—time, suchwas no longer the case.
All three commissioners would henceforth be appointed on a
full—time basis.184
In 1950 the government also considered the possibility
of making appointments to the Commission for fixed terms. The
major obstacle was that the Commission was a quasi—judicial body
and hence the argument was that appointments should be of the
same duration as judicial appointments. Although the Prime
Minister was anxious that a fixed term should be placed in the
statute, the officers of the Department felt that it mightlgg
unwise; that preferable might be a renewable term certain.
commissioners were opposed to any such proposal, arguing for a
. 186 . .
permanent status similar to that of a judge. No legislation
was adopted in relation to the matter but, since 1956 the
fixed terms seems to have been adopted in connection
The
practice of
184.Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, let Parliament,
6th Session, vol. 3, pp. 2973; 3104-3105, June 6, 1952.
185.Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 2492-B—4gé50.
Memorandum from Pick to J.S. Nutt (secret), JUlY 1:, 1950,
Memorandum from Burbridge to Moran (secret), Aug. I -
186.Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 24gziggio,
Letter from J.L. Dansereau to St. Laurent, Marc .
  
   
with appointments and renewals except in relation to the termof the commissioner designated chairman.
will be served in direct ratio to the ability, intelligence andwisdom of the Commissioners appointed." In another report laterthe same year, the officer gave a detailed analysis of the
as to how he thought the Commission could be made to operatemost effectively. He felt it was essential to keep controversial
 
would require "the maximum finesse in View of the long record rof 'freewheeling' by the Commission." In subsequent reports, the
the desirable course in dealing with the Commission.187 Thepractice of submitting such reports appears, however, to havebeen abandoned.
 
187.Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 2492—D-40,Memorandum from E.A. Cote on the IJC, Jan. 18, 1954; File2492-A-1-40, Memorandum from Coté to Under Secretary (restricted)
Apr. 28, 1954; Memorandum from Cote to Under Secretary(confidential), Apr. 14, 1955; Memorandum from Coté to Under
Secretary, Feb. 3, 1955; Memorandum from Cote to UnderSecretary (restricted), June 21, 1954; Memorandum from Cotéto Under Secretary, Oct. 15, 1954.
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earlier and requires only brief mention here. The matter was
very much in focus during the deliberations of the Commission
relating to the Columbia River. And, in the same way as he
saw the sections of the Commission performing two separate
functions, General McNaughton also visualized the role of the
commissioner as dual. He made this clear in an appearance
before the External Affairs Committee.
I made it a condition of entering discussions in
Washington [within the Commission relating to the
Columbia River reference] that those discussions
would not be regarded as closed discussions but
that the record when it became available might be
tabled by me for this committee in order that this
committee might know what their witness was doing
between sessions, and also how we were conducting
these important negotiations and the principles
which were involved.188
The appointment of McNaughton to the Canadian section
 
did not still all criticism of the lack of qualifications of the
personnel of the Commission. During the Winnipeg flood debates
in the House, several complaints were voiced. One member felt
that
. so far as Canadian appointments to the inter-
national joint commission on water rights are con-I
cerned, many people consider this a lucrative penSion
scheme to certain people for past faithful service.
Personal friends of mine, who rendered service for
three score years and ten and were then in ill health,
have been appointed to the Commission . . . . There
is great dissatisfaction in this regard among people
well acquainted with these flood problems. In fact .
the engineers' association has publicly protested this
method of appointment.189
With the death a month later of Glen, the Leader of
the Opposition urged the appointment of a highly qualified
engineer to replace him. He noted that the present composition
of the United States section recognized the importance which
that country attached to the need for engineering skills on
188.Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on
External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Ev
1dence,
22nd Parliament, 2d Session, June 1, 1955.
l89.Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, let
Parliament,
2d Session, vol. 2, pp. 2030—2031, May 1, 19
50.
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the Commission. The Secretary of State for External Affairs
while acknowledging the need for a high degree of competence,
denied that the Canadian section had lacked this in the past.190
The Canadian Government after giving consideration to
suggestions that the new chairman should be an eminent lawyer,
decided that instead, it would appoint another engineer to the
section and "recommend" the election of McNaughton as chairman.
On July 12, the appointment of J. Lucien Dansereau, formerly
an engineer with the federal service and a supporter of the
Liberal party from Quebec, was announced and a week later
McNaughton was chosen as chairman.191
In 1955, the government decided that the terms of
two of the commissioners, Spence and Dansereau, would expire
at the end of the year. Concern was expressed by the com—
missioners that such action was inimical to the best interests
of the Commission since it interfered with the quasi—judicial
nature of the appointments. Further, it would be disruptive
of the desirable continuity within the section. The chairman
192
was asked to intercede. The chairman agreed with the points
made but was reluctant to intervene, feeling that terms of
service were matters of governmental policy.193 He simply for—
warded the correspondence to the External Affairs MiniSter and
in December the terms of the commissioners were extended for
194
one year. Another one year term followed.
 
l90.Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, 21st Parliament,
2d Session, vol. 4, pp. 4397—4399, June 29, 1950.
191.Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 2492-B—40,
Memorandum from Under Secretary Heeney to Pearson (confidential),
June 28, 1950; Press Release, July 13, 1950.
l92.Privy Council Order 1955—1042, July 12, 1955; I.J.C. Can.
Sect. File E—16, Letter from Spence to McNaughton, Nov. 10,1955.
193.I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-16, Letter from McNaughton to Spence,
Nov. 13, 1955.
194.I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—16, Letter from McNaughton to
Pearson, Nov. 14, 1955; Privy Council Order 1893, Dec. 22,
1955. ' '
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In 1957 the new administration gave brief con-
sideration to a reorganization of the Commission. With a
view to accomplishing this, the term of Spence was not renewed
beyond the end of 1957.195 The Minister of National Resources,
while believing that the desirable composition of the section
would be a lawyer, an engineer and a political member, suggested
that in view of the chairman's age, it might be wise to appoint
a second and younger engineer. He recommended D.M. Stephens of
Winnipeg, an engineer who had at one time been Deputy Minister
of Mines in Manitoba and was now chairman of Manitoba Hydro.196
He accepted an appointment for a one year term.197
The Canadian section was now composed of three engineers.
This imbalance was noted and it was suggested that consideration
might be given to the appointment of a lawyer.198 The situation
was decried by two writers observing the reluctance of the
Commission to grapple with legal issues in recent years. Suggesting
that this was due to the lack of legal minds, they went on:
. It is rather disquieting that a body which has
an important judicial role in the relationship between
two large nations, and which also acts in an investigative
capacity in regard to questions involving complex and
important legal issues, should, at the very moment when
it is seised of some of the most difficult issues ever to
come before any international body, number not a single
lawyer in its membership. This is a far cry from the
early years when five of the Commissioner's six members
belonged to the legal profession.
The advice was not heeded by the government. It con-
tinued to renew the existing appointments from year to year. Nor
l95.I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-l6, Letter from Sidney Smith to
Spence, Dec. 24, 1957. .
l96.Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 2492-B—40, Letter
from Smith to Hamilton (confidential), Dec. 12, 1957; Letter
from Hamilton to Smith (personal and confidential), Dec. 1
7,1957.
197.Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 2492—B-40, Privy
Council Order 1958-23, Jan. 2, 1958.
rtment of External Affairs, File 2492-B-40
, Memo-198.
'canadar Depa ster (confidential), 00t-randum to the External Affairs Mini
23, 1958.
l99.Bloomfield, L.M. & Fitzgerald, G.F. Boundary Waters Pro
blems
of Canada and the United States Toronto,
Carswell, 1958, p.62.  
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did it accept the recommendation of the Borden Royal Commission
that one of the members of the proposed National Energy BOard
be appointed as a member of the Canadian section of the Commission.
In the view of the Minister of Trade and Commerce such a step
would be inconsistent with the principle that a quasi-judicial
body should not have as a member a representative of a body which
might be directly interested in proceedings before it.200
Dansereau submitted his resignation to the government
on June 1, 1961.
announced the appointment of René Dupuis, a Montreal engineer and
former member of the Quebec Hydro-Electric Commission.201 At
the
In February of the following year the government
same time General McNaughton agreed to retire on April 15, the
fiftieth anniversary of the Commission and shortly after his seventy
-
fifth birthday which, in the View of some was the mandatory retireme
nt
age for members of the Canadian section under the recent amend
ment
to the judges' retirement section of the BNA Act. On April 10 his
retirement was announced and on the same date the appointment
of
A.D.P. Heeney, a senior public servant and twice Canadian Amba
ssador
. . . . . 202
to Washington, as comm1581oner and chairman—de51gnate was made.
In January 1966, the government announced the reappoint-
ment of Dupuis and Stephens for a further two year term.203 At
the same time the legal adviser to the Canadian section was gi
ven
the additional new post of Assistant to the Chairman.
In the United States since 1950 there has been little
occupation With the need for changes in the structure or role
of
the Commission. .There has, however, been some conce
rn with the
internal aspects of the United States section, and on at
least
two occasions, proposals have been advanced for a merger
of the
200. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates
, 24th Parliament,
2d Session, 1959, vol. 4, p. 3924.
201. Decimal File 1960—64, Department of State, C
entral Files,
611.4232/2-2862, Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Washington t
o
Secretary of State, Feb. 28, 1962.
202. Decimal File 1960-64, Department of State, C
entral Files,
611.42311/4-1062, Telegram from Merchant, U.S. Embass
y, Ottawa.
to Secretary of State, Apr. 10, 1962.
203. Decimal File 1965-66, Department of State, C
entral Files,
(no number), Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Ottawa to
Secretary
of State, Jan. 21, 1966.
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International Joint Commission with the International Boundary
Commission.
In 1952 brief consideration was given to the possi—
bility of amending the appropriation provisions to permit
reimbursement by the Commission of agencies providing commissioners
for service with the International Joint Commission. This came
about as a request for such reimbursement by the Federal Power
204
Commission. Nothing appears to have resulted from the con-
sideration of the request.
In the same year, Truman determined to replace the
entire membership of the United States section. Despite advice
from the State Department that as important as it was to strengthen
the section, Stanley possessed too much political influence to
risk his removal, Truman requested resignations. Stanley
refused outright to submit his, one ground being that the State
. . . . 06
Department had no jurisdiction over the CommiSSion. The
Canadian commissioners felt that one of the present commissioners
. . 07
should remain for the sake of continuity. One also sug
gested
that if a reorganization were undertaken it would be ho
ped that
the new appointees would be full—time commissioners and
not
part—time.
There may have been some justification for su
ch a policy
in the early days when the Commission had v
ery little
work. Certainly there is no justification
for it now.
Anyway, the principle is wrong. The work
of such an_
international body as ours is too impor
tant to have its
members exposed to a divided loyalty.208
204.Decimal File 1950—54, Department
of State, Central Files,
611.42311/11—1852, Letter from T.C.
Buchanan, F.P.C. Chairman
to Dean Acheson, Nov. 18,1952;
611.42311/11—2452, Memorandum
from Vallance to Acheson, Nov.
24, 1952.
' '
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rtment of State, Central ,
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611-42311/2-1552, Memorandum
for File re International JOln
t
Commission, Feb. 15, 1952.
206.I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—16, Letter
Dec. 30, 1952.
207.I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E
—l6, Letter
Dec. 17, 1952; Letter from
Dansereau
Letter from Spence to S
utherland,
from Stanley to Dansereau
,
from Ellis to Sutherland,
to Stanley, Dec. 27, 1952
.
208.I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-l6,
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This view was shared by the Department of External Affairs
which took the opportunity to raise with the new administration
in the United States the question of appointing federal ser-
vants to the Commission.209
Following a frustrated and rather humourous attempt
in April 1953 by the new President to remove the United States
chairman,210 the President requested a memorandum on his powers
to compel the resignations of commissioners including the chair-
man. This was in response to a memorandum from Stanley to the
President in which Stanley held the view that the appointment
of chairman was for life, without power of removal. In the view
of the legal adviser to the Department, the President possessed
absolute discretion and power in the appointment and removal of
the commissioners. Even if the commissioners functioned in a
judicial or quasi—judicial manner (which the Department maintained
they did not), the President could remove the present chairman
simply by revoking the Executive order which continued Presidential
appointments beyond the age of 70 years.2
The suggestion from the White House at this point was that
consideration be given to a merger of the International Joint Com-
mission and the International Boundary Commission, presumably as
the means of retiring Stanley and obtaining as chairman the man
Eisenhower had originally intended to have the job as Commission
chairman.212. Reaction in the Department was to do nothing until
 
209.Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 2492-B-40, Memo-
randum from Burbridge to Leger, (confidential) May 19, 1953;
Despatch from Acting Under Secretary to Canadian Embassy,
Washington (confidential), May 25, 1953; Despatch from
Canadian Embassy, Washington to Under Secretary (confidential)
June 4, 1953.
210.I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—l6, Toronto Globe and Mail, May 2,
1953; Toronto Globe and Mail, Apr. 15, 1953; Ottawa Journal,
Apr. 15, 1953; Ottawa Citizen, Apr. 15, 1953.
211.Decimal File 1950-54, Department of State, Central Files,
611.42311/6-853, Memorandum from J. Tate to H. Phleger, Legal
Adviser, June 8, 1953.
212.Decimal File 1950-54, Department of State, Central Files 611.
42311/6-2353, Memorandum for the Record re Proposal for
merger of IJC and IBC (confidential), June 23, 1953.
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the Canadian attitude to such a proposal had been ascertained.
This was shortly forthcoming through the United States Ambassador.
Canadians would be disappointed with such a move, taking it
as a "further indication of the United States' indifference
to a matter considered important by Canada." Ambassador
Stuart felt that the best step was to appoint a United States
chairman equal to dealing with General McNaughton. "I am
convinced that a man of very real ability should be appointed..."213
At the same time the Secretary of the Interior was urging
the President to take prompt action in reorganizing the United
States section in view of the Vital water problems arising along
the boundary.
The United States section of the Commission needs an
aggressive full-time Chairman who will organize his
office along modern lines and work well within modern
government policies and procedures. He should be a
man who has achieved some public recognition, pre-
ferably a lawyer or public official who can be a diplomat,
run a meeting, organize and lead the work of subsidiary
boards and committees. He should maintain good relations
with Canada, his colleagues, and all agencies who cooperate
in doing work with the Commission. He should also, if
possible, be from a state on or near the Canadian border
and since the other members are from the East, it would
J
seem preferable that the Chairman be from some place
i
west of Chicago.
He further proposed that his Department rather than the Fed
eral
. . 214
Power Commission be represented on the Comm1531on.
The advice of the Department on both this proposa
l and
 
the one for merging the two Commissions was that
nothing should
be done until Stanley had been replaced b
y someone equalzig
the Canadian chairman and had had time t
o learn the job.
213. Decimal File 1950-54, Departme
nt of State, Central Files,
611.42311/7—2753, Despatch from Under
Secretary Lourie to stuart,
(confidential), July 18, 1953; Despa
tch from Stuart to Lourie,
(confidential), July 27, 1953.
214. Decimal File 1950—54, De
partment of State, Central Fil
es,
tary of Interior
611.42311/7-2453 Memorandu
m from Under Secre
to Secretary D. McKay, July 16
, 1953; Letter from McKay to
Eisenhower, July 22, 1953.
‘
State, Central Files
F
- ' - 4 De artment of . . .215. DeCimal File 1950 5 I P from Bonbright’ European DlVlslon
611.42311 7-2453 Memorandum ,
to Lourie{ July 51, 1953; Mem
orandum from Lourie to Sherman Adams, Aug. 19, 1953. U’9‘:
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Finally in January 1954 Stanley submitted his
resignation effective February 1. The White House immediately
renewed its proposal for merging the two Commissions to take
advantage of the lawyer who had been appointed in error to the
Boundary Commission. It was again rejected by the State
Department because of the very different functions of the two
bodies and of the attitude of the Canadians.
I have reviewed this problem and find that the Depart-
ment believes that any merger of these two commissions
should have such unfortunate consequences as to out—
weigh the relatively small economy which could be
achieved.
. . The Canadians attach very great importance to
the International Joint Commission and have appointed
very distinguished people to serve on the Canadian side.216
The same answer was given again in 1958 when Sherman Adams once
more sought to have the proposal reconsidered.217
In June the White House announced the appointment of
the retiring Republican Governor of Idaho, Len Jordan, as the
new chairman of the United States section. Due to his incumbency,
he did not assume the position until January of 1955.218
The same year the White House requested information
from the Department of State concerning whether the COmmission
was "coping with its tasks" and if not, what steps should be
taken to strengthen the United States section. The Legal Office,
comparing the two sections, concluded that the United States
section was at a distinct disadvantage in most respects. Noting
that the reorganization in 1939 had been merely "as an economy
measure", Vallance recommended that the section be restored to
 
216. Decimal File 1950—54, Department of State, Central Files,
611.42311/1-1954, Memorandum from Vallance to H. Phleger,
Jan. 19, 1954; 611.42311/3-2654, Memorandum from Thruston
Morton to Sherman Adams (confidential) Mar. 26, 1954.
217. Decimal File 1955—59, Department of State, Central Files,
611.42311/4—2358, Memorandum from Herter to Adams, Apr. 23, 1958.
218. Canada, Department of External Affairs, File 2492-B—40,
Despatch from Canadian Embassy, Washington to Department of
External Affairs, July 8, 1954; White House Press Release,
June 17, 1954.
     
  
277
three full-time commissioners with salaries set at the same
levels as the Canadian commissioners.219 This View was supported
in Congress by a Representative from New York who felt that the
increasing workload of the Commission made the change imperative.220
It was underlined by the action of the Federal Power Commission
failing to make provision for the salary of R. MCWhorter in the
1956 budget on grounds that he was now working full-time for
the International Joint Commission.221 Although the White House
inquired as to its authority to fix the salaries of the com-
missioners, nothing further seemed to come as a result of these
222
pressures.
In face of the diplomatic negotiations and policy state—
ments in which the United States' and Canadian chairmen engaged
during the Columbia River investigations, Senator Neuberger of
Oregon sought in 1956 and subsequent years to have the American
commissioners confirmed by the Senate in their appointment by
the President.223 The Department indicated on each occasio
n
that it would find no objection to such procedure e
ven though it
was not provided for in the treaty. Indeed, the As
sistant
Secretary in 1960 felt that it was quite desi
rable to have this
done since the International Joint Comm
ission, unlike the Boundary
was concerned with "matters of very subst
antial policy
mportant interest to the boundary
Commission,
implication and of most i
states. Further, the Internat
ional Joint Commission has
Department of State, Central Files,219.Decima1 File 1950—54,
um from Vallance to Thruston Mor
ton,
611.42311/7—1554, Memorand
July 15, 1954.
220.Congressional Record, 84t
h Congress,
vol. 101, part 4, p. 4480.
221.Decimal File 1950—54, Depart
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611.42311/1—2055, Memoran
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and McWhorter, Jan. 20, 1955
.
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611.42311/12-355, Memoran
dum from White House to H.
Phleger
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e House, Dec.
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2d Session, 1956, vol. 102,
223.Congre551onal Record,
lst ession' 1957' vol.
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0-12274; 85th Congress
, 2d Session, ,
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959,
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. . . . . . . 7
a qua51-judic1al function of substantial importance."“24 This
matter has never been further acted upon.
On August 15, 1957 Jordan resigned as United States
chairman and the same day Douglas McKay of Oregon, former Secretary
of the Interior in Eisenhower's cabinet wasappointed to replace
225 He was elected chairman in September. The followinghim.
year McWhorter retired from the FPC and Francis Adams of the
226 In July 1959, McKay
died suddenly and his vacancy was not filled until June of 1960
same agency was named to succeed him.
when Edward A. Bacon, a successful businessman and Republican
supporter from Wisconsin was appointed and elected chairman. Just
prior to his appointment the White House posed several questions
to the State Department concerning the effectiveness of the Com—
.mission in dealing with boundary waters problems. Queried as to
the need for revising the 1909 Treaty, the Department was reluctant
to consider such a step at the moment.
Although the Treaty may have certain imperfections,
it is considered to have worked well for over half
a century and to have contributed in large measure
to the avoidance of disputes and maintenance of good
relations with Canada. The Department of State feels
that it might be desirable at an appropriate future
time for the United States and Canada to examine this
historic document with a View to determining if it
could be improved to the mutual advantage of the two
countries. At the present time, however, such dis-
cussions, which would open up every boundary water
problem and, in particular, the Chicago diversion,
could well result in undermining the progress which
has been made on the Columbia.
As for the peed to strengthen the United States section, the
Department felt no "pressing need to initiate such studies." In
 
224.Decimal File 1955—59, Department of State, Central Files,
611.42311/7-2357, Letter from Assistant Secretary Macomber
to Senator T.F. Green, Dec. 20, 1957; Decimal File 1960-64,
Department of State, Central Files, 611.42311/1-1960, Letter
from Macomber to P.S. Hughes, Bureau of the Budget, Jan.29,1960.
225.Decimal File 1955-59, Department of State, Central.Files,
611.42311/7-257, Memorandum from Dulles to Eisenhower, July 2,
1957.
226.Decimal File 1955-59, Department of State, Central Files,
611.42311/8-558, Memorandum from Herter to Eisenhower,
Aug. 5, 1958.   
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any case it should be postponed until after the appointment
of a new chairman of the section. Neither question has been
followed up.227
With the election in 1960 of the Democratic admini—
stration, Bacon was requested to submit his resignation and
he was replaced in June 1961 by Teno Roncalio, a banker and
Democrat of Wyoming. The following year Adams retired from
the PFC and the Commission to be succeeded by Charles Ross,
a commissioner of the FPC. In 1964, Roncalio resigned the
chairmanship to become a candidate for election to the House
of Representatives. This vacancy remained until the appoint—
ment in late 1965 of former Democratic Governor of Indiana,
Matthew Welsh.228
In recent years, there have been few proposals either
in Canada or in the United States for change or reorganization
of the Commission. Those which have been made have bee
n in
very generhl terms. Some people have suggested tha
t the
Commissionimight in some way become a supranational
body with
exclusive and comprehensive administrative po
wers over the
Great Lakes system. Others have approached
the question of
change in terms of expansion of the scope
of the Commission's
activities to such diverse matters
as air traffic, continental
energy resources and tariffs.
In a speech before the Canadian Club
of Montreal in
1963 the Canadian chairman wondere
d if the underlying principles
and procedures of the Commissio
n could perhaps usefully be
. 229 .
extended beyond problems alo
ng the boundary line. Thi
s thought
a-United States relations
was picked up by a Canadian
student of Canad
ped as the nucleus
who felt that the Commiss
ion could be develo
227. Decimal File 1955-59,
Department of State, Centra
l Files,.
611.4232/10-2859, Letter
from Assistant Secretary F
. Kirlin
to M.H. Stans, Director,
Bureau of the Budget, Oct
. 28, 1959.
228. White House Pre
ss Release, Dec. 18,
1965.
229. A.D.P. Heeney, "
Dealing With Uncle Sam
—-The Work of the
- - - ' v the
Canadian Club
an 1 J01nt CommisSion', A
ddress to u _
Intern ona 14’ 1963. See also: Heeney: Diplomacy
International Joint
Commission", INCO
Fall 1966.
"
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with a Difference——The
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r 3,
 
     
280
of a permanent cooperative structure for dealing with the
whole range of uniquely North American affairs.230
The authors of the recent report on Canada-United
States relations ordered by the President and the Prime
Minister offered the following recommendation to the two
governments regarding the role of the Commission.
. . In our judgment, its solid foundation of law
and precedent and its long and successful record
in the disposition of problems along the boundary
justify consideration of some extension of the
Commission's functions. Accordingly, we recommend
that the two governments examine jointly the wisdom
and feasibility of such a development.231
More recently suggestions were advanced by a study-
group of Republican Representatives and Senators for an increased
role for the Commission. As well as proposing that the Commission
be given the task of examining and making recommendations on the
continental water and other energy resources, the group urged that
the Commission should include facilities for the joint study of
the technical aspects of foreign policy issues between the two
countries, thus developing expertise in fields other than water.232
There has been no indication from either the Canadian
Government or the United States Government as to their plans, if
any, for the future role of the International Joint Commission.
230. Tim Creery, "Canada in North American Affairs", Speech
before the Canadian Club of Ottawa, Apr. 23, 1963; Creery,
"Energy Resources: The North American Political Context",
5th Seminar on Canadian—American Relations, University of
Windsor, Nov. 7—9, 1963.
231. Heeney, A.D.P. and Merchant, L.T. Principles for Partnership--
Canada and the United States, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1965;
Washington, U.S.G.P.O., 1965.
232. I.J.C,, Can. Sect. File Sll-l, Report on United States—
Canadian Relations (Tupper Report), Sept. 27, 1965.
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VI MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTATION
There follows a brief digest of items of documentation
relating to the International Joint Commission which were not
fitted either in whole or in part into the earlier chapters.
These materials relate to the Commission either directly or
indirectly and are grouped below chronologically into four
categories: published treatises; unpublished theses and
manuscripts; hearings and speeches; papers and periodical
articles.
A. Published Treatises
 
The International Joint Commission-—Organization, Jurisdiction
and Operation under the Treaty of January 11, 1909, between
the United States and Great Britain. Washington, U.S.G.P.O., 1924.
Contains a comprehensive treatment of the genesis and
early development of the Commission, describing the function as
a combination judicial, arbitral and investigatory. Discusses
briefly the significance of each clause of the Treaty and con-
cludes with a summary of the first eighteen dockets of the
Commission.
Hughes, Charles Evans The Pathway to Peace: Addresses
1921—1925
New York, Harper, 1925.
pp.3-l9. The Pathway to Peace, Address to t
he Canadian Bar
Ass'n. Montreal, Sept. 4, 1923.
Dealing with various modes of effecting p
eaceful settle—
he points to the Commission and joint
commissions generally
"not to decide but
to find the facts
ment,
as one important means to achieve s
ettlement:
to inform, not to arbitrate but to in
vestigate,
 
and to report to the governments of
the states . . .
Hughes suggested unofficially
the establishment of a
t commission of wider scop
e than the Commission com-
permanent join
ished Canadian and Uni
ted States com—
posed equally of distingu
"to which automatically th
ere would be referred, for
missioners 
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examination and report as to the facts, questions arising
as to the bearing of action by either government upon the
interests of the other to the end that each reasonably
protecting its own interests would be so advised that it
would avoid action inflicting unnecessary injury upon its
neighbour."
Smith, Herbert Arthur The Economic Uses of International Rivers
London, King and Sons, 1931. pp.123—l3l
Deals with the Commission only by way of example as the
most functional of international commissions concerned with
economic uses of international waters. Suggests that the
Commission's major attribute is the ability to deal with each
problem on its own merits in a just manner and not by arbitrary
legal rules thus achieving in each case the maximum benefit from
the waters. Notes that while the Commission's jurisdiction is re-
latively limited, "[ilt has proved that all the complex problems
arising out of the economic uses of rivers are capable of peaceful
and just solution, provided that they are approached in the right
way.
Chacko, C. Joseph The International Joint Commission between
the United States of America and the Dominion of Canada New York,
1932.
The first and only major work dealing exclusively with the
Columbia University Press,
Commission, this treatise canvasses the genesis of the Commission,
its nature compared to other international water commissions and
the functions of the Commission with reference to the various
cases which had come before the Commission either by application
or reference at this point in time.
Functions, Powers and Duties of the International Joint Commission
and of the International Boards Operating under its Jurisdiction
Ottawa, King's Printer, 1935.
Outlines briefly the work and accomplishments of the
Commission and the role of the various boards created for the  
 T—ﬁ
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Commission: "The effective machinery in the field to ensure the
observance of the international obligations which are embodied
in the Commission's Orders." and concludes:
There is no record of any international controversy or w
even of local irritation having developed as a result 5
of the action of the Commission in any of these matters. .
On the other hand, it needs no great imagination to
conceive of the number and character of the international j
controversy which readily might have developed had an if
attempt been made to proceed with certain of the projects
without considering, in the careful manner which has been
possible through the machinery provided by the International
Joint Commission, interests adversely affected.
Callahan, James Morton American Foreign Policy in Canadian
Relations New York, ﬂacmillan & Co., 1937. pp.493-539
In chapter 20 the political aspects of the negotiations
leading up to and throughout the treaty are dealt with, par
—
ticular emphasis being laid upon the developing interna
tional .
94
9.
r
i
“
_'
._
.
personality of Canada.
. . One of its practical and significant meanin
gs
was the British transfer to Canada of t
he responsibility
of conducting its own foreign relations wit
hin the scope X
of jurisdiction defined in the agreement.
It promptly ﬂ
stimulated the creation of a Canadi
an Department of '@
External Affairs. . .
l
Corbett, Percy E. The Settlemen
t of Canadian-American Disputes,
3
pp.50-59; 116—119
i
New Haven, Yale University Pre
ss, 1937.
ifically in relation to
Deals with the Commission spe
c
i
nerally in relation to the
,
 
its work with inland waterways
and ge
exercise of its powers under A
rticles DCand X. Believes th
at
its work under Article D<has
ensured it a permanent place
in E
b
the diplomatic machinery of
the two countries but doubts
that
its powers under Article
X will ever be used becau
se the I
personnel of the Commis
sion is not competent to
deal with
E
arbitral matters.
 
   
Jessup, Philip C. Elihu Root vol. 2, 1905-1937 New York, Dodd,.
Mead & Co., 1937. pp. 96—99
Sets out briefly the rales played by Gibbons and
Anderson in negotiating the Boundary Waters Treaty.
On the American side, the real negotiator, the
man who worked out every point of detail, was
Chandler P. Anderson. His service was not as
a mere assistant, but a strong co-adjuter of
independent contacts with the representatives
of other powers.
Osborn, C.S. & Osborn, S.T. The Conquest of a Continent
Lancaster, Pa., Science Press Printing Co., 1939. pp.85-111
Gives a comprehensive account of the IJC and its work
based mainly upon Burpee's "Insurance for Peace" and Kyte's 1935
radio broadcast.
Concludes:
It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance
and significance of this action on the part of two
neighbouring nations, in creating an international
body, on which they have equal representation, and
transferring to it a material part of their own
sovereignty. Such a remarkable departure from the
traditions of the past is, of course, only practicable
in the case of two countries feeling for each other
such mutual confidence and respect as exists be—
tween Canada and the United States. The International
Joint Commission is an unusual, interesting and daring
experiment--an attempt to demonstrate in practice
certain theories as to the relationship that should
exist between two neighbouring peoples . . . .
Simsarian, James The Diversion of International Waters Washington,
(private printing), 1939. (see lengthy extract: "The Diversion of
Waters Affecting the United States and Canada", 32 A.J.I.L. 488
(1938).)
Deals chiefly with the legal aspects of the negotiations
surrounding Articles By ‘7& VL pointing out the particular pro-
v
blems surrounding the drafting of ArticleII.
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Hackworth, Green Havwood Digest of International Law Wash‘4 in ton,
U.S.G.P.O., 1940. Vol. 1, pp.6l6-6l8; 755-758 g
Volume I sets out the major provisions of the Boundary
Waters Treaty and comments on the Canadian views on the right of
diversion within a country's own territory. It also deals with
the more important features of the Commission in comparison to
those of the earlier International Waterway Commission.
Masters, Ruth D. Handbook of International Organizations in
the Americas Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1945. pp.225—234
Outlines summarily the history, functions (administrative,
  
investigative and arbitral), membership, administration and work
done by the International Joint Commission. Deals only with major
matters that have come before the body.
Brebner, John E. North Atlantic Triangle Toronto, Ryerson Press,
1945. pp.265—267
Mere brief description of the Treaty and Commission as
one of the most significant original developments in direct
relations between Canada and the United States.
Brown, George W. The Growth of Peaceful Settlement Betwee
n Canada
and the United States (C.I.I.A. Contemporary Affairs)
Toronto,
Ryerson Press, 1948. pp.26—3l
that the Treaty had as its basis the increasing
and the inability of the IWC to enforce its
in its narrow geographic scope and conclud
es that
is "the most important single agency for peace
ful
Notes
uses of waters
decisions even
the Commission
settlement so far established between
Canada and the United States.‘
A History of Canadian External Relations- o T"Glazebrook, G P de 238-241; 365
Toronto, Oxford University Press, 195
0. pp.
Deals with the Commission as one
(and the first) piece
between Canada and the United
States and
 
of diplomatic machinery
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suggests the limited role of the Commission is evidenced by
the fact that the subsequent establishment of the diplomatic
missions did not destroy the functions of the Commission.
  
Keenleyside, H.L. & Brown, G.S. Canada and the United States:
Some Aspects of their Historical Relations New York, Knopf,
1952. pp. 396—399
Briefly describes the functions of the Commission
  
suggesting it is one of the major factors contributing to the
peaceful relations between the two countries.
The International Joint Commission is still a successful
operating agency, effective in action and unique in con—
stitution. Its significance was strongly underlined by
the enlarged application of the principle on which it
was based by the creation during the war of a whole
series of agencies in its image. It is still one of
the most important, most satisfactory, and most
thoroughly unique developments in the history of
international relations.
  
Bloomfield, L.M. & Fitzgerald, G.F. Boundary Waters Problems
of Canada and the United States Toronto, Carswell Co., 1958.
In several short chapters, t outlines the nature of the
Treaty and the Commission, the work of the Commission as a
judicial, investigative, administrative and arbitral body and
the organization and procedure of the Commission. This is
followed by a comprehensive summary of each docket of the
Commission from 1912 to 1958 with particular attention to the
legal issues that arose in several of the cases.
Barber, Joseph Good Fences Make Good Neighbors: Why the United
States Provokes Canadians New York, McClelland and Stewart,
1958. c.10
Deals with the Commission only in terms of the Columbia
 
River negotiations and pointing to the impasse which occurred
between the sections and the subsequent removal of the matter
from the jurisdiction of the Commission, Barber wonders if this
might lead to a permanent abandonment of the "relatively informal,
judicial deliberations of thelong established Joint Commission"  
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in favour of the traditional bargaining procedures in which
Canada usually came out on "the short end of the stick."
Berber, F.J. Rivers in International Law London, Stevens &
Sons, 1959. pp.lll-llS
Deals not with the Commission but only with the
 
Harmon Doctrine and the dispute between Canada and the United
States over the interpretation of Article II of the Treaty.
Deener, David R. (ed.) Canada-United States Treaty Relations
Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1963. pp.28—71
La Forest in dealing with boundary water problems in
the East describes the Treaty and the Commission, emphasizing ‘
the broad scope of the former and its flexible interpretation
by the Commissioners. The value of the Commission is illustrated
 
I by the detailing of two major developments in the East and in
the analysis by Charles Martin of the Columbia River Treaty in
' the West where the investigative and recommendatory roles of
the Commission are emphasized.
Whiteman, Marjorie M. Digest of International Law Washington,
U.S.G.P.O., 1964. Vol. 3, pp. 752—871
In addition to extracts from the Treaty and Rul
es of
Procedure, the work contains a complete digest of all
dockets
of the Commission, 1—80.
Castel, J.G. International Law Chiefly as In
terpreted and
Applied in Canada Toronto, University
of Toronto Press, 1965.
pp.379—385
Basically the description of the Co
mmission and its
 
work set out in 3 External Affai
rs 90—95 (1951).
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B. Unpublished Theses and Manuscripts
 
Brown, Mannie An Introduction to the Legal Aspects of the St.
Lawrence Waterway Project M.A. in Law, University of Toronto,
1935. pp.l7—25; 99—119
First describes the role of the Commission in studying
 
the St. Lawrence project under the 1919 reference and then deals
generally with the treaty and the Commission, setting out the
various matters which had come before the body.
Sinclair, Elizabeth B. The International Joint Commission: An
Historical Survey and Analysis with Emphasis upon Early Work
M.A., Columbia University, 1930.
A sketchy and uncritical survey of the early work of
the Commission with some emphasis on six of the early cases
before the Commission. Does make the point that while everyone
calls for increased publicity for the Commission, it is perhaps
better working quietly without the glare of public attention.
Blais, Rolland Canadian and American Boundary and Transboundary
Rivers: Their Status in Municipal and International Law Seminar
Paper, McGill Law School, 1957.
Only the final part of the paper deals with the Boundary
Waters Treaty and this in a largely uninformed fashion.
Dunlop, Charles Clifford The Origin and Development of the
International Joint Commission as a Judicial Tribunal M.A.,
Queen's University, 1959.
A well—researched-and intelligent consideration of the
Commission as a judicial body. Considering in detail the
Commission under the following headings: "Personnel and Finance",
"Procedure of the Commission", and "The Commission and the Law",
Dunlop concludes that while the Commission originated as a judicial
body, its functions have changed over the years to some extent
although much of its work even today is of a judicial nature.  
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Piper, Donald Courtney The International Law of the Great Lakes
Ph.D., Duke Univer51ty, 1961. University Microfilms Inc., Ann
Arbor, 1963.
Touches only briefly on the Commission but makes ex—
tensive reference to the water law principles of the treaty
as they have relevance to the Great Lakes. Also deals with
matters relating to the Great Lakes which have come before the
Commission.
Jones, D. Wendy The Negotiations of the Boundary Waters Treaty
of 1909 B.A. Hons. Essay, Carleton University, 1962.
Purpose of the paper is to examine and assess the
development of Canada's international personality in the treaty
negotiation. Rather sketchily outlines the drafting, ratification
and implementation of the Boundary Waters Treaty.
Scott, Robert Day The Harmon Doctrine: Origin and Application
1880—1923 Washington, Unpublished Manuscript.
A large part of the paper deals with the negotiati
ons
between Anderson and Gibbons over the formulation
of Article II
in the treaty. Sets out in considerable detail
the arguments
over its meaning in the House of Commons in 1
910.
Jordan, F.J.E. The Changing Role of the
International Joint
Commission (Canada—United States)
LL.M., Michigan Law School,
1964.
After extensive examination of
the genesis of the
Commission the work seeks to e
xplain the present role of the
Commission through an examination
of the references dealt with
by the Commission.
C. Speeches, Papers and Pe
riodical Articles
George C. Gibbons, "Work
of the Waterways Commissi
on", Proceedings,
Canadian Club of Toront
o, vol. 6, 1908-09, pp.
102—107
Outlines the principles
of international water us
e which
have been enunciated by the
International Waterways Comm
ission and
suggests the need for a body Wh
iCh can apply these PrinCipleS°
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Stresses the necessity for direct relations with
the United States on all matters of North American concern.
Statement re: Boundary Waters Treaty, March 10, 1913. Magrath
Papers, vol. 6, file 23.
Provides a comprehensive analysis of the major features
of the treaty as interpreted by Magrath and summarizes the issues
then before the Commission.
Sir George Gibbons, "International Relations", Address to the
Canadian Bar Association, Toronto, 1916. Papers Relating to the
Work of the International Joint Commission, pp.7-l7
An attempt to explain the importance of the provisions
of Article IIand in particular the concept of equal division
of the waters along the boundary. In relation to Article H he
pointed out that it provided a remedy of equal treatment unknown
in law before.
Before adoption of this treaty there was no rule of
international law which called upon any of the nations
to recognize riparian rights outside of its own terri-
tory. Every nation had a perfect right, as long as it
did not interfere with the rights of navigation, to
divert the waters of the boundary streams without regard
to the injury inflicted upon private interests beyond
the boundary line.
 
Manton M. Wyvell, "Peace between Canada and the United States",
Advocate of Peace, July 1921, pp. 254—257. IJC, Can. Sect.
File E-8-10.
A poorly written general account of the role and
 
nature of the CommissiOn.
.r
sir Robert Borden, "Political Development and Relations Among
the English—Speaking Peoples", Speech at the University of
Michigan, Oct. 6, 1922. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-8-10.
Notes the importance of the International Joint Commission
in United States-Canadian relations and suggests that it has be-
come a permanent institution which can handle any dispute that  might arise.  
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L. J. Burpee, "An International Experiment", Address to the
School of Law, University of Michigan, 1922. Papers Relating
to the Work of the International Joint Commission, pp.48-62.
(Found also in Dalhousie Review, 1923.)
Outlines the history of the negotiations and the E
establishment of the Commission and seeks to explain its nature
in terms of the work it has done since 1912. Concludes with a
strong plea for recognition of the value of the Commission by .
placing more confidence in its competence.
. . There is no getting away from the fact that the
Treaty of 1909 and the International Joint Commission
will not and cannot realize the tremendous possibilities
of good that lie within them, until the people of these
two neighbouring democracies determine to give them their
intelligent and wholehearted support.
Hon. Wesley L. Jones, "The International Joint Commission o
f
the United States and Canada", Speech in the Unite
d States i‘
Senate, Feb. 26, 1915. Papers Relating to the Wor
k of the [;
International Joint Commission, pp. 18—26
A rather general but vigorous defence of
the Commission,
 
elaborating on the cases which had been "se
ttled" by it and con-
cluding that
I;
. . .[tlhis Commission therefore has
not only justified 'ﬁl
its existence and the wisdom of the
high contracting
parties in creating it, from the
standpoint of material
benefit to the Governments and t
he people liVing along
ﬂ
these boundary waters, but i
ts work and the satisfaction
1
which the result of its labor ha
s_given to both govern-
ments and their people is a
splended tribute to the
genius and progressive interna
tional statesmanship of
the two great English-spea
king nations of the world
in
thus providing a means which
, as the result of actual
experience, is proving effi
cient and invaluable for th
e ?
judicial settlement of great i
nternational questions
A
involving treaty obligation
s or the rights and interes
ts, %
as well as the health,
of their respective peo
ples.
L J Burpee, "A Successf
ul Experiment in Interna
tional Relations",
Address to the Victorian
Club of Boston, Feb: 17,
1919. Papers
Relating to the Work of
the International JOlnt
CommiSSion,
pp.27—42
Traces the back
x
x
‘
9
:
,
e
.
.
-
€
.
r
_.
ground to the negotiat
ions which resulted
Then examines each
of the
in the treaty and the Commi
ssion.
"
r
-
u
.-
.
v 
 Articles, suggesting interpretations of them. Next turns
to an elaboration of the various cases that have come before
the Commission, explaining how the body deals with the questions,
emphasizing the uniqueness of the approach and its essential
value.
One need not labour the point that this Tribunal,
open as freely to the humblest citizen of either
country as to the representatives of the Federal
Governments, marks a big step forward in the re-
lations of these two neighbouring commonwealths; and
it does seem to me that the true measure of the Com—
mission's usefulness to the people of the United States
and Canada lies not even so much in its positive as in
its negative qualities, not so much in the cases it has
actually settled as in the infinitely larger number of
cases that never come before it for consideration, simply
because the Commission is there, as a sort of international
safety-valve, and therefore the sting is taken out of the
situation.
Charles S. MacInnes, "The International Joint Commission", Papers
Relating to the Work of the International Joint Commission,
pp.43-47. (see also Round Table, September, 1915.)
A brief but cogent account of the establishment of the
Commission and of its import in relations between the two
countries since it deals with such a vital matter as water.
L.J. Burpeeﬂ "Insurance for Peace", Papers Relating to the Work
of the International Joint Commission, pp. 63—70 (see too,
Kiwanis Eggazine, September, 1925.)
  
A brief account of certain of the matters dealt with by
 
the Commission designed to reflect the unique nature of the body—-
particularly the fact that there is no umpire and the fact that
the Commission goes to the localities involved.’ The article also
quotes extensively from a contemporary article in the Christian
Science Monitor which criticizes the failure to publicize the‘work
__.—.———--_
and success of the Commission.
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L.J. Burpee, TA North American Forum", Address at the Round
Table DiSCUSSions, Kyoto, 1929. Magrath Papers, vol. 5
file 19. '
A general survey of the Commission and its work with
particular emphasis on characterizing its functions; judicial,
investigative, and arbitral, but most of the work to date has
been judicial. Places particular emphasis on the favourable
comments made about the Commission by King, Borden, Lord Curzon,
Charles Evans Hughes.
"Arsenals versus Courts" 59 New Republic, pp. 220-222,
July 17, I929.
Suggests that the reason why Canada and the United
States seldom have major disputes is that they have always
provided the maChinery necessary to settle the problems before
 
they become disputes. Points to the IJC as the best case in
point and notes that its permanency has made it even more
effective.
. the International Joint Commission has pre—
vented many disputes from arising between United
States and Canada, and in so doing has contributed
perhaps more to the peaceful relations of these
two
countries than the unfortified frontier. In
deed,
it might not be unfair to say that this fronti
er
is a symbol of the Commission's labors.
Also proposes that the Commission might well
take on other
matters of difference between the
two countries such as
tariffs, etc., and be enlarged if necess
ary to replace diplomatic
negotiations on many matters.
R.A. MacKay, "The International Joint
Commission between the
United States and Canada", Paper
s Relating to the Work of the
International Joint Commission,
pp. 71—100. (see also 22 A.J.I.L.
292 (1928).)
The first scholarly attem
p
the quasi—judicial power
s, the
t to analyse the operation
of the Commission, it considers
tigative powers and
the arbitral
executive powers, the inves
   
powers of the Commission in terms of the cases which had
been dealt with by the body. After looking too at the
organization and procedure of the Commission, it concludes
that the Commission was a success due mainly to three reasons:
it was a permanent body with an esprit de corps, the independence
and impartiality of the commissioners and to the simplicity and
directness of the procedure.
"The International Joint Commission", 20 Round Table, pp. 381-393,
1929—30.
Suggests that the treaty fills the obvious gaps in
international water law and establishes a body to apply the
rules which it lays down in an area in which the governments
could not deal directly due to the increasing competition for
the uses of boundary waters.
Considers the Commission's success to be based upon
the permanency of the Commission, the knowledge of the com-
missioners, the independence of the members, the directness and
simplicity of the procedure and the cooperation of the two
Governments.
Describes the Commission as an example of "international
government over nationals and national territory" and more impor—
tant, a moVe by the two countries toward eventual cooperative
development of international water resources.
Wm. H. Smith, "The International Joint Commission", Papers
Relating to the Work of the International Joint Commission,
pp. 110-115
Outlines in considerable detail the background and
nature of the Commission so as to gain for it an appreciation
by the public. Deals with each of the Articles, explaining
their ramifications and, with reference to the international
character of the Commission suggests:
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, ‘ ijhile the Commission is composed of an
American and a Canadian section, each with a Chairman
and a secretary, neither side has any authority under
the Treaty to act in either country independently of
the other. Each section acts in conjunction with the
other as a joint international organization which
functions as a unit.
J.A.P. Haydon, "Cooperation, Not Force", 13 Trades and Labor
Congress Journal (no. 8), pp. 22—23, Aug. 1934.
Gives brief sketch of the International Joint
Commission as a device for harmonizing relations between
neighbouring nations.
L.J. Burpee, "Quotations by Various Statesmen relating to
the International Joint Commission", 1936 IJC, Can. Sect. File
E—8-lO.
R.B. Bennett: "The International Joint Commission -— a successful
experiment of what the will of goodwill and neighbourliness may
accomplish in International affairs."
C.A. Magrath: "My twenty-four years association with the work
of the International Joint Commission, and which ends toda
y,
leads me to say, that no effort is more important, and
few indeed
quite as fine, as serving two neighbouring peoples in
disposing
of differences that may from time to time arise bet
ween them."
Arthur Meighen: "The International Joint Commiss
ion has indicated
the faith of statesmen who conceived an
d established it. The
ssion should be extended and in the exte
nded
powers of this Commi
uld be final unless reversed by a prepond
erant
area its decision sho
majority of the statesmen of eithe
r country."
"The International Joint Commission
gives service
R.L. Borden:
ghbouring nations but to the world
in
not only to two great nei
exemplifying good will and friendly
endeavours for the cause of
public right and peace on earth."
"The International Joint Co
mmission has,
Lord Tweedsmuir, G.G.:
orld the example of true mac
hinery
since its inception, shown the w
of peace which settles disp
utes before they arise, and
thereby
perpetuates the unwritten
alliance of friendship betw
een two
great countries."
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Elihu Root: "For the International Joint Commission whose work
is a signal illustration of the true way to preserve peace-—by
disposing of controversies at the beginning before they have
ceased to be personal and nations have become excited and
resentful about them."
Lord Bryce: "The creation of the International Joint Commission
was one of the best things done in our time for peace and good
will between the British Empire and the United States."
F.D. Roosevelt: "The establishment of the International Joint
Commission was unquestionably one of the most notable steps
taken by the United States and Canada in their continuous efforts
towards eliminating causes of possible friction between the two
countries."
Cordell Hull: "The International Joint Commission has made real
contributions to the amicable relations between the United States
and Canada by providing a forum for the speedy examination and
settlement of disputes."
Mackenzie King: "The creation of the International Joint Com-
mission was an act of faith in human intelligence and good will
on the part of the peoples of Canada and the United States. It
has become a very silent witness to this wisdom of their decision--
over a century old——not to arm against each other, and to the
power of non—violence. To our two countries it is the guardian
of the most precious heritage we hold in common."
L.J. Burpee, "Peacemakers in America--The Work of the International
Joint Commission", 25 The School (no. 6), Feb. 1937 (see also, IJC,
Can. Sect. File E-8—10; Magrath Papers, vol. 6, file 25.)
Outlines briefly the background to the Commission and
the nature of the jurisdictions conferred on it by the Treaty.
Notes the use of Boards of Control. Concludes:
It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance and
significance of this action on the part of two neighbouring
nations, in creating an international body, on which they
have equal representation, and transferring to it a
material part of their own sovereignty. Such a remarkable
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departure from the traditions of the past is, of
course, only practical in the case of two countries
feeling for each other such mutual confidence and
respect as exist between Canada and the United States.
The International Joint Commission is an experiment,
a very unusual, interesting and daring experiment: an
attempt to demonstrate in practice certain theories
as to the relationship which should exist between two
neighbouring peoples; an attempt to extend to the
citizens of two nations, without impairing the in—
dependence of either, the same spirit of good fellow-
ship and fair dealing that binds together men of
common allegiance.
In the last analysis the success of this Commission, as
a means of settling disputes and also of preventing
them-—and perhaps the latter is the more important
service-mmust depend to a very large extent upon public
understanding and support in the two countries. The
people of Canada and the United States cannot be expected
to give their whole-hearted support to such a tribunal
unless they thoroughly understand why it was created and
how it carries on its very important work.
 
George W. Kyte, "Organization and Work of the Internati
onal Joint
Commission", Ottawa, King's Printer, 1937. Magrath Pape
rs,
vol. 6, file 25.
I Describes the work o
f this "International Court"
 
I through the use of selected cases. Empha
sizes the permanent
and all—encompassing nature of the Commissi
on and suggests that
it is one of the most advanced steps ta
ken by any two Governments.
L.J. Burpee, "From Sea to Sea", 16-17
Canadian Geographical
Journal, pp. 3-32, 1938.
the various references that have
come before
g the important value of Articl
eIX in bringing
limited as it is to frontier q
uestions.
Describes
the Commission notin
matters before the IJC,
Foreward to the Internation
al Joint Commission Album p
repared by
C.A. Magrath, May 1938.
Outlining the early hist
ory of the Commission, M
agrath
ts to the Commissio
n:
notes with regard to appoint
men
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The Canadian members are selected from those who
are or have been active supporters of the political
party making the appointments, but changes in Govern—
ment have not in recent years affected their permanency
whereas President Taft adopted the principle that the
Government of the day will have two of the three members
politically sympathetic to it.
L.J. Burpee, "Good Neighbours", Contemporary Affairs No. 4,
Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1940.
The major effort by Burpee to provide a comprehensive
outline of the Commission and its work. Deals with all cases
which had come before the Commission and relates the various
functions of the Commission. Suggests that the equal partner-
ship created by the Commission is of far greater importance to
Canada than it is to the United States. Notes that the personnel
of the Commission has been of high caliber by and large and where
disagreements have arisen among the members it has been on the
basis of professional opinions rather than along national lines.
L.J. Burpee, Untitled speech, 1940. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File
E-16-1.
Relates various anecdotes about the early members
of the Commission.
L.J. Burpee, "A Hundred Years of North America", 1942. I.J.C.,
Can. Sect. File E—8-10.
Explains the Commission as a very important link in
Canada-United States relations. "The history of the Commission is
in a very real sense the history of the Canada-United States relations
as they are today."
Relates some humourous incidents involving the Canadian
and United States commissioners.
J.E. Perrault, "Commission conjointe internationale", 4 Revue
du Barreau, pp. 1-9, 1944. (see too I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-8-10)
A short article by the Canadian commissioner outlining
the nature, functions and certain of the work of the Commission.
He concludes:
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Cette commission internationale a été une
experience audacieuse. Un tel abandon des voies
diplomatique traditionnelle n'est pas possible
qu'entre deux peuples qui ont en vers l'un l'autre
une confiance mutuelle.
Joseph W. LaBine, "Six Men and a Border", Kiwanis Magazine,
Sept. 1948, pp. 27-29
Points out two "outstanding" features of the Commission:
It is available to the "little man" as well as to the "big" and
it operates on the basis of "quiet diplomacy".
Probably not one American or Canadian in a thousand
is aware that an International Joint Commission even
exists, yet this almost anonymous six—man institution
could qualify easily as one of the world's oldest,
most successful and most practical boards of
arbitration!
A.O. Stanley, "3000 Miles and Never a Quarrel", 76 The Rotarian
June 1950, pp. 20—23 (see too, Congressional Record, 8lst
Congress, 2d Session, 1950—51, vol. 96, part 15, Appendix
4025-27; 12 Pacific Northwest Industry, Sept. 1953, pp.223-226)
Explains the variety of functions exercised by the
 
Commission, noting the harmonious manner in which the
work is
done.
Notes how the scope of the studies referred to
the
Commission has broadened in recent year
s
"The International Joint Commission",
3 External Affairs, March
1951, pp. 90—95
A general article describing the es
tablishment,
jurisdiction, references and boardsprinciples, composition,
is is placed on the increasingof control. Particular emphas
use of references.
The procedure for referring
a question to the
Commission is designed to i
nsure the minimum amount of
delav and the maximum cooperat
ion from both countries.
This treatv, the Boundary Wa
ters Treaty of 1909, so
farsighted‘and wide in its
scope, was but the natural
outcome of the desire o f tw
o friendly neighbours
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possessing a common heritage and striving for the
same ideals, to settle in an amicable and informal
manner any of the differences and disagreements,
which are bound to arise between even the closest
friends. The means of implementing this common
purpose was the International Joint Commission,
the establishment of which was provided for in
this treaty.
A.G.L. McNaughton, Address to the Association of Professional
Engineers of Ontario, Toronto, Jan. 27, 1951. I.J.C. Can.
Sect. File E—lO-3.
A comprehensive commentary on the treaty provisions
and the functions of the Commission with specific reference to
a number of matters dealt with by the Commission.
The text of the Treaty shows that the plenipotentiaries
had a very clear conception of the varied character of
the complex questions and mutual problems which were
likely to arise in each of these several categories of
waters and certainly they have provided the Commission
with authority which has proved apt in each one of the
particular sets of circumstances which have had to be
met.
A.G.L. McNaughton, "The International Joint Commission",
Address to the Electric Club of Toronto, Feb. 28, 1951.
I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-lO-3.
Outlines in detail the proposals for development of
the St. Lawrence Seaway and the role played by the Commission
in the studies undertaken.
A.G.L. McNaughton, "Boundary Waters Between Canada and the
United States", Address to the Empire Club, Toronto, Dec. 6,
1951. Empire Club Addresses, 1951-52, pp. 121-136
Relates almost exclusively to the efforts over the
 
years to work out a plan of development for the St. Lawrence
system.
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A.G.L. McNaughton, Address to the Royal Military College,
Kingston, Oct 27, 1952. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-10—3.
Suggests that the responsibilities of the Commission
are very extraordinary and, within clearly defined limits, its
authority is above the national law of the two countries.
Virtually identical to the Professional Engineers speech.
"The International Joint Commission", Canadian Bank of Commerce
CommerCial Letter, August 1952. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—16.
A general account of the establishment and work of
 
the Commission highlighting a number of the more important
references.
A.G.L. McNaughton, "The Water Problem on the Canadian Bound
ary",
Address to the Annual Dinner of the Canadian Manufactu
rers
Association, Toronto, May 28, 1953. 54 Industr
ial Canada,
July 1953, pp. 80—88
Taking as examples the St. John River the St. La
wrence
Seaway,the Niagara Falls and the Columb
ia River references, the
General explains how the Commission seeks t
o harmonize the
various and divergent uses to which th
e waters in each case
might be put.
Makes a strong argument for an e
quitable sharing of
the Columbia River waters, desc
ribing the efforts to reach an
accord on this reference as one
of the greatest challenges
ever to come to the Commis
sion.
ess to the National Defence C
ollege,
I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-
10—3.
with the Columbia River
A.G.L. McNaughton, Addr
Kingston, July 27, 1953.
Deals chiefly and in deta
il
reference before the C
ommission.
A.G.L. McNaughton, Addre
ss to the Engineers Counc
il for
Professional Developme
nt, New York, Oct. 16,
1953. I.J.C.,
Can. Sect. File E—lO—3.
e nature of the wa
ter problems in N
orth
Discusses th
America and the role
which the Commission
must play.
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It must now be recognized that there simply is not
enough water for all desired uses, and that in many
places already its supply has become the limiting
factor on.development. And so we face the prospects
of envious competition, not only between regions in
each of our countries, but likewise across the boundary
from one country to the other.
A.G.L. McNaughton, "Water Resource Development in the Pacific
Northwest", Address to the Pacific Northwest Trade Association,
Spokane, Nov. 2-3, 1953. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—10—3.
Similar to the Engineers Council address except that
illustration is confined to the Columbia River.
C.K. Hurst, Address to the Kiwanis Club of Peterborough,
November 1953. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-16.
Outlines the nature and creation of the Commission,
and, with reference to several dockets, explains the manner
in which the Commission operates.
Alan 0. Gibbons, "Sir George Gibbons and the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909", 34 Canadian Historical Review 124-138 (1953).
Contains the highlights of the correspondence between
Gibbons and Laurier from 1906 to 1909 relating to the negotiation
 
of the treaty.
A.G.L. McNaughton, Address to the Royal Roads Military College,
Esquimalt, Feb. 19, 1954. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—10-3.
Identical to the Engineers Council address.
A.G.L. McNaughton, "Water Problems on the Canada-United States
Boundary", Address to the Canadian Club of Montreal, March 8,
1954. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-10-3.
rIdentical to the Engineers Council address.
A.G.L. McNaughton, Address to the National Defence College, Kingston,
July 20, 1954. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—10-3.
Almost identical to the Engineers Council address.  
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A.G.L. McNaughton, Address to the Canada-United States Committee
of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the United States Chamber
of Commerce, Ste. Adele—en—haut, Sept. 30—Oct. 1, 1954. I.J.C.,
Can. Sect. File E—lO—3.
A two-part address, the first dealing with the physical
attributes of the Columbia River and the second outlining the
legal aspects of power sharing under ArticleII of the Treaty.
C.K. Hurst, "International Waterways Problems-—The Boundary
Waters Treaty, the Duties of the International Joint Commission
and the Function of the Water Resources Division on assignments
for the International Joint Commission", Address to the District
Engineers of the Water Resources Branch, Feb. 18, 1955. I.J.C.
Can. Sect. File F-l—2.
After briefly discussing the articles of the Treaty,
Hurst explains the role played by various government departments
 
in assisting the Commission in undertaking an investigation
under a reference.
Len Jordan, "Some Technical and Economic Aspects of United‘
States—Canadian Water Resources", Address to the Canada—United
States Committee, Bermuda, Mar. 10-12, 1955. I.J.C., Can. Sect.
File E-8—2.
Discussing the principle of "equal and similar rights"
in the Treaty as applied to boundary waters has no application
to transboundary waters and therefore, the Commission
must seek
to evolve appropriate principles for this new situation
.
"The Significance of the Seaway", Address to- htonA.C.L. McNaug r Sect.
the University of Michigan, June 23, 1955.
I.J.C., Can.
File E—10-3.
Deals with the role of the Commission i
n the 1920's only.
Len Jordan, Address to the Oregon F
arm Bureau Federation, Salem,
Nov. 15, 1955. I.J.C., Can. S
ect. File E—8-2
Deals mainly with the arguments
favouring private
ed States. Describes the du
ties
power development in the Unit
of the United States members of the
Commission as "to safeguard
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the interests of the United States in ourcbalings with Canada
over boundary waters and rivers which cross the boundary."
A.G.L. McNaughton, "Problems of Development of International
Rivers on the Pacific Watershed of Canada and the United
States", Address to the Sixth World Power Conference, Vienna,
1956. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—lO-3.
Deals with the international aspects of the develop—
ment of the Columbia River under Article II of the Treaty and
McNaughton's proposals for a Canadian plan.
Len Jordan, "The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909", Statement
before the Senate Joint Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs and Foreign Relations, Mar. 22, 1956. I.J.C., Can.
Sect. File F-l—2.
An explanation of the Treaty and the Commission in
terms of the Libby Dam application and the Columbia River
reference and comments on the position taken by General
McNaughton concerning diversion of the Columbia.
Suggests that the U.S. section views its role as one
of preventing disputes rather than discussing legal remedies
under Article II and thus he seeks agreement with the Canadian
section.
C.K. Hurst, "Water in International Affairs", 16 Behind the
Headlines (no. 3), Sept. 1956.
Notes the role which the Commission has played in
seeking to resolve the conflicts among the competing demands
for the use of international water resources.
Leon J. Ladner, "Diversion of Columbia River Waters", UBC
Lecture Series No. 27, 1956, pp. 1—17
Considers the interpretation of Article II in light
of the Columbia River dispute and suggests that the Commission
work out a cooperative sharing arrangement rather than adhering
in each section to intractable interpretations of Article II.
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C.B. Bourne, "International Law and the Diversion of the
Columbi: River in Canada", UBC Lecture Series No. 27, 1956,
pp- - 7
Consideration only of Article II and conclusion
that under it Canada has an absolute right to divert the
Columbia in B.C.
The Activities of the International Joint Commission 1909—1956,
Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Water
Resources Branch, Queen's Printer, 1956
A summary of all IJC dockets to 1956.
Ernest Watkins, "The Columbia River: A Gordian Knot", 12
International Journal 250-261 (1957).
After discussing the legal rights under Article II
 
and the position if the Treaty were abrogated, Watkins suggests
that the problem of the Columbia can be solved only by a
political compromise and not by a legal wrangle.
Eugene Weber, "United States—Canadian Water Resource Problems",
Address to the Oregon Society of Professional Engineers, Portland,
Nov. 7,1958. I.J.C., U.S. Section File "Speeches".
A general outline of the nature and working of the
Commission with a survey of matters presently before the Commiss
ion.
Robert D. Scott, "The Canadian-American Boundary Wa
ters Treaty:
Why Article II?", 36 Canadian Bar Review 311 (19
58 ).
Attempts to set out the background to the nego
tiations
of Article II in 1908.
he Power Development of
' 1d "Le a1 As ects of
t
G.F. Fltzgera I g p of New
Brunswick Law Journal
the St. John River Basin", 12
Univ.
7-38 (1959).
Deals with the W
the St. John River Basin.
ork of the Commission in r
elation to
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Eugene Weber, "Activities of the International Joint Com-
mission, United States and Canada", 31 Sewage and Industrial
Waste 71—77 (January 1959).
Outlines briefly the background to and the
 
responsibilities of the Commission, dealing specifically with
the role of the Commission in relation to abatement of inter-
national air and water pollution through a system of cooperative
study and action.
Jacob Austin, "Canadian—United States Practice and Theory
Respecting the International Law of Rivers: A Study of the
History and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine", 37 Canadian
Bar Review 393 (1959).
While dealing particularly and at length with the
origins and meanings of Article II of the treaty, Austin also
considers other of the Articles, concluding:
Truly, viewing the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909
under the articles we have examined thus far it is
a wonderful document for international cooperation
and harmony. To quite an extent, considering the
period in question, both countries had given up
a significant area of their national sovereignty,
not only in theory, but with regard to substantial
assets in the economy of each nation. . ...
Statement by John Foster Dulles on the 50th Anniversary of the
International Joint Commission, Congressional Record, 86th
Cong., lst Sess., 1959, vol. 105, part 1, p. 799
 
This treaty and the Commission which it established
have made an important contribution to the maintenance
of the excellent relations which we have enjoyed with
Canada over the years. It has provided the means of
resolving problems connected with boundary waters
through mutual cooperation, and it exemplifies the
spirit with which we and our Canadianreighbours have
approached many other questions of joint concern.
The problems which have come before the International
Joint Commission since 1909 have touched the lives
and interests of countless citizens on both sides of
the border. They have ranged from consideration of
relatively minor matters such as the proposal of an
individual to block a transboundary stream to decisions
controlling the vast power and navigation projects on
the St. Lawrence River, but all have received fair and
thorough consideration by the CommisSion with a View to
protecting the rights of all concerned.
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A.G.L. McNaughton, Address to the Canadian Institute ofInternational Affairs, Montreal, Feb. 16, 1960. I.J.C.
Can. Sect. File E—10-3. I
In the main an advocacy of his position on Article
II that it requires recognition of equitable rights for both
parties in the use of international streams. Also notes that
the treaty must accommodate new situations and its general
principles are flexible for this purpose.
A.G.L. McNaughton, "The Development of the International Section
of the St. Lawrence River", Address to the Royal Canadian
Institute, Toronto, Mar. 4, 1961. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-10-3.
 
Details the studies, investigations and negotiations
relating to the St. Lawrence from 1920 to date, noting par—
ticularly the role of the Commission, first in the reference
and later in the application.
Teno Roncalio, Opening Remarks at the Columbia River Treaty
Panel Discussion, Inland Empire Waterways Association, Spokane,
Oct. 23, 1961. I.J.C., U.S. Sect. File Speeches by IJC Personnel.
Brief remarks on the nature and work of the Commission
with particular reference to the Columbia.
Teno Roncalio, Address to the Columbia Interstate Compact Com—
mission, Seattle, Feb. 5, 1962. I.J.C., U.S. Section File
Speeches by IJC Personnel.
Deals with the Columbia River reference, disagreeing
with the position taken by the Canadian chairman.
A.D.P. Heeney, "Dealing with Uncle Sam-~The Work of the Inter-
national Joint Commission", Address to the Canadian Cl
ub of
Montreal, Jan. 14, 1963. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File
E—8—ll.
Deals with the Commission as one of the ef
fective
methods of carrying on relations with the Uni
ted States.
' ' ' ' ‘ duresWhether this same prinCiple and Similar p
roce
could usefully be extended beyond pro
blems of the
boundary seems to me wo
sides——and this espeCia
mutual involvement, and our
increase daily—~in volume,
rthy of consideration——on both
11y as Canadian—United States"
"dealings with Uncle Sam
complexity and significance.
 
 G. Graham Waite, "The International Joint Commission-—Its
Practice and Its Impact on Land Use", 13 Buffalo Law Review
 
93-118‘(l963).
Deals basically with the procedure before the
Commission noting that its process of deliberation is more
akin to a legislative committee than to a court of law.
Explains that the rules of procedure differ sharply
from the actual practice and suggests that most functions of
the Commission are carried out by expert boards.
Traces in detail the procedure followed on an appli-
cation and on a reference.
Tim Creery, "Canada in North American Affairs", Speech to the
Canadian Club of Ottawa, Apr. 23, 1963.
Makes a gase for expanding the scope of matters
dealt with by the Commission to include such things as other
energy resources, air line routes, investment, taxation, etc.
Vade—Mecum Prepared by the Canadian Section, International
Joint Commission, 1963.
Sets out a summary of each of the 78 dockets of
the Commission.
M. W. Thompson, "International Water Problems on the Prairies",
Address to the Engineering Institute of Canada, Banff, May 1964.
I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—8-7.
Using as illustrations the various prairie water
references, Thompson describes the different roles of the
Commission under the treaty.
René Dupuis, Speech to the Montreal Port Council, June 30, 1964.
I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—8-6.
Using as an example the St. Lawrence and Great Lakes
water levels,Dupuis describes the role played by the Commission
in solving boUndary water problems.
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J.L. MacCallum, "The International Joint Commission and Its
Work”, Address to the Lambton Branch of the Association of
Professional Engineers, Sarnia, Feb. 23. 1965. I.J.C., Can.
Sect. File E-8-8.
Outlines the basic features of the Treaty and the
Commission emphasizing the flexible nature in performing both
judicial and investigative tasks.
M.W. Thompson, "Safeguarding the Quality of Boundary Waters",
Speech to the Twelfth Industrial Waste Conference, Bigwin Inn,
June 14, 1965. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E—8-7.
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Explains the increasing work of the Commission in
relation to water pollution and the manner in which the Com-
mission seeks to establish objectives of control with the
assistance of Advisory Boards.
Charles R. Ross, "Statement on Boundary Water Pollution Abate-
ment: United States and Canada", Statement to the Senate Sub—
committee on Air and Water Pollution, Buffalo, June 17, 1965.
I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-8—10; U.S. Sect. File Speeches by
IJC Personnel.
Outlines the efforts of the Commission to devise con-
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trols for pollution in the Great Lakes area and the cooperat
ive
arrangements which had been fostered between the Commis
sion and
local authorities.
Eugene Weber, Remarks at the Semi—Annua
l Meeting of the Great
Lakes Commission, Duluth, July 22, 1965. I.
J.C., U.S. Sect.,
File Speeches by IJC Personnel.
cusses the work of the Commission in
dealing with
01 and water levels on the Great Lak
es system.
Dis
pollution contr
I
l
1
J
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? D M Stephens, "Canada-Uni
ted States International Water Pro
blems",
1 . .
'ns University, Baltimore, 1
965.
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Address at Johns Hopki
Discussing the basic nature o
f the Commission—-not1ng
attributable to the procedure
which
that much of the success is
roblems with the paramount
character—
it has devised for handling p
istics of flexibility. It must con
stantly be prepared to meet
change.
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A basic requirement for any mechanisms designed to
deal with international water problems between these
two nations must be of course, that they are able to
cope with these wide differences in the nature of
the problems as they are encountered from region to
region . . . Our international water problems are
also complicated by the changing nature of use and
the changes in the relative importance of various
uses that are encountered from region to region along
these thousands of miles of common frontier.
A.D.P. Heeney, "Pollution in Boundary Waters", Address to the
Canadian Institute on Pollution Control, 32nd Annual Meeting,
Ottawa, Oct. 25, 1965. I.J.C. Can. Sect. File E—8—ll.
Detailed description of the work of the Commission in
the field of water pollution control, pointing out the con-
stitutional limitations on the action which the Commission may
take and noting that success must depend upon the securing of
cooperation of all bodies concerned with the problem.
M.W. Thompson, "The Great Lakes and Their Problems", Address
to the Conference on Water Resource Management and Conservation
Council of Ontario, Toronto May 27, 1966. I.J.C. Can. Sect.
File E—8—7.
Explains the current work of the Commission in seeking
to alleviate the dual problems of water levels and pollution
facing the Great Lakes.
J.L. MacCallum, "The International Joint Commission", 72 Canadian
Geographical Journal 76—87 (March 1966).
 
A general article describing the nature of the Com-
mission and the work in which it is presently engaged.
Matthew E. Welsh, Remarks before the Midwestern Governors'
Conference, Cincinnati, June 22, 1966. I.J.C., U.S. Sect. Files.
Describing the role of the Commission in the total
spectrum of water management, he lists five aspects of the
Boundary Waters Treaty which facilitate the role.   
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First, it provides the basic legal instrument for
the two countries to carry out a mutual resolve to
manage Wisely the waters of common concern.
Second, it enunciates a number of basic principles
to insure conSistencv and equity in the use of waters
of mutual concern.
Third, it establishes procedures to facilitate effective
handling of common water management problems on a con—
tinuing basis.
Fourth, it provides the opportunity for management of
international waters through the established institutions
of each country rather than by separate procedures which
could possibly duplicate or conflict with such insti—
tutions in either country.
Fifth, it provides a mechanism which can be used for
resolution of other common problems, the most recent
example being the control of air pollution in the boundary
area between Detroit and Windsor.
J.L. MacCallum, "International Use of Canadian Water Supplies",
Address to Sections of the American Bar Association, Montreal,
Aug. 9, 1966. I.J.C., Can. Sect. File E-8—8.
Outlines the legal rules spelled out by the Boundary
Waters Treaty governing the sharing of certain waters between
 
Canada and the United States.
A.D.P. Heeney, "Diplomacy with a Difference-—The International
Joint Commission", INCO Magazine, Vol. 31, Number 3, Fall
1966.
Outlines the development of the Commission briefly
emphasizing its creation as a substitute for usu
al diplomatic
Explains the philosophy of the treaty and th
e
"search for the common interest".
negotiations.
Commission as the
The Commissioners act, not as delegates
striVing
nder instruction from their
but as members of a Single body
problems in the common
for national advantage u
respective governments,
seeking solutions to common
interest.
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D. Hearings before Committees
 
United States Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Hearings on the Diplomatic and Consular Appropriation Bill,
Jan. 27-Feb. 3, 1913.
Statement by L.W. Busbey, Secretary, U.S. Section
United States Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Hearings on the Diplomatic and Consular Appropriation Bill,
Jan. 30 & Feb. 4, 1913.
Statement by J.A. Tawney, Chairman, U.S. Section
United States Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Hearings on the Diplomatic and Consular Appropriation Bill,
63d Cong., 3d sess., Dec. 17—22, 1914.
Statements by J.A. Tawney and O. Gardner, Chairman
United States Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Hearings on the Diplomatic and Consular Appropriation Bill,
Jan. 20, 1916.
Statement by J.A. Tawney
Canada, Parliament, Senate Committee on Banking and Commerce,
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, let Parl., 6th Sess.,
June 25, 1952.
Witness: A.G.L. McNaughton
Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on
External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, let Parl.,
7th Sess., Mar. 17 & 19, 1953.
Witness: A.G.L. McNaughton
Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on
External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 22nd Parl.,
lst Sess., May 13, 1954.
Witness: A.G.L. McNaughton
Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on
External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 22nd Parl.,
2d Sess., March, May & June, 1955.
Witness: A.G.L. McNaughton  —+J—
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Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on
External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 22nd
Parl., 3rd Sess., June 7 & 14, 1956.
Witness: A.G.L. McNaughton
Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on
External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 23rd
Parl., lst Sess., December, 1957.
Witness: A.G.L. McNaughton
Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on
External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 24th
Parl., lst Sess., August, 1958.
Witness: A.G.L. McNaughton
Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on
External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 24th
Parl., 2d Sess., April, 1959.
Witness A.G.L. McNaughton
1 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, St
anding Committee on
' External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedi
ngs and Evidence, 24th
Parl., 3d Sess., March, 1960.
Witness: A.G.L. McNaughton
Standing Committee on
Canada, Parliament, House of Com
mons, 24th
I External Affairs, Minutes
of Proceedings and Evidence,
Parl., 4th Sess., June, 1961.1
f Witness: A.G.L.
McNaughton
(
5, Standing Committee on
Canada, Parliament, House o
f Common I
dings and Ev1dence, 26th
7 External Affairs, Mi
nutes of Procee
Parl., 2d Sess., July 1964.
< Witness: A.D
.P. Heeney
Standing Committee on
s of Proceedings and E
v1dence,’ Canada, Parliament
, House of Commons,
Mines, Forests and Waters
, Minute
{ October, 1964.
Witness: A.D.P. Heeney
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, Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on
” External Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, June 1966.
Witness: A.D.P. Heeney
United States Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee
of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess., Feb. 1960, 1071—1079.
United States Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee
of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess., 1961, 1071—1081.
United States Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee
of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, 87th Cong., lst
Sess., 1962, 896—907.
> United States Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee
i of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess., 1963, 1219—1231.
United States Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee
of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, 88th Cong., lst
Sess., 1964, 1353-1373.
United States Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee
of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess., 1965. i
United States Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee
:7 of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, 89th Cong., lst
j, . Sess., 1966, 145-162.
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ARCHIVE RECORDS
Anderson Papers (Chandler P. Anderson) Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington. Boxes 11, 65, 68, 69.
Borden Papers (Robert L. Borden) M.G. 26 H 1(a), Public Archives
of Canada, Ottawa. Volumes 17 and 97.
Gibbons Papers (George C. Gibbons) M.G. 30 B 3, Public Archives
of Canada, Ottawa. Volumes 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 (Letterbooks l & 2),
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Governor Generals' Papers (1895-1920) R.G. 7, G 21, Public
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Section Files. General Files.
King Papers (W.L. Mackenzie King) (uncatalogue
d and closed
beyond 1931) Public Archives of Canada, O
ttawa. Volumes 78,
90) 119 and closed files.
Laurier Pa ers (Sir Wilfrid Laurier)
M.G. 26 G 1(a), Public
Archives of Canada, Ottawa. Volumes
242, 368, 435, 448, 456,
459, 480, 493, 495, 503, 504, 522, 52
3, 524, 525, 531, 532, 544,
547, 549, 550, 552, 553, 556, 557, 55
9, 560, 561, 562, 565, 566,
567, 570, 572, 574, 579, 580, 617,
734, 753, 755, 756.
Magrath Papers (Charles A. Magra
th) M.G. 30 B 2, Public Archiv
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of Canada, Ottawa. Volumes 1
, 5, 6.
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velt) Manuscript Division, Librar
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____________.____ , .
of Congress, Washington.
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Root Papers (Elihu Root) Man
uscript Division, Library of
Congress,
Washington. General Corres
pondence.
sion, Library of Congress,- ' t Divi
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Files 516 & 1041.
W shington. Presidential
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Manuscript Division, Lib
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GOVERNMENT RECORDS
Canada, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.
Files 1920—1959: Public Archives of Canada.
Files 1960—1966: Central Files.
File Numbers: 1514-40; 2492-40 to 2492—D—40;
5724 to 5724-2—40; 12355-40.
United States, Department of State, Washington.
Files 1906—1944: National Archives, Washington.
Files 1945—1966: Central Files.
Numerical File 1906-10, vol. 484, case 5934; Decimal
File 1910-29, boxes 6601 & 6602, 711.42155; Decimal
File 1930-1949, 711.4215-7ll.42155; Decimal File 1950-1966,
611.42311-6ll.4232.
International Joint Commission, Canadian Section, Ottawa.
Files E—l-l-l to E-4—2—l; E—8-l to E—l6—2; F—l—l
to F-3-2.
International Joint Commission, United States Section, Washington.
Library Records.
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ANDERSON, Chandler P. New York lawyer; special adviser
to Elihu Root in the Department of State; chief United
States negotiator of the Boundary Waters Treaty.
BRYCE, James (Lord Bryce) lawyer; British Ambassador to the
United States during negotiation of the Boundary Waters
Treaty; British signatory of the Treaty, Januar
y 11, 1909.
BURPEE, Lawrence J. Ottawa historian; appoin
ted as first
Secretary of the Canadian section of the
International
Joint Commission in 1912 where h
e remained until his
death in 1946.
CLINTON, George P. Buffalo, New
York lawyer; United States
member of the International W
aterways Commission; initial
 
United States negotiator of t
he Boundary Waters Treaty
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former Democrat United State
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GARDNER, Obadiah Maine
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GREY, Lord of Howick Governor General of Canada during the
negotiation of the Boundary Waters Treaty.
HEARST, Sir William H. Toronto lawyer; former Conservative
Premier of Ontario; appointed by Prime Minister Borden
as a member of the Canadian section of the International
Joint Commission in 1920 where he serveduntil his re-
tirement in 1940.
MAGRATH, Charles A. Alberta engineer-surveyor; former
Conservative Member of Parliament; appointed as a
member of the Canadian section of the International
Joint Commission by Prime Minister Borden in 1911;
became second Chairman of the Canadian section of the
Commission in 1914 and retired from that position in
1936.
McNAUGHTON, A.G.L. Saskatchewan engineer; General of the
Army and former commander of the Canadian forces;
former Cabinet Minister in King Government; appointed
as a member of the Canadian section of the International
Joint Commission by Prime Minister St. Laurent in 1950;
became Chairman of the Canadian section of the Commission
in 1950 and remained in that position until his retirement
in 19é2.
ROOT, Elihu New York lawyer; Secretary of State in the Theodore
Roosevelt cabinet; elected as Republican United States
Senator from New York in 1909; United States signatory
of the Boundary Waters Treaty, January 11, 1909.
STANLEY, Augustus 0. Kentucky lawyer; former Democrat United
States Senator from Kentucky; appointed as a member of
the United States section of the International Joint
Commission by President Coolidge in 1930; became Chairman
of the United States section of the Commission in 1933
where he remained until his resignation in 1954.  
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TAWNEY, James A. Minnesota lawyer; former Republican United
States Representative from Minnesota; appointed a
member of the United States section of the International
Joint Commission by President Taft in 1911; became sec
ond
Chairman of the United States section of the Commiss
ion in
1911; resigned as Chairman in 1914 but remained
a member
of the United States section until his dea
th in 1919.
Present Commissioners (1967)
DUPUIS, Rene engineer; former memb
er of the Quebec Hydro-
Electric Commission; appointe
d as a member of the
Canadian section of the Inte
rnational Joint Commission
by Prime Minister Diefenbaker
in 1962.
HEENEY, A.D.P. Montreal
lawyer; senior public serv
ant; former
Canadian Ambassador to the U
nited States; appointed a
r of the Canadian section
of the International Joint
 
membe
Commission by Prime Minis
ter Diefenbaker in 1962;
became
Chairman of the Canadi
an section of the Comm
ission in 1962.
ROSS, Charles R. lawye
r; Commissioner of the
Federal Power
Commission; appointed
as a member of the Unit
ed States
section of the Intern
ational Joint Commiss
ion by President
Kennedy in 1962.
STEPHENS, Donald M.
engineer; Chairman o
f Manitoba Hydro;
appointed as a memb
er of the Canadian
section of the
International Joi
nt Comm
in 1958.
ission by Prime Mini
ster Diefenbaker
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WEBER, Eugene W. engineer, former member of the United
States Army Corps of Engineers; appointed as a member 1
of the United States section of the International
Joint Commission by President Truman in 1948.
WELSH, Matthew E. Indiana lawyer, former Democratic Governor
of Indiana; appointed as a member of the United States
section of the International Joint Commission by President
Johnson in 1965; became Chairman of the United States
section of the Commission in 1966.
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